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Abstract	
The	Political	Economy	of	Private	Credit	Money	Accommodation.	A	Study	of	
Bank	Notes,	Bank	Deposits	and	Shadow	Money		by	Steffen	Murau			Private	credit	money	forms	are	debt	instruments	that	co-exist	alongside	publicly	provided	forms	of	money	and	emerge	de-centrally	out	of	the	lending	activities	of	banks	 or	 non-bank	 financial	 institutions.	 In	 normal	 times,	 they	 are	 easily	convertible	 into	 higher-ranking	 forms	 of	 public	 or	 commodity	 money.	Throughout	 history,	 however,	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 have	 repeatedly	become	 subject	 to	 a	 run	 by	 investors	 who	 all	 at	 once	 tried	 to	 convert	 their	private	 credit	 money	 balances	 into	 higher-ranking	 money.	 Such	 runs	 are	 an	integral	and	unavoidable	 feature	of	 the	modern	credit	money	system,	which	 in	its	essence	is	a	self-referential	network	of	expanding,	yet	instable	debt	claims.	To	keep	up	the	stability	of	the	monetary	system,	governments	had	to	react	to	these	runs	and	in	a	range	of	 instances	decided	to	drag	the	private	credit	money	form	under	the	control	of	the	state	by	ensuring	that	they	do	not	break	away	from	par.		This	 study	 examines	 this	 process	 of	 'accommodating'	 private	 credit	 money.	 It	establishes	 a	 functionalist	 theory	 about	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 modern	monetary	system.	To	understand	how	and	why	such	accommodation	occurred,	it	develops	 an	 ideal-typical	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 and	applies	it	on	three	cases	in	the	respective	centres	of	the	global	financial	system:	the	1797	Bank	Restriction	in	England	that	accommodated	bank	notes;	the	1933	Emergency	Banking	Act	 in	 the	U.S.	 that	 accommodated	 bank	deposits;	 and	 the	realignment	of	policies	by	the	Fed	and	the	U.S.	Treasury	in	the	2008	crisis,	which	accommodated	 overnight	 repurchase	 agreements	 and	 money	 market	 fund	shares	as	 ‘shadow	money’.	On	 the	basis	of	 those	case	studies,	 the	study	argues	that	today’s	public	credit	money	supply	 is	made	up	of	accommodated,	 formerly	
private,	credit	money	forms.	
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Introduction			
“[T]he	State	may	[..]	use	 its	chartalist	prerogative	 to	declare	
that	[a]	debt	itself	 is	an	acceptable	discharge	of	a	liability.	A	
particular	 kind	 of	 Bank-Money	 is	 then	 transformed	 into	
Money-Proper	 […].	When,	 however,	what	was	merely	 a	 debt	
has	 become	money-proper,	 it	 has	 changed	 its	 character	 and	
should	 no	 longer	 be	 reckoned	 as	 a	 debt,	 since	 it	 is	 of	 the	
essence	of	 a	debt	 to	be	 enforceable	 of	 something	other	 than	
itself”	(Keynes	1930a:	6).			
1.	Problématique	and	research	questions		The	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	brought	the	shadow	banking	system	to	the	centre	of	scholarly	attention.	The	events	 from	 the	near-failure	of	Countrywide	Securities	to	 the	 collapse	 of	 Bear	 Stearns	 and	 Lehman	 Brothers	 have	 convincingly	 been	described	 as	 runs	 on	 shadow	 banks	 (cf.	 Gorton	 2010;	 Mehrling	 2011).	 As	 the	runs	 took	 place	 on	 the	 wholesale	 money	 market,	 they	 were	 not	 as	 visible	 as	classic	 runs	 on	 commercial	 banks,	with	 long	 queues	 of	 depositors	 lining	 up	 in	front	 of	 bank	 branches.	 Other	 than	 that,	 however,	 there	 were	 little	 functional	differences	to	previous	bank	runs.	To	tame	the	run,	public	authorities	intervened	and	established	innovative	backstops	and	emergency	facilities	for	shadow	banks.	The	implications	of	this	intervention	continue	to	be	widely	debated.		 In	 this	context,	a	small	but	growing	group	of	monetary	 theorists	started	discussing	shadow	bank	liabilities	as	more	than	just	financial	assets	but	rather	as	‘shadow	 money’,	 i.e.	 money	 substitutes	 or—more	 precisely—substitutes	 for	commercial	bank	deposits	(cf.	e.g.	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	2016).	The	rationale	is	as	 follows:	 If	 banks	 create	 deposits	 as	 money	 and	 if	 shadow	 banking	 is	 the	contemporary	version	of	banking	 in	 an	unregulated	 realm,	 then	 shadow	banks	must	be	creators	of	something	that	is	money	in	a	functional	sense.	The	three	key	shadow	 money	 forms	 connected	 to	 the	 crisis	 are	 money	 market	 fund	 (MMF)	shares,	overnight	repurchase	agreements	(repos)	and	asset-backed	commercial	papers	 (ABCPs)	 (Ricks	 2011).	 Arguably,	 the	 public	 intervention	 in	 the	 shadow	banking	system	has	caused	a	profound	change	of	the	way	in	which	the	monetary	system	is	organized	and	the	role	that	the	state	plays	within	it	(cf.	Pozsar	2014).		While	 International	 Political	 Economy	 (IPE)	 has	 extensively	 studied	 the	phenomenon	 of	 shadow	 banking,	 the	 concomitant	 phenomenon	 of	 shadow	
money	has	received	much	less	scrutiny	(cf.	Helgadóttir	2016).	As	shadow	money	does	not	fit	the	standard	view	on	what	money	is	and	how	the	monetary	system	works,	IPE	scholarship	on	the	monetary	system	has	difficulties	integrating	it	into	its	 analyses	 (cf.	 Blyth	 and	Matthijs	 2017;	 Cohen	 2017).	 Thus,	 the	 rise	 and	 the	crisis	 of	 shadow	 money	 can	 hardly	 be	 reconciled	 with	 established	 notions	 of	institutional	change	in	the	monetary	system.	This	lack	of	understanding—how	to	explain	 the	 impact	of	shadow	money	on	the	transformation	 of	 the	monetary	
system—is	the	problématique	guiding	this	study.	 	
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Coming	 to	 grips	 with	 the	 rise	 and	 the	 crisis	 of	 shadow	 money	 is—according	 to	 Morgan	 Ricks,	 former	 member	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 and	 today	 a	leading	 scholar	 in	 the	 field—one	 of	 the	 greatest	 intellectual	 and	 political	challenges	of	our	time.	That	the	shadow	money	phenomenon	is	so	tricky	 is	not	surprising	as	the	usual	focus	in	IPE,	economics	and	related	disciplines	is	on	the	more	 established	 forms	 of	 money,	 or	 what	 Keynes	 in	 the	 introductory	 quote	refers	 to	as	 ‘money	proper’:	On	the	one	hand,	 this	refers	 to	commodity	money,	which	is	typically	seen	as	the	historically	dominant	form	of	money,	mainly	in	the	shape	of	 gold	 and	 silver.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 concerns	money	 forms	 that	 are	provided	and	 controlled	by	public	 authorities	 and	are	often	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘fiat	money’.	 Thus,	 ‘money	proper’—in	 the	 conventional	 understanding—is	 either	 a	commodity	or	a	creature	of	the	state.	Private	money	substitutes	such	as	shadow	money	do	not	fit	well	in	that	scheme.	Mostly,	these	money	substitutes	are	either	treated	 as	 an	 anomaly	 or,	 even	more	 likely,	 they	 simply	 drop	 out	 of	 scholarly	attention	and	are	largely	ignored.		However,	the	ascent	and	crisis	of	shadow	money	as	a	substitute	for	more	conventional	 forms	of	money	 is	not	a	novel	phenomenon.	 In	modern	monetary	systems,	 it	 is	the	rule,	not	the	exception,	that	more	established	forms	of	money	co-exist	alongside	financial	instruments	that	take	on	the	role	of	privately	created	money	 substitutes	 (Ingham	 2004).	 Such	 forms	 of	 ‘private	 credit	 money’	(Mehrling	 2011,	 2015;	 Pozsar	 2014)	 emerge	 de-centrally	 out	 of	 the	 lending	activities	 of	 banks	or	 other	non-bank	 financial	 institutions	 and	 annihilate	 once	the	debt	 is	repaid	(Wray	1990,	Rochon	1999).	For	 the	contemporary	monetary	system—next	 to	MMF	 shares,	 overnight	 repos	 and	 ABCPs—eurodollars	 (Ricks	2016:	51)	or	certificates	of	deposits	(CDs)	(Carlson	and	Wheelock	2016)	may	be	perceived	 as	 such	 private	 credit	 money	 forms.	 Historical	 examples	 are	 bank	notes	 in	 the	 18th	 and	 19th	 century	 (Liepmann	 1933)	 or	 bank	 deposits,	 trust	deposits	 and	 clearing	 house	 loan	 certificates	 in	 the	 19th	 and	 20th	 century	(Kindleberger	1978).	Wray	(1990)	and	Boyer-Xambeu	et	al.	 (1986)	even	argue	that	 bills	 of	 exchange	were	 such	 private	 credit	money	 forms	 that	 date	 back	 to	pre-modern	times.		 Under	 normal	 circumstances,	 private	 credit	money	 is	 easily	 convertible	into	 ‘money	 proper’	 (Giannini	 2004).	 Throughout	 history,	 however,	 it	 has	repeatedly	 occurred	 that	 a	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 lost	 its	 credibility	 and	became	 subject	 to	 a	 run	 by	 investors	 who	 all	 at	 once	 tried	 to	 convert	 it	 into	‘money	 proper’	 which	 was	 perceived	 as	 safer.	 To	 keep	 up	 the	 stability	 of	 the	monetary	system,	governments	have	sometimes	reacted	 to	 these	runs	and	 in	a	range	 of	 instances	 decided	 to	 drag	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 under	 the	control	of	the	state	by	guaranteeing	that	it	keeps	its	value	and	does	not	default.	This	 is	what	 the	 above	 quote	 from	Keynes’	Treatise	on	Money	 refers	 to—in	 its	very	 own	 terminology—as	 the	 state’s	 ‘chartalist	 prerogative’	 to	 transform	 a	‘debt’	 into	 ‘money-proper’.	 While	 Keynes	 addresses	 it	 as	 an	 economic	phenomenon,	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 chartalist	 prerogative	 relies	 on	 a	 political	process	 that	 follows	 individual	 rationales,	 institutional	 dynamics	 and	 decision-making	practices,	and	that	has	taken	shape	in	various	historical	manifestations.	This	 process	 and	 its	 political	 economic	 context	 is	 the	 analytical	 object	 of	 this	study	and	will	be	referred	to	as	‘accommodation’	of	private	credit	money.	 	
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Turning	to	the	economic	history	of	Western	political	economies,	we	find	that	 the	 main	 financial	 instruments	 that	 we	 think	 of	 as	 ‘money	 proper’	 today	used	to	be	private	credit	money	forms	in	the	past.	In	particular,	this	observation	applies	 to	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits,	which	may	be	 thought	of	as	 the	main	forms	 of	 shadow	money	 in	 the	 18th	 and	 19th	 century,	 respectively.	 Today,	 we	naturally	view	them	as	part	of	the	public	money	supply	and	think	that	they	are	money	in	the	proper	sense	of	the	word.	This,	however,	was	not	always	the	case:	For	 example,	 when	 Thornton	 (1802)	 wrote	 his	 Enquiry	 into	 the	 Nature	 and	
Effects	of	the	Paper	Credit	of	Great	Britain,	his	assertion	that	bank	notes	were	not	merely	 ‘paper	 credit’	 but	 actually	 ‘money’	 constituted	 a	marginalized	 position.	Only	 in	 the	 run	up	 to	 the	1833	and	 the	1844	Bank	Charter	Acts,	 this	 assertion	slowly	 became	 the	 dominant	 view	 (cf.	 Liepmann	 1933).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	1912,	when	the	National	Monetary	Commission	presented	its	analyses	of	various	European	banking	 systems	 in	view	of	 establishing	a	 central	bank	 in	 the	U.S.,	 it	was	 still	 the	 academic	 mainstream	 position	 that	 bank	 deposits	 are	 ‘credit’	instruments	 of	 private	 commercial	 banks,	 not	 ‘money’	 (cf.	 Kinley	 1910:	 2-3).	Only	in	the	writings	after	the	Great	Depression	and	the	associated	banking	crises	did	 the	 notion	 gain	momentum	 that	 bank	 deposits	 actually	 are	money	 (cf.	 e.g.	Meade	1934).			These	 observations	 of	 monetary	 history	 indicate	 that	 private	 credit	money	 accommodation	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 for	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	monetary	system.	It	not	only	seems	to	be	relevant	for	long	past	transformations	in	the	18th	and	20th	century	but	also	for	the	contemporary	monetary	system	and	the	 role	 that	 shadow	 money	 plays	 within	 it.	 However,	 the	 accommodation	 of	private	credit	money	is	a	phenomenon	which	is	off	the	radar	of	IPE	scholarship	on	 money	 and	 the	 monetary	 system.	 Of	 course,	 it	 is	 well	 known	 and	 well	researched	 that	 regulatory	 changes	 of	 the	 financial	 and	 the	 monetary	 system	occurred	after	crises	and	bank	runs.	Still,	there	is	a	lack	of	understanding	in	IPE	scholarship	concerning	the	form	and	the	causes	of	the	general	process	that	brings	forth	an	 ‘accommodation’	of	private	credit	money.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	no	adequate	analytical	language	about	the	role	of	public	and	private	money	to	grasp	that	 process.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 what	 the	 similarities	 and	differences	of	the	various	empirical	manifestations	of	the	process	are.	This	refers	to	 the	 actual	 instances	 of	 accommodation,	 its	 legal	 implications,	 timeframe,	driving	 forces	 etc.,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 general	 procedural	 pattern	 and	 if	 the	accommodation	was	an	intended	or	unintended	result	of	crisis	resolution.		Therefore,	 this	 study	 sets	 off	 to	 address	 this	 gap	 in	 our	 understanding	about	 the	dynamics	of	 the	monetary	system’s	 transformation	by	answering	 the	following	research	questions:	
	
RQ1:	How	does	private	credit	money	accommodation	affect	 the	
transformation	of	the	monetary	system?	
	
RQ2:	Why	 is	private	 credit	money	accommodated	 in	 the	public	
money	supply?	
	 	
	 4	
2.	Research	design		To	generate	answers	 to	 the	 research	questions,	 the	 study	develops	a	 theory	of	private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 that	 is	 located	 at	 the	 interdisciplinary	intersection	 of	 IPE	 and	 heterodox	 economics.	 The	 theory	 comprises	 an	 ideal-typical	 two-phase	 model	 that	 describes	 and	 explains	 the	 phenomenon	 on	 a	higher	 level	 of	 abstraction	 and	 is	 subsequently	 applied	 on	 bank	 notes,	 bank	deposits	and	shadow	money	as	the	key	historical	cases.	These	are	determined	by	looking	at	the	contemporary	empirical	setup	of	the	money	supply	and	making	an	inference	on	the	past	accommodation	processes	that	must	have	taken	place.	The	study	 thus	 presents	 an	 interpretivist	 genealogy	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	transformation	as	a	repeated	manifestation	of	the	accommodation	process.			
2.1	Research	paradigm	
	In	 order	 to	 describe	 and	 explain	 the	 process	 of	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation,	the	study	operates	within	a	research	paradigm	that—following	Peter	 T.	 Jackson’s	 The	 Conduct	 of	 Inquiry	 in	 International	 Relations	 (2011)—corresponds	to	‘analyticism’	in	the	tradition	of	Max	Weber.	Analyticism	seeks	to	carve	out	ideal-typical	phenomena	via	analytical	narratives	using	configurational	types	of	causation	and	case	study-based	research.			Jackson	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 contemporary	 scholarship	 in	 International	Relations	 (IR)—and	 thus	 IPE,	 as	 we	 may	 contend—effectively	 corresponds	 to	four	different	research	paradigms:	‘neopositivism’,	‘critical	realism’,	‘analyticism’	and	‘reflexivity’	(cf.	Figure	0.1):			
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Figure	0.1—Four	research	paradigms	in	contemporary	IR	and	IPE			 Jackson	 distinguishes	 these	 four	 paradigms	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 two	‘transcendental	cleavages’:	The	first	cleavage	addresses	what	is	often	referred	to	as	 the	 difference	 between	 ‘positivist’	 and	 ‘interpretivist’	 approaches	 and	translates	into	the	difference	of	mind-world	dualism	and	mind-world	monism.	As	to	Jackson,	this	relates	to	the	connection	of	 ‘knowledge’	and	the	‘known’,	which	“involves	the	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	the	world,	and	speaks	to	the	 question	 of	whether	 the	 objects	 of	 study	 have	 a	more	 or	 less	 determinate	essential	character	that	is	separate	from	the	researcher's	activity,	or	whether	the	process	of	research	in	some	sense	constitutes	the	object	of	study	en	passant,	 in	
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the	 course	 of	 gathering	 and	 assembling	 data”	 (ibid:	 35).	 The	 second	 cleavage	addresses	 the	 kind	 of	 facts	 that	 can	 be	 used	 for	 empirical	 analysis,	 i.e.	 the	relationship	 between	 knowledge	 and	 observation.	 In	 this,	 transfactualism	maintains	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 know	 things	 about	 in-principle	 unobservables,	whereas	 phenomenalism	maintains	 that	 is	 neither	 necessary	 nor	 possible	 to	research	 facts	 that	 transcend	experience.	Thus,	both	cleavages,	which	 translate	into	the	fourfold	table	of	research	paradigms,	are	a	priori	assumptions	about	the	respective	study’s	ontology	and	epistemology	(cf.	Jackson	2011:	197).1		Analyticism,	as	the	paradigm	that	this	study	identifies	with,	engages	in	a	“disciplined	ordering	of	facts	of	experience”	(ibid:	112).	Due	to	the	assumption	of	mind-world	 monism,	 analyticist	 inquiry	 cannot	 raise	 the	 claim	 to	 create	 a	representation	 of	 the	 objective	 reality	 but	 only	 a	 representation	 in	 which	 the	researcher	and	 the	world	are	mutually	 constituted.	Theory,	 from	an	analyticist	point	 of	 view,	 “provides	 a	 set	 of	 more	 or	 less	 helpful	 idealizations	 or	oversimplifications	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 order	 the	 complex	 chaos	 of	 empirical	reality	into	more	comprehensible	and	manageable	forms”	(ibid:	113).2	Causality,	in	the	analyticist	paradigm,	is	not	a	factual	empirical	force	that	follows	universal	rules	 which	 lie	 in	 the	 world	 and	 have	 to	 be	 uncovered	 by	 the	 investigator.	Instead,	 it	 is	 a	 projection	 of	 the	 researcher	 on	 the	 world	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	organizing	 principle	 that	 helps	 rendering	 specific	 phenomena	 comprehensible.	In	 search	 for	 causal	 mechanisms,	 the	 methodology	 of	 choice	 will	 not	 be	 a	quantitative	 analysis,	 which	 relies	 on	 hypothesis	 testing	 and	 the	 variation	 of	dependent	and	independent	variables,	but	a	hermeneutically	guided	isolation	of	plausible	 factors	 that	 induce	 a	 given	 outcome.	 The	 criterion	 for	 validity	 of	 the	causal	mechanism	established	cannot	be	whether	 it	 is	 ‘true’	or	not,	as	 ‘truth’	 in	the	sense	of	an	accurate	representation	of	the	world	by	itself	is	not	a	meaningful	category	 within	 mind-world	 monism.	 Instead,	 validity	 depends	 on	 the	mechanism’s	 instrumental	 value	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 social	 purpose—if	 it	 is	 a	meaningful	way	 to	 order	 experience	 and	 inter-subjectively	 convey	 knowledge.	Within	the	analyticist	framework,	the	adequate	research	design	is	to	implement	small	 ‘N’	 case	 studies	 that	 lead	 to	 individual	 case	 narratives,	 which	 embody	different	 empirical	 manifestations	 of	 the	 causal	 mechanism	 under	 scrutiny.	 In	contrast	 to	 neopositivist	 and	 critical	 realist	 research,	 comparing	 the	 different	cases	cannot	meaningfully	serve	to	test	hypotheses.	Instead,	it	allows	illustrating	empirical	 variations	 and	 helps	 making	 inference	 on	 the	 ideal	 type	 of	 the	phenomenon	that	is	to	be	understood—for	‘ideal-typification’	is	the	ultimate	goal	of	analyticist	research	practice	(ibid:	112-155).	 																																																									1	 Jackson’s	 argument	 about	 the	 four	 research	 paradigms	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	complementary	 co-existence	 of	 those	 different	 approaches	 and	 the	 advantages	 of	methodological	 pluralism.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 remaining	consistently	within	the	logic	and	the	specific	way	of	knowledge	production	predetermined	by	the	 paradigm	 chosen.	 The	 knowledge	 generated	 via	 a	 given	 study	 remains	 specific	 to	 the		respective	paradigm	chosen	(Jackson	2011:	210).	2	 Jackson	argues	that	Kenneth	N.	Waltz’s	Theory	of	International	Politics	(1979)	operates	in	an	analyticist	 framework:	 “Theories,	 for	Waltz,	 are	 simply	not	 something	 that	one	compares	to	reality;	 rather,	 theories	 ‘construct	a	reality,	but	no	one	can	ever	 say	 it	 is	 the	reality,’	 and	as	such	 should	 be	 evaluated	 in	 terms	 of	 whether	 they	 ‘convey	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 unobservable	relations	 of	 things’	 and	 provide	 ‘connections	 and	 causes	 by	which	 sense	 is	made	 of	 things	observed’”	(Jackson	2011:	113,	citing	Waltz	1979:	9;	italics	in	original).		
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Jackson’s	model—although	it	certainly	reduces	complexity	with	regard	to	the	ontological	and	methodological	underpinnings	of	contemporary	research	 in	IR	 and	 IPE—is	 helpful	 in	 determining	 the	 aspiration	 of	 this	 study	 about	 the	accommodation	of	private	credit	money	and	 its	 role	 for	 the	monetary	system’s	transformation.	 Hence,	 what	 this	 study	 seeks	 to	 achieve	 within	 an	 analyticist	paradigm	is	to	establish	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	an	ideal-typical	process	 that	 appears	 repeatedly	 throughout	 history	 in	 varying	 manifestations	but,	 on	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 abstraction,	 follows	 a	 similar	 pattern	 and	 causes	 a	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	Within	this	paradigm,	the	study	crafts	an	analytical	 narrative	 about	 a	 retrospective	 transformation	 pattern	 that,	 in	 its	repetition,	leads	up	to	today’s	empirical	reality	of	the	monetary	system.		With	 its	 analyticist	 aspiration,	 the	 study	 chimes	 in	 with	 a	 research	tradition	that	Benjamin	Cohen	has	termed	‘British	IPE’.	In	an	attempt	to	map	and	systematize	the	contemporary	field	of	IPE,	Cohen	(2007:	198)	distinguishes	two	major	strands	of	IPE	research:	American	IPE,	on	the	one	hand,	tends	to	be	firmly	rooted	 in	 the	 scientific	 method,	 with	 a	 positivist	 and	 empiricist	 ontology	 and	epistemology.	Methodologically,	 it	 has	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	midlevel	 theory	that	 seeks	 to	 develop	 hypotheses	 and	 systematically	 test	 them.	 Speaking	with	Jackson,	it	is	thus	more	akin	to	neopositivism	and	critical	realism.	British	IPE,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	less	coherent	strand	of	research	within	which	scholars	adopt	a	 variety	 of	 different	 ontological,	 epistemological	 and	 methodological	approaches.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 a	 field	 that	 is	 paradigmatically	more	 pluralist	 and	 also	offers	 space	 for	 research	 that	 Jackson	would	 label	 as	analyticist	and	 reflexivist.	British	 IPE	 tends	 to	 be	 more	 interdisciplinary,	 goes	 beyond	 mainstream	economics	and	political	 science,	and	also	allows	 tackling	normative	 issues.	 It	 is	less	 prone	 to	 use	 ‘hard	 science’	methodology	 and	 often	 has	 a	more	 ambitious	agenda	 as	 it	 does	 not	 shy	 away	 from	 ‘grand	 theories’	 that	 ask	 the	 ‘really	 big	question’	about	systemic	transformation	(see	Cohen	2008:	Ch.	3).3		 Despite	 the	 repeated	 criticism4	that	Cohen’s	broad-brush	distinction	has	received,	 the	 label	 ‘British	 IPE’	 grasps	well	 this	 study’s	 impetus	 to	 understand	the	transformation	of	 the	monetary	system	across	a	 longer	time	scale,	which—speaking	with	Fernand	Braudel—may	be	referred	to	as	the	moyenne	durée.	Thus,	as	the	study	actually	dares	to	ask	one	of	the	‘really	big	questions’	about	systemic	transformation	with	regard	to	money,	it	can	be	thought	of	as	a	macrolevel	theory	that	operates	on	a	higher	level	of	abstraction	than	in	today’s	American-style	IPE.	The	study	also	corresponds	to	British	IPE-style	as	it	adopts	an	interdisciplinary	approach	 that	 combines	 the	 analysis	 of	 political	 economic	 phenomena	 with	concepts	 from	heterodox	 economics	 and	 economic	 history.	 In	 this,	 it	 stands	 in	the	tradition	of	the	work	of	Charles	Kindleberger,	whose	broad,	interdisciplinary	work	 focused	 on	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 subject,	 not	 least	 the	 monetary	 system	 (cf.	Kindleberger	 1970,	 1973,	 1978,	 1984).	 Although	 Kindleberger	 was	 American	and	 is	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 forefathers	 of	 IPE	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 his	 methodological	approach	is	more	akin	to	the	research	practice	in	British	IPE	today.	 																																																									3	 Cohen	(2008:	66)	argues	that	dealing	with	the	really	big	questions	of	systemic	transformation	has	been	traditionally	a	focus	of	Robert	Cox	and	Charles	P.	Kindleberger	in	IPE.	4		 See	 e.g.	 the	 2009	 special	 issue	 in	 New	 Political	 Economy	 14(3)	 on	 “The	 ‘British	 School’	 of	International	Political	Economy”.	
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2.2	Methodical	approach		Bearing	 in	 mind	 the	 analyticist	 approach	 to	 social	 science,	 including	 its	concomitant	 implications	 for	 ontology,	 epistemology	 and	 methodology,	 how	does	 the	 study	 proceed	 methodically	 to	 realize	 its	 goal	 and	 respond	 to	 the	research	questions?			 In	 its	 theoretical	 part	 (Chapters	2	and	3),	 the	 study	 establishes	 the	process	 of	 private	 credit	money	 accommodation	 as	 a	 generalized	 ideal	 type.	 It	first	determines	a	distinct	conceptual	lens	on	the	monetary	system	to	then	build	upon	 it	 a	 political-economic	 theory	 about	 the	 transformation	 dynamics	 of	 the	monetary	 system.	 The	 theory	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 as	 a	repeating	 phenomenon	 that	 leads	 to	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 is	thus	derived	from	the	IPE	and	economics	literature	(e.g.	e.g.	Kindleberger	1978,	Keynes	 1930a,	 Minsky	 1986),	 and	 more	 explicitly	 formulated	 while	 using	 the	terminology	and	the	concepts	of	 the	Money	View	(Mehrling	2011,	2015a).	As	a	result,	 the	 theory	 contains	 a	 two-phase	 model	 that	 is	 applicable	 on	 different	historical	 episodes	 about	 the	 rise	 and	 the	 accommodation	 of	 a	 private	 credit	money	form,	which	entails	a	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		In	 its	 empirical	 part	 (Chapters	 4,	5	and	6),	 the	 study	 demonstrates	 how	this	ideal-typical	model	has	manifested	itself	throughout	history.	To	this	end,	the	study	applies	case	study-based	research	and	deploys	the	method	of	a	structured,	focused	 comparison	 (cf.	 George	 and	Bennett	 2005:	 67ff)	 to	 deliver	 a	 narrative	explanation	of	 the	 causal	 path	 that	 led	 to	 the	 accommodation	of	 private	 credit	money	 as	 specific	 outcome.	 To	 implement	 its	 research	 agenda,	 it	 applies	 a	catalogue	of	sub-questions	derived	from	the	theoretical	chapters	(cf.	Table	0.1).	This	catalogue	is	‘structured’	in	the	sense	that	it	reflects	the	objective	to	generate	an	answer	 to	 the	research	question	and	pre-structures	 the	data	collection.	 It	 is	‘focused’	because	it	only	carves	out	certain	aspects	of	reality	that	are	necessary	to	 isolate	 the	 process	 of	 accommodating	private	 credit	money.	 The	 structured,	focused	comparison	requires	a	small	‘N’	case	design,	in	which	the	group	of	cases	belong	to	the	same	class	of	instances.			
Phase	I	(pre-accommodation)	
• How	did	new	private	financial	instruments	develop?	
• How	did	the	private	financial	instruments	become	money	substitutes?	
• How	was	the	monetary	system	organized	prior	to	the	accommodation?	
• How	did	the	private	money	substitute	become	systemically	relevant?		
Phase	II	(accommodation)	
• How	did	the	crisis	of	the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	emerge?	
• How	did	public	actors	react	to	the	crisis?	
• How	did	the	interventions	of	the	public	actors	amount	to	an	accommodation?	
• How	did	the	decision-making	processes	for	the	act	of	accommodation	work?			
Table	0.1	–	Subquestions	structuring	the	case	studies	 	
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For	establishing	the	causal	mechanism	that	led	to	the	various	instances	in	which	private	credit	money	was	accommodated,	the	study	will	apply	the	method	of	process	tracing—“a	procedure	designed	to	identify	processes	linking	a	set	of	initial	 conditions	 to	 a	 particular	 outcome”	 (Vennesson	 2008:	 224).	 Process	tracing	requires	an	initial	adequate	and	thorough	description	to	be	subsequently	able	to	analyse	“trajectories	of	change	and	causation”	(Collier	2011:	823).			
	
2.3	Case	selection		As	to	George	and	Bennett	(2005:	73ff),	 the	crucial	criteria	for	an	adequate	case	selection	are	 their	 “relevance	 to	 research	objective”	and	 that	 they	provide	 “the	kind	of	control	and	variation	required	by	the	research	problem”,	which	“requires	that	the	universe	or	subclass	of	events	be	clearly	defined”.	Given	that	the	general	process	of	accommodating	private	credit	money	has	not	yet	been	systematically	scrutinized	 in	the	IPE	 literature,	 it	will	be	necessary	to	deploy	the	technique	of	‘casing’.	This	implies	“carving	an	aspect	of	reality	that	is	different	from	the	ways	in	which	the	phenomenon,	or	the	event,	is	taken	for	granted”	(Vennesson	2008:	229).		 	The	 nature	 of	 the	 contemporary	 monetary	 system—see	 e.g.	 Giannini	(2004)	 and	 Pozsar	 (2014)—suggests	 that	 three	 cases	 lend	 themselves	 to	 be	chosen	for	further	scrutiny.	They	occurred	in	different	centuries	in	the	respective	centres	of	 the	global	monetary	 system	and	 turn	out	 to	be	authoritative	 for	 the	way	 in	which	 the	monetary	 system	 is	 organized	 today:	 the	 accommodation	 of	bank	 notes	 in	 England	 in	 the	 late	 18th	 century;	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	deposits	 in	 the	 United	 States	 during	 the	 Great	 Depression;	 as	 well	 as	 the	accommodation	 of	 contemporary	 shadow	 money—in	 particular	 overnight	repurchase	 agreements	 and	money	market	mutual	 fund	 shares—in	 the	United	States	during	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis.		Although	bank	notes,	bank	deposits	and	shadow	money	came	up	as	novel	financial	 instruments	 at	 very	 different	 times	 and	 in	 very	 different	 institutional	contexts,	they	share	a	range	of	common	features.	On	the	one	hand,	this	refers	to	the	way	in	which	they	emerged	historically.	They	were	brought	forth	by	private	financial	institutions	and	took	up	the	role	of	private	credit	money	that	co-existed	next	 to	 the	 publicly	 regulated	 monetary	 system	 before	 they	 got	 into	 financial	distress	 and	 their	 issuing	 institutions	 had	 to	 be	 bailed	 out	 through	 a	 public	intervention.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 their	 creation	 follows	 similar	 balance	 sheet	mechanics.	In	this,	the	issuing	institutions	engage	in	money	creation	and	increase	the	total	money	supply	as	the	number	of	liabilities	they	bring	forth	exceeds	the	total	 amount	 of	 assets	 they	 hold.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 issuing	 institutions	 are	always	 susceptible	 to	 a	 run	 that,	 if	 not	 prevented,	 would	 result	 in	 a	devalorization	or	even	total	collapse	of	the	privately	issued	credit	money.			This	 case	 selection	 and	 the	 concomitant	 view	 on	 private	 credit	 money	creation	can	be	legitimized	with	the	works	of	a	number	of	scholars	such	as	Arnon	(2011),	Keynes	 (1930a,	 1930b),	 Giannini	 (2004),	 Ingham	 (2004),	Kindleberger	(1978),	 McMillan	 (2014),	 Minsky	 (1986),	 Mitchell-Innes	 (1913,	 1914),	 Ricks	
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(2011,	2016)	and	Wray	(1990).	Primarily,	however,	it	makes	sense	in	the	context	of	the	so-called	Money	View	(cf.	Mehrling	2011,	2015a;	Pozsar	2014),	which—as	Chapter	 2	 will	 elaborate	 in	 detail—is	 a	 contemporary	 market-based	 credit	theory	 of	 money	 and	 in	 this	 provides	 the	 adequate	 conceptual	 lens	 on	 the	monetary	system	for	the	purpose	of	this	study.		 The	 choice	 of	 cases	 fits	well	 to	 the	 analyticist	 approach	 adopted	 in	 this	study.	To	develop	the	theory	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	an	ideal-type,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 focus	 on	 those	 instances	 in	 which	 the	 phenomenon	actually	did	materialize.	Still,	as	Chapter	7	will	problematize	more	in	detail,	this	case	 selection	has	 to	be	 treated	with	 some	 caution.	As	 the	 cases	 are	 chosen	 to	comprehend	 the	 genesis	 of	 today’s	 monetary	 system,	 the	 study	 is	 potentially	subject	to	selection	bias	(cf.	Geddes	1990):			First,	 the	case	selection	 follows	an	ex	post	 logic.	Taking	 into	account	 the	contemporary	setup	of	the	public	money	supply,	the	study	only	focuses	on	those	instances	in	which	an	accommodation	did	occur	and	studies	what	happened	with	those	 formerly	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 whose	 par	 clearance	 is	 publicly	guaranteed	today.	This	approach	does	not	take	into	account	cases	in	which	a	run	took	place	on	a	private	credit	money	form	and	did	not	lead	to	an	accommodation.	At	the	same	time,	however,	each	of	the	three	cases	studies	involves	other	forms	of	 private	 credit	 money	 that—following	 a	 Money	 View	 logic—were	 located	further	down	in	the	hierarchy.	While	 the	systemic	crisis	actually	started	with	a	run	on	them,	they	were	not	subject	to	accommodation.	In	this	regard,	the	study	takes	into	account	negative	cases.		Second,	there	is	the	potential	for	a	regional	selection	bias	as	all	the	three	cases	 under	 scrutiny	 occurred	 in	 the	 respective	 centres	 of	 the	 international	monetary	 system	at	 their	 time.	 It	 cannot	be	 ruled	out	 that	 instances	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	may	have	taken	place	in	peripheral	countries	that	are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study.	 This	 entails	 a	 number	 of	 questions:	 Can	accommodation	also	occur	in	other	countries	than	the	global	centre	at	all	or	are	there	reasons	speaking	against	it?	Would	the	process	in	peripheral	countries	be	identical	 to	 the	 ones	 in	 the	 centre?	 This	 study	 indeed	 contends	 that	accommodation	with	a	permanent	impact	on	the	setup	of	the	monetary	system	is	a	phenomenon	specific	 to	the	apex	of	 the	(hierarchical)	 international	monetary	system	 and	 that	 there	 are	 spill-over	 mechanisms	 to	 peripheral	 monetary	jurisdictions.	However,	the	international	considerations	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.			Both	these	caveats	regarding	the	case	selection	potentially	have	an	impact	of	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	 accommodation	 theory	 established	 in	 this	 study.	However,	 as	 Chapter	 7	will	 explain	more	 in	 detail,	 they	 can	 be	 remedied	with	further	research	that	builds	on	the	findings	of	this	study	and	adopts	a	different	research	design	 to	 test	 for	negative	cases	and	analyze	 the	 international	effects,	respectively.	 Notably,	 speaking	 with	 Jackson	 (2011),	 the	 findings	 of	 this	
analyticist	study	 can	 provide	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 further	 studies	 using	 e.g.	 a	neo-positivist	research	paradigm.	 	
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2.4	Sources		To	attain	the	empirical	 information	relevant	for	the	implementation	of	the	case	studies,	the	study	applies	methodological	triangulation	and	combines	secondary	literature,	primary	literature	and	quantitative	data	as	sources.		 Secondary	 sources	 comprise	 systematic	 histories	 of	money,	 banking	 and	
central	 banking,	 more	 specific	 studies	 in	 the	 broader	 spectrum	 of	 the	 political	
economy	and	economics	literature	as	well	as	works	of	monetary	thought.	As	these	sources	 only	 emerge	 with	 a	 considerable	 time	 lag	 after	 an	 accommodation	process	 has	 occurred,	 they	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 relevant	 for	 the	 historical	 case	studies	on	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits	than	for	the	contemporary	case	study	on	 shadow	money.	Moreover,	while	 they	will	 be	 very	 useful	 to	 establish	what	happened,	they	will	hardly	be	sufficient	to	understand	why	it	happened.	
	 Primary	 sources	 contain	 policy	 documents	 (e.g.	 parliamentary	 debates,	technical	 analyses	 and	 recommendations	 of	 expert	 bodies),	 press	 articles	 of	relevant	newspapers	 (e.g.	 the	Financial	Times)	 as	well	 as	 eight	 interviews	with	experts	from	international	financial	institutions,	central	banks,	the	private	sector	and	 academia.	 While	 some	 of	 these	 primary	 sources	 are	 available	 online,	 the	acquisition	 of	 others	 has	 required	 actual	 fieldwork.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 has	taken	place	in	archives	to	get	access	to	policy	documents	and	press	articles.	On	the	other	hand,	interviews	were	conducted	in	the	relevant	political	and	financial	centres,	most	notably	New	York	and	Washington.	Given	the	rather	macroscopic	level	of	 the	research	question,	 the	 less	 formalized	 interview	technique	of	semi-structured	interviews	was	applied	(cf.	Mosley	2013).			Quantitative	 data	 complements	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	 sources	 to	map	 the	process	of	accommodating	private	credit	money.	Valuable	 sources	are	the	balance	sheets	of	central	banks,	quantitative	estimates	of	monetary	aggregates	and	 statistics	about	 the	 financial	 system.	 The	 data	 for	 the	 historical	 cases	were	found	 in	 the	 secondary	 literature;	 the	 data	 for	 the	 contemporary	 case	 studies	was	compiled	on	the	basis	of	primary	sources.					 	
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3.	Core	argument	
	The	answers	to	the	research	questions	can	be	presented	as	follows:	
	 RQ1:	 How	 does	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 affect	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system?	 Private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	
transforms	the	public	money	supply	by	shifting	the	delineation	between	public	and	
private	 credit	money.	 It	 is	 preceded	by	a	 long	period	of	 financial	 stability	during	
which	 private	 profit-oriented	 institutions	 conduct	 financial	 innovation.	 They	
develop	novel	 short-term	 IOUs,	which	 eventually	 become	private	 credit	money	as	
they	 establish	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 money	 forms	 and	 attain	
systemic	 relevance	 as	 they	 grow	 in	 size,	 interconnectedness,	 non-substitutability	
and	complexity.	The	private	credit	money	form	is	accommodated	at	a	very	specific	
moment	 in	 time	 that	 coincides	 with	 a	 ‘Minsky	moment’,	 i.e.	 a	 systemic	 financial	
crisis,	 when	 public	 balance	 sheets	 are	 used	 to	 create	 backstops	 against	 the	
illiquidity	 and	 insolvency	 of	 the	 defaulting	 institutions	 that	 have	 issued	 the	
systemically	relevant	credit	money	form.			RQ2:	Why	 is	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodated	 in	 the	 public	 money	supply?	Private	credit	money	accommodation	is	driven	by	the	very	own	properties	
of	 the	 monetary	 system	 itself,	 notably	 its	 ability	 to	 create	 credit	 money	 out	 of	
nothing.	 As	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims,	 the	
monetary	system’s	ability	to	bring	forth	new	forms	of	private	credit	money	sooner	
or	 later	 leads	 to	 an	 imminent	 threat	 of	 implosion.	 This	 creates	 the	 necessity	 for	
political	 authorities	 to	 bail	 out	 the	 struggling	 institutions	 that	 issue	 the	
systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form.	 As	 private	 agency	 dominates	
during	the	rise	of	the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form,	public	actors	
only	 react	 ex	 post	 to	 the	 technical	 necessities	 in	 a	 crisis	 to	 prevent	 a	 systemic	
meltdown.	 The	 accommodation—i.e.	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	
that	 induces	 a	 change	 in	 the	 public-private	 setup	 of	 the	 money	 supply	 while	
exercising	 the	 state’s	 infrastructural	 power—is	 the	 unintentional	 side-effect	 of	
those	 bail-outs,	 decided	 upon	 on	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 government	 under	 extreme	
time	pressure	and	uncertainty	while	fearing	a	doomsday	scenario	for	the	financial	
system	and	the	wider	political	economy.		
	 This	 theory	 of	 private	 credit	money	 accommodation	 connects	 historical	transformation	dynamics	in	the	monetary	system	with	the	actual	empirical	setup	of	 today’s	money	 supply.	 Hence,	 today’s	monetary	 system	 is	 the	 result	 of	 past	instances	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	which	followed	this	logic.	It	is	a	 functionalist	 political	 economic	 theory	 which	 attributes	 specific	 places	 to	private	and	public	agency	but	views	the	monetary	system’s	very	own	properties	as	 the	 key	 driving	 force	 of	 accommodation	 and	 thus	 its	 own	 transformation.	Three	major	instances	of	such	accommodation	occurred	in	the	respective	centres	of	 the	world	 financial	 system:	 Bank	 notes	were	 accommodated	with	 the	 1797	Bank	Restriction	 in	England,	bank	deposits	were	accommodated	with	 the	1933	Emergency	 Banking	 Act	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 and	 overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 as	shadow	money	 forms	were	accommodated	with	 the	2008	establishment	of	 the	Federal	 Reserve’s	 Primary	 Dealer	 Credit	 Facility	 and	 Term	 Securities	 Lending	Facility,	as	well	as	the	U.S.	Treasury’s	temporary	guarantee	for	MMFs.	 	
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4.	Novelty	and	relevance		The	 novelty	 of	 the	 study	 lies	 in	 defining,	 describing	 and	 explaining	 a	phenomenon	that	has	not	yet	been	systematically	described	and	comparatively	studied	 so	 far	 in	 IPE:	 the	 political	 process	 of	 accommodating	 private	 credit	money	forms	by	dragging	them	under	the	control	of	the	state	 in	order	to	avoid	that	 they	 break	 away	 from	 par	 and	 make	 the	 credit	 money	 system	 implode.	Historical	processes	and	events	that	are	well-known	to	scholars	of	IPE—e.g.	the	1797	Bank	Restriction	and	the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act,	the	banking	crises	during	the	 Great	 Depression	 and	 the	 New	 Deal	 reforms,	 as	 well	 as	 contemporary	phenomena	such	as	disintermediation,	shadow	banking	and	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis—will	 be	 looked	 at	 from	 one	 coherent	 covering	 perspective.	 Such	perspective	has	not	yet	been	adopted	in	IPE	but	promises	to	yield	valuable	and	topical	findings	on	the	political	economy	of	modern	credit	money	systems.		 The	findings	on	the	process	of	accommodating	private	credit	moneys	will	have	relevance	as	a	contribution	to	IPE	scholarship	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	On	the	one	hand,	the	study	furthers	our	understanding	of	what	is	 driving	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system.	 The	 accommodation	process	delivers	an	argument	 for	how	and	why	 financial	 innovations	affect	 the	monetary	system	in	general	and	allows	us	to	explain	via	a	causal	mechanism	how	new	 configurations	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 come	 up.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	accommodation	process	on	the	monetary	system	is	indeed	substantial	and	leads	to	a	 seemingly	opaque	amalgam	of	public	and	private	 credit	money	 forms	 that	co-exist	 next	 to	 each	 other	 and	 are	 summarized	 by	 regulators	 via	 different	monetary	aggregates.	On	the	other	hand,	the	study	generates	insights	about	the	entanglement	of	political	and	economic	forces	as	concerns	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	The	accommodation	of	private	credit	money	is	a	recurring	phenomenon	 that	 constitutes	 a	 channel	 through	 which	 private	 agency	 first	develops	 new	 forms	 of	 near	 money	 forms	 via	 financial	 innovation	 and	 later	drives	political	authorities	to	step	in	and	put	their	par	clearance	under	political	control.	 The	 public-private	 interaction	 is	 connected	 via	 a	 functionalist	 view	on	the	 properties	 of	 the	 modern—or:	 capitalist—credit	 money	 system	 which	 is	capable	of	creating	money	ex	nihilo.		Moreover,	 the	 study	 presents	 a	 theoretically	 and	 historically	 grounded	analysis	 of	 the	 emergence	 and	 the	 crisis	 of	 the	 contemporary	 shadow	banking	system.	 It	 demonstrates	 that	 in	 a	 functional	 sense,	 shadow	 banking	 and	 the	associated	creation	of	shadow	money	as	forms	of	private	credit	money	is	nothing	new.	 Overnight	 repurchase	 agreements,	money	market	 fund	 shares	 and	 asset-backed	commercial	papers	as	shadow	money	 forms	have	historical	precedents.	We	might	argue	 that	Bank	of	England	notes	and	especially	 country	bank	notes	had	 been	 the	 ‘shadow	 money’	 of	 the	 18th	 century;	 bank	 and	 notably	 trust	deposits	were	the	same	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	century.	Hence,	this	study	is	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 current	 debates	 about	 the	 present	 and	 future	 of	 the	shadow	banking	system.	It	may	be	of	interest	to	those	scholars	and	practitioners	who	occupy	themselves	with	understanding	and	regulating	shadow	money	as—to	recall	the	words	of	Morgan	Ricks—one	of	the	greatest	intellectual	and	political	challenges	of	our	time.	 	
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Finally,	 by	developing	 the	Money	View	as	 a	 conceptual	 lens	 for	 IPE,	 the	study	 seizes	 cutting-edge	 insights	 from	 an	 upcoming	 strand	 in	 monetary	economics	 and	makes	 it	 applicable	 for	 innovative	 and	 topical	 political	 science	research.	 The	 Money	 View	 framework	 allows	 systematic	 analyses	 of	 the	monetary	 and	 financial	 system	 from	 a	 coherent	 perspective	 that	 adopts	 the	notion	of	a	credit	theory	of	money	and	views	money	creation	as	a	market-based	phenomenon	 that	 structurally	 occurs	 endogenously	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 private	enterprise.	 It	 provides	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 dominant	 state-	 and	 fiat	 money-centered	approaches	in	IPE.	By	framing	the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims,	 it	 offers	 an	 entry	 point	 to	studying	 current	 questions	 of	 money	 and	 finance	 from	 a	 political	 economy	perspective	from	a	different	angle	that	is	arguably	closer	to	the	‘real	world’	than	much	of	the	existing	scholarship.		 	
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5.	Structure	of	the	study		To	generate	answers	to	the	research	questions	and	bring	the	envisioned	project	to	reality,	this	study	is	organized	as	follows.		 Chapter	1	 reviews	 the	 literature	on	 the	 transformation	of	 the	monetary	system	in	IPE.	It	systematizes	the	different	approaches	that	describe	and	explain	the	transformation	dynamics.	It	argues	that	the	literature	tends	to	be	subject	to	two	‘biases’	connected	to	the	monetary	theory	they	implicitly	or	explicitly	apply:	First,	they	neglect	the	full	implications	of	the	fact	that	capitalist	money	is,	and	has	been,	in	its	essence	debt—not	commodities	or	a	legal	token	as	suggested	by	the	term	‘fiat	money’.	This	distracts	from	addressing	changes	in	the	structure	of	debt	issuance	 as	 crucial	 aspects	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	(‘Essentialist	bias’).	Second,	 they	assume	that	money	by	default	 is	a	creature	of	the	 state	 and	 rarely	 acknowledge	 the	 existence	 and	 the	 systemic	 relevance	 of	private	money	creation	beyond	state	control	(‘Chartalist	bias’).	Thus,	the	existing	IPE	literature	fails	to	theorize	how	private	credit	money	creation	has	an	impact	on	 the	 historical	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system.	 In	 consequence,	 the	existing	 scholarship	 is	not	 able	 to	 explain	 the	actual	 empirical	 setup	of	 today’s	money	 supply—a	 seemingly	 opaque	 amalgam	 of	 credit	 instruments,	 some	 of	which	are	issued	by	public	and	most	of	which	by	private	institutions.		 Chapter	 2	 introduces	 the	 ‘Money	 View’	 as	 the	 conceptual	 lens	 on	 the	monetary	 system	 that	 this	 study	 applies	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 Chartalist	 and	 the	Essentialist	 bias.	 The	Money	 View,	 as	 used	 in	 economics,	 is	 an	 institutionalist	framework	 for	 the	 study	 of	 modern	 monetary	 systems	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	German	Historical	 School	 and	 American	 Institutionalism.	 As	 a	 credit	 theory	 of	money,	 the	Money	View	 takes	 the	 debt	 properties	 of	modern	money	 seriously	and	overcomes	the	Essentialist	bias.	As	a	market-based	theory	of	money,	it	takes	private	 money	 creation	 seriously	 and	 overcomes	 the	 Chartalist	 bias.	 For	 the	purpose	of	 IPE,	 four	analytical	 ideas	of	 the	Money	View	play	a	key	role:	money	creation	 as	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs;	 hierarchy	 of	 different	 credit	money	 forms;	 public-private	hybridity	of	the	money	supply;	and	inherent	instability	of	credit	money.	Taking	this	into	account,	the	Money	View	portrays	the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 unstable	 debt	 claims.	 This	 provides	 the	entry	point	 for	an	analysis	and	explanation	of	 the	monetary	system’s	historical	transformation.		 Chapter	 3	 develops	 a	 theory	 on	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 private	 credit	money	accommodation.	The	theory	describes	and	explains	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	beyond	the	Essentialist	and	the	Chartalist	biases	via	a	two-phase	 model	 using	 the	 Money	 View	 lens.	 In	 Phase	 I,	 new	 credit	 instruments	emerge	 that	 become	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	money.	 In	 Phase	 II,	 a	run	 on	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 threatens	 to	 make	 the	 entire	 financial	system	collapse.	Policy-makers	then	intervene	and	establish	public	backstops	for	the	 private	 credit	 money	 form.	 In	 this,	 they	 create	 an	 ad	 hoc	 public-private	partnership	to	protect	the	credit	money	form	by	guaranteeing	its	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	 established	 money	 forms	 and	 ‘accommodate’	 it	 in	 the	 public	 money	supply.	 While	 private	 agency	 dominates	 in	 phase	 I,	 public	 agency	 becomes	
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crucial	in	phase	II	when	political	authorities	react	to	technical	necessities	in	the	systemic	crisis.	Still,	 the	 transformation	 follows	a	 functionalist	 logic	as	 the	root	causes	for	private	credit	money	accommodation	are	to	be	found	in	the	inherent	dynamics	of	the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	expanding,	yet	instable	 debt	 claims.	 This	 property	 unavoidably	 creates	 the	 necessity	 to	accommodate	at	some	point	to	self-preserve	the	system.		Chapter	 4	 analyzes	 and	 explains	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	notes	 that	occurred	 in	 England	 in	 1797.	 Bank	 notes	 as	 a	 private	 credit	 money	 form	developed	from	the	17th	throughout	the	18th	century,	with	the	Bank	of	England	and	 country	 banks	 as	 main	 issuers.	 The	 accommodation	 took	 place	 when	 the	government—as	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 depletion	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 bullion	reserve	in	a	financial	crisis	connected	to	the	French-English	wars—initiated	the	‘Restriction	Period’	by	suspending	the	guaranteed	conversion	of	Bank	of	England	notes	into	gold.	Via	an	Order	of	the	Privy	Council	and	later	backed	by	Parliament,	the	Restriction	effectively	turned	Bank	of	England	notes	into	publicly	guaranteed	credit	money:	Public	backstops	were	established	via	the	legal	proclamation	that	Bank	of	England	notes	were	a	promise	to	pay	nothing	else	but	themselves—they	were	 turned	 into	 an	 ultimate	 means	 of	 payment—and	 the	 government’s	guarantee	 to	 accept	 an	 unlimited	 amount	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 for	 tax	payments.			 Chapter	5	analyzes	and	explains	the	accommodation	of	bank	deposits	that	occurred	in	the	United	States	in	1933.	Bank	deposits	emerged	even	earlier	than	bank	notes;	they	are	expressions	of	the	debt	owed	by	the	bank	to	their	customers	and	 are	 hence	 a	 by-product	 of	 double-entry	 book	 keeping,	 which	was	 already	common	in	Renaissance	Italy.	Still,	they	developed	into	a	fully	functional	private	credit	money	form	only	after	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes,	first	in	England	and	 later	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 accommodation	 took	 place	 after	 the	 1929	Financial	 Crisis	 when	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 system	 was	 subject	 to	 a	 multi-annual	banking	crisis,	which	appeared	 in	 four	waves	between	1930	and	1933.	 It	could	only	be	stopped	when	President	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt	declared	a	National	Banking	 Holiday	 and,	 by	 passing	 the	 Emergency	 Banking	 Act	 in	 March	 1933,	announced	 an	 implicit	 100%	 government	 guarantee	 for	 bank	 deposits.	 This	allowed	 the	 private	 deposit-issuing	 commercial	 banks	 to	 tap	 public	 balance	sheets	and	turned	deposits	into	publicly	guaranteed	credit	money.		 Chapter	 6	 analyzes	 and	 explains	 the	 accommodation	 of	 shadow	money	that	 occurred	 in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 2008.	 Shadow	money	 as	 a	 private	 credit	money	 form	 developed	 roughly	 from	 the	 1970s	 onwards.	 The	 three	 eminent	forms	were	asset-backed	commercial	papers,	overnight	repurchase	agreements	and	 money	 market	 fund	 shares.	 The	 accommodation	 of	 shadow	 money	 took	place	during	the	2007-9	Crisis	when	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Department	of	Treasury	 intervened	 to	 backstop	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system.	 Overnight	repurchase	agreements	were	 turned	 into	publicly	guaranteed	credit	money	via	the	Primary	Dealer	Credit	Facility	and	the	Term	Securities	Lending	Facility	of	the	Fed,	money	market	 fund	shares	via	 the	Treasury’s	Temporary	Guaranty.	Asset-backed	commercial	papers,	in	contrast,	were	not	accommodated	as	their	market	had	been	dried	out	already	in	2007.	 	
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Chapter	7	discusses	the	role	of	the	accommodation	theory	in	the	broader	framework	of	IPE.	It	first	provides	a	comparative	summary	of	the	findings	in	the	three	case	studies	and	thus	highlights	the	empirical	variations	of	the	ideal	type.	Subsequently,	 it	points	out	the	contribution	the	study	makes	to	field	of	IPE	and	the	literature	on	the	monetary	system’s	transformation.	It	stresses	three	aspects:	presenting	a	historical	genealogy	of	the	monetary	system,	bringing	in	innovative	tools	 for	 IPE’s	 conceptual	 apparatus	 and	 developing	 a	 distinct	 functionalist	explanatory	approach.	After	that,	the	chapter	discusses	some	implications	of	the	analyticist	research	paradigm	and	the	functionalist	explanatory	approach.	These	concern	the	issue	of	negative	cases	as	well	as	a	possible	underappreciation	of	the	role	of	 the	state	when	 it	 comes	 to	creating	new	 forms	of	private	credit	money.	Eventually,	the	chapter	illustrates	venues	for	further	research.	On	the	one	hand,	this	 refers	 to	 developing	 a	 more	 systematic	 understanding	 of	 the	 follow-up	processes	 after	 the	 accommodation.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 takes	 into	 account	possible	 applications	 of	 the	Money	 View	 in	 scholarship	 of	 IPE,	 notably	 on	 the	International	Monetary	System	and	the	European	Monetary	Union.		 Finally,	the	Conclusion	completes	the	study	by	reconnecting	its	findings	to	the	problématique,	i.e.	the	question	of	how	to	reconcile	the	rise	and	the	crisis	of	shadow	money	with	IPE	studies	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		
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Chapter	1	
Literature	Review:	The	Essentialist	and	the	Chartalist	Bias		
in	IPE	Studies	on	the	Transformation	of	the	Monetary	System	
	
	
“[M]any	 of	 the	 political	 changes	 in	 the	 century	 have	
been	 caused	 by	 little-understood	 perturbations	 in	 the	
international	monetary	system,	while	these	in	turn	have	
been	a	consequence	of	the	rise	of	the	United	States	and	
mistakes	 of	 its	 financial	 arm,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
System”	(Mundell	2000:	327).	
	
	
1.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	 chapter	 reviews	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	system	in	IPE.	It	systematizes	the	different	approaches	that	describe	and	explain	the	 transformation	dynamics	and	points	 to	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 literature,	namely	 that	the	role	of	private	credit	money	has	not	systematically	been	taken	into	account	to	 analyze	 and	 explain	 the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation.	 In	 consequence,	the	 existing	 scholarship	 is	 not	 able	 to	 explain	 the	 actual	 empirical	 setup	 of	today’s	 money	 supply—a	 seemingly	 opaque	 amalgam	 of	 credit	 instruments,	some	of	which	are	issued	by	public	and	most	of	which	by	private	institutions.		The	chapter	argues	that	this	is	because	the	vast	majority	of	IPE	studies	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	has	two	biases:	First,	they	neglect	to	take	into	account	the	full	implications	of	the	insights	from	the	studies	that	have	argued	 how	 capitalist	 money	 is,	 and	 has	 been,	 in	 its	 essence	 debt—not	commodities,	a	mere	legal	creature,	or	a	social	construction	as	suggested	by	the	term	‘fiat	money’.	As	a	result,	the	existing	literature	barely	addresses	changes	in	the	 structure	 of	 debt	 issuance	 as	 crucial	 aspects	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	transformation	 (‘Essentialist	 bias’).	 Second,	 they	 tacitly	 assume	 that	money	 by	default	 is	a	 creature	of	 the	 state	and	rarely	acknowledge	 the	existence	and	 the	systemic	relevance	of	private	money	creation	beyond	the	purview	of	the	state.	In	this,	 they	 underemphasize	 the	 role	 of	 private	 agency,	 notably	 within	 a	 credit	leverage	 cycle,	 for	 changes	 in	 the	 monetary	 system	 (‘Chartalist	 bias’).	 In	 a	nutshell,	with	both	biases	combined,	 the	existing	IPE	 literature	 fails	 to	theorize	how	private	 credit	money	 creation	and	 the	dynamics	 associated	with	 it	has	 an	impact	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	in	general.			What	is	the	body	of	literature	that	this	chapter	reviews	and	to	which	this	assessment	 applies?	 In	 contemporary	 academia,	 disciplinary	 boundaries	 are	difficult	to	draw.	Studies	connected	to	the	“economy”	or	“political	economy”	are	scattered	 across	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 subfields,	 many	 of	 which	 have	 developed	 a	distinctive	disciplinary	identity.	The	field	of	“economics”	is,	in	its	mainstream—as	 it	 developed	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	Marginalists	William	Stanley	 Jevons	 and	Léon	Walras—founded	on	a	methodological	 account	 that,	 based	on	 the	Arrow-Debreu	version	of	the	Walrasian	general	equilibrium	theory,	effectively	models	a	non-monetary	 economy	 and	 by	 assumption	 rules	 out	 that	 questions	 about	 the	
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institutional	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	can	be	reasonably	asked	(cf.	Hahn	1983:	1,	5;	Romer	2016).	Thus,	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	is	a	theme	 profoundly	 underdeveloped	 in	mainstream	 economics.	 Other	 fields	 and	theoretical	approaches—especially	 those	 that	do	not	 see	a	 clear-cut	distinction	between	 economic	 and	 political	 rationales	 as	 the	 Marginalists	 and	 their	successors—found	 their	 home	 in	 various	 ‘neighbouring’	 disciplines	 to	economics.	Today,	 IPE	 is	 the	 leading	discipline	studying	 the	 linkages	of	politics	and	economics	(cf.	Cohen	2008)	and	thus	has	a	say	on	describing	and	explaining	processes	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	boundaries	of	IPE	cannot	be	clearly	determined.	There	are	unavoidable	overlaps	with	 other	 fields	 such	 as	 economic	 history,	 ‘heterodox	 economics’	 (e.g.	 Post	Keynesianism),	economic	sociology,	history,	finance,	legal	studies,	or	philosophy.		The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:		Section	 1.2	 reviews	 the	 existing	 literature	 in	 IPE	 and	 asks	 how	 the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	is	described	and	explained.	It	highlights	the	 main	 descriptive	 themes	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 this	 literature—the	international	exchange	rate	arrangements,	central	banking,	the	physical	shape	of	the	monetary	units,	and	the	relationship	of	money	and	the	nation	state—across	a	variety	 of	 historical	 key	 phases:	 the	 early	 modern	 period,	 the	 Classical	 Gold	Standard,	 the	Bretton	Woods	 System,	 and	 generalized	 floating.	 Explanations	 of	these	 monetary	 transformations	 typically	 correspond	 to	 realist,	 rationalist,	constructivist,	 structuralist,	or	 functionalist	approaches.	They	reflect	 in	various	ways	 on	 the	 respective	 roles	 of	 states	 and	 markets,	 as	 well	 as	 agents	 and	structures,	 and	 point	 to	 different	 conceptualisations	 of	 power	 as	 the	 force	driving	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		Section	1.3	argues	that	the	reviewed	literature	on	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	is	subject	to	two	biases.	Both	refer	to	the	monetary	theory	that	—mostly	 implicitly—is	 adopted.	 The	 Essentialist	 bias	 denotes	 the	 neglect	 of	addressing	the	credit	properties	of	the	contemporary	and	the	historical	British-style	monetary	 system	upfront.	 It	 is	made	 evident	when	 those	 studies	 become	more	 explicit	 on	what	 money	 is,	 as	 well	 as	 how	 and	where	 it	 originated.	 The	Chartalist	bias,	in	its	strong	version,	points	to	the	fact	that	money	creation	is	seen	as	 an	 exclusive	 privilege	 of	 the	 state.	 In	 a	 lighter	 version,	 it	 assumes	 that	 the	general	money	supply	was	under	the	control	of	the	state.	These	assumptions	are	evident	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 discussing	 the	 role	 of	 public	 and	 private	 actors	 in	money	 creation.	 The	 prevalence	 of	 both	 biases	 leads	 to	 the	 current	 state	 of	affairs,	 in	which	 IPE	 studies	do	not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 role	of	private	 credit	money	 as	 a	 driving	 force	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 and	 hence	have	a	blind	spot	both	 in	 their	description	and	 their	understanding	of	how	the	modern	credit	money	system	changes	its	shape	over	time.		Section	 1.4	 concludes	 by	 calling	 for	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	transformation	that	attributes	crucial	relevance	to	private	credit	money	creation	and	 develops	 a	 notion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 which	 involves	 accommodating	private	credit	money	in	the	public	money	supply..	 	
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1.2	The	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	in	IPE		This	section	sets	out	to	review	the	literature	in	IPE	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	The	main	motivation	informing	this	review—corresponding	to	what	the	introductory	chapter	has	established	as	the	problématique	guiding	this	study—is	 to	understand	how	the	 literature	portrays	 the	historical	processes	of	institutional	 change	 that	 have	 led	 up	 to	 today’s	 institutional	 reality	 in	 the	monetary	 system.	 To	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 the	 section	 analytically	 distinguishes	between	the	various	approaches	to	describing	and	explaining	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system:	On	the	one	hand,	 the	section	reviews	which	particular	phenomena	 of	 institutional	 change	 the	 IPE	 literature	 pays	 attention	 to.	 It	identifies	 four	 key	 themes:	 the	 transformation	 of	 international	 exchange	 rate	arrangements,	central	banking,	the	monetary	unit’s	physical	shape	as	well	as	the	relationship	between	money	and	the	nation	state.	On	the	other	hand,	the	section	systematizes	 how	 the	 various	 aspects	 of	 institutional	 change	 in	 the	 monetary	system	 are	 explained	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 forces	 driving	 the	 transformation.	 It	identifies	 realist,	 rationalist,	 constructivist	 as	 well	 as	 structuralist	 explanatory	approaches.			
1.2.1	Describing	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system		The	 IPE	 literature	 addresses	 the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 sometimes	explicitly	 as	 a	 subject,	 yet	 more	 often	 refers	 to	 it	 implicitly.	 What	 specific	phenomena	does	 the	 literature	 focus	on	when	 it	 studies	historical	 institutional	change	 in	 the	monetary	 system?	What	actual	 transformation	processes	 leading	up	from	the	past	to	today	do	IPE	scholars	take	into	account?		 When	investigating	transformations	in	the	monetary	system,	the	existing	IPE	scholarship	focuses	on	four	main	themes:	the	transformation	of	international	exchange	 rate	 arrangements;	 the	 transformation	 of	 central	 banking;	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 units’	 physical	 shape;	 as	 well	 as	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	money	 and	 the	 nation	 state.	 In	 its	depiction,	 the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	inherently	 is	attributed	a	national	 and	 an	 international	 dimension;	 both	 are	 connected	with	 each	 other,	and	 influence	 each	 other,	 in	 various	 fashions	 (cf.	 Walter	 and	 Sen	 2009).	Traditionally,	the	eminent	countries	under	scrutiny	are	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States,	due	to	their	hegemonic	status	as	the	world’s	financial	centres,	as	 well	 as	 France	 and	 Germany	 as	 the	 two	 most	 influential	 countries	 on	 the	European	continent,	which	in	the	1990s	merged	and	became	the	core	countries	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU).	Other	countries	and	regions	such	as	the	former	 communist	 block	 and	 emerging	 economies	 are	 occasionally	 taken	 into	account	 but	 are	 less	 systematically	 studied.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 section	provides	an	overview	on	the	current	state	of	research	on	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	in	IPE.	It	reviews	some	of	the	main	debates	by	looking	at	the	four	main	themes	and	discussing	for	each	of	 them	which	emphases	are	made	in	IPE	scholarship	 throughout	 the	 various	 historical	 stages.	 In	 this,	 the	 review	establishes	what	is	on	the	radar	of	IPE	in	terms	of	actual	historical	phenomena	in	order	to	later	point	out	what	is	not.	 	
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First,	 the	 dominant	 theme	 discussed	 within	 the	 IPE	 literature	 on	 the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 is	 the	 changing	 shape	 of	 the	 international	
exchange	 rate	 arrangements	 that	are	 in	place	between	monetarily	 sovereign	states.	 As	 is	 conventionally	 understood,	 there	 are	 four	 main	 eras	 of	 those	exchange	arrangements:	the	Early	Modern	Period	(until	1873),	the	Classical	Gold	Standard	 (1873-1932),	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 System	 (1944-1973),	 as	 well	 as	Generalized	 Floating	 (since	 1973)	 (cf.	 e.g.	 D’Arista	 2009,	 Eichengreen	 2008,	Helleiner	 2011a,	 Mundell	 2000).	 As	 Figure	 1.1	 demonstrates,	 those	 exchange	rate	 arrangements	 are	 typically	 connected	 to	 what	 Cohen	 (1993b)	 calls	 the	“unholy	 trinity”	 or	 Broz	 and	 Frieden	 (2001)	 refer	 to	 as	 “impossible	 trinity”	(critical:	Widmaier	2004).	It	is	a	framework	based	on	Mundell	(1960,	1963)	and	Fleming	 (1962)	 that	 connects	 the	 exchange	 rate	 arrangements—first	 and	foremost	 the	 choice	 of	 fixed	 or	 flexible	 exchange	 rates—with	 regulations	 for	international	 capital	 mobility	 and	 the	 ability	 of	 states	 to	 conduct	 autonomous	monetary	 policy.	 In	 typical	 parlance,	 those	 arrangements—in	 line	 with	 the	respective	 regulations	 for	 international	 capital	 mobility	 as	 well	 as	 the	autonomous	domestic	monetary	policy—are	also	referred	to	as	the	International	Monetary	System	(IMS).5					
Free	International	
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	Classical	Gold	 	 														Generalized	
	Standard	 	 	 		Floating	
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Bretton	Woods	
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Figure	1.1—International	monetary	systems	and	the	‘Impossible	Trinity’			 In	the	literature,	the	transformation	of	these	exchange	rate	arrangements,	or—more	generally	speaking—the	IMS,	is	discussed	on	the	one	hand	with	regard	to	 the	 transition	 from	 one	 historical	 formation	 to	 another.	 Within	 this	perspective,	 the	historical	process	of	 the	monetary	system’s	 transformation	 led	from	 relinquishing	 domestic	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy	 over	 prohibiting	international	 capital	 mobility	 to	 today’s	 system	 of	 largely	 unregulated	international	 exchange	 rate	 relations	 (cf.	 Cooper	 1968;	 Andrews	 1994).																																																										5		 Some	scholars	such	as	Mundell	(1972),	Cohen	(1977)	and	Strange	(1996)	make	a	distinction	between	 the	 international	 monetary	 system	 and	 the	 international	 monetary	 order,	 arguing	that	the	latter	was	similar	to	the	‘constitution’	of	the	former.	This	overview	sympathizes	with	this	approach	but	will	not	get	so	much	into	detail	that	the	distinction	is	of	practical	relevance.	
	 21	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 literature	 discusses	 dynamics	 within	 those	 formations	that	ultimately	led	to	institutional	stability	or	change.	The	literature	then	focuses	on	issues	such	as	the	scope	of	monetary	cooperation,	monetary	regionalization,	financial	 liberalization,	 political	 control	 over	 the	 system,	 role	 of	 a	 monetary	hegemon	 and	 its	 national	 currency,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 distribution	 of	 costs	 for	international	adjustments	(cf.	Walter	and	Sen	2009:	97).			The	early	modern	period	is	typically	portrayed	as	the	time	preceding	the	Classical	Gold	Standard,	virtually	as	the	ex	negativo	against	which	all	subsequent	formations	 are	 compared.6	The	 dominant	 perspective	 on	 this	 time	 views	 the	international	 exchange	 rate	 system	 as	 a	 non-system	 that	 had	 merely	 orderly	structures	within	the	British	Empire.	The	main	transformation	analyzed	is	how	the	 gold	 standard	 as	 an	 initially	 domestic	 structure	 developed	 into	 a	 world	encompassing	system	(cf.	Bordo	and	Schwartz	1984;	Redish	1990,	1995;	Knafo	2006,	 2013).	 As	 milestones	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation,	 the	literature	singles	out	the	year	1717	when	Isaac	Newton,	then	Master	of	the	Mint,	fixed	the	mint	price	of	gold	and	overvalued	it	relatively	to	silver,	de	facto	creating	a	 monometallic	 standard	 (Vilar	 1969,	 Hall	 2008),	 and	 1821	 when	 Britain	returned	 to	 convertibility	 after	 the	 Restriction	 Period,	 during	 which	 Bank	 of	England	 notes	 could	 not	 be	 converted	 into	 gold	 (Harrod	 1969;	 Bordo	 and	Schwartz	1984).	At	 that	 time,	 the	British	Pound	Sterling	gradually	replaced	the	Dutch	Guilder	as	the	hegemonic	international	currency	(Arrighi	1994:	147,	163;	also	 Braudel	 1982).	 In	 contrast,	 Flandreau	 (2004)	 portrays	 this	 time	 as	 a	consistent	 international	monetary	regime	 that	 rested	on	 the	 interaction	among	the	 British	 Empire	 as	 the	 ‘gold	 bloc’,	 a	 ‘silver	 bloc’	 dominated	 by	 the	 German	States	and	Holland,	and	the	‘bimetallic	bloc’,	for	which	the	French	economy	acted	as	 a	 pivot-point	 and	 which	 also	 included	 the	 U.S.	 in	 the	 19th	 century.	 The	literature	 then	 discusses	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 as	 changes	within	these	blocs,	involving	a	series	of	international	monetary	conferences	and	the	foundation	of	the	initially	bimetallic	Latin	Monetary	Union	(Friedman	1990,	Gallarotti	 1993)	 until	 the	 bimetallic	 standard	 eventually	 faded	 out	 (Flandreau	2004).		The	 Classical	 Gold	 Standard	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	 first	 full-fledged	international	monetary	system	(cf.	Bordo	and	Schwartz	1984;	Eichengreen	and	Flandreau	1985).	Since	it	was	only	gradually	adopted,	the	literature	differs	in	its	accounts	 of	 how	 the	 transformation	 towards	 it	 occurred	 and	 when	 it	 actually	started	(D’Arista	2009:	635).	One	of	 the	most	convincing	suggestions	 is	 to	date	the	beginning	of	the	Classical	Gold	Standard	on	1873	when	the	U.S.	demonetized	silver	 and	 Germany	 went	 “on	 gold”,	 whilst	 France	 was	 forced	 to	 give	 up	 its	bimetallic	 standard	after	 the	military	defeat	against	Germany	 in	1871	 (Frieden	1997).	 IPE	 debates	 about	 the	 Classical	 Gold	 Standard	 and	 its	 associated	transformation	range	from	its	emergence	(Broz	1997b;	Knafo	2013a,	2013b)	and																																																									6		 Preceding	the	Classical	Gold	Standard	typically	refers	to	the	European	state	system	in	the	18th	and	19th	century,	during	the	early	stages	of	capitalism.	A	broader	historical	focus	rather	falls	under	the	scrutiny	of	historians,	although	occasional	references	are	made	within	the	broader	field	of	IPE	(cf.	e.g.	Arrighi	1994).	Also	a	wider	geographical	focus	is	possible	but	would	rather	refer	to	the	field	of	anthropology	or	ethnography.	This	study’s	interest	is	understanding	and	describing	monetary	transformation	in	Western	capitalism.	
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its	 heyday	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 to	 its	 collapse	with	 the	 First	World	War,	attempts	 to	 restore	 it	 during	 the	 Interwar	 Years,	 and	 its	 terminal	 breakdown	during	the	Great	Depression	in	1932	(Ahamed	2009;	Bernanke	2000;	Cleveland	1976;	Galbraith	1954)	when	the	faltering	British	Empire	decided	in	an	unorderly	manner	 to	 “go	 off	 gold”	 for	 good	 (Cassel	 1936;	 Gallarotti	 1995;	 Eichengreen	1992;	Kindleberger	1973;	Walter	1991).	The	standard	narrative	argues	that	the	Classical	 Gold	 Standard	was	 stabilized	 by	 a	 natural	 and	 automatic	 adjustment	mechanism	for	prices	and	current	account	imbalances,	based	on	the	price-specie	model	of	Hume	(1742).	Allegedly,	 this	did	not	require	political	 intervention	(cf.	Cohen	 1977;	 Polanyi	 1944)	 and	 enabled	 the	 first	 age	 of	 financial	 globalization	(Abdelal	 2007;	 Flandreau	 and	 Zumer	 2004)	 as	 it	 created	 a	 system	 of	 fixed	exchange	rates	with	free	international	capital	flows.	National	central	banks	could	allow	 the	 international	 adjustment	 mechanisms	 to	 function	 smoothly	 (Knafo	2006:	 81-82)	 if	 only	 they	 adhered	 to	 the	 “Rules	 of	 the	 Game”	 (Keynes	 1925;	McKinnon	1993).	If	the	gold	standard	actually	functioned	in	this	quasi-automatic	way	 has	 sparked	 debates	 in	 IPE.	 Critical	 voices	 contend	 that	 the	 smooth	adjustment	 did	 not	 actually	work,	 that	 central	 banks	 actually	 sought	 to	 shield	their	economies	from	the	gold	standard’s	detrimental	effect	and	that	hence	this	was	by	no	means	an	apolitical	arrangement	(cf.	e.g.	Bordo	1999,	Knafo	2006).		For	the	Bretton	Woods	System,	in	contrast	to	the	Classical	Gold	Standard,	the	literature	typically	determines	a	clear	start	date.	The	system	was	put	in	place	as	the	result	of	the	negotiations	mainly	between	the	U.S.	and	the	United	Kingdom	at	the	1944	conference	in	New	Hampshire	(De	Cecco	1979;	Widmaier	2016).	The	conference	 is	 typically	 portrayed	 as	 a	 contest	 between	 the	Keynes	Plan,	which	suggested	the	end	of	commodity	money	and	an	International	Clearing	Union	with	Bancor	 as	 international	 currency,	 and	 the	 White	 Plan,	 which	 foresaw	 a	 gold-dollar	standard	with	restricted	international	capital	mobility	and	was	eventually	adopted	 (Andrews	 2008;	 Cesarano	 2006;	 Cohen	 1977;	 Gardner	 1956;	 critical:	Helleiner	2014b,	2016).	The	Bretton	Woods	System	acknowledged	the	decline	of	Pound	 Sterling	 (Strange	 1971a)	 and	 positioned	 the	 U.S.	 Dollar	 as	 the	 new	hegemonic	currency	(Gilpin	1987).	It	granted	the	U.S.	the	‘exorbitant	privilege’	of	realizing	 unprecedented	 seigniorage	 gains	 while	 issuing	 the	 world’s	 reserve	currency	 in	 an	 environment	 of	 ever	 expanding	 international	 trade	 with	increasing	 demand	 for	 liquidity	 (Eichengreen	 2011).	 As	 the	 main	 source	 for	institutional	instability,	the	literature	points	to	the	‘Triffin	dilemma’	according	to	which	 the	 guaranteed	 dollar-gold	 peg	 became	 ever	 harder	 to	 remain	 credible	(Machlup	1968;	Triffin	1960).	Hence,	institutional	transformation	in	the	sense	of	the	 system’s	 demise	 is	 associated	 with	 U.S.	 President	 Nixon’s	 refusal	 of	 the	French	 request	 to	 convert	 its	 dollar	 holdings	 into	 gold	 in	 1971,	 and	 the	 year	1973	 when	 the	 fixed	 exchange	 rate	 system	 fell	 apart	 because	 a	 number	 of	countries	 decided	 to	 no	 longer	 peg	 their	 currencies	 to	 the	 U.S.	 dollar	 (Block	1977).	 The	 literature	 stresses	 that	 this	 occurred	 in	 a	 situation	 when	 the	restriction	of	capital	flows	had	become	ever	more	difficult	to	sustain	(Best	2005;	Chwieroth	2010;	Frieden	1987;	Helleiner	1994),	e.g.	due	to	the	emergence	of	the	eurodollar	market	(Burn	1999,	2006;	Palan	1998;	Strange	1986;	Talani	2012).			Generalized	 Floating	 is	 the	 IMS’s	 formation	 that	 came	 about	 with	 the	demise	 of	 the	 Bretton	Woods	 System	 and	 lasts	 until	 today.	 The	 IPE	 literature	
	 23	
studies	 the	 transformations	 connected	 to	 this	 era	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 different	angles.	Scholars	often	stress	that	Generalized	Floating	is	marked	by	the	absence	of	 any	 centrally	 planned	 political	 organization	 (Bernhard	 and	 Leblang	 1999;	Broz	 and	 Frieden	 2001;	 Cohen	 1976;	 Cooper	 1975;	 Kindleberger	 1970;	 Meier	1974)—at	times,	it	is	even	called	an	‘international	monetary	non-system’	(Bibow	2008).	With	 the	 end	 of	 international	 capital	 controls,	 global	 capital	 flows	have	reached	an	unprecedented	extent.	This	transformation	has	attracted	widespread	attention	 in	 the	 IPE	 discourse	 and	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 second	 era	 of	financial	 globalization	 (Abdelal	 2007;	 Cerny	 1994;	 Cohen	 1996;	 Frieden	 1991;	Germain	 1997;	 Gill	 and	 Law	 1989;	 Goodman	 and	 Pauly	 1993;	 Kapstein	 1994;	Kirshner	1999;	Krippner	2011;	Panitch	and	Gindin	2012;	Porter	2005;	Strange	1986;	Watson	2007)	and	precipitating	various	regional	and	global	crises	(Amato	and	Fantacci	2012;	Best	2009;	Cafruny	and	Schwartz	2013;	Eichengreen	2004;	Helleiner	2011b;	Schwartz	2009,	2012;	Widmaier	2003b).	Generalized	Floating	transformed	the	monetary	system	by	triggering	processes	of	regional	monetary	cooperation,	 most	 importantly	 the	 project	 of	 European	 monetary	 integration	(Cohen	 1993a;	 Eichengreen	 1997;	 Eichengreen	 and	 Frieden	 2001;	 Henning	1998;	Jabko	2006,	2008;	McNamara	1998;	Padoa-Schioppa	1994).	It	led	from	the	Snake	in	the	Tunnel	over	the	1979	European	Monetary	System	(EMS)	with	fixed	but	 adjustable	 exchange	 rates	 to	 monetary	 unification	 with	 the	 European	Monetary	 Union,	 agreed	 upon	 with	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Maastricht	 in	 1992	 and	becoming	effective	in	1999	(Brunnermeier	et	al.	2016;	James	2012),	with	various	ups	 and	 downs	 following	 ever	 since	 (Blyth	 and	 Matthijs	 2015;	 Braun	 2015a;	Copelovitch	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Enderlein	 2006;	 Enderlein	 and	 Verdun	 2009;	 Frieden	and	Walter	2017;	Jones	et	al.	2016;	Krampf	2014;	Lapavitsas	2012;	Mabbett	and	Schelkle	 2015;	 Schwarzer	 2015).	 Similar	 but	 less	 far	 reaching	 processes	 have	been	 taking	 place	 elsewhere,	 e.g.	 in	 Asia	 (Dieter	 and	 Higgott	 2010).	 However,	most	developing	countries	have	continued	to	peg	their	exchange	rates	(Kirshner	2003).		Most	IPE	scholars	agree	that	the	era	of	Generalized	Floating	is	marked	by	continuous	dollar	hegemony	and	centrality	of	the	U.S.	(Bibow	2010;	Cohen	2015;	Cohen	 and	 Benney	 2014;	 Eichengreen	 2011;	 Helleiner	 and	 Kirshner	 2012;	Kirshner	 2014;	 Norrlof	 2014;	 Strange	 1971b;	 Stokes	 2014;	 Wyplosz	 2010),	although	 this	 is	 regularly	 put	 into	 doubt	 due	 to	 the	 competition	 of	 other	currencies	 such	 as	 the	 Euro	 (Cohen	 2012a;	 McNamara	 2008;	 Norrlof	 2009;	Germain	and	Schwartz	2014)	or	the	Renminbi	(Cohen	2012b).	In	the	2000s,	the	so-called	 Bretton	Woods	 II	 hypothesis	 had	 sparked	 some	 discussions	 about	 a	new	system	of	quasi-fixed	exchange	rate	 that	was	said	 to	have	emerged	as	 the	result	 of	 endogenous	 developments	 (Dooley	 et	 al.	 2003,	 2009).	 International	monetary	collaboration	takes	place	in	a	rather	informal	and	technocratic	fashion	via	 different	 fora,	 most	 notably	 the	 G7	 (formerly	 G5,	 G6	 or	 G8)	 and	 the	 G20	(Helleiner	and	Pagliari	2009;	Soederberg	2010),	as	well	as	the	Financial	Stability	Board	 (FSB),	 earlier	 Financial	 Stability	 Forum	 (FSF)	 (Porter	 2003;	 Helleiner	2010b).	 The	 IMF	 re-defined	 its	 role	 from	 scratch	 and	 changed	 its	 institutional	orientation	 rather	 towards	 long-term	 lending	 (Broome	2010;	 Chwieroth	 2014;	Moschella	 2009,	 2010;	Woods	 2006).	 Debates	 about	 future	 transformations	 of	the	 IMS	 are	 ongoing	 (see	 e.g.	 Awrey	 2017;	 D’Arista	 2009;	 Eichengreen	 2011;	Helleiner	2010a;	Hocket	2013).	 	
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In	conjunction	with	the	domestic	dimension	of	the	Impossible	Trinity,	the	transformation	of	 central	 banking	 is	 the	 second	 theme	 that	 the	 IPE	 literature	addresses	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system.	 It	 is	connected	 to	 varying	 national	 experiences	 with	 central	 banks	 (cf.	 Goodhart	1988;	Singleton	2011)	and	organizational	forms	of	national	banking	system	(cf.	Smith	 1936).	 As	 to	Marcussen	 (2006,	 2009),	 based	 on	 Fischer	 (1994),	 central	banking	history	broadly	corresponds	to	the	four	eras	of	the	IMS.		 Scholarship	 on	 central	 banking	 in	 the	 Early	Modern	 Period	 is	 relatively	scarce.	The	literature	typically	portrays	the	mint	as	the	core	monetary	institution	of	 the	 time,	 which—in	 a	 mercantilist	 setting—conducted	 ‘monetary	 policy’	 by	realizing	seigniorage	gains,	e.g.	 through	currency	debasement	and	coin	clipping	(Vilar	 1969).	 The	 transformation	 towards	 the	 use	 of	 central	 banks	 took	 place	gradually,	and	at	an	accelerating	pace	in	the	19th	century	(Hixson	1993;	Hodgson	2015).	IPE	discusses	the	rise	of	central	banking	in	a	variety	of	aspects,	taking	into	account	 different	 countries’	 experiences. 7 	England	 was	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	developing	new	financial	techniques	of	credit	money	creation,	which	contributed	significantly	 to	 the	 appeal	 of	 the	 early	 gold	 standard	 (Carruthers	 1996;	 Desan	2014;	 Kreitner	 2012;	 Knafo	 2006,	 2013a).	 This	 coincided	 with	 the	 1694	foundation	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	 initially	 as	 a	 private	 institution,	 which	 is	commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 prototypical	 central	 bank.8	Further	milestones	 in	British	 central	 banking	 history	 were	 the	 1797	 Bank	 Restriction,	 which	suspended	 the	 convertibility	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 into	 gold	 during	 the	Napoleonic	 wars;	 the	 1821	 resumption	 of	 convertibility;	 and	 the	 1844	 Bank	Charter	 Act,	 which	 restructured	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 by	 splitting	 it	 up	 into	 a	banking	and	a	note	issuing	department	(Cameron	et	al.	1967;	Capie	et	al.	1994;	Giannini	 2004;	 Kindleberger	 1984;	 Sgambati	 2016).	 The	 English	 experience	 in	transformation	is	depicted	as	unique,	while	France	and	the	U.S.	are	discussed	as	the	two	major	counter-experiences.	On	the	one	hand,	French	central	banking	in	the	18th	century	is	discussed	in	the	literature	primarily	as	a	story	of	failure,	with	various	unsuccessful	attempts	to	introduce	paper	money.	Most	notably,	the	years	1716	 to	 1720	 witnessed	 John	 Law’s	 “first	 full-blown	 implementation	 of	 fiat	money	in	Europe”	(Velde	2007)	and	the	years	1789	to	1797	the	assignats	as	the	French	revolutionary	currency.	Both	led	to	major	inflations.	In	1800,	the	Banque	de	France	was	founded	but	financing	techniques	never	reached	the	same	level	of	sophistication	as	 in	England	 (Cameron	et	 al.	 1967;	Kindleberger	1984).	On	 the	other	hand,	an	extensive	literature	addresses	the	transformations	the	U.S.	went	through.	 Topics	 under	 scrutiny	 are	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 First	 and	 the	 Second	Bank,	which	were	 in	place	 from	1791	 to	1811	and	1816	 to	1836,	 respectively.	Subsequently,	 the	country	entered	the	Free	Banking	Era	(1836-1864),	 followed	by	 the	National	Banking	System,	put	 in	place	after	 the	Civil	War	 in	1865.	Both	phases	were	marked	by	 the	absence	of	 a	 central	bank	 (Frieden	2015;	Giannini	2004;	Kreitner	2011).		 																																																									7			 Singleton	(2011:	9)	makes	the	very	valid	point	that	“no	two	central	banks	are	identical”.	Yet,	it	seems	 adequate	 to	 discuss	 generalizable	 tendencies	 while	 taking	 into	 account	 variations	across	different	countries.	8		 Still,	Kindleberger	(1984)	points	to	the	Bank	of	Amsterdam	as	the	prototypical	central	bank.	
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Under	 the	 Classical	 Gold	 Standard,	 most	 major	 countries	 had	 already	established	 a	 central	 bank	 or	 were	 about	 to	 do	 so	 (Goodhart	 1988).	 As	 the	argument	 goes,	 central	 banking	 to	 a	 large	 extent	was	 connected	 to	 complying	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 international	 Gold	 Standard	 and	 to	 manage	 the	domestic	 monetary	 and	 banking	 system	 (Bloomfield	 1959;	 Kreitner	 2010),	predominantly	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 note	 issuing	 (Kisch	 and	 Elkin	 1928).	 The	inception	of	the	Classical	Gold	Standard	coincided	with	the	publication	of	Walter	Bagehot’s	 Lombard	 Street	 (1873);	 under	 the	 impression	 of	 recurrent	 financial	crises	 that	marked	British	banking	history,	he	argued	that	 the	Bank	of	England	does	and	should	act	in	the	public	interest	of	financial	stability	as	a	lender	of	last	resort.	During	the	Gold	Standard,	the	Bank	of	England	is	portrayed	as	constantly	having	had	to	mitigate	between	the	requirements	of	operating	the	international	Gold	 Standard	 and	 managing	 the	 domestic	 banking	 system.	 As	 to	 Gallarotti	(1995:	 7),	 central	 bank	 cooperation	 mainly	 involved	 ad	 hoc	 bilateral	arrangements	to	transfer	liquidity	when	needed.	This	went	reasonably	well	until	the	 First	 World	 War	 but	 less	 so	 in	 the	 Interwar	 Years	 when	 Sterling	 was	 in	decline	 (Calomiris	 and	 Haber	 2015;	 Hawtrey	 1932;	 Strange	 1971).	 The	 U.S.	experience,	as	the	literature	contrasts,	differs	profoundly.	Scholars	point	out	that	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	the	U.S.	still	had	the	National	Banking	System	without	a	central	bank.	Only	the	1905	crisis	initiated	a	process	which	culminated	in	the	foundation	of	the	Federal	Reserve	in	1913.	The	system	improved	the	monetary	situation,	 but	 yet	 proved	 to	 be	 insufficiently	 equipped	 to	 prevent	 the	 Great	Depression	 in	 the	 Interwar	 Years	 (1930-33)	 (Broz	 1997a;	 Conti-Brown	 2016;	Grossman	 2010;	 Kindleberger	 1978;	 Konings	 2011;	 Meltzer	 2003;	 Rothbard	2002).	Events	prominently	debated	in	the	literature	on	monetary	transformation	in	Germany	is	the	foundation	of	first	central	bank	in	the	unified	German	Reich	in	1875	 and	 the	 German	 hyperinflation	 in	 1923	 (Ahamed	 2009;	 Bibow	 2017).	Negotiations	over	German	wartime	reparations	eventually	led	to	the	foundation	of	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	 (BIS)	 in	 1930,	 the	 first	 international	institution	for	monetary	cooperation	(Seabrooke	2006b;	Toniolo	2005).		With	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 System,	 as	 IPE	 scholarship	 contends,	 central	banking	became	subject	to	a	transformation	towards	a	relatively	broad	mandate.	This	 involved	 maintaining	 the	 politically	 agreed	 exchange	 rates	 as	 well	 as	pursuing	domestic	monetary	policy	which	sought	to	manage	the	perceived	trade-off	between	price	stability	and	full	employment	(Davies	and	Green	2009;	Fischer	1994;	Siklos	2002;	Singleton	2011).	Expansionary	monetary	policy	was	seen	as	a	legitimate	tool	in	the	macroeconomic	policy	mix.	As	the	conventional	story	goes,	there	 was	 a	 broad	 consensus	 to	 accept	 higher	 inflation	 rates	 to	 keep	 the	economies	 close	 to	 full	 employment	 (Blyth	 2002;	 Hall	 1989;	 Jessop	 2003;	Meltzer	2009a,	2009b).	The	Bretton	Woods	System	relied	on	fixed	but	adjustable	exchange	 rates,	with	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	 functioning	as	 the	key	international	institution	that	provided	short-term	credit	to	the	participating	central	banks	to	help	them	intervene	in	the	foreign	exchange	market	and	induce	the	 politically	 agreed	 exchange	 rates	 (Endres	 2011).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	inception	of	Bretton	Woods	corresponds	with	a	‘nationalisation’	of	many	central	banks	 (e.g.	 Banque	 de	 France	 in	 1945	 and	 Bank	 of	 England	 in	 1946)	 by	establishing	full	state	ownership	of	its	shares	(Goodhart	et	al.	1994).		 	
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In	the	era	of	Generalized	Floating,	with	the	end	of	gold	convertibility	and	under	 the	 impression	 of	 stagflation,	 central	 banks	 adopted	 a	 new	 role	 with	 a	much	stronger	focus	on	price	stability.	Key	reference	points	in	the	IPE	literature	are	 the	 introduction	 of	 transparency,	 inflation	 targeting	 and	 central	 bank	independence	 (CBI)	 to	ensure	 ‘credibility’	 (Bernhard	et	al.	2002;	Blinder	2004;	Dyson	and	Marcussen	2009;	Eijffinger	and	De	Haan	1996;	Goodman	1992;	Hall	2008;	Henning	1994;	Kirshner	2003a,	2003b;	Krippner	2007;	Siklos	2002).	Vice	versa,	 there	 is	 a	 wide	 discourse	 on	 the	 retreat	 of	 central	 banks	 and	 the	 de-regulation	 of	 the	 banking	 system	 (Christophers	 2013;	 D’Arista	 1994;	 Erturk	2016;	 Goldbach	 2015;	 Kapstein	 1989;	 Kay	 2015;	 Kotlikoff	 2010;	 Lall	 2012;	Persaud	 2015;	 Rethel	 and	 Sinclair	 2012;	 Thiemann	 2014).	 Whilst	 France	repeatedly	sought	to	sustain	a	Keynesian	monetary	policy	orientation,	Germany	clinged	 to	 its	 rather	monetarist	 Bundesbank	 tradition,	while	 running	 the	 EMS.	The	 decision	 in	 favour	 of	 EMU	 implied	 irrevocably	 uniting	 the	 French	 and	German	 monetary	 systems	 and	 putting	 them	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 ECB	(Bindseil	 2004,	 2014;	 Busch	 2009;	De	Haan	 2000;	Dyson	 2009;	 Flassbeck	 and	Spiecker	 2011;	 McNamara	 1998).	 This	 step	 occurred	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	German	unification,	which	also	implied	the	introduction	of	Deutschmark	in	East	Germany	(De	Grauwe	1992;	Streeck	2009).	The	United	Kingdom	sought	to	adjust	to	 the	 new	 monetary	 realities,	 e.g.	 by	 temporarily	 adopting	 a	 monetarist	experiment	and	temporarily	 joining	the	EMS	(Capie	2010;	Elgie	and	Thompson	1998).	The	Fed	restored	its	hegemonic	position,	despite	the	Volcker	shock	in	the	1970s	 (Dowd	 1993).	 Decades	 of	 low	 interest	 rates	 persisted	 throughout	 the	‘NICE’	 years	 (non-inflationary	 constant	 expansion)	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	eminent	 Alan	 Greenspan	 (Golub	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Mayer	 1990),	 until	 the	 2007-9	Financial	 Crisis	 changed	 everything	 (Admati	 and	 Hellwig	 2013;	 Blinder	 2013;	Crotty	and	Epstein	2009;	Drezner	2014;	Ingham	2008;	Kaufman	2009;	Konings	2010;	Mian	and	Sufi	2014;	Nesvetailova	2010;	Samman	2014;	Varoufakis	2011)	and	led	to	multiple	bank	bailouts	(Culpepper	and	Reinke	2014;	Woll	2014).	The	Fed	 had	 to	 set	 up	 numerous	 emergency	 facilities,	 sharply	 expand	 its	 balance	sheet,	 and	 adopt	 an	 array	 of	 new	 responsibilities	 (Broz	 2015;	 Brunnermeier	2009;	 Mehrling	 2011;	 Wray	 and	 Nersisyan	 2016).	 In	 terms	 of	 international	collaboration,	 the	Fed	established	 innovative	swap	 lines	with	 the	major	central	banks,	among	them	the	ECB	and	the	Bank	of	England	(Henning	2015;	McDowell	2012,	2016).	Since	the	crisis,	with	interest	rates	at	the	zero	lower	bound,	central	banking	 resorts	 to	 emergency	 measures	 such	 as	 Quantitative	 Easing	 (Bibow	2016;	 Braun	 2015b,	 2016b;	 Gabor	 2014;	 Koo	 2014;	 Pettifor	 2017;	 Schwartz	2015)	and	further	transformation	of	central	banks	into	the	unpredictable	future	(Gabor	2016;	Gabor	and	Ban	2016;	Goodhart	et	al.	2016;	King	2016;	Ricks	2016).		As	 third	 theme,	 the	 IPE	 literature	 discusses	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	
monetary	units’	physical	shape.	In	conjunction	with	the	transformation	of	the	International	 Monetary	 System,	 this	 involves	 changes	 in	 the	 prevalence	 from	commodity	 money	 over	 paper	 money	 and	 book	 money	 to	 ‘fiat	 money’	 (cf.	Giannini	2004)	as	well	as	the	role	of	‘credit	money’	and	other	alternative	money	forms.	In	this,	neither	the	terminology	nor	the	interpretation	of	historical	events	are	consistently	used.		 	
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The	 literature	 contends	 that	 money	 in	 the	 Early	 Modern	 Period	 was	mainly	commodites,	notably	gold	and	silver,	but	also	other	precious	metals	such	as	 copper	 (Cottrell	 1992;	 Flandreau	 2004;	 Kreitner	 2011;	 Redish	 1995;	 Vilar	1969).	 It	 is	noted	 that	 this	monetary	system	was	confronted	with	a	permanent	shortage	of	supply.	To	have	sufficient	monetary	commodities	in	a	country,	it	was	important	 to	 have	 export	 surpluses	 and	 attract	 precious	metals	 (Desan	 2014).	For	 early	 banking	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	Bank	 of	 Amsterdam,	 guaranteeing	 a	proper	quality	of	commodity	money	was	the	main	business	model	(Kindleberger	1984).	 The	 literature	 occasionally	 acknowledges	 that	 there	 were	 money-like	credit	 instruments,	 e.g.	 bills	 of	 exchange,	 which	 helped	 facilitate	 international	trade	 without	 commodity	 money	 (Boyer-Xambeu	 et	 al	 1986;	 Ingham	 2004;	Kindleberger	1984).	More	prominently,	 IPE	discusses	 the	 rise	of	paper	money,	notably	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	French	paper	money	experiments	 (Velde	2007)	and	the	more	successful	Bank	of	England	notes	(Arnon	2011;	Helleiner	2003;	Knafo	2013).	 Insofar	 as	 these	 paper	 notes	 were	 not	 or	 no	 longer	 convertible	 into	commodity	 money—as	 e.g.	 during	 the	 French	 paper	 money	 experiments,	 the	English	Restriction	Period	or	 the	American	Greenback	era—they	are	said	 to	be	fiat	 money,	 relying	 on	 nothing	 else	 but	 the	 government’s	 guarantee	 (D’Arista	2009).	Before	 the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act	established	a	note	 issuing	monopoly,	bank	notes	were	also	issued	by	English	country	banks	(Pressnell	1956;	Cameron	et	al.	1967);	the	same	was	true	in	other	monetary	jurisdictions—for	example	the	U.S.	(see	e.g.	Rothbard	2002)—until	the	20th	century.	After	the	1844,	the	physical	shape	of	the	monetary	unit	transformed	itself	as	‘book	money’	or	‘bank	money’	in	the	 form	of	bank	deposits	became	more	 influential	 and	widespread	 (Liepmann	1933).	Occasionally,	yet	as	an	exception	in	the	reviewed	literature,	British	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits	are	also	discussed	as	‘credit	money’	(Guttmann	1994).		The	 Gold	 Standard	 and	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 System	 are	 discussed	 as	commodity	money	standards,	which	consolidated	the	commodity	money	basis	to	one	 single	 monetary	 commodity	 (Bordo	 1999).	 Throughout	 the	 20th	 century,	paper	money	declined	in	its	importance,	leading	to	today’s	suggestions	to	abolish	it	 entirely	 (Rogoff	 2016).	 Instead,	 the	 role	 of	 deposits	 at	 commercial	 banks	became	 eminent	 (Bruner	 and	Carr	 2009).	With	 the	 rise	 of	 IT	 technology,	 their	physical	shape	was	further	transformed,	leading	to	‘electronic	money’	(Helleiner	1998).	At	the	same	time,	a	major	concern	was	finding	new	forms	of	international	money,	 e.g.	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 IMF’s	 Special	 Drawing	 Rights	 (SDRs),	 which—developed	during	the	Bretton	Woods	System	to	counteract	 the	Triffin	Dilemma	(Helleiner	2011a)—constitute	a	basket	of	the	world’s	major	currencies	and	could	potentially	 be	 turned	 into	 an	 international	 currency	 in	 its	 own	 right	 (Cooper	2010),	 eventually	 termed	 ‘paper	 gold’	 (Bordo	1999:	2).	 In	 addition,	 alternative	money	 forms	 emerged.	 For	 example,	 the	discussion	 refers	 to	private	money	 in	the	form	of	local	currencies	(Helleiner	2000)	and	alternative	money	forms	such	as	 vouchers	 and	 loyalty	 cards,	 which	 have	 monetary	 properties	 as	 they	constitute	a	medium	of	exchange,	a	unit	of	account,	and	a	store	of	value	(Cohen	2003).	Zelizer	(1994)	focuses	on	alternative	‘domestic’	currencies.			In	 recent	 times,	 extended	 attention	 is	 given	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 Bitcoin	 (e.g.	Hendrickson	et	al.	2016),	the	possible	transformation	of	derivatives	into	money	(Bryan	 and	 Rafferty	 2006),	 and—most	 importantly	 for	 this	 study—the	 rise	 of	
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‘shadow	money’	such	as	repurchase	agreements,	money	market	fund	shares,	and	asset-backed	 commercial	 paper	 (Gabor	 and	 Vestergaard	 2016;	 Gorton	 2011;	Ricks	 2011,	 2012a,	 2012b,	 2013,	 2016).	 Most	 prominently,	 however,	 the	inception	of	Generalized	Floating	is	discussed	as	initiating	the	age	of	fiat	money,	portrayed	as	a	fundamental	transformation	that	money	is	no	longer	connected	to	a	tangible	physical	commodity	base	but	instead	relies	on	pure	government	‘fiat’	(cf.	e.g.	Amato	and	Fantacci	2012;	Drezner	and	McNamara	2013;	Gallarotti	1995;	Giannini	2004;	Jessop	2013;	Macesich	1999;	Redish	1993).	As	to	D’Arista	(2009:	635),	 the	 inception	 of	 fiat	money	 completed	 a	 transformation	 that	 had	 started	long	 before:	 “In	 today’s	 national	 economies	 and	 the	 international	 monetary	system,	 fiat	 currencies	 are	 the	 norm.	With	 no	 backing	 other	 than	 the	 full	 faith	and	credit	of	 the	governments	 that	 issue	 them,	 the	evolution	of	 today’s	money	began	with	the	introduction	and	acceptance	of	paper	money	in	the	seventeenth	century	in	the	form	of	receipts	for	deposits	of	gold	in	the	Bank	of	Amsterdam.”		The	 fourth	 theme	 is	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
money	and	the	nation	state	i.e.	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	‘Westphalian	monetary	system’	with	 the	principle	“One	nation/	one	money”	as	 the	key	reference	point	(cf.	 Cohen	 1998,	 2008;	 Helleiner	 2003;	 also	 Dowd	 and	 Timberlake	 1998).	Accordingly,	in	the	Early	Modern	Period,	money	was	nationally	issued	but	could	be	used	in	other	monetary	jurisdiction	without	major	restrictions.	Only	with	the	rise	 of	 nation	 states,	 political	 actors	 excluded	 foreign	 currencies	 from	 their	domestic	 circulation	 and	 established	 a	 monopoly	 for	 national	 money	 (Cohen	1998,	2003).	Hefeker	(1995,	1997)	studies	monetary	integration	in	Germany	and	Italy,	the	latecomers	among	the	European	nation	states.	Polanyi	(1944)	sees	this	transformation	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 feudal	 to	 the	 capitalist	order	 based	 on	 a	 market	 economy.	 Helleiner	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 in	 monetary	jurisdictions	at	 the	 time,	with	official	 currencies	being	barely	homogenous	and	standardized,	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 currencies	 would	 circulate	 alongside	 each	other.	Only	with	the	inception	of	the	Classical	Gold	Standard,	the	transformation	towards	 territorially	 homogeneous	 and	 exclusively	 national	 money	 was	completed	in	Europe,	the	U.S.	and	Japan.	In	former	colonial	states	of	Asia,	Africa,	Latin	 America	 and	 the	Middle	 East,	 it	 was	 only	 in	 the	 Interwar	 Years	 or	 after	World	 War	 II	 that	 exclusive	 territorial	 currencies	 were	 established	 (also	 see	Gilbert	 and	 Helleiner	 1999).	 Since	 the	 era	 of	 Bretton	 Woods	 and	 throughout	Generalized	Floating,	the	Westphalian	monetary	system	is	said	to	be	in	decline.	Cohen	(1998,	2003)	points	out	the	role	of	market-driven	currency	competition,	in	which	the	cross-border	demand	and	use	of	the	major	currencies	is	increasing.	This	leads	to	a	deterritorialization	of	money	and	more	complex	currency	usage.		To	sum	up,	 the	depiction	of	 the	 four	 themes	 that	address	aspects	of	 the	monetary	system’s	transformation	provides	an	overview	on	the	big	picture	of	the	focal	points	of	IPE	scholarship.	Portraying	the	discourse	in	this	way	shows	what	is	 on	 the	 radar,	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 All	 four	 themes	 reconstruct	 a	 historical	development	 towards	 today’s	 world	 of	 fiat	 money—in	 the	 IMS,	 for	 domestic	central	 banks,	 from	 a	 physical	 point	 of	 view,	 and	 as	 concerns	 the	 role	 of	 the	modern	 state	 for	 supplying	money.	Before	 setting	 up	 an	 argument	 about	what	this	body	of	 literature	 is	missing	 in	descriptive	 terms,	 the	next	section	reviews	the	theoretical	approaches	towards	explaining	the	observed	phenomena.		 	
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1.2.2	Explaining	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system		Within	the	body	of	literature	that	studies	the	monetary	system’s	transformation,	which	theoretical	approaches	are	prevalent	to	explain	the	observed	phenomena?	What	are	the	forces	said	to	be	driving	the	monetary	system’s	transformation?			 This	section	shows	that,	insofar	as	the	reviewed	works	go	beyond	a	mere	description9	and	 establish	 a	 somewhat	 delineable	 causality,	 the	 explanatory	approaches	to	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	correspond	to	eminent	strands	 of	 IPE	 theories—notably	 realism,	 liberalism,	 constructivism	 and	structuralism.10	These	 explanatory	 approaches	 reflect	 in	 various	 forms	 on	 the	roles	 of	 states	 and	 markets	 (cf.	 Strange	 1988)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 agent-structure	problem	(cf.	Wendt	1987).	This	section	sketches	some	core	assumptions	of	 the	four	 explanatory	 approaches	 and	 points	 to	 selected	 works	 on	 the	 monetary	system’s	 transformation	 in	 which	 these	 are	 manifested.11 	Such	 undertaking	necessarily	is	an	abstraction,	generalization	and	simplification,	both	with	regard	to	the	way	in	which	the	theories	and	the	actual	arguments	are	portrayed;	but	it	may	 nevertheless	 yield	 valuable	 insights	 in	 how	 existing	 arguments	 about	 the	causes	and	drivers	of	monetary	transformation	are	construed.		
Realist	explanations	see	states	as	the	relevant	actors	and	states’	pursuit	of	their	interests	as	the	decisive	vehicle	to	bring	about	monetary	transformation.	Such	views	are	often	connected	to	rather	traditional	conceptualizations	of	state	power,	 e.g.	 termed	 ‘compulsory	 power’,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 respective	 state’s	capabilities	to	push	through	their	interests	and	get	others	to	do	what	they	would	not	 do	 otherwise	 (Barnett	 and	 Duvall	 2005).	 Realist	 approaches	 to	 ‘monetary	power’	 have	 been	 brought	 forth	 by	 Kirshner	 (1995),	 who	 argues	 that	 states	choose	 the	monetary	 unit	 that	 is	most	 conducive	 to	 the	 own	 interests	 or	 best	advances	their	own	political	goals,	and	Cohen	(2015)	as	to	whom	it	is	ultimately	state	 power,	 e.g.	 by	 its	 sheer	 size,	 that	 determines	 the	 international	 use	 of	 a	domestic	 currency	 (also	 see	 Andrews	 2006;	 Hardie	 and	 Maxfield	 2016).	 Also	Strange	(1971a)	provides	a	realist	view	on	a	state’s	currency	power,	depending	on	its	currency’s	status	within	her	framework	of	Top,	Neutral,	Master,	as	well	as	Negotiated	Currencies.	The	most	 influential	realist	explanation	 for	stability	and	change	in	the	monetary	system	is	the	Hegemonic	Stability	Theory	(HST),	based	on	Kindleberger	(1973;	also	1970,	1981),	which—in	its	application	to	monetary	matters—contends	 that	 a	 liberal	 international	 monetary	 system	 has	 to	 be	maintained	by	a	hegemonic	power	(cf.	Walter	1996).		Realist	 explanations	 of	 monetary	 transformation	 are	 manifested	 in	 the	literature	 primarily	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 exchange	 rate	arrangements	 and,	 associated	 with	 it,	 international	 capital	 account	 openness.	Frieden	(1997)	portrays	the	transformation	away	from	bimetallism	towards	the																																																									9			 Kindleberger	 (1984),	 for	 example,	 is	 a	 book	 so	 rich	 in	 detail	 about	 various	 aspects	 of	monetary	transformation	that	it	cannot	be	reduced	on	one	single	explanatory	approach.	10		 See	Cohen	(1996)	for	a	discussion	of	various	ways	to	structure	IPE	scholarship	on	money.	11	 It	has	 to	be	noted	that	some	authors	resort	 to	different	explanatory	approaches	 in	different	publications	(e.g.	Cohen	and	Eichengreen),	or	even	provide	competing	explanations	within	a	single	monography	(cf.	Helleiner	1994).	
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Early	 Gold	 Standard	 as	 a	 power	 play	 between	 England	 and	 France,	 and	 traces	back	 the	 inception	 of	 the	 Classical	 Gold	 Standard	 to	 the	 military	 victory	 of	Germany	over	France	(also	see	Eichengreen	and	Flandreau	1997).	Gilpin	(1987),	Mundell	 (2000),	 and	 Eichengreen	 (2011)—along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 HST—summarize	the	transformation	of	the	IMS	in	conjunction	with	the	roles	of	the	UK	and	 the	 U.S.	 as	 monetary	 hegemons.	 Kirshner	 (1995)	 suggests	 that	 those	hegemonic	states	established	and	maintained	the	respective	systems	in	order	to	distribute	 their	 advantages,	 e.g.	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 costs	 of	 adjustment,	 to	themselves.	 Most	 prominently,	 HST	 is	 related	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Gold	Standard	 in	 the	 interwar	years	when	 the	UK	was	 to	weak,	 and	 the	U.S.	not	yet	strong	 enough,	 to	 act	 as	 a	 stabilizing	 hegemon	 (Kindleberger	 1973;	 Walter	1991).	The	Bretton	Woods	System,	as	it	was	politically	planned	from	scratch,	is	a	paramount	 example	 for	 state	 agency	 and	 state	 power	 to	 establish	 an	 IMS	(Andrews	 2008,	 De	 Cecco	 1979;	 also	 Panitch	 and	 Gindin	 2012).	 Furthermore,	realist	arguments	can	be	found	regarding	today’s	dollar	hegemony	(Cohen	2015;	Cohen	 and	Benney	 2014;	 Germain	 and	 Schwartz	 2014;	Helleiner	 and	Kirshner	2012;	Kirshner	2014;	Norrlof	2009,	2014;	 Stokes	2014)	and	Germany’s	 role	 in	the	EMU	(Krampf	2015),	as	well	as	the	Fed’s	international	swap	lines	(McDowell	2016)	and	the	rise	of	fiat	money	(Macesich	1999).		
	
Liberal	 explanations	 attribute	monetary	 transformation	 to	 the	 choices	of	 interest	 groups	 which	 act	 as	 rational	 utility-maximizers	 to	 enforce	 their	interests	within	their	respective	countries	(cf.	Helleiner	2011).	Most	prominently	features	 the	 Open	 Economy	 Politics	 (OEP)	 paradigm;	 it	 combines	 the	assumptions	 of	 neoclassical	 economics	 and	 international	 trade	 theory	 with	political	 variables	 and	 explains	 monetary	 transformation	 by	 aggregating	individual	 preferences	 that	 influence	 domestic	 political	 institutions,	 which	 in	turn	 determine	 the	 bargaining	 position	 between	 states	with	 different	 interests	(cf.	Lake	2009;	Cohen	2016).	A	second	and	complementary	theoretical	strand	is	rational	choice	institutionalism,	a	deductive	approach	that	explains	the	existence	of	 institutions	 via	 their	 value	 for	 the	 actors	 affected.	 Hence,	 institutions	 are	assumed	 to	 be	 purposefully	 built	 and	 institutional	 transformation	 occurs	primarily	 due	 to	 benefits	 for	 the	 relevant	 actors	 involved.	 Politics	 is	 seen	 as	 a	series	 of	 collective	 action	 dilemmas,	 often	modeled	 by	 game	 theory	 (Hall	 and	Taylor	1996:	944-946).	Such	explanations	have	exogenous	 interests	on	a	micro	level	as	main	drivers	of	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	and	often	point	to	an	 understanding	 of	 ‘instrumental	 power’	 held	 by	 interest	 group,	 e.g.	 through	lobbying,	to	make	polities	act	according	to	their	preferences	(Pagliari	and	Young	2016).		From	 this	 perspective,	 transformations	 of	 the	 international	 monetary	systems	are	caused	by	interest	groups	influencing	national	political	 institutions	who	 upload	 their	 choices	 to	 the	 international	 level	 (Pagliari	 and	 Young	 2014,	2016),	 e.g.	with	 regard	 to	 the	Gold	 Standard	 (Broz	 1997b;	 Eichengreen	 1992),	the	 demise	 of	 Bretton	Woods	 (Cohen	1976,	 1977;	 Cooper	 1975),	 the	 choice	 of	exchange	rate	regimes	under	Generalized	Floating	(Bernhard	and	Leblang	1999;	Broz	and	Frieden	2001;	Sattler	and	Walter	2010),	macroeconomic	adjustments	(Walter	 2013),	 preferences	 about	 capital	 mobility	 and	 hence	 the	 trade-offs	within	the	impossible	trinity	in	general	(Frieden	1987,	1991),	as	well	as	the	EMU	
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and	 its	 crisis	 (Copelovitch	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Eichengreen	 and	 Frieden	2001;	 Frieden	2015;	 Frieden	 and	 Walter	 2017;	 Jones	 et	 al.	 2016).	 Furthermore,	 liberal	arguments	 can	 be	 found	with	 regard	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 central	 banking	(Broz	 1997a;	 Meltzer	 2003;	 Rothbard	 2002;	 Siklos	 2002),	 monetary	 policy	strategies	 (Bernhard	et	al.	2002;	Henning	1994),	banking	crises	 (Calomiris	and	Haber	 2015),	 bank	 bail-outs	 (Woll	 2014),	 banking	 regulation	 (Admati	 and	Hellwig	 2013;	 Busch	 2009;	 Culpepper	 2015;	 Culpepper	 and	 Reinke	 2014;	Goldbach	 2015;	 Roos	 2016)	 and	monetary	 nationalization	 (Cohen	 1998,	 2003;	Hefeker	1995,	1997).	
	
Constructivist	 explanations	 attribute	 crucial	 importance	 to	 ideas	 and	discourse	when	it	comes	to	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	Schmidt	(2008)	 unites	 those	 approaches	 under	 the	 umbrella	 term	 of	 ‘discoursive	institutionalism’,	 arguing	 that	 ideas	 can	 refer	 to	 policies,	 programmes,	 or	philosophies,	 and	 that	 discourse	 may	 imply	 both	 ‘communicative’	 discourses	within	 the	 wider	 society	 and	 ‘coordinative’	 discourses	 within	 a	 technocratic	setting.	 The	 latter	 points	 to	 the	 critical	 importance	 of	 epistemic	 communities	(Haas	1992)	and	the	associated	knowledge	networks	(cf.	Seabrooke	and	Tsingou	2009;	 Tsingou	 2015).	 Blyth	 (2002)	 brings	 forth	 a	 constructivist	 theory	 of	institutional	change.	He	argues	that	 ideas	shape	actors’	 identities	and	 interests,	and	 come	 to	 the	 core	 in	 particular	 in	 moments	 of	 crisis	 under	 Knightian	uncertainty.	 Carstensen	 and	 Schmidt	 (2016)	 develop	 a	 concept	 for	 ‘ideational	power’,	 which	 they	 define	 as	 the	 capacity	 of	 actors	 to	 influence	 other	 actors’	normative	and	cognitive	beliefs,	by	using	power	through	ideas,	over	ideas,	and	in	ideas.	Drezner	and	McNamara	(2013)	associate	constructivist	explanations	of	the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 ‘global	 financial	 orders’,	which	are	stabilized	by	economic	ideas	and	political	power.			 As	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 IMS,	 Blyth	 (2002)	 makes	 recourse	 to	economic	 ideas	 for	 explaining	 the	 transition	away	 from	 the	Gold	 Standard	and	towards	Bretton	Woods	by	 ‘embedding’	 liberalism,	and	 to	Generalized	Floating	by	‘disembedding’	it	again.	Similiarly,	Cesarano	(2006),	Peter	Hall	(1989)	and,	to	a	certain	extent,	Helleiner	(1994)	study	the	role	of	economic	and	monetary	ideas	in	 connection	with	Bretton	Woods	and,	 at	 its	 end,	 the	demise	of	Keynesianism	and	the	rise	of	monetarism.	Best	(2005)	adds	to	this	a	constructivist	focus	on	the	role	of	ambiguity	 to	stabilize	 ideas	and	 institutions.	Wesley	Widmaier	analyzes	the	 transition	 between	 economic	 orders	 in	 the	 20th	 century,	 which	 broadly	correspond	 to	 the	 three	 types	 of	 the	 IMS	 (2016),	 and	 points	 to	 the	 social	construction	of	monetary	 crises	 (2003b)	as	well	 as	 the	 Impossible	Trinity	 as	 a	frame	of	reference	(2004).	Abdelal	(2007),	Chwieroth	(2010,	2014),	and	Endres	(2011)	 study	 the	 ideational	 underpinnings	 of	 capital	 account	 liberalization.	 To	explain	European	monetary	integration,	Jabko	(2006)	focuses	on	strategic	ideas,	McNamara	 (2008)	 points	 to	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 to	 explain	 and	 overcome	 policy	failure,	and	Blyth	and	Matthijs	(2015)	to	the	influence	of	ideas	in	the	euro	crisis.	Furthermore,	 constructivist	 scholarship	 tackles	 central	 banking	 (Rodney	Bruce	Hall	2008;	Braun	2015b,	2016b;	Gabor	2014;	Golub	et	al.	2015;	Kreitner	2010)	and	the	physical	transformation	of	the	monetary	unit	with	regard	to	the	rise	of	fiat	money	(Drezner	and	McNamara	2013).	 	
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Structuralist	 explanations	 suggest	 that	 the	 monetary	 system’s	transformation	needs	to	be	understood	with	respect	to	its	relation	vis-à-vis	the	larger	 system	 or	 structure,	 which	 organizes	 the	 world	 economy	 (cf.	 Wendt	1987).	 Structuralist	 scholarship	both	 involves	 rather	descriptive-analytical	 and	more	 critical-normative	 approaches	 and	 refers	 in	 its	 explanations	 to	 broader	structures	 such	 as	 capitalism,	 financialization,	 or	 financial	 globalization.	Contemporary	 theoretical	 strands	 that	 resort	 to	 structuralist	 explanations	 and	have	 a	 say	 on	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 are	 e.g.	 (Neo-)Marxism,	World	Systems	Theory,	 the	regulation	school,	and	approaches	 in	 the	context	of	the	 discourses	 on	 neoliberalism	 or	 financialization.	 Structuralist	 approaches	often	 adopt	 perspectives	 of	 grand	 theories	 and,	 following	 Marx’s	 project	 of	critiquing	 political	 economy	 (cf.	Murau	2011),	 focus	 e.g.	 on	 the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	financialized	hegemons	(Arrighi	2006),	capitalist	instability	(Itoh	and	Lapavitsas	1998),	power	structures	of	debt	(Di	Muzio	and	Robins	2015),	or—as	Amato	and	Fantacci	 (2009)—adopt	 a	 dialectical-speculative	 approach	 to	 understand	 the	genesis	 of	money	 and	 finance	 in	 a	 phenomenological	 sense	 (ibid:	 10;	 also	 see	Krüger	2012).			Structuralist	 explanations	 of	 the	 IMS’s	 transformation	 interpret	 e.g.	 the	rise	of	the	Gold	Standard	as	an	aspect	of	the	transition	from	a	feudal	order	to	the	capitalist	market	 economy	 (Polanyi	 1944)	 and	 the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 the	 Bretton	Woods	 System	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Keynesian	 Welfare	 National	 State	 as	 an	institutional	 order	 or	 ‘spatiotemporal	 fix’	 (Jessop	 2002).	 Structuralist	 analyses	and	 explanations	 of	 the	 capital	 liberalization	 and	 financial	 globalization	 under	generalized	 floating	 are	 provided	 by	 Andrews	 (1994),	 Goodman	 and	 Pauly	(1993),	 Gill	 and	 Law	 (1989),	 Krippner	 (2011),	 Schwartz	 (2009),	 Seabrooke	(2001),	 Soederberg	 (2010),	 Strange	 (1996),	 and	 Watson	 (2007).	 Similarly,	international	 structures	 are	 attributed	 an	 explanatory	 role	 for	 the	 Global	Financial	 Crisis	 (Schwartz	 2009),	 European	 monetary	 integration	 (Henning	1998),	the	Eurocrisis	(Lapavitsas	2012),	or	the	Bretton	Woods	II	system	(Dooley	et	 al.	 2003,	 2009;	 critical:	 Bibow	 2008).	 Krippner	 (2007)	 connects	 the	 rise	 of	central	 bank	 transparency	 with	 neoliberalism.	 Konings	 (2011)	 focuses	 on	 the	rise	of	the	Fed	in	conjunction	with	the	rise	of	U.S.	finance	with	a	focus	on	social	structures	and	its	inherent	contradictions.	Concomitantly	to	the	changing	shape	of	 central	 banking,	 Christophers	 (2013)	 as	 well	 as	 Rethel	 and	 Sinclair	 (2012)	develop	 structuralist	 analyses	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	 commercial	 banking.	Crotty	 and	 Epstein	 (2009),	 Erturk	 (2016),	 Kay	 (2015),	 and	 Varoufakis	 (2011)	view	 the	 transformation	 of	 banking	 in	 the	 context	 of	 financialization.	 Finally,	Zelizer	 (1994)	 presents	 her	 study	 of	 ‘household’	 currencies	 as	 a	 sociological	approach	to	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	units’	physical	shape.		In	 summary,	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 that	 tackles	 the	 four	 themes	 of	 the	monetary	system’s	transformation	contains	realist,	rationalist,	constructivist	and	structuralist	explanatory	approaches	for	the	observed	phenomena.	While	realist	approaches	 stress	 the	 role	 of	 state	 agency,	 liberal	 approaches	 focus	 on	 the	rational	 interests	 of	 domestic	 actors.	 Constructivists	 position	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	center-stage	 whereas	 structuralist	 approaches	 attribute	 causation	 to	macroscopic	structures	and	processes.	 	
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1.3	Two	biases:	The	strange	absence	of	credit	money	and	private	money		The	 above	 section	 has	 pointed	 out	 how	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	system	is	described	in	the	IPE	scholarship	and	along	which	theoretical	lines	it	is	explained.	The	review	has	placed	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	reconstruction	of	the	historical	 genesis	 towards	 today’s	monetary	 system.	The	 remainder	of	 this	chapter	develops	the	argument	that	this	literature	has	a	major	shortcoming	with	regard	to	the	monetary	theory	that	is	predominantly	applied—mostly	implicitly,	sometimes	explicitly.	This	 study	contends	 that	 in	 the	majority	of	 IPE	works	on	the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation,	 the	 underlying	 monetary	 theory	 is	insufficiently	able	 to	grasp	 the	workings	of	 the	capitalist	monetary	 system	and	the	 dynamics	 it	 is	 subject	 to.	 It	 thus	 operates	 with	 a	 stark	 simplification—or	rather:	 a	premodern	anachronism—of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	modern	monetary	system	 works.	 This	 translates	 into	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 its	transformation	 throughout	 history.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 existing	 body	 of	literature	in	IPE	is	neither	able	to	account	for	the	past	transformations	within	the	modern	 credit	money	 system,	 nor	 can	 it	 fully	 account	 for	 the	 actual	 empirical	setup	of	today’s	money	supply	and	how	it	historically	emerged.			 This	 section	 frames	 said	 shortcoming	 in	 the	 predominant	 monetary	theory	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘two	 biases’—the	 Essentialist	 and	 the	 Chartalist	 bias—with	regard	 to	 the	 scholarship	 on	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation.	 The	implication	 of	 the	 Essentialist	 bias	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 neglect	 the	 credit	 money	properties	 of	 the	 modern	 monetary	 system.	 The	 Chartalist	 bias	 refers	 to	 a	tendency	 to	 not	 appreciate	 the	 crucial	 role	 of	 private	 money	 creation.	 It	demonstrates	to	which	extent	those	biases	apply	to	the	body	of	literature	on	the	transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system,	 both	 as	 concerns	 the	 phenomena	described	 and	 the	 explanatory	 approaches.	 The	 implication	 is	 that	 the	 IPE	scholarship	on	 the	monetary	system’s	 transformation	 tends	 to	operate	with	an	incomplete	picture	of	today’s	reality	in	the	monetary	system.	Taken	together,	the	IPE	literature	fails	to	systematically	theorize	the	functional	role	of	private	credit	money	for	the	monetary	system’s	transformation.	This	is	the	gap	that	this	study	seeks	to	fill.		 These	 biases,	 however,	 do	 not	 relate	 to	 the	 entire	 literature	 on	 the	monetary	system’s	 transformation	 in	general.	There	are	notable	exceptions,	 i.e.	authors	who	overcome	one	or	even	both	of	those	biases	and	do	take	into	account	credit	money	and	private	money.	At	the	same	time,	these	authors	have	not	fully	developed	a	clear	systematic	understanding	of	the	monetary	system’s	historical	transformation	 process	 that	 would	 take	 into	 account	 both	 private	 money	 and	credit	money.	The	scholar	who	comes	closest	to	such	an	assessment	is	Charles	P.	Kindleberger	who	alleges	to	the	relevance	of	repeatedly	emerging	private	credit	money	 for	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation,	 but	 does	 not	 go	 more	 into	depth.	 Furthermore,	 the	 scholarship	 of	 those	 authors	 does	 not	 speak	 to	 each	other	 in	 a	 consistent	 explanatory	 approach	 that	 would	 explicity	 attribute	 the	causality	for	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	within	the	properties	of	that	system,	 which	 might	 force	 political	 authorities	 to	 bring	 about	 institutional	change	in	a	largely	pre-determined	fashion.	 	
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1.3.1	The	Essentialist	bias		A	key	reference	point	in	the	IPE	literature	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system—as	has	been	demonstrated	in	Section	1.2—is	the	concept	of	fiat	money.	On	 the	one	hand,	analyses	 studying	 the	 transformation	of	 the	 IMS	discuss	how	there	 was	 a	 commodity	 money	 base	 during	 the	 early	 modern	 period,	 the	Classical	 Gold	 Standard,	 and	 the	 Bretton	Woods	 System;	 and	 how	 through	 the	inception	 of	 Generalized	 Floating	 this	 commodity	 base	 went	 away	 and	 was	replaced	 by	 a	 pure	 fiat	 money	 standard.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 physical	 shape	 of	 the	 monetary	 unit	 is	 discussed,	 a	transitional	logic	is	established	ranging	from	precious	metals	over	paper	money	to	today’s	fiat	money.		 This	 logic—that	 money	 initially	 used	 to	 be	 a	 commodity	 and	 then	 has	become	a	 ‘token’	backed	by	state	power,	 i.e.	 through	government	 ‘fiat’—can	be	found	e.g.	 in	 the	work	of	Benjamin	Cohen	on	 the	 transformation	of	 the	 IMS.	 In	examplary	fashion,	he	writes	in	Organizing	the	World’s	Money:	
	 “All	 forms	 of	 international	 liquidity	may	 be	 classified	 as	 either	 commodity	reserves	 or	 fiduciary	 (fiat)	 reserves.	 Commodity	 reserves	 are	 those	 which	have	some	 intrinsic	economic	value	quite	apart	 from	their	value	as	money;	the	 most	 prominent	 example	 of	 course	 is	 gold	 […].	 Fiduciary	 reserves,	 by	contrast,	have	no	intrinsic	economic	value	apart	from	their	value	as	money:	their	 general	 acceptability	 as	 international	 liquidity	 rests	 upon	 the	confidence	of	governments	rather	than	upon	any	promise	of	redemption	 in	commodities.	 Prominent	 examples	 of	 fiat	 reserves	 include	 national	currencies	that	are	formally	or	informally	inconvertible	into	precious	metals	such	as	gold”	(Cohen	1977:	68).		
	Similarly,	in	The	Gold	Standard	and	Related	Regimes,	Michael	Bordo	puts	the	fiat	money	logic	in	the	context	of	the	transformation	of	central	banking:		 “Under	 a	 gold	 standard	 the	money	 supply	 is	 determined	 by	 (and	 in	 some	cases	 consists	 partially	 or	 entirely	 of)	 the	 monetary	 gold	 stock.	 A	 gold	standard	 provides	 a	 natural	 constraint	 to	 monetary	 growth	 because	 new	production	 is	 limited	 (by	 increasing	 costs)	 relative	 to	 the	 existing	 stock.	Under	 a	 fiat	 or	 paper	monetary	 standard,	 by	 contrast,	 there	 is	 no	 limit	 to	money	 issue	other	 than	 the	good	performance	of	 the	monetary	authorities.	Unlike	a	fiat	standard,	however,	under	a	gold	standard,	monetary	authorities	have	considerably	less	flexibilityto	deal	with	shocks”	(Bordo	1999:	6).		Daniel	 Drezner	 and	 Kathleen	 McNamara,	 when	 studying	 the	 monetary	 unit’s	physical	transformation,	view	fiat	money	as	essentially	a	social	construction:			 “Modern	money	[…]	 is	 the	ultimate	social	construct.	Fiat	currency	obtains	value	only	in	social	interactions	among	human	beings.	Be	it	a	printed	piece	of	paper	or	an	electronically	represented	number,	money	only	has	value	to	the	extent	 that	 those	using	 it	 can	agree	upon	 that	value.	 Intersubjectively	constructed,	it	does	not	exist	unless	symbolically	represented,	and	depends	upon	 shared	 understandings	 and	 ongoing	 practices	 for	 its	 existence	 and	valuation”	(Drezner	and	McNamara	2013:	159).	 	
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Eric	Helleiner,	 in	The	Making	of	National	Money,	connects	the	rise	of	 fiat	money	with	 the	 process	 of	 nationalizing	 the	money	 supply.	 In	 this,	 he	 focuses	 on	 the	physical	properties	of	money	and	underappreciates	its	debt	qualities:		 “Territorial	 currencies	 could	 not	 be	 created,	 furthermore,	 without	 a	technological	transformation	that	has	received	less	scholarly	attention:	the	application	 of	 new	 industrial	 technologies	 to	 the	 production	 of	 coins	 and	notes	in	the	nineteenth	century.	This	development	dramatically	and	rapidly	improved	 the	 uniformity	 of	 the	 money	 in	 circulation	 by	 enabling	 the	production	of	standardized	currency	in	mass	quantities.	For	the	first	time,	public	 authorities	 also	 found	 it	 possible	 and	 affordable	 to	 produce	 large	quantities	 of	 high-quality,	 low-denomination	 coins	 that	 were	 linked	 in	 a	stable	 fashion	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 official	 monetary	 system.	 Equally	important,	 the	high	quality	of	 the	new	industrially	produced	money	made	counterfeiting	 a	 much	 more	 difficult	 proposition,	 a	 development	 that	 in	turn	strengthened	the	ability	of	state	authorities	to	maintain	stable	national	‘fiduciary’	forms	of	money	on	a	mass	scale.	This	latter	development	was	of	enormous	significance	in	enabling	states	to	create	and	maintain	territorial	currencies”	(Helleiner	2003:	7).		Filippo	Cesarano,	in	Monetary	Theory	and	Bretton	Woods.	The	Construction	of	an	
International	Monetary	Order,	epitomizes	the	alleged	centrality	of	the	fiat	money	concept	when	he	argues	that			 “the	demise	of	the	short-lived	Bretton	Woods	experience	did	not	just	put	an	end	 to	 the	 postwar	 monetary	 reconstruction,	 but	 it	 brought	 about	 the	generalized	 diffusion	 of	 fiat	 money,	 an	 epoch-making	 change	 after	 2,500	years	of	commodity	money”	(Cesarano	2006:	ix).		 How	does	this	concept	of	fiat	money	as	a	derivative	of	commodity	money	correspond	to	the	way	in	which	‘money’	is	treated	in	practical	terms	today?	The	conventional	 way	 of	 approaching	 the	 money	 supply	 is	 to	 look	 at	 different	monetary	 aggregates.	 The	 definitions	 of	 those	 aggregates	 differ	 across	 various	monetary	 jurisdictions	 in	detail,	but	are	broadly	consistent	 to	each	other.	Most	influential	are	those	by	the	ECB,	the	Bank	of	England,	and	the	Fed.	As	to	O’Brien	(2007:	 6-8),	 the	 ECB	 operates	 with	 the	 monetary	 aggregates	 M1	 (narrow	money),	M2	(intermediate	money)	and	M3	(broad	money).	As	money	issuers,	 it	defines	on	the	one	hand	monetary	financial	institutions	(MFIs).	This	includes	the	Eurosystem	 (i.e.	 the	 ECB	 and	 national	 central	 banks,	 NCBs),	 domestic	 credit	institutions	(i.e.	commercial	banks),	all	other	resident	financial	institutions,	and	money	 market	 funds	 (MMFs).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 by	 definition,	 central	governments	 issue	 money	 on	 Post	 Office	 accounts,	 national	 savings	 accounts,	and	Treasury	accounts.	The	Bank	of	England	largely	follows	the	ECB’s	definition	but	uses	a	different	approach	to	M3	and	in	addition	publishes	the	aggregate	M4.	Also	 it	used	 to	denominate	central	bank	money	as	M0.	The	Federal	Reserve,	 in	contrast,	 only	 operates	 with	 the	 monetary	 aggregates	 M1	 and	 M2	 as	 the	publication	 of	M3	was	 discontinued	 in	 2006.	Money	 issuers,	 by	 definition,	 are	depository	institutions,	Federal	Reserve	Banks,	and	the	U.S.	Treasury.	Table	1.1	and	Table	1.2—taken	from	O’Brien	(2007:	18,	19)—provide	an	overview	on	the	definition	of	the	money	aggregates	used	by	the	ECB	and	the	Fed.		 	
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Components	of	Major	Aggregates	 Definition	of	Each	Component	
M1	(Narrow	Money)	 Sum	of	the	following	two	components.	(1)	Currency	in	Circulation	 Notes	and		coins	issued	by	money	issuers	held	by	private	non-FMI	residents	located	in	and	outside	the	EMU.	(2)	Overnight	and	Similar	Deposits	 Deposits	which	can	be	converted	into	currency	or	used	for	cashless	payments.	
M2	(Intermediate	Money)	 M1	plus	non-M1	component	of	M2	
Non-M1	Component	of	M2	 Sum	of	the	following	two	components.	(1)	Short-term	Saving	Deposits	 Deposits	redeemable	at	a	period	of	notice	up	to	3	months.	(2)	Short-term	Time	Deposits	 Deposits	with	an	agreeable	maturity	of	up	to	2	years.	
M3	(Broad	Money)	 M2	plus	marketable	instruments	issued	by	MFIs.	
Marketable	Instruments	Issued	
by	Monetary	Financial	
Institutions	(MFIs)	
Sum	of	the	following	three	components.	
(1)	Money	market	fund	shares	and	units	(MMFs)	 Excluding	shares	and	units	held	by	MFIs,	CGs,	and	non-euro	are	residents.	(2)	Repurchase	Agreements	(repos)	 Repo	liabilities	of	the	MFIs	with	the	money-holding	sector.	(3)	Debt	securities	with	an	original	maturity	of	up	to	2	years	 Liabilities	of	the	MFIs	held	by	the	money-holding	sector.		
Table	1.1—Composition	and	Definition	of	Monetary	Aggregates	in	the	EMU	
	
Components	of	Major	Aggregates	 Definition	of	Each	Component	
M1	 Sum	of	the	following	four	components.	(1)	Currency	Component	 Currency	outside	the	U.S.	Treasury,	Federal	Reserve	Banks,	and	the	vaults	of	depository	institutions.	(2)	Demand	Deposit	Component	 Demand	deposits	at	commercial	banks	(excluding	those	amounts	held	by	depository	institutions,	the	U.S.	government,	and	foreign	banks	and	official	institutions)	less	cash	items	in	the	process	of	collection	(CIPC)	and	Federal	Reserve	float.	(3)	Other	Checkable	Deposits	(OCD)	 Including	negotiable	order	of	withdrawal	(NOW)	and	automatic	transfer	service	ATS	accounts	at	depository	institutions,	credit	union	share	draft	accounts,	and	demand	deposits	at	thrift	institutions.	(4)	Non-bank	Traveller’s	Checks	 Traveller’s	checks	issued	by	non-depository	institutions.	
M2	 M1	plus	non-M1	component	of	M2.	
Non-M1	Component	of	M2	 Sum	of	the	following	three	components.	(1)	Saving	Deposits	 Including	money	market	deposit	accounts	(MMDA),	but	excluding	those	held	by	the	U.S.	government.	(2)	Small-denomination	Time	Deposits	 Time	deposits	in	amounts	of	less	than	$100,000,	less	individual	retirement	account	(IRA)	and	Keogh	balances	at	depository	institutions.	(3)	Retail	Money	Market	Mutual	Funds	(MMFs)	 Excluding	those	held	in	IRA	and	Keogh	accounts.		
Table	1.2—Composition	and	Definition	of	Monetary	Aggregates	in	the	U.S.	
	This	overview	on	the	monetary	aggregates	points	to	an	important	insight	about	 the	empirical	 setup	of	 the	contemporary	monetary	system:	The	 financial	instruments	that	together	make	up	the	money	supply	are	all	debt	instruments	or	
IOUs	issued	on	balance	sheets	of	various	 financial	 institutions.	Neither	are	 they	
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connected	 to	 an	 essential	 commodity	 basis,	 nor	 could	 it	 be	made	 immediately	clear	 that	 they	 are	 tokens	 established	 by	 the	 powers	 of	 government	 fiat.	 The	majority	 of	 works	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature	 on	 monetary	 transformation,	 have	difficulties	establishing	connection	to	the	writings	of	monetary	practitioners	and	the	applied	discourse	of	political	and	financial	 institutions.	So	 it	comes	that	the	studies	 reviewed	 in	 the	 preceding	 section	 have	 very	 little	 to	 say	 about	 how	 it	happened	 that	 the	 money	 supply	 today	 looks	 the	 way	 it	 does.	 There	 is	 no	compelling	 analysis	 capable	 of	 explaining	 the	 setup	 of	 the	 various	 monetary	aggregates	 and	how	such	 institutional	 reality	developed.	 It	 is	 this	 absence	of	 a	proper	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 empirical	 fact	 of	 a	 credit	money	 system	 in	 the	IPE	literature	on	money,	which	this	study	refers	to	as	the	Essentialist	bias.		What	is	the	origin	of	this	essentialist	bias?	How	to	explain	its	prevalence?	This	 study	 suggests	 that	 an	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 can	be	 found	 in	 a	 body	of	scholarship	that	is	rising	in	volume	since	the	latest	financial	crisis.	Following	the	work	of	scholars	such	as	Christine	Desan,	Perry	Mehrling,	and	Stefano	Sgambati,	the	Essentialist	bias	can	be	traced	back	to	what	may	be	viewed	as	premodern,	or	precapitalist,	intuitions	about	how	monetary	systems	and	money	creation	work.		Christine	 Desan,	 in	 her	 book	 Making	 Money.	 Coin,	 Currency,	 and	 the	
Coming	of	Capitalism,	makes	a	compelling	argument	that	provides	an	explanation	for	the	prevalence	of	the	Essentialist	bias.	As	she	argues,	the	financial	revolution	in	 early	 modern	 England	 “reinvented”	 the	 medium	 money.	 While	 premodern	monetary	systems	relied	essentially	on	commodity	money,	the	English	invention	of	 credit	 money	 has	 an	 entirely	 different	 operational	 logic.	 In	 fact,	 the	 rise	 of	capitalism	 in	 17th	 and	 18th	 century	 England	 is	 inherently	 connected	 to	redesigning	 money	 and	 establishing	 a	 new	 monetary	 architecture	paradigmatically	different	than	commodity	money	(Desan	2014:	1-2).	However,	this	fundamental	change	in	the	way	the	real	monetary	system	operates	has	not	been	well	reflected	 in	the	way	money	 is	 theorized	by	economists	who	typically	characterize	money	as	“a	simple	commodity,	a	social	convention,	or	an	abstract	‘numéraire’”.	Desan	points	out	 that	 this	 “diverts	attention	 from	 the	 institutions	that	really	make	and	maintain	money”	(ibid:	6).	Following	this	assessment	about	the	theory	of	money	in	economics,	we	may	as	well	translate	it	to	scholarship	in	IPE	and	the	analyses	of	monetary	transformation.		Perry	Mehrling,	 in	his	 article	Beyond	Bancor,	 applies	 this	 assessment	on	the	way	the	in	which	the	transformation	of	the	IMS	is	typically	studied.	Mehrling	(2016)—in	 line	with	Kindleberger	(1970)—presents	a	counter-narrative	 to	 the	dominant	 view	 on	 the	 transformation	 from	 commodity	 money	 to	 fiat	 money	when	he	argues	that	the	commodity	base	for	the	gold	standard	and	the	Bretton	Woods	System	was	not	actually	very	relevant.	Instead,	those	were	credit	money	standards	 with	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 running	 an	 international	 pound	 sterling	system	until	the	early	20th	century,	and	the	Fed	running	an	international	dollar	system	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	World	War	 II.	 The	 commodity	 base	was	merely	 a	(barbarous)	relic	of	the	premodern	monetary	system.	The	transition	away	from	gold	 in	 the	 1970s	 was	 then	 not	 actually	 such	 a	 major	 revolution,	 but	 just	stripping	 off	 the	 nominal	 relic.	 IPE	 seems	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 intuition	 that	 the	commodity	base	was	necessary	to	guarantee	the	moneyness	of	the	pound	or	the	
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dollar.	This	gives	rise	to	the	argument	that	the	abolished	commodity	base	had	to	be	replaced	by	state	power	or	a	social	construction.		Stefano	 Sgambati,	 in	 his	 Rethinking	 Banking.	 Debt	 Discounting	 and	 the	
Making	of	Modern	Money	as	Liquidity,	 sketches	how	the	Essentialist	bias	affects	the	 portrayal	 of	 central	 and	 commercial	 banking.	 As	 he	 argues,	 not	 only	 the	concept	 of	 fiat	 money	 but	 also	 the	 predominant	 notions	 of	 fractional	 reserve	banking	and	banking	as	 financial	 intermediation	 follow	 the	premodern	 lines	of	thinking	about	money,	which	presuppose	the	existence	of	money	before	debt	can	be	issued.	Sgambati	views	this	as	inherently	connected	to	the	fiat	money	logic:		“Our	 understanding	 of	 banking	 is	 still	 anchored	 to	 a	 dogmatic	 notion	 of	banking	 as	 a	 system	 of	 financial	 intermediation.	 This	 notion	 implicitly	neglects	the	fact	that	through	the	banking	process	new	money	(qua	liquidity)	is	 infused	 in	 the	 financial	 system.	 It	 is	 therefore	not	 a	 coincidence	 that	 the	dogma	 of	 banking	 as	 intermediation	 is	 often	 preached	 together	 with	 the	myth	of	modern	money	as	a	creation	ex	nihilo	or	by	fiat.	[…T]hese	two	beliefs	support	each	other	and	are	subtly	employed	to	contrive	an	a-historical	and	pre-political	view	of	modern	banking”	(Sgambati	2016:	275,).		“[T]he	concept	of	 fractional	reserve	banking	 is	not	only	used	to	explain	 the	functioning	of	modern	banking	but	is	also	evoked	in	many	cases	to	justify	the	historical	 transition	 from	 precious-metal	 'commodity	 money'	 to	 scriptural	'fiduciary	money'	(or	'fiat	money')”	(ibid:	278).		Similar	 to	 Desan,	 Sgambati	 sees	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 between	 the	premodern	 logic,	 which	 embraces	 the	 concepts	 of	 commodity	 and	 fiat	money,	and	the	credit	money	logic,	which	emerged	with	the	English	financial	revolution:		 “a	 number	 of	 financial	 innovations	 took	 place	 specifically	 in	 England	throughout	 the	 seventeenth	 century	which	were	 responsible	 for	producing	no	 less	than	an	 ‘epistemological	revolution’	 in	the	English	culture	of	credit”	(Sgambati	2016:	284).		In	a	nutshell,	Sgambati	(2016)	frames	the	Essentialist	bias—the	neglect	of	taking	fully	into	account	the	operational	logics	of	the	modern	credit	money	system—as	a	“pervasive	dogma	of	banking	as	financial	intermediation”	(ibid:	286).		 The	essentialist	bias	thus	refers	to	the	observation	that	the	vast	majority	of	 works	 in	 IPE	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 full	 implication	 of	 the	 fact	 that	modern	monetary	systems	are	principally	based	on	credit	money.	The	focus	on	(historical)	commodity	money	and	(contemporary)	fiat	money	gives	evidence	of	a	dominant	understanding	of	money	that	seeks	to	root	the	true	essence	of	money	in	 either	 a	 ‘real’	 commodity	 basis	 or	 in	 ‘pure’	 government	 power,	 and	 in	 this	misses	 the	 point	 that	 capitalist	 money	 has	 been	 predominantly,	 and	 today	 is	exclusively,	a	network	of	debt	claims	that	does	not	have	or	require	an	essential	basis	after	all.	The	notion	of	 the	monetary	system	as	a	debt	network	without	a	material	 or	 immaterial	 anchor	 is	 largely	 absent	 in	 the	 reviewed	 IPE	 literature.	Hence,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 historical	 transformation,	 the	literature	rarely	focuses	on	pivotal	changes	and	dynamics	within	the	network	of	debt	claims	and	the	political	economy	implications	connected	to	it.	 	
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1.3.2	The	Chartalist	bias		The	Chartalist	bias	refers	 to	 the	notion	 that	 the	 institution	of	money	 is,	by	and	large,	a	privilege	of	the	state.	In	its	strictest	version,	the	Chartalist	bias	points	to	the	insinuation	that	money	is	exclusively	provided	by	the	state;	in	a	more	relaxed	version,	it	alleges	that	the	money	supply	is	at	least	controlled	by	the	state,	even	though	not	exclusively	provided	by	public	institutions.	Similar	to	the	Essentialist	bias,	 this	position	is	rarely	expressed	explicitly	but	rather	shines	through	as	an	implicit	assumption.	Due	to	the	Chartalist	bias,	the	vast	majority	of	IPE	literature	on	 money	 barely	 accounts	 for	 autonomous	 and	 systemically	 relevant	 private	money	creation	 in	general,	and	underestimates	 the	role	of	private	money	 in	 its	depiction	and	explanation	of	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	in	particular.	This	 study	 will	 argue	 that	 private	 credit	 money—sometimes	 also	 termed	‘endogenous’	 money—is	 much	 more	 relevant	 for	 the	 operational	 logic	 of	 the	monetary	system	than	suggested	in	the	current	body	of	IPE	literature.	Similarly	to	 the	 Essentialist	 bias,	 the	 Chartalist	 bias	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 underlying	monetary	theory	that	is	used	in	most	IPE	studies.		 In	 the	 IPE	 literature	 on	 monetary	 transformation,	 the	 Chartalist	 bias	comes	to	the	surface	in	three	main	versions:	When	a	given	currency	is	suggested	to	be	 just	provided	by	 the	 state	 it	 is	 associated	with;	when	 the	 central	bank	 is	suggested	 to	 be	 identical	with	 the	 state;	 and	when	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	money	creation	by	commercial	banks	is	a	function	of	central	bank	decisions.		First,	 the	 literature	 gives	 evidence	 of	 a	 tendency	 to	 starkly	 simplify	questions	of	money	issuance	and	suggest	the	states’	full	control	over	their	money	supply.	When	the	literature	refers	to	the	“U.S.	Dollar”,	the	“British	Pound”,	or	the	“Euro”,	 it	abstracts	from	any	institutional	underpinnings	of	money	creation	and	does	 not	 ask	what	 “the	 Dollar”,	 “the	 Pound”,	 or	 the	 “Euro”	 actually	 are,	 i.e.	 as	specific	money	forms.	It	then	reads	as	an	insinuation	that	it	would	be	the	states	themselves	who	 issue	 and	 control	 their	money	 supply.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 such	notion	often	comes	with	an	equalisation	of	‘money’	with	‘currency’.			Focusing	 on	 explanatory	 approaches,	 this	 form	 of	 the	 Chartalist	 bias	applies	primarily	to	realism,	rationalism,	and	constructivism.	Realist	scholarship	tends	to	view	the	state	as	a	money-issuing	black	box.	For	example,	it	is	reflected	in	 the	 conceptualisations	 of	 monetary	 power	 following	 Kirshner	 (1995)	 and	Cohen	(2015)	and	writings	applying	the	logic	of	Hegemonic	Stability	Theory.	It	is	also	prevalent	in	the	literature	that	follows	the	scheme	of	international	currency	hierarchy	 (cf.	 Strange	 1971a),	 when	 the	 Euro	 is	 portrayed	 as	 a	 “negotiated	currency”	 because	 it	 does	 not	 actually	 have	 a	 single	 issuing	 country.	 In	 this	approach,	 the	 state	 as	 the	 primary	 issuer	 of	 money	 is	 naturalized.	 Rationalist	scholarship	 alleges	 that	 the	 state	 could	determine	 its	money-related	politics	 in	accordance	with	the	relative	influence	of	interest	groups	(see	e.g.	Broz	1997b).	In	the	 logic	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	 Open	 Economies	 Politics,	 the	 nation	 state	 by	definition—when	 it	 aggregates	 interests	 and	 preferences	 and	 then	 translates	them	via	domestic	institutions	into	policies—must	be	the	entity	that	issues	and	controls	the	money	supply.	And	constructivist	scholarship,	with	its	emphasis	on	the	role	of	ideas,	also	puts	the	state	at	the	centre	of	its	attention.		 	
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Focusing	instead	on	descriptive	themes,	the	Chartalist	bias	in	this	form	is	first	 and	 foremost	 reflected	 in	 the	discussions	of	 the	 transforming	 relationship	between	 money	 and	 the	 nation	 state.	 For	 example,	 when	 Cohen	 (1998	 4-5)	writes	about	 the	 rise	of	 the	Westphalian	monetary	system,	he	suggests	 that	by	establishing	a	national	monopoly,	the	money	supply	was	put	under	the	control	of	the	state.	While	he	acknowledges	a	decline	of	the	Westphalian	monetary	system,	this	 only	 refers	 to	 a	 change	 in	 the	 use	 of	 or	 the	 demand	 for	 money	 due	 to	enhanced	currency	competition,	but	decisively	not	for	the	creation	or	the	supply	of	 money	 (see	 e.g.	 Cohen	 1998:	 4-5).	 Moreover,	 also	 the	 debates	 on	 the	transformation	of	the	IMS	rest	to	a	large	extent	on	the	view	that	money	issuance	is,	by	and	large,	conducted	by	the	state.	On	the	one	hand,	this	is	made	evident	in	concepts	such	as	the	Impossible	Trinity,	which—as	pointed	out	in	1.2.1—guides	our	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 international	 monetary	 relations	 and	 alleges	 state	autonomy	 over	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 capital	 mobility,	 and	 domestic	 monetary	policy.	On	the	other	hand,	in	more	general	terms,	the	antagonistic	logic	between	the	 ‘national’	monetary	 system	as	 the	 logical	 prerequisite	 of	 the	 ‘international’	monetary	 system	may	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 Chartalist	 bias	 itself,	given	 that	 thinking	 about	 the	 IMS	 as	 the	 organized	 interaction	 of,	prima	 facie,	‘monetarily	 sovereign’	 states	 pre-supposes	 that	 states	 are	 the	 autonomous	creators	of	money.		Overall,	 it	 is	 often	 viewed	 as	 a	 defining	 criterion	 of	 IPE	 to	 form	 an	opposition	 towards	 the	market-orientation	 of	 the	 economics	 discipline,	 and	 to	postulate	and	illustrate	the	primacy	of	the	political	over	the	economic.	Hence,	it	may	not	be	 surprising	 that	 the	 state	 is	 attributed	 crucial	 relevance	and	agency	for	money	 creation.	What	 is	 the	problem	with	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 state	 is	issuing	and	controlling	its	domestic	currency?			The	insinuation	that	the	U.S.	would	control	the	U.S.	Dollar	and	Britain	the	Pound	Sterling—just	as	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	Essentialist	bias—abstracts	 from	 the	way	 in	which	 the	money	 supply	 is	 actually	 set	up.	As	 the	money	aggregates	 in	Table	 1.1	 and	 Table	 1.2	 show,	 “the	 state”	 itself	 does	 not	 provide	money	 but	 a	number	 of	 financial	 institutions	 that	 can	 be	 public	 or	 private.	 Simply	 put,	 the	money	 issuers	 in	 a	 given	 contemporary	 monetary	 jurisdiction	 are	 the	 central	bank,	 commercial	 banks,	 as	well	 as	 non-bank	 financial	 institutions	 or	 ‘shadow	banks’.	The	different	aggregates	contain	different	‘financial	instruments’,	namely	currency	 (i.e.	 bank	 notes	 issued	 by	 the	 respective	 central	 banks),	 demand	 and	savings	 deposits	 (i.e.	 deposits	 issued	 by	 commercial	 banks	 with	 different	maturities),	as	well	as	a	range	of	other	instruments	issued	by	shadow	banks	such	as	 money	 market	 fund	 (MMF)	 shares	 and	 repurchase	 agreements	 (repos).	Central	bank	money	sometimes	is	still	referred	to	as	the	‘monetary	base’	or	M0.12	It	contains	currency	and	deposits	held	by	commercial	banks	at	the	central	bank.			Figure	 1.2	 and	 Figure	 1.3—compiled	 with	 the	 tools	 provided	 by	 the	website	 of	 the	 St	 Louis	 Fed—present	 quantitative	 overviews	 on	 the	 (not	seasonally	adjusted)	monetary	aggregates	as	published	in	the	EMU	and	the	U.S.																																																									12	 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/m0.aspx		(accessed	29	April	2017).	
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from	 1980	 to	 2017.	13	As	 these	 figures	 demonstrate,	 the	 component	 of	 public	money	(which	is	just	a	fraction	of	M1)	within	the	general	money	supply	is	very	small	and	almost	negligible	compared	to	the	volume	of	private	money.	Hence,	it	is	 somewhat	 questionable	 whether	 the	 emphasis	 on	 currency,	 which	 is	 often	reflected	 in	 IPE	 works,	 is	 appropriate	 to	 give	 a	 good	 representation	 of	 the	monetary	system.		
	
Figure	1.2—Monetary	aggregates	in	the	EMU	(1980-2017,	in	trillion	EUR)		
	
Figure	1.3—Monetary	aggregates	in	the	U.S.,	1980-2017	(in	billion	USD)	 																																																									13		 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/tags/series?t=monetary%20aggregates	(accessed	29	April	2017)	
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Now	it	is	true	that,	when	tackling	the	transformation	of	money’s	physical	shape,	the	IPE	literature	does	take	into	account	private	money,	e.g.	in	the	form	of	local	 currencies	 (Helleiner	2000),	 vouchers	and	 loyalty	 cards	 (Cohen	2003),	 or	domestic	 currencies	 (Zelizer	 1994).	 However,	 these	 private	 money	 forms	 are	typically	 seen	 as	 being	 situated	 outside	 the	main,	 systemically	 relevant	money	supply	and	typically	use	a	different	unit	of	account.	Hence,	these	approaches	see	private	money	 as	 an	 opaque	 alternative	 to	mainstream	money,	 and	 not	 as	 the	crux	 of	 the	matter.	 Overall,	 the	 ideas	 of	what	 is	 often	 termed	 the	 ‘endogenous	money	discourse’	(cf.	Section	2.2.1)	have	rarely	found	their	way	into	IPE.		Lighter	 versions	 of	 the	 Chartalist	 bias	 are	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 strand	 of	literature	 that	 studies	 the	 transformation	 of	 central	 banking.	 In	 this	 form,	 the	Chartalist	bias	is	even	more	closely	connected	to	the	prevailing	monetary	theory	and	the	actual	mechanics	of	central	banking.		On	the	one	hand,	the	Chartalist	bias	appears	through	the	assumption	that,	while	the	central	bank	is	issuing	money	on	its	balance	sheet,	it	does	so	upon	the	command	of	the	government.	In	fact,	the	dimensions	of	central	bank	dependence	and	 independence	 have	 constantly	 been	 varying	 from	 country	 to	 country,	 and	from	 time	 to	 time	 (cf.	 Singleton	 2011).	 Certainly	 for	 the	 era	 of	 Generalized	Floating,	 with	 the	 spread	 of	 central	 bank	 independence,	 this	 assumption	 is	difficult	 to	 uphold.	 Both	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 at	 the	times	 of	 their	 foundation,	 were	 decisively	 private	 institutions,	 although	 they	assumed	 special	 responsibilities	 vis-à-vis	 their	 country’s	 governments	 (cf.	Goodhart	1988).	The	Chartalist	bias	appears	in	this	form	e.g.	 in	Blinder	(2004),	Frieden	(2015)	or	Hardie	and	Maxfield	(2016).		 On	the	other	hand,	in	its	weakest	form,	the	Chartalist	bias	appears	via	the	assumption	that	central	banks	can	control	the	volume	of	the	commercial	banks’	money	 creation.	 This	 idea	 is	 part	 of	 the	 economic	 textbooks	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Mishkin	2009)	through	the	so-called	money	multiplier.	It	suggests	that	the	central	bank’s	provision	of	 reserves	and	 its	determination	of	 the	minimum	reserve	ratio	 limit	the	 commercial	 banks’	 ability	 to	 lend	 out	 money	 and	 thus	 puts	 a	 cap	 on	 the	amount	 of	 deposits	 they	 can	 create	 as	 ‘inside	money’.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 this	 view	assumes	 that	 there	 is	 no	 autonomous	 private	 money	 creation	 through	commercial	banks	(cf.	e.g.	Cohen	1998).	This	view,	 in	 line	with	the	belief	 in	the	money	 multiplier,	 has	 increasingly	 been	 challenged	 in	 recent	 years—most	prominently	 through	 the	Bank	 of	 England’s	 paper,	 directed	 to	wider	 public,	 in	which	it	announces	that	banks	do	actually	autonomously	create	money	(McLeay	et	 al.	 2014).	 Discussing	 this	 matter	 would	 require	 digging	 deeper	 into	 the	mechanics	 of	 the	 discount	window	 and	 open	market	 operations,	 and	 has	 been	the	 subject	 of	 vivid	 debates	 between	 endogenous	 and	 exogenous	 money	approaches,	 notably	 in	 the	 1970s	 to	 the	 1990s	 (cf.	Moore	 1988).	 A	 number	 of	works	in	the	IPE	literature	on	the	transformation	of	central	banking	tend	to	refer	to	concepts	of	inside	money	and	the	money	multiplier.		While	 the	 Chartalist	 bias	 is	 prevalent	 in	 rather	 traditional	 studies	 of	money	in	IPE,	a	number	of	topical	publications	go	beyond	this	bias	and	stress	the	
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role	of	money	creation	beyond	the	purview	of	the	state.	A	few	of	them	shall	be	singled	out	here	as	they	will	prove	authoritative	for	this	study:		 Dan	 Awrey,	 in	 his	 article	Brother,	Can	You	Spare	a	Dollar?	Designing	an	
Effective	Framework	for	Foreign	Currency	Liquidity	Assistance,	demonstrates	why	this	 is	 the	 case.	Awrey	 (2017)	 criticizes	 the	view	 that	 the	 state	 is	 the	 issuer	of	money,	 applying	 a	 revisionist	 notion	 of	 the	 IMS.	 Along	 the	 lines	 of	 Mehrling	(2016),	he	insists	that	the	IMS	in	the	age	of	Generalized	Floating	is	actually	run	via	private	 international	 credit	money	 creation,	 first	 and	 foremost	 through	 the	Eurodollar	 market.	 Thus,	 he	 stresses	 the	 approach	 that	 Strange	 (1971a)	 had	explicitly	 repudiated.	 The	 main	 source	 of	 their	 disagreement	 is,	 again,	 the	underlying	 monetary	 theory	 applied	 for	 the	 respective	 analyses	 on	 the	institutional	 reality.	 In	 this,	 Awrey	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 arguments	 provided	 by	Stefan	 Avdjiev,	 Robert	 McCauley	 and	 Hyung	 Song	 Shin.	 In	 their	 BIS	 working	paper	Breaking	Free	of	the	Triple	Coincidence	in	International	Finance,	Avdijev	et	al.	(2015)	point	to	the	Chartalist	bias	when	they	argue	that	a	style	of	thought	is	pervasive	in	matters	of	international	money,	according	to	which	there	is	always	an	 overlap	 between	 the	 economic	 area,	 the	 decision-making	 unit,	 and	 the	currency	area;	or—in	a	nutshell—that	“each	economic	area	has	its	own	currency	and	the	use	of	that	currency	is	largely	confined	to	that	economic	area”	(ibid:	3).	As	 they	 contend,	 this	 simplification	 might	 be	 useful	 in	 theory-building	 but	 is	empirically	misleading.			A	counter	theory,	which	transcends	the	Chartalist	bias	and	is	increasingly	being	 acknowledged	 within	 IPE,	 is	 the	 shadow	 money	 approach	 by	 Daniela	Gabor	and	Jakob	Vestergaard.	In	their	2016	working	paper	Towards	a	Theory	of	
Shadow	Money,	written	for	the	Institute	of	New	Economic	Thinking	(INET),	they	develop	a	nuanced	approach	of	different	shadow	bank	liabilities	and	their	role	as	private	 credit	 money	 forms	 as	 they	 function	 as	 substitutes	 for	 bank	 deposits	(Gabor	 and	 Vestergaard	 2016).	 An	 author	 who	 thinks	 along	 similar	 lines	 is	Morgan	 Ricks—in	 his	 2016	 book	 The	 Money	 Problem.	 Rethinking	 Financial	
Regulation	as	well	as	his	previous	publications	(cf.	Ricks	2016;	also	2011,	2012a,	2012b,	 2013).	 Benjamin	 Braun,	 in	 his	 article	 Speaking	 to	 the	 People?	 Money,	
Trust,	and	Central	Bank	Legitimacy	in	the	Age	of	Quantitative	Easing,	stresses	the	role	 of	 private	 money	 creation	 from	 a	 central	 banking	 perspective.	 He	 brings	forth	 the	 argument	 that	 central	 banks	 actually	 do	 have	 a	 stark	 interest	 in	pretending	 vis-à-vis	 the	 public	 that	 they	 would	 be	 able	 to	 control	 the	 money	supply—with	a	‘folk	theory	of	money’	to	induce	monetary	trust	(Braun	2016b).		With	their	analyses,	and	by	purposefully	starting	from	an	alternative	view	on	monetary	theory,	said	authors	operate	outside	the	Chartalist	bias	and	present	innovative	approaches	towards	private	money	creation,	both	in	an	international	and	a	domestic	context.	However,	 they	do	not	embed	 their	analyses	 in	a	wider	context	of	the	monetary	system’s	historical	transformation.		 	
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1.3.3	The	gap:	The	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	beyond	the	
Chartalist	and	the	Essentialist	bias		As	 the	preceding	sections	have	 indicated,	 the	 two	biases	 lead	 to	an	 incomplete	representation	of	how	the	monetary	system	has	been	 transforming	empirically	and	how	the	empirical	credit	money	supply	is	made	up	today.	Neither	is	the	fact	of	credit	money,	nor	the	 fact	of	systemic	private	money	creation	systematically	accounted	 for	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature.	While	 the	 literature	predominantly	 focuses	on	specific	historical	episodes,	it	does	not	provide	a	convincing	theory	capable	of	making	sense	of	the	monetary	system’s	historical	transformation	in	such	a	way	that	 it	 could	explain	 the	appearance	of	 the	money	supply	 today—made	up	of	a	seemingly	opaque	amalgam	of	credit	 instruments,	some	of	which	are	 issued	by	public	and	most	of	which	by	private	institutions.		 This	 shortcoming	 is	 neither	 surprising	 nor	 specific	 to	 IPE.	 Instead,	 the	discrepancy	between	prevailing	monetary	theories	and	the	institutional	realities	of	 today’s	 monetary	 system	 permeates	 other	 disciplines,	 first	 and	 foremost	economics.	 Hence,	 the	 findings	 on	 the	 IPE	 discourse	 thus	 are	 only	 the	manifestation	of	a	‘status	quo’	in	which	the	dominant	theories	about	money	are	relatively	 distant	 to	 the	 institutional	 realities	 and	 the	 operational	 logics	 of	 the	monetary	system.	Along	with	this	comes	a	disconnect	between	the	academic	and	the	practioners’	literature	on	money.	Yet,	as	IPE	is	the	main	discipline	that	asks	questions	about	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system,	the	Essentialist	and	the	Chartalist	bias	are	especially	relevant	here.	So	far,	IPE	has	not	brought	forth	a	theory	of	 change	 in	 the	monetary	 system	based	on	both,	 a	 credit	money	and	a	private	money	logic.	and	which	takes	the	role	of	private	credit	money	seriously.	To	understand	the	type	of	transformation	that	can	explain	how	today’s	setup	of	the	 monetary	 system	 came	 about,	 we	 have	 to	 shift	 our	 focus	 to	 the	 non-commodity	 sphere;	 to	 the	 sphere	 that	 evolved	 in	 path-dependency	 from	 the	English	 system,	 prospered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 the	 gold	 standard,	 led	 to	massive	monetary	and	 industrial	 expansion,	 and—since	 the	demise	of	gold—is	the	only	remaining	monetary	system	at	present.	It	is	not	a	sphere	of	token	or	fiat	money,	but	it	is	a	sphere	of	credit	money.	Private	and	public	credit	instruments	co-exist	 next	 to	 each	 other	 and	 make	 up	 the	 monetary	 system.	 The	 historical	transformation	 leading	up	to	the	monetary	system	as	we	know	it	must	refer	to	the	way	in	which	this	amalgam	of	debt	instruments	is	organized	and	structured.			IPE	 therefore	 fails	 to	 provide	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	transformation	that	takes	both	the	logics	of	private	money	and	of	credit	money	seriously	and	views	 this	 system’s	properties	as	a	driving	 force	 for	 institutional	change.	 Such	 theory	 could	 actually	 help	 us	 understand	 what	 historically	happened	in	the	credit	money	sphere	beyond	the	“golden	umbrella”,	and	why	the	money	 supply	 adopts	 the	 shape	 it	 has	 today	 according	 to	 the	 interpretation	of	central	 banks	 who	 define	 it	 via	 different	 aggregates	 in	 the	 form	 of	 concentric	circles.	The	gap	thus	is	a	political	economy	explanation	of	the	monetary	system’s	transformation	 that	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 addresses	 a	 pivotal	 role	 to	 the	 dynamics	associated	with	private	credit	money	creation	and	on	the	other	hand	finds	space	for	political	agency	and	power	in	its	explanation	of	the	historical	processes	that	led	to	the	public-private	money	supply	we	are	confronted	with	today.	 	
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1.4	Conclusion		This	chapter	has	reviewed	the	significant	literature	within	IPE	investigating	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	In	this,	it	identified	the	key	themes	and	explanatory	approaches	characteristic	of	this	literature.	Based	on	this	review,	the	chapter	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 literature	 is	 subject	 to	 two	 biases	 that	 imply	 a	neglect	 of	 credit	money	 and	private	money	 and	 thus,	 taken	 together,	 lead	 to	 a	state	 of	 research	 that	 fails	 to	 theorize	 the	 role	 of	 private	 credit	money	 for	 the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation.	 In	 a	 descriptive	 sense,	 this	 applies	 to	 the	various	 phenomena	 the	 literature	 takes	 into	 account—from	 international	exchange	 rate	 arrangements	 over	 central	 banking	 and	 the	 monetary	 units’	physical	 shape	 to	 the	 relationship	 of	 money	 and	 the	 nation	 state.	 From	 an	explanatory	perspective,	this	is	true	for	whatever	is	perceived	as	the	key	driving	force	of	 institutional	 change	 in	 the	monetary	 system—whether	 state	 agency	 in	realist,	 private	 agency	 in	 liberalist,	 ideas	 in	 constructivist	 or	 wider	 social	formations	in	structuralist	scholarship.		 To	remedy	this	gap,	this	study	will	add	a	political	economic	analysis	to	the	literature	 on	monetary	 transformation	 that	 places	 private	 credit	money	 center	stage:	 the	 theory	of	private	 credit	money	 accommodation.14	The	 theory	will	describe	 and	 explain	 how	 new	 credit	 instruments	 emerge	 that	 become	systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	money	 before	 a	 run	 on	 them	 threatens	 to	make	 the	 entire	 financial	 system	 collapse	 which	 forces	 political	 authorities	 to	establish	 public	 backstops	 and	 integrate	 the	 credit	 money	 form	 in	 the	 public	money	supply.	This	will	be	depicted	as	a	repeating	process	in	monetary	history	which	 keeps	 up	 a	 permanent	 tendency	 to	 transform	 the	monetary	 system	 and	has	eventually	led	to	the	current—hybrid—setup	of	the	empirical	money	supply.		To	develop	the	argument	about	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	a	repeating	 process	 that	 drives	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	monetary	 system,	 this	study	will	first	introduce	a	conceptual	lens	going	beyond	the	Essentialist	and	the	Chartalist	bias	 in	 IPE.	This	 is	 the	 ‘Money	View’—a	contemporary	market-based	credit	theory	of	money	which	provides	a	frame	for	the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims	 (Chapter	 2).	Subsequently,	the	study	will	develop	a	two-phase	model	to	describe	and	explain	the	phenomenon	of	private	credit	money	accommodation.	This	will	bring	forth	a	theoretically	 driven	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 monetary	 system	 transforms	through	necessities	created	by	the	system’s	very	own	properties	themselves	and	effectively	implemented	via	the	infrastructural	power	of	the	state	(Chapter	3).		
																																																								14	 Section	 2.1	 will	 discuss	 the	 choice	 of	 terminology	 for	 disambiguation.	 While	 the	 term	‘accommodation’	 is	 sometimes	 used	 in	 a	 different	 context	 when	 referring	 to	 the	monetary	system,	Hoacket	and	Omarova	(2016)	have	a	very	similar	understanding	as	this	study.	
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Chapter	2	
Framework:	The	Money	View	as	a	Conceptual	Lens	for	IPE			
“We	must	have	a	good	definition	of	Money,	
For	if	we	do	not,	then	what	have	we	got,	
But	a	Quantity	Theory	of	no-one-knows-what,	
And	this	would	be	almost	too	true	to	be	funny.	
Now,	Banks	secrete	something,	as	bees	secrete	honey;	
(It	sticks	to	their	fingers	some,	even	when	hot!)	
But	what	things	are	liquid	and	what	things	are	not,	
Rests	on	whether	the	climate	of	business	is	sunny.	
For	both	Stores	of	Value	and	Means	of	Exchange	
Include,	among	Assets,	a	very	wide	range,	
So	your	definition’s	no	better	than	mine.	
Still,	with	credit-card-clever	computers,	it’s	clear	
That	money	as	such	will	one	day	disappear;	
Then,	what	isn’t	there	we	won’t	have	to	define”	
(Boulding	1969:	555).			
2.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	chapter	introduces	the	‘Money	View’	as	the	conceptual	lens	on	the	monetary	system	 that	 this	 study	 applies.	 As	 a	market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	money,	 the	Money	View	goes	beyond	the	Essentialist	and	Chartalist	biases	found	in	the	IPE	literature	 (cf.	 Chapter	1).	 This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 monetary	 system	constitutes	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable,	 debt	 claims,	based	on	the	hybridity	of	public	and	private	credit	money.	This	notion	will	be	the	prerequisite	 for	 studying	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 as	 a	 repeating	transformation	process	that	the	monetary	system	is	subject	to.		 The	 Money	 View	 is	 an	 institutionalist	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 the	analysis	of	credit	money	systems,	which	is	most	prominently	represented	in	the	works	of	Perry	Mehrling	and	Zoltan	Pozsar	(cf.	e.g	Mehrling	2011,	2013b,	2015a;	Pozsar	 2012,	 2014).15	As	Mehrling	 (2011:	 4)	 claims,	 thinking	 according	 to	 the	logic	 of	 the	 Money	 View—albeit	 never	 explicitly	 called	 this	 way—used	 to	 be	common	sense	among	central	bankers	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	century,	yet	was	ousted	after	the	World	Wars.	Mehrling	(2011)	characterizes	the	Money	View	as	 a	 mode	 of	 studying	 the	 monetary	 and	 financial	 system	 that	 analyses	 cash	flows	and	payments	commitments	in	the	present.	This	stands	in	contrast	to	the	more	dominant	approaches	of	economics	and	finance	which	focus	on	the	past	or	the	 future,	 respectively.	 Both	 alternative	 views	 have	 in	 common	 that	 they	essentially	abstract	from	money	and	the	technical	details	of	money	creation:	 																																																									15	 Currently,	no	coherent,	 systematic	 theoretical	account	of	 the	Money	View	has	been	brought	forth	so	far.	Next	to	Mehrling	(2011),	a	number	of	blog	posts	as	well	as	the	online	course	The	
Economics	of	Money	and	Banking	are	key	reference	points.	 In	addition,	Pozsar	(2014)	claims	the	label	‘Money	View’	in	his	paper	on	shadow	money.	This	study	chimes	in	with	some	of	his	notions,	notably	as	concerns	the	representation	of	the	hybridity	of	money.	
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“On	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 have	 the	 view	 of	 economics,	 which	 resolutely	 looks	through	 the	 veil	 of	 money	 to	 see	 how	 the	 prospects	 for	 the	 present	generation	depend	on	 investments	 in	real	capital	goods	 that	were	made	by	generations	 past.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 we	 have	 the	 view	 of	 finance,	 which	focuses	on	the	present	valuations	of	capital	assets,	seeing	them	as	dependent	entirely	on	imagined	future	cash	flows	projected	back	into	the	present.		 The	economics	view	and	 the	 finance	view	meet	 in	 the	present,	where	 cash	flows	emerging	from	past	real	investments	meet	cash	commitments	entered	into	in	anticipation	of	an	imagined	future.	This	present	is	the	natural	sphere	of	the	money	view.	But	both	economics	and	finance	abstract	from	money;	for	both	of	them,	money	is	just	the	plumbing	behind	the	walls,	taken	for	granted.	Both	 largely	 ignore	 the	 sophisticated	mechanism	 that	 operates	 to	 channel	cash	flows	wherever	they	are	emerging	to	meet	cash	commitments	wherever	they	are	most	pressing”	(Mehrling	2011:	4-5;	italics	in	original).		The	 Money	 View	 thus	 has	 the	 self-proclaimed	 goal	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	 actual	‘financial	 plumbing’	 of	 the	 ‘real	 world’—this	 is	 to	 say	 to	 take	 the	 historically	contingent	 institutions	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 its	development	 seriously	 and	 to	 not	 shy	 away	 from	 the	 rather	 technical	 and	detailed	 knitty-gritty	 of	 how	 financial	 markets	 and	 institutions	 operate,	 in	particular	with	regard	to	the	continuous	creation	and	destruction	of	money.			 As	 a	 so-called	 ‘heterodox’	 economic	 theory,	 the	 Money	 View	 stands	 in	contrast	 to	 the	 model-based,	 ahistoric	 approach	 of	 neo-classical	 mainstream	economics	 and	 rather	 emerges	 from	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 German	 Historical	School	(cf.	e.g.	Schmoller	1901,	and	in	particular	Schumpeter	1912,	1954,	1970)	and	 American	 Institutionalism	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Commons	 1924,	 1931,	 1934,	 and	 in	particular	 Minsky	 1957,	 1986).	 In	 its	 approach	 to	 the	 monetary	 system,	 the	Money	 View	 goes	 beyond	 the	 conventional	 notion	 of	 a	 homogenous,	 clearly	delineable	money	 supply	 as	 is	 conventionally	 found	 in	 the	 type	of	mainstream	economics	that	is	based	on	Walrasian	general	equilibrium	theory	and	models	de	
facto	a	non-monetary	economy	(Hahn	1983;	Romer	2016).16	Instead,	it	assumes	that	the	money	supply	is	an	inherently	hierarchical	conglomerate	of	publicly	and	privately	 created	 debt	 claims	 with	 various	 degrees	 of	 ‘moneyness’	 that	 are	convertible	 into	 each	 other	within	 different	 segments	 of	 the	 payments	 system.	Those	debt	claims	are	permanently	created	and	destroyed	as	transactions	within	the	payment	system	occur.	A	methodical	key	element	of	the	Money	View	to	grasp	the	‘plumbing’	of	the	monetary	and	financial	system	is	to	base	its	arguments	on	the	analysis	of	balance	sheet	dynamics.	This	allows	highlighting	the	way	in	which	debt-issuing	 financial	 institutions	 operate	 and	 thus	 the	mechanisms	 of	 money	creation	 (cf.	 Mehrling	 2011).	 In	 this,	 the	 Money	 View	 takes	 the	 proverbial	assessment	 of	Minsky	 (1986)	 seriously,	 according	 to	which	money	 creation	 is	nothing	but	a	mere	balance	sheet	operation.	 																																																									16		 A	 prominent	 example	 for	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 clearly	 identifiable	 and	 delineable	money	 supply	 in	mainstream	economics	is	the	eminent	Fisher	Equation	MV=PT,	which	is	still	to	be	found	in	the	vast	majority	of	textbooks	on	the	matter.	Following	the	logic	of	the	equation,	the	determinate	quantitative	 money	 supply	 M	 must	 have	 a	 fixed	 ex	 post	 relationship	 with	 the	 velocity	 of	circulation	 of	 the	 given	 quantity	 of	 money	 units	 (V),	 the	 price	 level	 P	 and	 the	 number	 of	transactions	T.		
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As	an	analytical	framework,	the	Money	View	is	predominantly	used	in	the	context	of	the	academic	disciplines	of	economics	and	law	(cf.	e.g.	Mehrling	2011,	Pistor	 2013)	 and	 applied	 by	 practitioners	 in	 financial	 markets	 and	 regulatory	financial	 institutions	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Pozsar	 2014,	 Mehrling	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Yet,	 with	 its	institutionalist	 underpinnings,	 the	Money	 View	 can	 also	 serve	 as	 a	 conceptual	lens	for	studies	 in	IPE.	 It	 involves	a	range	of	tangible	concepts	as	well	as	a	rich	body	 of	 already	 existing	 analyses	 that	may	well	 be	 applied	 for	 analyses	 of	 the	(global)	 political	 economy	 of	 money	 and	 finance	 in	 an	 IPE	 context.	 Still,	 a	systematic	exposition	of	the	Money	View	which	contextualizes	the	approach	and	highlights	 its	 core	 ideas	 that	 are	 relevant	 in	 an	 IPE	 context	 is	 missing.	 This	chapter	 seeks	 to	 fill	 this	 gap	 by	 contextualizing	 the	 Money	 View	 approach	paradigmatically	 in	the	history	of	monetary	thought	and	by	presenting	a	handy	interpretation	of	it	that	boils	it	down	to	four	key	concepts.			 The	remainder	of	the	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:			 Section	 2.2	 defines	 the	 place	 of	 the	 Money	 View	 within	 the	 broader	context	of	monetary	theories.	As	to	be	demonstrated,	the	Money	View	is	unique	in	combining	two	theoretical	traits	in	the	thinking	on	money:	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	a	credit	theory	of	money,	which—in	contrast	to	the	more	dominant	tradition	of	monetary	theories	of	credit—considers	money	and	credit	in	a	non-dichotomous,	not	mutually	exclusive	relationship.	In	this,	it	overcomes	the	Essentialist	bias	in	IPE.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	a	market-based	monetary	theory,	which—in	contrast	to	state-based	approaches	connected	to	the	Chartalist	bias—assumes	that	money	can	 be	 created	 privately	 outside	 the	 public	 monetary	 realm	 and	 that	 private	actors	are	able	to	develop	new	forms	of	credit	money.	The	combination	of	both	these	 propositions	 makes	 it	 uniquely	 suitable	 to	 study	 the	 accommodation	 of	private	credit	money.		Section	 2.3	 presents	 a	 systematic	 account	 of	 the	 key	 concepts	 of	 the	Money	View	as	a	market-based	credit	theory	of	money	to	make	it	applicable	as	a	conceptual	 lens	 for	 scholarship	 in	 IPE.	The	 section	 systematically	develops	 the	Money	View	on	 the	basis	 of	 four	 key	 ideas:	money	 creation	 as	 a	 swap	of	 IOUs	within	the	monetary	system	as	a	payment	system;	hybridity	of	public	and	private	money	 forms;	 hierarchy	 of	money	 forms;	 as	well	 as	 the	 inherent	 instability	 of	credit	money.			The	 concluding	 section	 2.4	 summarizes	 the	 particular	 understanding	 of	the—often	 viewed	 as	 problematic—connection	 between	 the	 categories	 of	‘money’	and	 ‘credit’	 that	comes	along	with	a	Money	View	perspective.	 It	points	out	why	it	comes	with	the	Money	View	approach	that	the	monetary	system	is	to	be	 portrayed	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 ever-expanding	 debt	 claims,	 and	reveals	in	how	far	this	is	relevant	to	scrutinize	the	role	of	private	credit	money	for	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		 	
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2.2	Two	fundamental	propositions	of	the	Money	View		As	 this	 section	 will	 point	 out,	 the	 Money	 View	 incorporates	 two	 fundamental	propositions	 that	 are	 key	 analytical	 prerequisites	 to	 overcome	 the	 Essentialist	and	Chartalist	biases	in	IPE:	
• ‘Credit	money’:	As	all	modern	money	is	essentially	tradable	debt,	there	is	a	logical	superiority	of	the	category	of	‘credit’	compared	to	the	category	of	‘money’	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 ‘credit	 theories	 of	money’.	 This	insight	will	define	a	counterposition	to	the	Essentialist	bias.	
• ‘Private	money’:	While	credit	money	can	both	be	issued	by	public	and	by	private	 institutions,	 new	 credit	 money	 forms	 are	 first	 endogenously	developed	by	private	actors	in	the	financial	system	before	they	find	their	way	 into	 the	 public	monetary	 sphere.	 Hence,	 as	 a	 logical	 superiority	 of	private	 money	 creation	 compared	 to	 public	 money	 creation,	 this	 view	presents	an	alternative	to	the	Chartalist	bias.		 To	 contextualize	 both	 these	 fundamental	 propositions,	 this	 section	 will	provide	discussions	of	both	ideas	on	a	conceptual	level	and	give	an	overview	on	how	 they	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 history	 of	 monetary	 thought.	 It	 will	 begin	 with	outlining	 the	 implications	 of	 a	 credit	 theory	 of	 money	 as	 compared	 to	 the	opposite,	 more	 widespread	 approach	 of	 a	 monetary	 theory	 of	 credit.	Subsequently,	 it	will	discuss	 the	antagonism	between	market-based	 theories	of	money,	which	regard	money	as	emerging	 in	reaction	 to	private	enterprise,	and	state-centered	theories	of	money,	which	assume	that	it	is	the	state’s	recognition	that	 makes	 money	 money.	 These	 discussions	 will	 allow	 to	 flesh	 out	 the	implications	of	the	Money	View	as	a	market-based	credit	theory	of	money.			
2.2.1	A	credit	theory	of	money,	not	a	monetary	theory	of	credit		The	 Money	 View	 is	 a	 contemporary	 version	 of	 a	 credit	 theory	 of	 money.	 The	conceptual	 distinction	 between	monetary	 theories	 of	 credit	 (MTCs)	 and	 credit	theories	of	money	(CTMs)	has	been	introduced	by	Schumpeter	in	his	1954	work	
History	 of	 Economic	 Analysis.	 Schumpeter	 establishes	 the	 antagonism	 of	 MTCs	and	CTMs	as	a	guiding	principle	 for	how	conceptual	approaches	 to	money	and	the	monetary	 system	are	 constructed,	 to	 then	argue	 in	 favour	of	 the	 analytical	advantages	 of	 CTMs.	 Arnon	 (2011)	 supports	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 distinction	between	 MTCs	 and	 CTMs	 is	 a	 guiding	 principle	 if	 we	 are	 to	 understand	 the	fundamental	propositions	of	monetary	theories,	both	in	the	past	and	today.		
Monetary	theories	of	credit,	according	to	Schumpeter,	proclaim	a	logical	superiority	of	the	category	of	‘money’	over	‘credit’,	and	have	been	the	dominant	way	of	forming	monetary	theories:		“[T]extbooks	on	Money,	Currency,	 and	Banking	are	more	 likely	 than	not	 to	begin	with	an	analysis	of	a	state	of	things	in	which	legal-tender	‘money’	is	the	only	means	of	paying	and	lending.	The	huge	system	of	credits	and	debits,	of	claims	and	debts,	by	which	capitalist	society	carries	on	its	daily	business	of	production	 and	 consumption	 is	 then	 built	 up	 step	 by	 step	 by	 introducing	claims	to	money	or	credit	instruments	that	act	as	substitutes	for	legal	tender	
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and	are	allowed	indeed	to	affect	its	functioning	in	many	ways	but	not	to	oust	it	 from	 its	 fundamental	 role	 in	 the	 theoretical	 picture	 of	 the	 financial	structure.	 Even	 when	 there	 is	 very	 little	 left	 of	 this	 fundamental	 role	 in	practice,	 everything	 that	 happens	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 currency,	 credit,	 and	banking	 is	 construed	 from	 it,	 just	 as	 the	 case	 of	money	 itself	 is	 construed	from	barter”	(Schumpeter	1954:	686).		Following	 the	 logic	 of	 MTCs	 in	 the	 way	 monetary	 theories	 are	designed	stands	to	reason,	according	to	Schumpeter,	given	the	institutional	realities	of	the	pre-capitalist	world:		“Historically,	this	method	of	building	up	the	analysis	of	money,	currency,	and	banking	 [according	 to	 MTCs,	 S.M.]	 is	 readily	 understandable:	 from	 the	fourteenth	and	fifteenth	centuries	on	(and	even	in	the	Graeco-Roman	world)	the	 gold	 or	 silver	 or	 copper	 coin	 was	 the	 familiar	 thing.	 The	 credit	structure—which	moreover	 was	 incessantly	 developing—was	 the	 thing	 to	be	explored	and	to	be	analyzed.	The	legal	constructions,	too—remember	that	most	economists	who	were	not	businessmen	were	jurists—were	geared	to	a	sharp	distinction	between	money	as	the	only	genuine	and	ultimate	means	of	payment	 and	 the	 credit	 instrument	 that	 embodied	 a	 claim	 to	 money”	(Schumpeter	1954:	686).		Schumpeter,	however,	is	very	critical	about	the	MTC’s	approach	of	starting	with	coins	or	other	forms	of	commodity	‘money’	and	regarding	them	as	logically	superior	 to	 ‘credit’	 instruments.	 He	 views	 this	 as	 a	 historical	 relict	 that	unavoidably	 leads	 to	 conceptual	 quarrels.	 To	 theorize	 money	 under	 the	conditions	of	a	capitalist	system,	he	supports	the	opposite	analytical	approach	of	
credit	 theories	 of	 money	 which	 view	 the	 category	 of	 ‘credit’	 as	 logically	superior	to	‘money’:		 “[L]ogically,	 it	 is	by	no	means	 clear	 that	 the	most	useful	method	 is	 to	 start	from	the	coin—even	if,	making	a	concession	to	realism,	we	add	inconvertible	government	paper—in	order	to	proceed	to	the	credit	transactions	of	reality.	It	 may	 be	 more	 useful	 to	 start	 from	 these	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 to	 look	 upon	capitalist	 finance	 as	 a	 clearing	 system	 that	 cancels	 claims	 and	 debts	 and	carries	forward	the	differences—so	that	‘money’	payments	come	in	only	as	a	special	 case	 without	 any	 particularly	 fundamental	 importance.	 In	 other	words:	 practically	 and	 analytically,	 a	 credit	 theory	 of	 money	 is	 possibly	preferable	to	a	monetary	theory	of	credit”	(Schumpeter	1954:	686).		 Following	from	Schumpeter’s	explanation,	we	can	establish	the	following	distinction	(cf.	Table	2.1):	
• MTCs	view	a	clear	separation	between	the	economic	categories	of	‘money’	and	 ‘credit’;	 both	 categories	 as	 dichotomous	 and	 mutually	 exclusive.	Analytically,	MTCs	proclaim	a	 logical	superiority	of	 the	 ‘money’	category	and	 regard	 ‘credit’	 as	 logically	 subordinate.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 granting	‘credit’	without	‘money’	is	not	considered	possible.	
• CTMs,	 in	 turn,	 treat	 ‘credit’	 as	 logically	 paramount	 to	 ‘money’.	 Hence,	moneyless	debt	is	considered	very	well	a	meaningful	idea.	Money	is	seen	as	an	endogenous	product	of	lending	activity,	it	is	tradable	credit.	Thus,	a	clear-cut	delineation	between	the	categories	of	‘money’	and	‘credit’	is	not	
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possible.	 In	 particular,	 whether	 a	 given	 debt	 certificate	 is	 viewed	 as	‘money’	always	includes	an	arbitrary	aspect.	 ‘Money’	and	 ‘credit’	are	not	dichotomous,	as	any	money	form	can	as	well	be	a	form	of	credit’.		
Monetary	Theories	of	Credit	(MTCs)	 Credit	Theories	of	Money	(CTMs)	Money	is	the	logical	prerequisite	of	credit	 Credit	is	the	logical	prerequisite	of	money	Money	and	credit	are	dichotomies	 Money	and	credit	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin	Credit	instruments	that	function	as	near-monies	are	a	theoretical	problem	 Credit	instruments	that	function	as	near-monies	are	a	normal	phenomenon	
	
Table	2.1—Monetary	theories	of	credit	vs	credit	theories	of	money	
	
	 In	 the	 history	 of	 Western	 monetary	 thought,	 the	 antagonism	 between	MTC	and	CTM	approaches	came	 to	 the	surface	 in	various	 forms	and	at	various	stages.	 Some	 major	 authors	 and	 their	 principal	 works	 are	 to	 be	 identified	according	to	eight	subsequent	phases:	the	Early	Modern	Period	(1600-1800);	the	Bullionism	 Debate	 (1801-1819);	 the	 Currency	 School-Banking	 School	Controversy	(1830s-1844);	the	Gold	Standard	era	from	the	Second	Peel’s	Act	to	World	War	 I	 (1844-1917);	 the	 interwar	 debates	 (1919-1939);	 debates	 during	the	Bretton	Woods	era	(1944-1973);	the	discourses	during	the	period	from	the	inception	of	Generalized	Floating	until	 the	Global	Financial	Crisis	 (1973-2007);	and	the	post-Financial	Crisis	scholarship	(since	2008).	The	subsequent	overview	will	 underpin	 the	 point	 made	 by	 Schumpeter	 that	 CTMs—although	 there	 are	good	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 they	 are	 conceptually	 superior	 to	 MTCs	 for	explaining	capitalist	monetary	systems—have	always	had	a	marginalized	status	and	 were	 seen	 as	 ‘critical’	 or	 ‘heterodox’	 theories	 opposed	 to	 the	 theoretical	mainstream,	which	relied	on	the	logic	of	MTCs.		 In	 contrast	 to	 CTM	 approaches,	 the	 origins	 of	 MTCs	 are	 more	 easily	detectable	 in	Western	 philosophy	 and	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 as	 far	 as	 Aristotle’s	
Politics.	In	the	early	modern	period,	seminal	authors	bringing	forth	MTC	ideas	in	 Britain	 are	 Petty	 (1660),	 Mun	 (1664),	 Locke	 (1689)	 and	 David	 Hume’s	publications	On	the	Balance	of	Trade	(1742)	as	well	as	Of	Interest	and	Of	Money,	both	 published	 in	 1752.	 Associated	 with	 ideas	 of	 mercantilism,	 they	 place	emphasis	on	money	as	precious	metall.	Adam	Smith’s	1776	Wealth	of	Nations—without	 a	 doubt	 the	 most	 referenced	 economic	 publication	 and	 the	 founding	work	 for	 classical	 political	 economy—similarly	 views	 money	 as	 ultimately	derived	out	of	commodities	and	hence	follows	the	MTC	logic.17		The	first	time	that	the	antagonism	between	MTCs	and	CTMs	came	to	the	surface,	 in	 a	 form	 still	 prevalent	 in	 today’s	 collective	 memory,	 was	 the	
Bullionism	Debate,	which	Britain	witnessed	in	the	first	two	decades	of	the	19th	century.	18	During	the	Restriction	Period,	when	Bank	of	England	notes	could	not	be	converted	into	gold,	the	‘Bullionists’	wanted	the	Bank	of	England	to	return	to	convertibility,	 whilst	 the	 ‘Anti-Bullionists’	 supported	 the	 suspension	 of	convertibility.	While	the	Bullionist	followed	the	conventional	MTC	logic,	the	Anti-																																																								17		 For	a	discussion	of	Smith’s	monetary	theory,	see	Weber	(2015a).	18	 Cf.	Viner	(1937),	Fetter	(1965),	Humphrey	(1988),	Arnon	(2011)	as	well	as	Marx	(1863a-c).	
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Bullionist’s	 arguments	 started	 developing	 the	 logic	 of	 CTMs.	 Among	 Bullionist	authors	were	Walter	 Boyd	 (1801)	 and,	 even	more	 importantly,	 David	Ricardo.	His	 1810	 pamphlet	 on	 The	 High	 Price	 of	 Bullion	 addressed	 the	 debate	 most	directly,	but	his	contributions	to	monetary	theory	can	also	be	found	in	his	1817	magnum	opus	On	the	Principles	of	Political	Economy	and	Taxation	and	the	1824	
Plan	 for	 the	 Establishment	 of	 a	 National	 Bank,	 which	 was	 published	 after	 his	death.	Ricardo’s	monetary	ideas	were	to	become	highly	influential	for	the	‘British	monetary	 orthodoxy’	 (Fetter	 1965)	 and	 still	 shape	 mainstream	 economic	thought	today	(cf.	Stadermann	2002).	Among	the	most	prominent	Anti-Bullionist	authors	 were	 Baring	 (1797,	 1801)	 and	 Henry	 Thornton	who	wrote	 the	 1802-book	An	Enquiry	into	the	Nature	and	Effects	of	the	Paper	Credit	on	Great	Britain	individually	and	the	1810	Report	of	the	Bullion	Committee	together	with	two	co-authors.	 Thornton	may	well	 be	 considered	 the	 first	major	 theorist	 of	 the	 CTM	approach	(cf.	Arnon	2011).		A	second	debate	that	referred	to	the	adequate	choice	of	monetary	system	occurred	 after	 the	 return	 to	 convertibility:	 the	 Currency	 School-Banking	
School	 controversy,	 which	 had	 its	 heyday	 at	 around	 1840.19	The	 Currency	School,	 based	 on	 the	 heritage	 of	 Hume	 and	 Ricardo,	 was	 in	 some	 sense	 a	continuation	of	 the	Bullionists’	position	and	defended	a	MTC	position.	 Its	most	important	proponent	was	Samuel	 Jones	Loyd,	 later	called	Lord	Overstone,	who	published	his	book	Further	Reflections	on	the	State	of	the	Currency	and	the	Action	
of	the	Bank	of	England	 in	1837.	Other	authors	were	Robert	Torrens	and	George	Warde	 Norman.	 Since	 the	 Currency	 School’s	 proposals	 found	 their	 way	 into	policy	 via	 the	 1844	Bank	 Charter	 Act	 (also	 known	 as	 ‘Second	 Peel’s	 Act’),	 it	 is	considered	 the	 ‘winner’	 of	 the	 controversy,	 although	 the	 Act	 caused	 harsh	criticism	 in	 the	 decades	 after	 it	 became	 effective.	Whilst	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	Currency	School	were	based	on	analytical	principles,	the	Banking	School	rather	brought	 forth	 aphorisms	 critical	 towards	 the	 Currency	 School’s	 Ricardian	tradition.	Prominent	representatives	of	the	Banking	School	were	John	Fullarton	and	James	Wilson.	 Its	most	 important	work,	however,	 is	 the	1844-pamphlet	An	
Inquiry	 into	 the	 Currency	 Principle	 written	 by	 Thomas	 Tooke,	 who—	 together	with	Henry	Thornton—may	be	regarded	as	the	pioneer	of	modern	CTM	thought.		 In	the	second	half	of	the	19th	and	the	early	20th	century,	during	the	time	of	the	 Early	 and	 the	 Classical	 Gold	 Standard,	 the	 main	 works	 on	 monetary	thought	cannot	be	as	neatly	divided	into	specific	debates	as	before.	Most	authors	from	the	Anglo-Saxon	and	the	continental	traditions	remained	clearly	within	the	realm	of	MTCs.	What	was	to	become	‘British	monetary	orthodoxy’	(Fetter	1965)	was	 first	 defined	 by	 John	 Stuart	 Mill’s	 1848	 Principles	 of	 Political	 Economy	(although	he	was	said	to	have	had	proximity	to	the	Banking	School	in	his	earlier	writings)	 and	 later	 by	 Marshall	 (1890)	 and	 Pigou	 (1917).	 The	 ‘orthodoxy’	incorporated	 the	 thoughts	 of	 the	 scholars	 who	 pushed	 forward	 what	 today	 is	known	as	the	‘marginalist	revolution’	(cf.	Jevons	1875,	Walras	1886,	Edgeworth	1888).	Within	 the	 logic	 of	Walrasian	 general	 equilibrium	 theory,	MTC	 thinking	received	the	status	of	a	logical	necessity.	Seminal	works	from	the	Austrian	School																																																									19		 Cf.	 Hayek	 (1929),	 Liepmann	 (1933),	 Viner	 (1937),	 Horsefield	 (1944),	 Mints	 (1945),	 Fetter	(1965),	Arnon	(2011).	
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on	 that	 matter	 were	 Carl	 Menger’s	 1892-article	 On	 the	 Origin	 of	 Money	 and	Ludwig	 von	Mises’s	 1912-book	Theorie	des	Geldes	und	der	Umlaufmittel.	 Georg	Friedrich	Knapp,	 the	 founder	of	Chartalist	monetary	 theory,	 equally	belongs	 to	the	 realm	 of	MTCs	with	 his	 Staatliche	Theorie	des	Geldes,	 published	 in	 1905.20	Influential	 contributors	 to	 the	 debate	 from	 the	 American	 side	 were	 Fischer	(1911)	 and	 Kemmerer	 (1907).	 Finally,	 also	 Karl	 Marx	 with	 his	 critique	 of	political	economy,	most	prominently	brought	 forth	 in	 the	 three	volumes	of	Das	
Kapital	(1867,	1885,	1894),	is	to	be	put	in	the	MTC	tradition—provided	that	we	follow	 an	 interpretation	 of	 his	 unfinished	 work	 according	 to	 which	 the	
Wertformanalyse	of	Vol.	 I,	Ch.	1,	Sec.	3	 is	the	heart	of	his	analysis	on	the	 logical	origin	of	money	 (Marx	1867:	62f.).	Accordingly,	 the	 concept	of	money	 (‘money	form’)	 is	 systematically	 to	 be	 derived	 out	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 marketable	commodity	 (‘commodity	 form’)	 and	 logically	 superior	 to	 all	 forms	 of	 credit	instruments,	 which	 are	 brought	 into	 the	 picture	 in	 Vol.	 III	 and	 may	 be	summarized	under	the	umbrella	term	of	‘fictitious	capital’	(cf.	Marx	1894:	413f.).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Walter	 Bagehot	 who	 had	 a	 huge	 impact	 with	 his	 1873	
Lombard	Street	 is	 an	 author	who	 stands	 in	 the	 tradition	of	 the	Banking	 School	and	thus	CTM	theory.	In	the	U.S.,	Charles	F.	Dunbar’s	Chapters	on	the	Theory	and	
History	of	Banking	published	in	1885	clearly	stress	the	credit	character	of	money.	Further,	Wicksell	 (1898,	1906)	and	Schumpeter	(1921)	are	 two	authors	with	a	German-speaking	background	whose	work	is	reminiscent	of	CTM	ideas.	Shortly	afterwards,	 in	 1913	 and	 1914,	 Alfred	 Mitchell-Innes	 wrote	 two	 articles	 called	
What	is	Money?	and	The	Credit	Theory	of	Money	 that	were	to	become	important	points	of	reference	for	CTM	thought	throughout	the	20th	century.		 Monetary	 thought	 in	 the	 interwar	 years	 was	 shaped	 primarily	 by	debates	 over	 the	 return	 to	 the	 gold	 standard	 and	 the	Great	Depression.	 Those	topics	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 work	 of	 John	 Maynard	 Keynes.	 In	 his	 earlier	publications	 such	 as	 the	 1924	 Tract	 on	 Monetary	 Reform,	 Keynes’s	 monetary	thought	still	was	rooted	in	the	British	orthodoxy.	However,	his	principal	works—the	1930	Treatise	on	Money	and	the	1936	General	Theory	of	Employment,	Interest	
and	Money,	which	triggered	the	so-called	‘Keynesian	Revolution’—contain	traces	of	CTM.21	Those	ideas	are	also	to	be	found	in	Ralph	Hawtrey’s	1919	Currency	and	
Credit	 and	 1932	 The	 Art	 of	 Central	 Banking,	 as	 well	 as	 Allyn	 Young’s	 1929	
Mystery	 of	 Money,	 John	 R.	 Commons’s	 1934	 Institutional	 Economics,	 Hans	Neisser’s	 1928	 Der	 Tauschwert	 des	 Geldes	 and	 Schumpeter’s	 Das	 Wesen	 des	
Geldes,	 which	 was	 written	 at	 around	 1929	 but	 only	 published	 in	 1970	 from	fragments	 that	were	 found	after	 is	 his	death.22	Yet,	most	publications	 advocate	an	MTC	view:	Among	them	are	Marshall	(1923),	Crick	(1927),	von	Hayek	(1929)	as	well	as	Fisher	(1927,	1936).	Those	works	all	emerged	prior	to	the	Keynesian	Revolution.	The	most	important	publication	after	it	was	John	R.	Hicks’s	1937	Mr.	
Keynes	and	the	'Classics'.	This	article	cemented	an	authoritative	interpretation	of	Keynes’s	work	that	assigned	it	to	the	MTC	realm.		 																																																									20		 See	 2.2.2	 for	 a	 brief	 discussion	 of	 Knapp’s	 monetary	 theory	 and	 his	 categorization	 in	 the	history	of	monetary	thought	21		 See	Leijonhufvud	(1968),	Minsky	(1957),	Bibow	(2006)	and	Hayes	(2006).	22		 An	English	version	of	Schumpeter’s	book	has	only	appeared	in	2015	titled	Treatise	on	Money.	
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In	the	era	of	 the	Bretton	Woods	 System,	 the	opposition	of	Monetarism	and	Keynesianism	(mainly	in	the	form	of	the	‘Neoclassical	Synthesis’,	also	called	‘Neo-Keynesianism’)	 was	 formative.	 Yet,	 both	 schools	 adhered	 to	 the	 MTC	concept:	The	central	monetarist	works,	on	the	one	hand,	were	Milton	Friedman’s	1956-edited	 volume	 Studies	 in	 the	 Quantity	 Theory	 of	 Money,	 his	 1963-book	
Monetary	 History	 of	 the	 United	 States	 1867–1960	 (co-authored	 with	 Anna	Schwartz)	and	his	1968-speech	The	Role	of	Monetary	Policy.	Influential	authors	of	the	Neoclassical	Synthesis,	on	the	other	hand,	were	Samuelson	(1948),	Mundell	(1961)	 and	 Patinkin	 (1956).	 In	 their	 Keynes	 interpretation,	 they	 followed	 the	path	trodden	by	Hicks	(1937).	Contrasting	to	this,	Post	Keynesians	presented	a	divergent	exegesis	of	Keynes’s	work	that	focused	on	the	CTM	aspect	(cf.	Eichner	and	Kregel	1975).	Relevant	works	are	Kalecki	(1954)	and	Robinson	(1956)	who	come	from	the	Cambridge	milieu,	as	well	as	American	Post	Keynesians	 like	 the	young	Hyman	Minsky	 (1957)	 and	Davidson	 (1972).	Other	U.S.	 economists	 that	advocate	 aspects	 of	 a	 CTM	 approach	 but	 cannot	 easily	 be	 ascribed	 to	 the	 Post	Keynesian	 school	 are	 James	 Tobin	 with	 his	 1963-article	 Commercial	 Banks	 as	
Creators	of	‘Money’	as	well	as	John	G.	Gurley	and	Edward	S.	Shaw	who	published	their	 book	Money	 in	a	Theory	of	Finance	 in	 1960.	 Finally,	 a	 Cambridge	 scholar	who	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 Post-Keynesian	 but	 applies	 a	 MTC	 concept	 and	 thus	founded	Neo-Ricardianism	is	Piero	Sraffa	with	his	1960-book	The	Production	of	
Commodities	by	Means	of	Commodities.			After	the	inception	of	Generalized	Floating,	mainstream	economics	came	up	with	the	‘New	Keynesian’	approach	under	the	influence	of	the	Lucas	Critique	(Lucas	1976)	and	the	time	inconsistency	problem		(Kydland	and	Prescott	1977).	This	 led	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 rational	 expectations-based	 Real	 Business	 Cycle	models	(following	Kydland	and	Prescott	1982)	and	Dynamic	Stochastic	General	Equilibrium	 models	 (after	 Rotemberg	 and	 Woodford	 1997),	 which	 are	 both	essentially	subjecting	the	MTC	logic.	This	is	also	true	for	influential	works	in	the	‘rules	 vs.	 discretion’	 debate	 (Barro	 and	 Gordon	 1983;	 Taylor	 1993).	 Michael	Woodford’s	 2003-book	 Interest	and	Prices,	which	has	 been	widely	 regarded	 as	the	 main	 contribution	 to	 monetary	 theory	 in	 the	 last	 decades,	 models	 a	 pure	credit	 economy	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	Wicksell,	 in	 which	 the	 central	 bank	 has	 no	control	 over	monetary	 aggregates,	 and	 thus	 is	 sometimes	 regarded	 as	 bearing	the	 idea	 of	 endogenous	money.	 Yet,	 as	Woodford	 abstracts	 from	money	 as	 an	institution	 and	 merely	 holds	 interest	 rates	 for	 relevant,	 Interest	 and	 Prices	emanates	from	the	tradition	of	the	monetary	Walrasianism	found	in	MTCs.23			In	contrast,	Post	Keynesian	endogenous	money	theory,	which	applies	the	CTM	 rationale,	 flourished	 in	 relative	 separation	 from	 mainstream	 economics.	Next	to	a	new	generation	of	British	scholars	(Chick	1977;	Kaldor	1982;	Dow	and	Chick	2002),	Post	Keynesian	endogenous	money	theory	is	represented	in	North	America	by	authors	such	as	Hyman	P.	Minsky	(Stabilizing	an	Unstable	Economy,	1986),	his	student	L.	Randall	Wray	(1990)	and	Thomas	 I.	Palley	(2002).	Moore	(1988)	introduced	the	‘horizontalist	approach’	and	Lavoie	(1985)	the	‘verticalist	approach’	 to	 endogenous	 money.	 Besides,	 outside	 the	 U.S.	 developed	 the																																																									23		 Cf.	 e.g.	McCallum	 (2005),	Laidler	 (2006),	Lavoie	 (2006:	20),	Mehrling	 (2006),	Arnon	 (2011:	358)	and	Romer	(2016)	for	comments	on	that	matter.	
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‘Monetary	 Circulation	 Theory’	 that	 embraces	 authors	 like	 Graziani	 (1989)	 and	Rochon	(1999).	John	Hicks,	with	his	1989	A	Market	Theory	of	Money,	made	a	U-turn	in	his	monetary	thinking	and	shifted	from	the	MTC	logic	of	his	1937	article	to	a	determined	CTM	approach.	Werner	(1997,	2005)	and	economic	sociologist	Geoffrey	 Ingham	 with	 his	 2004-book	 The	 Nature	 of	 Money	 published	 further	contributions	 in	 the	 CTM	 framework.	 Joseph	 Huber,	 another	 economic	sociologist,	descriptively	acknowledges	the	CTM	logic,	yet	rejects	systemic	credit	money	 creation	 from	 a	 normative	 point	 of	 view	 and	 calls	 for	 a	 purely	governmental	 monetary	 system	 (see	 e.g.	 Vollgeld,	 1998).	 Hayek’s	 1976	
Denationalisation	of	Money,	 also	 an	 example	 for	 a	 CTM,	 argues	 in	 the	 opposite	direction	 and	 advocates	 for	 the	 end	 of	 the	 alleged	 government	 monopoly	 on	money	issue	and	calls	for	currency	competition.		 The	latest	event	that	exercised	substantial	influence	on	monetary	thought	was	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis.	 Several	 novel	 contributions	 in	 the	 post-
Financial	 Crisis	 scholarship	constitute	reactions	 to	 the	crisis	 from	a	monetary	theory	 point	 of	 view	 and	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 CTM.	 Of	 primary	relevance	for	the	purpose	of	this	study,	of	course,	is	the	scholarship	that	can	be	broadly	 connected	 to	 the	 Money	 View.	 The	 key	 authors	 in	 this	 regard	 are	Mehrling	 (2011,	 2012a,	 2012b,	 2012c,	 2013a,	 2013b,	 2015a),	 Mehrling	 et	 al.	(2013)	 and	 Pozsar	 (2011,	 2014,	 2015).	 A	 major	 aspect	 of	 the	 Money	 View	perspective,	which	is	of	particular	relevance	for	this	study,	is	the	insinuation	that	shadow	banking	 constitutes	 a	monetary	 phenomenon	 and	 goes	 along	with	 the	creation	of	 ‘shadow	money’.	 Such	 considerations	 are	 to	be	 found	 in	Gabor	 and	Vestergaard	 (2016),	 Gorton	 (2010,	 2012),	McMillan	 (2012,	 2014),	 Moe	 (2012,	2014),	Ricks	(2011,	2012,	2016).	Approaches	emerging	from	Post	Keynesianism	are	 the	so-called	 ‘Modern	Money	Theory’	or	 ‘Neochartalism‘	 (cf.	Fulwiler	2010,	Wray	2015),	Thomas	I.	Palley’s	Asset	Based	Reserve	Requirements	doctrine	(cf.	Palley’s	 2013,	 2014)	 as	well	 as	 Borio	 (2011,	 2012)	 and	Werner	 (2012,	 2015).	David	Graeber	 contributed	 to	 the	 debate	 as	 an	 anthropologist,	with	 his	widely	renowned	2011-book	Debt.	The	First	5000	Years.			
2.2.2	A	market-,	not	a	state-based	theory	of	money	
	The	 second	 antagonism	 within	 the	 history	 of	 monetary	 thought,	 which	 is	formative	to	characterize	the	Money	View	as	the	conceptual	lens	for	the	study	of	private	credit	money	accommodation,	 is	 that	between	state-	and	market-based	theories	of	money.	The	fundamental	opposition	refers	to	the	question	of	whether	it	 is	ultimately	public	 institutions	or	private	agency	 that	define	what	money	 is.	Both	 approaches	 can	 be	 consistently	 thought	 trough	 within	 the	 MTC	 and	 the	CTM	logic.	 In	 its	 ‘classical’	 form,	the	antagonism	appeared	in	the	Gold	Standard	era	 between	 two	 MTCs—Menger’s	 Metallism	 and	 Knapp’s	 Chartalism	 (cf.	Semionova	 2014:	 108).	 Within	 contemporary	 credit	 theories	 of	 money	 of	 the	post-2008	 era,	 it	 can	 be	 found	 between	 the	 Neo-Chartalist	 Modern	 Money	Theory	 and	 the	 Money	 View	 (cf.	 Table	 2.2).24	These	 four	 approaches	 will	 be	compared	as	quintessential	for	the	antagonism.	 																																																									24		 A	related	version	of	this	table	has	been	provided	in	Bruun	(1995:	25).	
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	 State-based	monetary		
theories	
Market-based	monetary	
theories	
Monetary	theories	
of	credit		 Chartalism	(Knapp	1905)		 Metallism	(Menger	1892)		
Credit	theories	of	
money		 Neochartalism	(Fulwiler	2010,	Wray	2015)		 Money	View	(Mehrling	2000,	2011,	2015a;	Pozsar	2014)		
	
Table	2.2—Antagonism	of	state-	and	market-based	theories	of	money	
	
	 The	Metallism	 of	Menger	 (1892)	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 expositions	 of	 the	approach	 that	 sees	 money,	 in	 its	 purest	 form,	 as	 a	 commodity	 that	 had	 been	singled	 out	 as	 a	 medium	 of	 exchange	 through	 market	 processes	 and	 due	 to	practical	 and	 historical	 reasons	 is	 made	 up	 of	 precious	 metals.	 As	 to	 Menger	(1892:	239),	 the	origin	of	money	involves	“certain	commodities	(these	being	 in	advanced	 civilizations	 coined	 pieces	 of	 gold	 and	 silver,	 together	 subsequently	with	 documents	 representing	 those	 coins)	 becoming	 universally	 acceptable	media	of	exchange”.	The	alleged	reason	for	the	rise	of	such	commodity	money	is	to	 overcome	 the	 inherent	 problem	 of	 a	 barter	 economy.	 As	 barter	 exchange	relies	on	a	 ‘double	 coincidence	of	wants’,	 exchange	between	parties	 could	only	take	 place	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 each	 of	 two	 individuals	 was	 willing	 to	exchange	 what	 they	 possessed	 for	 that	 which	 was	 offered	 by	 someone	 else.	Money	 then	 is	 said	 to	 haven	 arisen	 spontaneously	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 as	 a	means	to	eliminate	the	deficiencies	of	barter	(Bell	1998:	2-3).	To	determine	what	functions	as	money,	an	involvement	of	the	state	is	not	necessary:	The	primacy	of	the	market	is	exemplified	when	Menger	frames	as	the	main	puzzle	of	monetary	theory	 “why	 it	 is	 that	 the	 economic	 man	 is	 ready	 to	 accept	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	commodity,	 even	 if	he	does	not	need	 it,	or	 if	his	need	of	 it	 is	already	supplied,	 in	exchange	for	all	the	goods	he	has	brought	to	market”	(Menger	1892:	239).25			The	 Chartalism	 of	 Knapp	 (1905)	 concurs	 with	 Menger	 that	 money	 is	ultimately	 a	 commodity	 (“The	 favourite	 form	of	money	 is	 specie”,	Knapp	1905	[1924]:	1);	 it	thus	remains	within	the	MTC	logic.	However,	Knapp	sees	it	as	the	legal	 privilege	 of	 the	 state	 to	 decide	 whether	 a	 commodity	 may	 function	 as	money	or	not:	“The	soul	of	currency	is	not	in	the	material	of	the	pieces,	but	in	the	legal	ordinances	which	regulate	their	use”	(Knapp	1905	[1924]:	2).	In	criticizing	the	Metallist	 approach,	he	holds	 the	attempt	 to	deduce	 it	without	 the	 idea	of	a	State	 to	be	not	 only	out	 of	 date,	 but	 even	absurd,	 however	widely	 these	 views	may	 still	 obtain”	 (Knapp	1905	 [1924]:	 viii).	Knapp	argues	against	 the	metallist	position	that,	as	the	intrinsic	value	of	the	commodity’s	material	content	does	not	correspond	 to	 its	 face	 value	 (ibid:	 30),	 “[o]ur	means	 of	 payment,	 then,	wheter	coins	or	warrants,	[…]	are	pay-tokens,	or	tickets	used	as	means	of	payment.	[…]	Perhaps	the	Latin	word	‘Charta’	can	bear	the	sense	of	ticket	or	token,	and	we	can	form	a	new	but	intelligible	adjective—‘Chartal.’	Our	means	of	payment	have	this	token,	or	Chartal,	form.	Among	civilised	peoples	in	our	day,	payments	can	only	be																																																									25		 Giannini	(2004:	18)	argues	that	Menger	does	not	 fully	exclude	the	state	 in	his	approach	but	merely	 grants	 a	 subordinate	 role	 following	 the	 logic	 ‘The	 market	 produces	 and	 the	 state	perfects’.		
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made	with	pay-tickets	or	Chartal	pieces”	(ibid:	32).	Knapp’s	guiding	theoretical	principle	therefore	is:	“Money	is	a	creature	of	law”	(ibid:	1).26		Both	approaches,	Metallism	and	Chartalism,	emphasize	money’s	role	as	a	‘means	of	payment’,	which	is	the	common	approach	of	the	MTC	logic.27	CTMs,	in	contrast,	prioritze	the	 ‘unit	of	account’	 function:	Since	money	 is	primarily	debt,	which	originates	in	the	lending	activity	of	economic	units,	it	requires	a	common	unit	of	account	to	denominate	this	debt.	This	view	has	been	well	made	explicit	by	Mitchell-Inness	(1913,	1914).	The	Modern	Money	Theory	as	well	as	 the	Money	View,	as	two	contemporary	CTMs,	follow	this	rationale	and	concur	in	claiming	a	priority	of	the	unit	of	account	function.	They	differ,	however,	with	regard	to	the	role	they	attribute	to	the	state	in	choosing	this	unit	of	account,	determining	what	credit	money	is	as	well	as	its	general	status	and	role	in	the	monetary	system.	28	Moreover,	while	 the	Money	View	 is	meant	 to	be	 specific	 to	 a	 capitalist	 setting,	Modern	Money	Theory	claims	to	be	relevant	also	for	pre-capitalist	times.		The	Modern	 Money	 Theory	 (MMT),	 according	 to	 its	 proponents,	 has	been	developed	since	the	1990s	as	an	approach	to	monetary	theory	on	the	basis	of	Knapp’s	state	money	approach,	the	credit	money	view	of	Mitchell-Innes,	Abba	Lerner’s	 functional	 finance	 approach,	 Minsky’s	 views	 of	 banking	 as	 well	 as	Wynne	 Godley’s	 functional	 finance	 approach	 (Fullwiler	 et	 al.	 2012:	 17).	 Most	recently,	it	has	been	represented	in	contributions	such	as	Fullwiler	et	al.	(2012),	Tymoigne	and	Wray	(2013)	as	well	as	in	Wray	(2015)—an	introductory	Primer	on	MMT	to	which	this	depiction	will	refer.		Wray	 (2015)	 describes	 MMT	 as	 a	 “theory	 of	 sovereign	 currency”	 (ibid:	41).	As	a	Neo-Chartalist	approach,	MMT	suggests	that	it	 is	the	state	that	choses	the	unit	of	account	and	defines	which	IOUs,	denominated	in	this	unit	of	account,	may	function	as	money.	Hence,	for	“4000	years”,	the	monetary	system	has	been	a	“state	money	system”,	in	which	“the	state	chooses	the	money	of	account,	imposes	obligations	 (taxes,	 tribute,	 tithes,	 fines,	 and	 fees),	 denominated	 in	 that	 money	unit,	and	issues	a	currency	accepted	in	payment	of	those	obligations”	(ibid:	1-2).	This	is	the	unique	power	of	the	sovereign	government,	which	also	holds	it	in	its	discretion	 to	 decide	 how	monetary	 contracts	 can	 be	 legally	 enforced	 in	 courts	(ibid:	43-44).	The	structural	root	for	this	power	of	the	state	is	that	the	populace	by	definition	owes	tax	debt	to	the	state	(“taxes	drive	money”,	ibid:	50),	and	that	the	state	is	in	the	unique	position	to	create	and	provide	the	only	acceptable	IOUs	
																																																								26	 Many	contemporary	authors,	in	particular	those	from	a	Neo-Chartalist	tradition,	read	Knapp’s	work	as	if	he	represented	a	CTM	approach	that	establishes	a	logical	superiority	of	‘credit’	over	‘money’(cf.	e.g.	Bell	1998).	To	the	conviction	of	the	author	of	this	study,	such	an	interpretation	is	hard	to	justify	on	the	basis	of	Knapp’s	original	work.	Still,	Knapp’s	writing	remains	hermetic	to	a	large	extent,	not	the	least	because	of	a	very	complex	system	of	neologisms	he	introduces	as	well	as	a	not	straightforward	way	of	presenting	his	arguments.	27		 Giannini	 (2004:	5)	suggests	 that	 the	discrepancy	between	Menger	and	Knapp	can	be	 traced	back	to	an	antagonism	within	the	work	of	Aristotle	who	in	his	Politics	adopts	a	metallist	and	in	his	Nicomachean	Ethics	a	Chartalist	approach.	28		 Michell	(2016)	provides	an	excellent	juxtaposition	of	MMT	and	Money	View	approaches	with	regard	to	the	debate	on	‘shadow	money’.	
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to	discharge	this	debt.29	Hence,	“[o]ur	currency	is	government’s	liability,	an	IOU	that	is	redeemable	for	tax	obligations	and	other	payments	to	the	state”	(ibid:	7).	It	is	thus	the	state’s	“fiat”—this	is	to	say	the	Chartalist	power	of	the	state—that	makes	an	IOU	money:			 “[W]hy	 would	 anyone	 accept	 government’s	 ‘fiat’	 currency?	 Because	 the	government’s	currency	is	the	main	(and	usually	the	only)	thing	accepted	by	government	 in	 payment	 of	 taxes	 and	 other	 monetary	 debts	 due	 to	government.	 To	 avoid	 the	 penalties	 imposed	 for	 nonpayment	 of	 taxes	(including	 prison),	 the	 taxpayer	 needs	 to	 obtain	 the	 government’s	currency”	(ibid:	49).		
Prima	facie,	following	the	MMT	logic,	any	kind	of	non-state	institution	that	might	be	 interested	 in	 issuing	 credit	money	upon	 its	own	discretion	would	act	beyond	 legality	 and	 commit	 the	 crime	 of	 counterfeiting	 (ibid:	 44).	 Private	institutions	may	only	issue	money-like	IOUs	if	they	have	been	explicitly	entitled	by	the	state	to	do	so.	This	is	the	case	for	banks	who	have	been	put	in	place	by	the	state	as	 intermediaries	and	who	are	supervised	by	the	central	bank	as	a	public	institution:	 “Today	 with	 banks	 intermediating,	 it	 is	 the	 bank	 that	 delivers	 the	currency.	 In	 the	 old	 days,	 taxpayers	 did	 it	 directly	 without	 an	 intermediary—they	 actually	brought	 coins,	 tally	 sticks,	 or	paper	 currency	 to	 the	 exchequer	of	the	 treasury	 to	pay	 taxes,	 fees,	 and	 fines	due	 to	 the	 government”	 (Wray	2015:	49).	Thus,	within	the	logic	of	MMT	as	a	state-based	credit	theory	of	money,	the	adequate	way	of	thinking	about	private	money	creation—primarily	by	banks—is	to	think	of	them	as	leveraging	state	money,	i.e.	creating	private	credit	money	as	promises	to	pay	‘actual’	government	money	(Wray	2015:	79).		 The	Money	 View,	 in	 contrast	 to	 MMT,	 postulates	 a	 primacy	 of	 market	mechanisms	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 origination	 of	 credit	 money.	 It	 assumes	 that	financial	 market	 participants	 are	 in	 the	 position	 to	 develop	 new	 credit	instruments	 that	 function	 as	 substitutes	 for	 established	 money	 forms.	 Those	near-monies	 find	 application	 in	 various	 subsections	 of	 the	 financial	 system.	 In	this,	it	follows	up	on	Hicks	(1989)	and	his	Market	Theory	of	Money,	and	is	in	line	with	the	famous	verdict	of	Minsky	(1986:	228)	according	to	which	“everyone	can	create	money;	 the	 problem	 is	 to	 get	 it	 accepted”.30	The	difference	 between	 the	market-centered	Money	View	and	the	state-centered	MMT	is	well	addressed	 in	
																																																								29	 Wray	(2015:	50)	makes	a	very	telling	remark	about	Bank	of	England	notes:	“The	‘promise	to	pay’	that	is	engraved	on	UK	Pound	notes	is	superfluous	and	really	quite	misleading.	The	notes	should	actually	read	‘I	promise	to	accept	this	note	in	payment	of	taxes’.	We	know	that	the	UK	Treasury	will	not	 really	pay	anything	 (other	 than	another	note)	when	 the	 five	Pound	paper	currency	 is	 presented.	 However,	 it	will	 and	must	 accept	 the	 note	 in	 payment	 of	 taxes.	 If	 it	refuses	to	accept	 its	own	IOU	in	payment,	 it	 is	defaulting	on	that	 IOU”.	The	analysis	of	bank	note	accommodation	in	Chapter	4	will	shed	light	on	this	issue	and	present	a	counterargument	to	Wray’s	notion.	Accordingly,	the	function	to	discharge	tax	debt	was	only	introduced	with	the	act	 of	 accommodating	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 more	 than	 a	 century	 after	 the	 first	 Bank	 of	England	 note	 had	 been	 issued.	 Hence,	 the	 understanding	 that	 discharging	 tax	 debt	 is	 the	origin	of	what	makes	an	IOU	money	is	historically	inaccurate.	30	 Curiously	enough,	also	MMT	sees	Minsky	(1986)	as	one	of	the	key	reference	points	for	their	approach.	The	antagonism	between	MMT	and	 the	Money	View	 thus	has	 some	aspects	of	 an	intellectual	quarrel	among	heirs.	
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Mehrling	(2000)—an	article	termed	Modern	Money.	Fiat	or	Credit?,	which	here	is	seen	as	laying	the	foundations	for	what	was	later	to	become	the	Money	View.			Accordingly,	 from	 a	Money	 View	 perspective,	 “state	money	 is	 not	 a	 fiat	outside	money	but,	rather,	an	inside	credit	money	because	it	is	the	liability	of	the	central	bank.	Further,	there	is	a	kind	of	power	involved	in	taxing	authority,	but	it	is	 a	 power	 we	 understand	 better	 when	 we	 treat	 it	 as	 an	 asset	 on	 the	government’s	 balance	 sheet”	 (Mehrling	 2000:	 401).	 Thus,	 the	 MMT	 approach	“misconstrues	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 modern	 state	 that	 issues	 modern	 currency”	(ibid).	 From	 a	Money	View	perspective,	 not	 the	 state,	 but	 “private	 finance	 is	 a	better	 logical	 place	 to	 start	 when	 trying	 to	 understand	modern	money”	 (ibid:	402).	Hence,	the	state	is	not	the	logical	origin	of	what	money	is	and	the	anchor	of	the	monetary	system,	but	merely	the	largest	among	a	number	of	other,	private,	payment	communities.	Thus,	“the	significant	point	about	the	modern	state	is	not	its	coercive	power	but	the	fact	that	it	is	the	one	entity	with	which	every	one	of	us	does	ongoing	business.	We	all	buy	from	it	a	variety	of	services,	and	the	price	we	pay	for	those	services	is	our	taxes	[…].	It	is	the	universality	of	our	dealings	with	the	government	that	gives	government	credit	its	currency”	(ibid:	402-403).	Yet,	the	state	does	not	logically	precede	the	private	economy	but,	adopting	effectively	a	Lockean	position,	the	state	is	seen	as	logically	subordinate:	“[O]ur	government	is	our	creation.	It	is	only	able	to	tax	us	to	the	extent	that	we	allow	it	to	do	so.	Its	taxing	authority	arises	not	from	its	raw	power	but	from	its	legitimate	authority”	(ibid:	 402).	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 state	 sets	 the	 unit	 of	 account	 is	 not	 an	 inherent	necessity	but	a	matter	of	historical	practicality	as	it	is	the	largest	of	all	payment	communities.	Hence,	“the	state	 is	 ideally	placed	to	be	the	 issuer	of	 the	ultimate	domestic	money”	(ibid:	403).		In	this	logic,	since	the	state	is	just	any	payment	community	among	others,	the	 creation	 of	 credit	 money	 by	 other	 actors—i.e.	 private	 credit	 money	creation—is	an	entirely	logical	concept	from	a	Money	View	perspective:		 “Monetary	 systems	 are	 always	 hierarchical,	 with	 the	 best	 quality	 debts	circulating	 as	money	 to	 clear	 lesser-quality	 debts.	 The	 important	 point	 is	that	 ‘quality’	 in	 this	context	 is	not	primarily	about	default	 risk,	but	 rather	about	 the	pattern	 of	 payments.	 Liabilities	 that	 are	 default-free	may	make	good	 investments	 for	 the	 risk-averse,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 make	 very	 good	money	unless	a	large	number	of	people	need	to	make	regular	payments	to	the	 issuer	 of	 the	 liabilities.	 The	 problem	 that	 there	 may	 be	 no	 such	individual	in	the	economy	is	the	principle	obstacle	standing	in	the	way	of	a	purely	private	monetary	system.	It	is	this	obstacle	that	banking	overcomes.	[…A]	 bank	 holding	 a	 portfolio	 of	 self-liquidating	 bills	 is	 an	 entity	 whose	own	 liabilities	 are	 suitable	 to	 serve	as	money.	Thus,	money	 can	and	does	easily	 arise	 out	 of	 private	 financial	 arrangements	 in	 private	 pay	communities.	 Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 certain	private	pay	 community	accepts	a	 certain	private	money	will	 tend	 to	make	 that	money	acceptable	also	to	members	of	other	overlapping	pay	communities	whose	own	money	is	something	else”	(ibid:	403-404,	emphasis	in	original).		Hence,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	MMT	 approach,	 according	 to	which	 banks	merely	 by	state	 authority	 are	 granted	 the	 privilege	 to	 issue	 debts	 as	 substitutes	 for	 the	
	 60	
‘true’	public	money,	 the	 issuance	of	bank	money	 is	seen	as	a	genuine,	privately	driven	enterprise	which	logically	precedes	the	state’s	action:		“[I]nstead	 of	 seeing	 banks	 as	 purely	 intermediary,	 linking	 the	 longs	 and	shorts,	 it	 is	 probably	more	 helpful	 to	 see	 banks	 as	 themselves	 taking	 the	short	 positions	 that	 correspond	 to	 the	 long	 positions	 of	 their	 depositors,	and	hence	themselves	facing	the	prospect	of	a	short	squeeze.	[…]	Second,	it	is	 probably	 more	 helpful	 to	 see	 bank	 loans	 as	 the	 bank’s	 long	 positions	corresponding	 to	 the	private	borrowers’	 shorts.	 In	 this	 conceptualization,	the	 role	of	bank	 lending	enters	naturally	 into	 the	 theory	of	money”	 (ibid:	405).		 Table	2.3	summarizes	those	findings	and	contrasts	the	views	of	MMT	and	the	 Money	 View.	 Accordingly,	 MMT	 alleges	 that	 the	 provision	 of	 money	 has	always	been	the	privilege	of	the	state	and	in	this	follows	what	in	Chapter	1	has	been	termed	the	“Chartalist	bias”	 in	the	IPE	 literature	on	the	transformation	of	the	 monetary	 system.	 The	 Money	 View,	 in	 contrast,	 sees	 money	 first	 and	foremost	 as	 a	 private	 construct	 and	 assumes	 that	 private	 agency	 and	 society	precede	 the	 state	 and	 its	 structures.	 For	 this	 study	 of	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation,	 the	key	difference	between	both	approaches	refers	to	the	 idea	of	 private	 credit	money	 creation	beyond	 the	 control	 of	 the	 state.	 Conceptually,	this	is	only	a	meaningful	notion	within	an	market-based	monetary	theory	such	as	the	 Money	 View.	 While	 this	 study	 acknowledges	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 MMT	perspective,	 especially	 with	 regard	 to	 pre-capitalist	 times,	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	Money	View	is	more	suitable	to	grasp	the	functioning	of	the	capitalist	monetary	system.			
Modern	Money	Theory	 Money	View	The	state	has	logical	priority	in	determining	what	money	is	 The	private	financial	system	has	logical	priority	in	determining	what	money	is	The	state	necessarily	sets	the	unit	of	account	because	it	is	the	logical	starting	point	to	understand	how	monetary	systems	operate	 The	state	happens	to	set	the	unit	of	account	because	it	is	the	biggest	payment	community	The	state’s	taxing	power	is	what	makes	an	IOU	money	when	it	is	declared	by	government	fiat	to	discharge	tax	debt	 The	state’s	taxing	power	is	just	an	asset	on	the	state’s	balance	sheet,	i.e.	a	promise	for	a	future	payment	flow	State-issued	money	is	outside	money	that	relies	on	government	fiat	 State-issued	money	is	inside	money	that	relies	on	government	credit	Bank-issued	money	is	a	derivative	form	of	debt	that	leverages	the	quantity	of	‘original’	money,	which	has	been	provided	by	the	state	 Bank-issued	money	is	genuine	money	and	not	necessarily	subordinate	to	or	a	derivative	of	state-issued	money	Autonomous	private	credit	money	creation	beyond	the	purview	of	the	state	is	not	a	meaningful	concept	 Autonomous	private	credit	money	creation	beyond	the	purview	of	the	state	is	a	meaningful	concept		Private	enterprise	cannot	develop	new	forms	of	private	credit	money	 Private	enterprise	is	capable	of	developing	new	forms	of	private	credit	money		
Table	2.3—MMT	vs	Money	View	on	private	money	creation	and	the	role	of	the	state		 	
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Essentialist	
bias	
2.3	The	Money	View	as	a	Conceptual	Lens	for	IPE		The	Money	View,	as	a	market-based	credit	theory	of	money,	has	the	potential	to	overcome	 the	Essentialist	 and	 the	Chartalist	biases	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature	on	 the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system,	which	is	connected	to	an	ultimately	pre-modern	understanding	of	how	 the	monetary	 system	works	 (cf.	 Chapter	1).	 	As	Table	2.4	 indicates,	 the	 Essentialist	 bias	 coincides	 with	 an	 explicit	 or	 implicit	application	 of	 the	 MTC	 logic.	 The	 Chartalist	 bias,	 in	 turn,	 goes	 along	 with	 the	explicit	or	implicit	endorsement	of	a	state-based	monetary	theory	that	interprets	the	state	as	the	paramount	issuer	of	money	and	sees	private	money	creation	at	best	as	a	subordinate	aspect	of	the	monetary	system.	Adopting	the	Money	View	as	 a	 conceptual	 lens	 on	 the	 monetary	 system	 allows	 to	 explicitly	 adopt	 an	alternative	conceptual	perspective	beyond	both	biases	and	to	address	the	blind	spot	that	IPE	has	with	regard	to	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	
	
	
	
	 State-based	monetary		
theories	
Market-based	monetary	
theories	
Monetary	
theories	of	credit		 Chartalism	(Knapp	1905)			 Metallism	(Menger	1892)		
Credit	theories	
of	money		 Neochartalism	(Fulwiler	2010,	Wray	2015)		 Money	View	(Mehrling	2000,	2011;	Pozsar	2014)		
	
	
Table	2.4—The	Chartalist	and	the	Essentialist	bias	in	monetary	theories		 	The	 Money	 View	 offers	 a	 body	 of	 literature	 that	 brings	 along	 great	potential	for	studies	in	the	political	economy	of	money	and	finance	from	an	IPE	point	of	view:	On	the	one	hand,	publications	within	the	Money	View	framework	present	 cutting-edge	 insights	 into	 the	 contemporary	 monetary	 and	 financial	system—in	 particular	 how	 non-bank	 financial	 institutions	 in	 the	 so-called	shadow	 banking	 system	 (‘shadow	 banks’)	 create	 short-term	 IOUs	 that	may	 be	considered	‘shadow	money’.	The	Money	View	has	thus	been	specifically	taylored	to	analyze	 the	 institutional	 realities	 in	 the	age	of	 financial	globalization,	 i.e.	 the	financial	 plumbing	 of	 the	 shadow	banking.	 As	 a	market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	money,	it	understands	the	shadow	banking	system	as	an	arena	for	autonomous	private	money	creation	(cf.	Pozsar	2014;	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	2016).	On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	Money	View	 literature	 is	well	 rooted	 in	 economic	 history.	The	analysis	 of	 shadow	 banking	 implies	 that	 the	 traditional	 commercial	 banking	system—i.e.	 those	 institutional	 structures	 that	 had	 been	 established	 after	 the	1929	crisis—is	not	seen	as	a	general	norm	for	how	the	monetary	and	 financial	system	works,	but	as	historically	 contingent.	 It	has	been	man-made,	 and	 it	 can	change.	 To	 underpin	 that	 point,	 scholarship	 on	 the	Money	 View	 engages	 with	economic	history	and	studies	the	‘financial	plumbing’	of	other	eras.	For	example,	in	Bagehot	was	a	 Shadow	Banker,	 Mehrling	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 scrutinize	 the	 British	monetary	and	banking	system	of	the	late	19th	century.	 	
Chartalist	bias	
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In	order	to	develop	the	Money	View	as	a	conceptual	lens	for	IPE,	the	way	ahead	is	to	narrow	down	the	core	ideas	in	the	literature	broadly	associated	with	the	Money	View	on	a	number	of	key	concepts	that	incorporate	the	insights	of	a	market-based	credit	theory	of	money	and	that	can	be	applied	as	the	conceptual	background	to	analyze	political-economic	phenomena.	Following	the	depiction	of	Mehrling	 (2015a),	 this	 section	will	 synthesize	 the	core	principles	of	 the	Money	View	on	 the	basis	of	 four	key	aspects,	which	represent	 the	essence	both	of	 the	CTM	aspect	and	the	market-based	approach:	money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs;	hierarchy	 of	 different	money	 forms;	 hybridity	 of	 Public	 and	 Private	Money,	 as	well	as	inherent	instability	of	credit	money.			
2.3.1	Money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs		As	 a	 CTM,	 the	 Money	 View	 considers	 money	 in	 its	 essence	 as	 nothing	 but	circulating	debt.	In	this,	it	applies	the	ideas	of	the	tradition	that	started	with	the	19th	 century	 Anti-Bullionists	 and	 the	 Banking	 School	 (Thornton	 1802,	 Tooke	1844	and	later	Bagehot	1873),	was	reflected	in	early	20th	century	British	works	(Mitchell-Innes	1913,	1914,	Hawtrey	1919,	Keynes	1930)	and	further	developed	in	the	U.S.-dominated	endogenous	money	theories	of	the	Post	Keynesian	tradtion	(Kaldor	1982,	Minsky	1986,	Moore	1988).			 The	underlying	notion	of	the	monetary	system	in	this	is	that	of	a	‘payment	system’	 (Mehrling	 2011)	 or	 an	 ‘accounting	 system	 of	 exchange’	 (Arnon	 2011:	152ff):	 Payment	 occurs	 via	 tradable	 debt	 claims	 (‘inside	 money’)	 that	 are	transferred	 between	 the	 accounts	 of	 the	 participating	 institutions.	 Such	 inside	money	is	a	specific	instrument	that	promises	convertibility	into	other	‘financial’	assets	 or	 ‘real’	 commodities	 or	 services.	 A	 transaction	 within	 the	 payment	system	 necessarily	 follows	 the	 accounting	 rules	 of	 double-entry	 bookkeeping,	given	 that	 always	 two	participants	 in	 the	 payment	 system	 are	 affected.	Hence,	the	 formally	 accurate	 way	 that	 allows	 representing	 the	 dynamics	 in	 the	payments	 system	 is	 an	 analysis	 of	 balance	 sheet	mechanics.	 The	 creation	 and	destruction	of	money	 is	ultimately	a	balance	 sheet	operation,	 regardless	of	 the	physical	shape	of	the	money	form.31	Credit	money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	is	thus	the	‘byproduct’	of	granting	credit	(McMillan	2014:	6).		 In	such	a	credit	money	system,	money	creation	takes	place	when	financial	institutions,	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	 loan	 or	 a	 bond	 as	 long-term	 IOU	owed	 to	 them,	create	 a	 short-term	 IOU	 that	 can	 be	 traded	 on	 secondary	 markets	 against	commodities,	 services	or	other	 financial	 instruments.	 In	 terms	of	balance	sheet																																																									31	 As	Boyanovsky	and	Erreygers	(1999)	argue,	the	idea	of	portraying	the	monetary	system	as	a	payments	system	can	be	traced	back	to	the	writings	of	Ernest	Solvay	in	the	late	19th	century	(cf.	 Solvay	 1900).	 Lakomski-Laguerre	 (2016:	 490,	 495)	 points	 out	 that	 Schumpeter’s	 Das	
Wesen	des	Geldes,	 is	 built	 upon	 a	 consistent	 theory	 of	 a	 social	 accounting	 system	 following	Ernest	 Solvay	 (cf.	 Schumpeter	 1970).	 This	 is	 consistent	 to	 a	 Money	 View	 approach	 and	institutionalist	scholarship:	“In	order	to	go	beyond	the	current	debate	opposing	the	metallists	(commodity	 money)	 and	 the	 chartalists	 (state	 money),	 Schumpeter	 assumed,	 as	 a	 basic	assumption,	that	money	is	an	institution.	The	concept	of	a	social	accounting	system	gives	rise	to	a	general	theory	where	money	principally	acts	as	a	unit	of	account	and	a	clearing	process	for	debts	and	claims”	(Lakomski-Laguerre	2016:	491).	
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mechanics,	 this	 involves	that	the	credit	money	issuer	expands	its	balance	sheet	on	both	sides	and	swaps	IOUs	of	different	maturities	(see	Figure	2.1).	The	short-term	IOU,	 in	so	 far	as	 it	 is	 tradable	on	a	secondary	market,	 functions	as	money	that	 can	 be	 used	 by	 the	 issuer	 of	 the	 loan	 or	 bond.	 Assuming	 that	 regulatory	restrictions	are	absent,	money	creation	can	thus	literally	occur	out	of	nothing.			 Borrower	 	 Credit	money	issuer	+	Money				(short-term	IOU)	 +	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 	 +	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 +	Money				(short-term	IOU)		 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	2.1—Credit	money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	
	If	credit	money	created	today	is	a	promise	to	pay	credit	money	tomorrow,	we	seem	to	be	approaching	 logical	difficulties.	What	 is	 the	payment	of	ultimate	money	supposed	to	be?	A	traditional	argument	would	be	that	it	is	a	money	form	with	 ‘actual	 value’.	 This	 is	 why	 until	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	monetary	 theorists,	which	ultimately	adhered	to	 the	MTC	 logic,	believed	that	 it	was	not	possible	 to	decouple	monetary	systems	from	a	scarce	commodity	such	as	 gold	 (cf.	 Arnon	 2011).	 A	 counter-argument	 comes	 from	Mitchell-Innes	who	postulates	 that	 we	 only	 need	 the	 highest	 money	 as	 an	 ‘idea’—as	 a	 ‘unit	 of	account’.	“The	eye”,	he	argues,	“has	never	seen,	nor	the	hand	touched	a	dollar.	All	that	we	can	touch	or	see	is	a	promise	to	pay	or	satisfy	a	debt	due	for	an	amount	called	a	dollar”	(Mitchell-Innes	1914:	155).		The	notion	of	credit	money	creation	via	a	swap	of	IOUs	is,	in	the	words	of	Mehrling	 (2015a),	 the	 “alchemy	of	 banking”—a	process	 fundamentally	 at	 odds	with	our	natural	 intuitions	about	what	it	means	to	 ‘lend’	something,	but	crucial	for	the	understanding	of	the	‘financial	plumbing’	of	capitalist	monetary	systems.	The	position	 is	a	 radical	expression	of	 the	 idea	of	endogenous	money	creation.	Traditionally,	 endogenous	money	 theory	 is	 specific	 to	 deposit-banking	 and	 the	interactions	between	a	central	bank	and	commercial	banks	(cf.	e.g.	Moore	1988).	The	 ‘swap	 of	 IOUs’	 argument	 goes	 further	 than	 that.	 By	 systematically	 tracing	back	money	creation	to	a	more	basic	root,	any	institution	is	structurally	able	to	create	 money-like	 IOUs,	 while	 only	 facing	 the	 challenge	 to	 get	 them	 accepted	(Minsky	1986:	228).	The	swap	of	IOUs	scheme	can	be	applied	to	different	specific	institutions.	The	actual	 credit	money	 then	 takes	on	 the	 shape	of	various	 short-term	 IOUs,	 named	 differently	 and	 acceptable	 in	 different	 contexts.	 Today,	‘traditional’	forms	of	money	co-exist	with	‘shadow	money’.		On	the	one	hand,	in	the	traditional	banking	system,	commercial	banks	—and	 similarly	 the	 central	 bank—create	 bank	money	by	 swapping	 IOUs.	 Private	bank	notes	were	 the	dominant	 form	of	bank	money	until	 the	mid-19th	 century	(see	Chapter	4).	Since	then,	bank	deposits	have	replaced	notes	as	the	main	form	of	 bank	money	 (see	 Chapter	 5).	 Deposit	 creation	 is	 usually	 taken	 as	 the	most	straightforward	example	to	refer	to	credit	money	creation.	Banks	issue	loans	by	creating	deposits.	The	loan	constitutes	an	asset	of	the	bank,	as	it	is	the	long-term	IOU	owed	to	the	bank;	the	deposit,	as	the	short-term	IOU	owed	by	the	bank,	is	the	bank’s	liability.	In	this	specific	form,	money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	has	been	exemplified	by	Ralph	Hawtrey	in	his	1919	Currency	and	Credit:	 	
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	“When	a	banker	lends,	we	say	that	he	grants	or	creates	credit	or	‘a	credit’.	This	is	a	loose	way	of	describing	a	double	transaction.	The	banker	assumes	an	 immediate	 obligation	 to	 his	 customer,	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 customer's	obligation	to	him	at	a	 future	date.	The	banker's	obligation	or	 ‘bank	credit’	meets	the	customer's	need,	because	it	can	be	assigned	away	as	a	means	of	payment.	The	customer's	obligation,	since	it	yields	interest	or	discount	for	the	 period	 before	 it	 becomes	 due,	 supplies	 the	 banker's	 profit.	 Thus	 two	credits	or	debts	are	really	created,	though	only	one	of	them	is	destined	to	be	used	as	a	means	of	payment”	(Hawtrey	1919:	9).		 On	the	other	hand,	in	the	contemporary	shadow	banking	system,	various	non-bank	 financial	 institutions—conceptually	 understood	 as	 shadow	 banks—create	 short-term	 IOUs	 that	 function	as	 ‘shadow	money’	 (see	Chapter	6).	As	 to	Ricks	 (2012),	 three	main	 forms	 of	 shadow	money	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 the	shadow	 banking	 system	 since	 the	 1970s:	 asset-backed	 commercial	 papers	(ABCPs),	overnight	repurchase	agreements	(overnight	repos)	and	Money	Market	Fund	 shares	 (MMF	 shares).	 The	 issuance	 of	 those	 shadow	 money	 forms	inherently	relies	on	a	swap	of	IOUs	of	different	maturities:		
• ABCPs	are	issued	by	Special	Purpose	Vehicles	(SPVs),	which	are	typically	established	by	large	commercial	banks	as	off-balance-sheet	constructs	to	circumvent	 capital	 requirements.	 SPVs	 swap	 ABCPs	 as	 short-term	 IOUs	against	asset-backed	securities	(ABSs)	as	long-term	IOUs.	
• Overnight	 repos	 are	 issued	 by	 Securities	 Dealers	 who	 issue	 them	 as	private	 debt	 instruments	 which	 are	 constructed	 around	 the	 sale	 and	repurchase	 of	 securities.	 Dealers	 swap	 overnight	 repos	 against	 term-repos	with	longer	maturities.	
• Finally,	MMF	 shares	 are	 issued	by	Money	Market	 Funds	which	pool	 the	funds	 of	 institutional	 investors	 and	 households	 on	 the	 retail	 money	market	 and	 invest	 them	 in	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system.	 Accordingly,	MMFs	 swap	 their	 shares	 against	 other	 shadow	 bank	 liabilities,	 in	particular	ABCPs	and	overnight	repos	(Murau	2017).		Figure	 2.2—taken	 from	 Murau	 (2017:	 8)—synthesizes	 the	 notion	 that	traditional	 and	 shadow	 money	 are	 both	 created	 by	 commercial	 and	 shadow	banks	as	a	swap	of	IOUs.		 Assets	 Liabilities		Commercial	Banks	 	Loans	and	bonds	(long-term	IOUs)	 	Notes	and	Deposits	(very	short-term	IOUs)		SPVs	 ABSs	(long-term	IOUs)		 ABCPs	(short-term	IOUs)	Securities	Dealers	 Term	repos	(long-term	IOUs)		 Overnight	repos	(short-term	IOUs)	MMFs	 ABCPs	and	overnight	repos	(short-term	IOUs)	 MMF	shares	(very	short-term	IOUs)			
Figure	2.2—Traditional	and	shadow	money,	created	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	 	
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2.3.2	Hierarchy	of	different	money	forms		From	a	Money	View	perspective,	the	monetary	system	as	a	payments	systems	is	fundamentally	hierarchical	(Mehrling	2000,	2015a).	This	hierarchy	refers	to	two	different	 aspects:	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 domestic	money	 supply	 is	made	 up	 of	different	 credit	 money	 forms	 which	 are	 located	 on	 different	 layers	 within	 a	hierarchical	relationship.	On	the	other	hand,	the	international	monetary	system	is	 structured	 hierarchically,	 with	 one	 country	 situated	 at	 its	 apex	 and	 other	countries	forming	the	periphery	to	it.		 In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 idea	 of	 hierarchy	 refers	 to	 the	 different	 forms	 of	credit	money	within	 a	 domestic	 payments	 system	 and	 the	 various	 institutions	issuing	them	as	their	liabilities.	Money	forms	higher	up	in	the	hierarchy	are	safer,	more	acceptable	 from	a	demand	side	and	of	more	stable	value,	yet	scarcer	and	more	 exclusive	 to	 supply;	 money	 forms	 further	 down	 the	 hierarchy	 are	more	‘elastic’	 to	 create	 and	 more	 accessible	 from	 the	 supply	 side,	 but	 are	 less	acceptable	 from	 a	 demand	 side.	 Figure	 2.3—based	 on	 Mehrling	 (2012a)—highlights	this	idea	in	the	form	of	a	‘Monetary	Pyramid’,	a	concept	that	has	been	brought	up	by	Minsky	(1986:	228)	and	also	elaborated	upon	e.g.	in	Foley	(1989),	Bell	(1998)	and	Wray	(2015),	following	a	MMT	logic.		
	
Figure	2.3—The	hierarchy	of	money	(conceptually)	
	 On	 the	 top	 of	 the	monetary	 pyramid—well	 in	 line	with	Mitchell-Innes’s	verdict—is	an	actual	or	a	fictional	unit	of	account,	e.g.	gold	or	dollar,	respectively.	Below	 this	 are	 a	 range	 of	 institutions	 issuing	 debt	 claims	 as	 inside	money.	 In	today’s	world,	the	IOUs	issued	by	the	central	bank	are	higher	ranking	than	those	of	the	commercial	banking	system,	which	in	turn	are	higher	ranking	than	those	of	 the	 shadow	banking	 system.	Within	 the	hierarchy,	 the	 various	 IOUs	 imply	 a	promise	to	pay	the	higher-ranking	form	of	money.	Money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	involves	transcending	the	different	layers	of	the	hierarchy.	The	money	form	situated	at	the	top	is	the	final	means	of	settling	payment	(cf.	Pozsar	2014:	7-8).	 	
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Within	the	monetary	pyramid,	corresponding	to	the	CTM	logic,	there	is	no	dichotomous	division	between	the	categories	of	‘money’	and	‘credit’.	Depending	on	 the	 issuing	 institution’s	 position	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 of	money,	 a	 credit	money	form	will	 look	 like	 ‘money’	 if	held	as	asset	on	the	 institution’s	balance	sheet	or	‘credit’	if	held	as	liability	on	the	institution’s	balance	sheet	(cf.	Mehrling	2012a).	The	money	forms	further	up	in	the	hierarchy	have	a	higher	‘moneyness’,	i.e.	they	appear	as	money	to	a	greater	number	of	actors,	while	the	‘creditness’	of	money	increases	further	down	the	hierarchy:	
	 The	 crucial	 criterion	 for	 whether	 a	 given	 short-term	 IOU	 is	 part	 of	 the	pyramid	or	not	 is	 if	 it	 is	 instantaneously	or	almost	 instantaneously	convertible	into	hierarchically	higher	money	 forms—and	 thus,	 in	 consequence,	 to	 the	 final	means	of	settling	payments	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy—at	par	value,	i.e.	at	a	one-to-one	 exchange	 rate.	 In	 turn,	 the	 money	 form	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 is	defined	as	trading	in	par	to	the	‘fictional’	unit	of	account.	As	to	Pozsar	(2014:	7),	it	is	“the	quintessential	attribute	of	money—that	money	always	trades	at	par	on	demand”.	 In	 this,	 money	 forms	 further	 down	 the	 hierarchy—i.e.	 with	 a	 lower	‘moneyness’—have	a	higher	risk	of	breaking	away	from	par.	“Money	claims	are	also	hierarchical	[…]	in	the	sense	that	not	all	money	claims	are	equally	strong	in	their	 par	 on	 demand	 promise	 in	 all	 states	 of	 the	world”(Pozsar	 2014:	 7).	 The	reason	for	this	is	that	par	clearance	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	but	needs	to	be	actively	established,	 either	by	political	measures	and	guarantees	or	via	market	forces	and	private	guarantees	(cf.	Mehrling	2015a).			 Second,	 in	addition	 to	 the	domestic	perspective,	 the	hierarchy	of	money	has	 an	 international	 dimension.	 The	 ‘plumbing’	 of	 the	 international	 financial	system	 can	 be	 imagined	 as	 a	 hierarchically	 structured	 entity	 with	 various	overlapping	 jurisdictions	 that	 issue	 credit	 money	 in	 their	 respective	 national	units	of	account.	“Viewed	globally”,	Mehrling	(2000:	405)	argues,	“the	collection	of	nation-states	is	a	collection	of	overlapping	payment	communities	that	face	the	same	 problem	 of	 tracking	 clearing	 balances	 that	 state	 money	 solves	 for	 the	overlapping	domestic	private	pay	communities”.	32		Typically,	 one	 country	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 apex	 of	 the	 hierarchical	international	financial	system.	For	the	international	monetary	system,	viewed	as	an	 international	 payments	 system,	 this	 country	 plays	 an	 outstanding	 role:	 It	defines	 the	 international	 unit	 of	 account,	 international	 payments	 flows	 are	channelled	through	accounts	located	in	the	center,	and	its	central	bank	also	plays	the	role	of	the	world’s	central	bank.	The	apex	is	connected	to	different	regional	financial	 centers	 that	 are	 situated	 on	 a	 level	 deeper	 down	 in	 the	 international	hierarchy	and	are	 connected	both	 to	peripheral	 financial	 systems	 (cf.	Mehrling	2015c).	 For	 this	 reason,	 shocks	 and	 institutional	 changes	 that	 eventuate	 in	 the	apex	of	the	international	monetary	system	affect	the	system	as	a	whole.	As	Pistor	(2013)	 argues	 in	 conjunction	with	 her	 ‘Legal	 Theory	 of	 Finance’,	 law	 is	 ‘more	elastic’	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 system	 than	 in	 peripheral	jurisdictions.	 																																																									32	 Strange	(1971:	217)	presents	a	‘taxonomy’	of	different	types	of	international	currencies—Top	Currencies,	 Master	 Currencies,	 Passive	 or	 Neutral	 Currencies,	 as	 well	 as	 Political	 or	Negoatiated	Currencies—that	also	implies	a	form	of	hierarchy.		
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Empirically,	 throughout	 the	 19th	 century	 until	 the	 the	 First	World	War,	the	 center	of	 the	world’s	 financial	 system	used	 to	be	 the	United	Kingdom.	The	Gold	Standard	was	in	fact	a	Sterling	standard	run	by	the	Bank	of	England:	Gold	as	the	money	form	at	the	top	of	the	international	monetary	pyramid	was	defined	in	sterling,	and	all	other	national	currencies	had	to	establish	a	fixed	exchange	rate	vis-à-vis	 the	 sterling.	 International	 payments	 had	 effectively	 to	 be	 channelled	through	the	London	money	market	(cf.	Mehrling	2016).	After	the	Second	World	War,	the	United	States	took	on	the	role	of	the	apex	of	the	international	financial	system.	During	the	Bretton	Woods	era,	the	U.S.-Dollar	still	used	to	be	defined	in	terms	 of	 gold	 and	 other	 currencies	 were	 connected	 with	 fixed	 but	 adjustable	exchange	rates	to	it.	The	commodity	standard	was	abrogated	with	the	inception	of	 generalized	 floating	 in	 the	 1973.	 Today,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 is	 the	 central	bank	of	the	world,	situated	at	the	top	of	the	international	payments	system.33		Figure	2.4—adopted	from	Mehrling	(2015c:	314)—presents	an	account	of	the	contemporary	international	hierarchy	of	money.	At	the	top	level,	it	comprises	the	 domestic	 creation	 of	 dollar-denominated	 credit	 money	 (‘onshore	 dollars’).	Lower	levels	imply	‘offshore	dollars’,	i.e.	dollar-denominated	credit	money	forms	created	outside	the	U.S.,	e.g.	in	the	form	of	currency	swap	lines.	With	U.S.-Dollar	balances	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy,	 Mehrling	 (2015c)	 attributes	 particular	relevance	 to	 a	 network	 of	 unlimited	 swap	 lines	 among	 the	 six	 major	 central	banks	 (C6).	 At	 the	 layer	 below,	 other	 bilateral	 swaps	 are	 located	 as	 well	 as	regional	 pooling	 institutions	 and	 IMF	 facilities	 (ibid:	 314),	 followed	by	 various	other	domestically	created	forms	of	credit	money.			
		
Figure	2.4—The	contemporary	international	hierarchy	of	money	 																																																									33		 Being	 the	 country	 at	 the	 apex	 of	 the	 international	 monetary	 system	 brings	 along	 a	 major	power	position.	When	Valérie	Giscard	d’Estaing	described	the	U.S.’s	position	in	the	post-war	international	 monetary	 system	 as	 being	 connected	 with	 an	 ‘exorbitant	 privilege’,	 this	 very	well	corresponds	to	its	location	in	the	international	hierarchy.	
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To	sum	up,	the	notion	of	hierarchy	within	the	monetary	system	conceived	as	a	payment	system	made	up	of	inside	money	forms	is	crucial	for	a	Money	View	perspective,	 both	 domestically	 and	 internationally.	 The	 aspect	 of	 hierarchy	 is	vital	 for	 analyses	 of	 the	 ‘financial	 plumbing’,	 but	 easy	 to	 overlook.	 This	 is	especially	 true	 with	 regard	 to	 domestic	 monetary	 systems	 in	 which	 different	money	 forms	usually	 trade	 at	 par,	which	 tends	 to	 conceal	 inherent	 differences	between	them.	In	the	domestic	hierarchy,	 it	 is	key	to	understand	that	there	are	different	overlapping	money	forms,	which	are	not	identical	but	trade	at	a	one-to-one	ratio:	“central	bank	money	 is	better	money	than	private	bank	money,	even	though	 they	 trade	 at	 par”	 (Mehrling	 2015a).	 The	 international	 hierarchy	 “is	apparently	 hard	 to	 accept	 mainly	 because	 it	 offends	 our	 sense	 of	 justice	 as	between	states—the	Westphalian	notion	of	equal	sovereignty”	(ibid).	
	
	
2.3.3	Hybridity	of	Public	and	Private	Credit	Money	
	The	 money	 forms	 that	 are	 created	 as	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	 and	 located	 within	 the	Monetary	Pyramid	can	be	issued	both	by	public	and	by	private	institutions.	The	money	 supply	 is	 thus	 a	 hybrid	 of	 public	 and	 private	 money	 forms.	 In	 normal	times,	public	and	private	money	forms	trade	at	par	with	each	other,	which	makes	them	 appear	 similar	 and	 the	 differences	 between	 them	 seem	 negligible.	 The	public-private	 hybridity	 is	 often	 hard	 to	 accept	 as	 it	 runs	 counter	 intuitions,	which	see	the	money	supply	either	as	fully	public	or	private	(Mehrling	2015a).		Figure	 2.5—based	 on	 Pozsar	 (2014:	 15)—shows	 the	 ‘Money	Matrix’	 as	 a	heuristic	tool	to	systematize	the	public-private	hybridity	of	credit	money	forms:		
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	public	institution	(e.g.	central	bank	or	treasury)	
	 Public	Inst.	Any	assets	 Pure	Public	Money		 	
	
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	private	institution	
• Public	assets	as	collateral	
	 Private	Inst.	Public	assets	 Public-private	Money		 	
	
	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	private	institution	
• Backstopped	at	public	institution	
	 Private	Inst.	Any	assets	 Private-public	Money		 	
Public	Backstop	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	private	institution	
• Private	assets	as	collateral	
	 Private	Inst.	Private	assets	 Pure-Private	Money		 	
		
Figure	2.5—The	Money	Matrix	(conceptually)	
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Following	 Pozsar	 (2014:	 13-16),	 the	 Money	 Matrix	 is	 to	 be	 read	 as	follows:	 The	 left	 column	 displays	 two	 different	 categories	 of	 ‘public	 credit	money’.	The	money-like	liabilities	of	a	public	institution,	typically	a	modern-type	central	bank	or	the	Treasury,	are	pure	public	money.34	The	money-like	liabilities	of	private	institutions	that	have	public	backstops	and	can	tap	public	institutions’	balance	sheets	via	the	discount	window	or	insurance	schemes	are	private-public	
money.	 The	 right	 column	 displays	 two	 different	 categories	 of	 ‘private	 credit	money’:	The	money-like	liabilities	of	private	institutions	that	do	not	have	access	to	backstops	on	a	public	balance	sheet	are	public-private	money	if	issued	against	public	 assets,	 and	 purely	 private	 money	 if	 issued	 against	 private	 assets.	 For	private	 credit	 money,	 par	 clearance	 is	 only	 sustained	 by	 market	 forces	 and	private	guarantors	but	not	the	state.	Together,	public	and	private	credit	money	forms	 constitute	 the	 general	 money	 supply.35	Within	 the	 Money	 Matrix,	 the	criterion	of	 instantaneous	par	clearance	 is	crucial:	Only	 those	public	or	private	IOUs	are	part	of	the	Matrix	which	can	be	converted	into	higher-ranking	money	at	a	 one-to-one	 rate.	 IOUs	 that	 do	 not	 fulfill	 this	 criterion	 do	 not	 fall	 under	 the	Money	View’s	definition	of	‘money’.		The	Money	Matrix	is	a	useful	tool	to	present	a	taxonomy	of	the	hybridity	of	public	and	private	credit	money.	Still,	to	make	it	properly	applicable	in	an	IPE	context,	a	number	of	points	that	are	left	open	in	the	depiction	of	Pozsar	(2014)	require	discussion	and	clarification.	Those	 refer	 to	 the	 issues	of	what	 it	means	for	 an	 institution	 to	 be	 public,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 backstops,	 the	 general	relationship	between	hybridity	and	hierarchy,	as	well	as	the	role	of	commodity	money.		First,	 Pozsar’s	 Money	 Matrix	 brings	 about	 important	 implications	 for	what	is	means	that	a	given	credit	money	form	is	 ‘public’—a	definition	that	is	of	major	 relevance	 for	 the	purpose	of	 this	 study.	By	definition,	 the	 ‘public	money	supply’	 is	 considered	 as	 the	 left	 column	 of	 the	 Money	 Matrix,	 i.e.	 pure	 public	
money	 and	 private-public	money.	 Implicit	 in	 this	 is	 a	 very	 specific	 meaning	 of	what	 it	 means	 that	 a	 given	 credit	 money	 form	 is	 ‘under	 public	 control’.	 In	contrast	to	a	monetarist	understanding,	it	does	not	mean	that	central	banks	have	the	policy	 tools	 to	 implement	 a	 targeted	 growth	 rate	 of	 a	monetary	 aggregate.	Instead,	it	suggests	that	public	institutions	find	a	way	to	assume	responsibility	to	guarantee	 par	 clearance	 of	 a	 given	 credit	money	 form	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	money	forms	or—in	the	case	of	the	top	credit	money	form—to	the	‘fictional’	unit	of	account.			The	way	in	which	this	guarantee	for	par	clearance	is	upheld	differs	for	the	two	 types	 of	 public	 money:	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 for	 pure	 public	 money,	 public																																																									34	 Whether	 or	 not	 the	 Treasury	 IOUs	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 money	 is	 debated.	 Pozsar	 (2014)	suggests	 that	 short-term	 treasury	 notes	 fall	 under	 this	 definition;	 however,	 they	 do	 not	normally	 trade	 at	 par	 on	 demand	 to	 central	 bank	money.	However,	 there	 are	 examples	 for	Treasury	 IOUs	 that	 do	 indeed	 correspond	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 pure	 public	 money,	 e.g.	 the	Greenback	issued	in	the	U.S.	during	the	Civil	War.	35		 In	their	empirical	application,	the	credit	money	forms	within	the	Money	Matrix	correspond	to	different	 monetary	 aggregates.	 The	 actual	 setup,	 however,	 is	 historically	 contingent	 and	varies	over	time.	
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authorities	 are	 able	 to	 uphold	 par	 clearance	 directly	 because	 they	 issue	 it	themselves.	But	under	which	condition	can	we	say	that	the	credit	money	issuing	institution	is	‘public’	by	definition?	While	it	seems	to	be	easily	acceptable	that	the	treasury	department	as	a	branch	of	government	is	a	public	institution,	the	case	is	not	 so	 clear	 for	 a	 central	 bank.	 Mehrling	 (2015a)	 points	 out	 that	 the	 public-private	hybridity	also	refers	to	the	status	of	central	banks:	“[C]entral	banks	are	part	 private	 bankers’	 bank	 and	 part	 public	 government	 bank,	 with	 the	proportions	 shifting	 over	 time	 with	 financial	 development	 and	 with	 the	exigencies	 of	 the	 state	 (such	 as	 war).”	 Goodhart	 (1988),	 in	 turn,	 speaks	 of	 a	continuous	 evolutionary	 process	 that	 turned	 central	 banks	 historically	 from	private	into	public	institutions.	Goodhart	et	al.	(1994:	23)	discuss	this	issue	and	describe	the	establishment	of	100	per	cent	state	ownership	as	nationalisation	of	central	banks.	Speaking	with	Kisch	and	Elkin	(1932:	67),	we	may	suggest	that	the	central	bank	is	a	public	institution	because	it	is	“an	organ	of	public	policy	and	not	an	 instrument	 of	 private	 advantage”.	 	 Conti-Brown	 (2016:	 16,	 31,	 38),	 along	those	 lines,	 introduces	 the	 notion	 of	 public	 governance	 and	 points	 to	 the	relevance	of	the	legal	structure	and	staff,	notably	via	a	board	that	is	independent	of	the	financial	industry.	Based	on	such	considerations,	this	study	suggests	that	a	central	bank	effectively	 is	a	public	 institution	once	 it	 is	 committed	 to	serve	 the	public	interest,	which	may	involve	public	ownership,	a	legal	mandate	and	a	staff	that	is	politically	chosen.			 On	the	other	hand,	as	concerns	private-public	money,	Pozsar	defines	that	those	money	forms	are	issued	by	a	private	institution	but	backstopped	on	public	balance	 sheet.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 asked	 again	 under	 which	condition	 an	 institution’s	 balance	 sheet	 is	 a	 public	 balance	 sheet.	 A	 similar	consideration	as	above	applies:	It	must	be	the	balance	sheet	of	an	institution	that	distinctively	 belongs	 to	 the	 government	 or	 to	 a	 central	 bank	 that	 satisfies	 the	condition	 to	 be	 counted	 as	 ‘public’.	 To	 flesh	 out	 the	 category	 of	 private-public	
money,	 this	 study	 suggests	 to	view	 it	 as	 ‘public’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 a	 full-fledged	public-private	partnership	for	credit	money	creation	has	been	established.	This	implies	 that	 public	 authorities	 grant	 private	 institutions	 permission	 to	 issue	credit	 money,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 adopt	 responsibilities	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	credit	money	issuance	functions	smoothly	and	that	par	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	forms	is	maintained.	In	line	with	Bundesbank	(2014),	this	public-private	partnership	 for	 credit	 money	 issuance	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 involving	 the	following	four	aspects:	
• Public	liquidity	backstops,	i.e.	a	discount	window	which	is	run	by	a	public	institution	 that	 gives	 liquidity	 injections	 when	 the	 private	 issuing	institution	runs	low	on	reserves;	
• Public	solvency	backstops,	i.e.	a	publicly	organized	scheme	for	holders	of	the	credit	money	form	which	guarantees	that	their	credit	money	balances	will	be	redeemed	in	case	of	the	private	issuing	institution’s	default.	
• Regulation,	 i.e.	 a	 legal	 framework	 is	 established	 that	 provides	 legal	guidelines	for	the	activities	conducted	on	the	balance	sheets	of	the	private	issuing	institutions;	
• Supervision,	 i.e.	 administrative	 bodies	 are	 established	 to	 permanently	monitor	if	the	private	issuing	institutions	comply	with	the	rules,	and	are	empowered	to	impose	sanctions	for	the	case	of	non-compliance.	 	
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Second,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 backstops	 for	 private-public	money,	 Pozsar	(2014:	 14)	 argues	 that	 they	 have	 to	 be	 of	 “explicit	 and	 public	 nature”.	 This	definition	may	stand	to	reason	as	implicit	backstops	are	hard,	if	not	impossible,	to	measure	 as	 they	 are	 not	 formalized	 and	 depend	 on	 the	 expectations	 of	 the	actors	 involved.	However,	 it	may	be	asked	whether	 the	public	backstops	really	need	 to	 be	 made	 explicit	 in	 a	 public-private	 partnership	 for	 the	 creation	 of	
private-public	money.	 As	MacDonald	 (1996:	 8)	 argues	 in	 the	 context	 of	 deposit	insurance,	 implicit	 guarantee	 schemes	are	 a	 solid	 complement	 to	 explicit	 ones.	Though	 not	 comparable	 in	 legal	 terms,	 an	 implicit	 guarantee	 has	 the	 same	economic	and	 functional	effects—i.e.	 consumer	protection	and	 the	reduction	of	systemic	risk.	An	explicit	guarantee	scheme	would	be	“normally	established	by	a	law	 which	 specifies,	 inter	 alia,	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 compensation	becomes	 payable	 (usually	 the	 involuntary	 closure	 of	 a	 bank),	 the	 maximum	amount	 of	 compensation	which	 can	 be	 paid	 to	 a	 single	 depositor,	 the	 types	 of	deposit	 and/or	 depositors	 eligible	 for	 compensation,	 the	 arrangements	 for	funding	 compensation	 payments	 and	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 scheme”	 (ibid:	10).	 An	 implicit	 guarantee	 scheme,	 in	 contrast,	 “involves	 the	 government	 in	having	 to	decide,	on	a	 case	by	 case	basis,	both	 the	 form	which	protection	 is	 to	take	 and	 the	manner	 in	which	 it	 is	 to	 be	 financed.	 Protection	 of	 this	 kind	 can	involve	 the	 government	 in	 paying	 compensation	 directly	 to	 depositors”	 (ibid).	Sustaining	an	implicit	guarantee	can	actually	be	preferable	from	the	regulators’	perspective:	 “The	principal	advantages	of	 implicit	deposit	protection	are	that	 it	allows	the	government	flexibility	in	the	way	in	which	it	resolves	individual	cases	of	failure,	and	that	it	avoids	the	administrative	costs	involved	in	establishing	and	operating	 a	 formal	 scheme”	 (ibid:	 11).	 Therefore,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Pozsar’s	 view,	this	study	assumes	 that	also	 implicit	public	backstops	may	satisfy	 the	criterion	that	 a	 given	 credit	 money	 form	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 public-private	 partnership	 for	money	creation	and	thus	private-public	money.		 Third,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 credit	 money	 and	 the	hybridity	of	 credit	money	needs	 to	be	clarified.	 It	may	seem	natural	 to	assume	that	 public	 credit	 money	 is	 always	 hierarchically	 higher	 than	 private	 credit	money.	 This	 would	 correspond	 to	 a	 Chartalist	 understanding	 of	 the	monetary	system,	as	e.g.	represented	by	MMT	(cf.	Wray	2015):	Those	money	forms	that	are	explicitly	 state-sanctioned	 are	 necessarily	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy.	 Pozsar	(2014:	 13-14)	 seems	 to	 suggest	 such	 an	 interpretation	 when	 he	 writes	 that	“purely	public,	private-public,	public-private,	and	purely	private	money	[…have]	a	 decreasing	 strength	 to	 their	 promise	 of	 par	 on	 demand	 and	 par	 at	maturity,	during	 all	 phases	 of	 an	 interest	 rate	 or	 credit	 cycle—this	 is	 the	 hierarchy	 of	money”.	 However,	 while	 this	 assumption	 may	 be	 true	 for	 the	 contemporary	domestic	U.S.	monetary	system	which	Pozsar	(2014)	refers	to,	there	is	a	danger	to	overgeneralize	the	finding	that	the	four	categories	represented	in	the	Matrix	automatically	correspond	to	the	hierarchy	of	money	forms.	In	fact,	a	number	of	examples	can	be	found	for	when	this	is	not	the	case	and	private	credit	money	is	actually	 hierarchically	 higher:	 In	 pre-capitalist	 times	 e.g.,	 private	 credit	money	was	 considered	 hierarchically	 higher	 than	 public	 credit	 money.	 As	 absolutist	sovereigns	were	not	bound	to	the	rule	of	law,	they	were	able	to	simply	default	on	their	 debt,	 i.e.	 the	 credit	 money	 they	 had	 issued.	 Therefore,	 private	 credit	money—as	issued	by	respected	private	banks—were	considered	safer	and	more	
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preferable	(cf.	Boyer-Xambeu	et	al.	1986,	Ingham	2004).	Moreover,	Mehrling	and	Tooze	 (2016)	 argue	 that	 in	 the	 contemporary	 global	 monetary	 system,	 it	 is	actually	 private	 credit	 money—mainly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 dollar-denominated	eurodollar	deposits—that	is	situated	at	the	top	of	the	international	hierarchy.	As	to	Mehrling	(2015c:	315),	“[t]he	central	institution	of	the	world	liquidity	system	is	the	offshore	Eurodollar	market”.	For	this	reason,	the	hierarchy	of	credit	money	forms	is	historically	contingent	and	not	necessarily	correlated	to	whether	a	given	credit	money	form	is	issued	by	a	public	or	a	private	institution.		Fourth,	 the	 original	Money	Matrix	 is	 specific	 to	 a	modern	 inside	money	system	in	which	all	money	forms	are	credit	money,	i.e.	assets	that	are	somebody	else’s	 liabilities.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	 allow	 to	 fully	 grasp	 the	 multiplicity	 of	money	 forms	 in	 historical	 monetary	 systems	 that	 are	 based	 on	 the	 use	 of	commodity	money,	which	 is	 outside	money	 (i.e.	merely	 an	 asset	 and	 nobody’s	liability).	 As	 has	 been	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 this	 was	 the	 empirical	 setup	 of	monetary	systems	until	the	collapse	of	Bretton	Woods	and	effectively	constituted	an	 overlap	 of	 precapitalist	 commodity	 money	 and	 capitalist	 credit	 money	 (cf.	Desan	 2014).	 Thus,	 a	 taxonomy	 of	 a	monetary	 and	 banking	 system	 before	 the	breakdown	of	the	commodity	money	system	in	the	1970s	requires	a	conceptual	expansion	of	Pozsar’s	original	matrix.	Figure	2.6	therefore	proposes	an	expanded	version	 of	 the	 Money	 Matrix	 that	 also	 integrates	 commodity	 money.	 The	modification	follows	the	view	of	Ingham	(2004:	122-124)	on	the	“hybridization”	of	capitalist	money	into	“coinage”	and	“credit”.		
Commodity	Money		 	 Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
Outside	Money	
	
• Is	noone’s	liablity	
• Derives	value	from	commodity	prices	
	 Mint	Outside	Money	 		 	
	
	 	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	public	institution	(e.g.	central	bank	or	treasury)	
	 Public	Inst.	Any	assets	 Public	Money		 	
	
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	private	institution	
• Public	assets	as	collateral	
	 Private	Inst.	Public	assets	 Public-private	Money		 	
	
	 	 	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	private	institution,	backstopped	by	public	institution	
	 Private	Inst.	Any	assets	 Private-public	Money		 	
Public	Backstop	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	
• Issued	by	a	private	institution	
• Private	assets	as	collateral	
	 Private	Inst.	Private	assets	 Public-private	Money		 	
		
Figure	2.6—Expanded	Money	Matrix	including	commodity	money	(conceptually)		 	
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2.3.4	Inherent	instability	of	credit	money		The	 issuance	 of	 credit	 money	 as	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	 within	 the	 hierarchical	 and	hybrid	fabric	of	the	monetary	system	is	inherently	prone	to	crises.	Credit	money	creation	 implies	 issuance	 of	 an	 IOU	 in	 the	 present	 that	 derives	 its	 ‘value’	 and	acceptability	 from	 an	 expected	 payment	 in	 the	 future.	 In	 line	 with	 Commons	(1924),	this	way	of	valorizing	assets	may	be	called	‘futurity’.	It	stands	in	contrast	to	 ‘classical’	 monetary	 theories,	 which	 ultimately	 see	 the	 value	 of	 money	 as	labour	 time	 embodied	 in	 the	 money-commodity	 (Ricardo	 1810,	 1817;	 Marx	1867)	or	‘neo-classical’	monetary	theories,	which	derive	the	value	of	money	from	the	current	market	price	of	 the	money-commodity	vis-à-vis	other	 commodities	(e.g	Walras	1886).	 In	a	futurity-based	credit	money	system,	the	functionality	of	money	today	requires	the	continuation	of	debt	issuance	tomorrow.	This	process	is	 self-reinforcing	 until	 at	 a	 point	 of	 time	 that	 cannot	 be	 predicted	 ex	 ante,	 it	reverses	 itself	 and	 produces	 a	 crisis.	 Within	 such	 crisis,	 investors	 lose	 the	confidence	in	the	credit	money	form	they	hold	and	flee	to	higher-ranking	forms	in	the	hierarchy	of	money.	This	produces	severe	strains	on	the	balance	sheets	of	the	 credit	money	 issuers.	 The	 panic	manifests	 itself	 as	 a	 run	 of	 the	 respective	credit	 money	 form	 and,	 in	 absence	 of	 effective	 exogenous	 counter-measures,	creates	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy	including	the	default	of	the	credit	money	issuers	and	the	annihilation	of	the	credit	money	balances.		This	 idea	 of	 expansion	 and	 collapse	 in	 the	 financial	 system	 has	 been	referred	to	by	Hawtrey	(1919)	as	the	“inherent	instabilty	of	credit”	or	by	Minsky	(1986	 and	 1992)	 as	 “Financial	 Instability	 Hypothesis”.	 Figure	 2.7—based	 on	McCulley	(2009)—describes	this	process:																	
Figure	2.7—Minsky	cycle	and	the	inherent	instability	of	credit	money	
		The	 financial	 system	 first	builds	up	 leverage	by	 creating	more	debt,	 and	hence	credit	money;	the	monetary	pyramid	expands	and	becomes	flatter.	In	the	process	of	 expanding	 the	 debt	 network,	 the	 credit	money-issuing	 financial	 institutions,	concerning	their	income-debt	relations,	pass	the	stages	of	a	dominance	of	hedge	finance	to	a	dominance	of	speculative	and	Ponzi	 finance	(Minsky	1992:	8):	 In	a	
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system	 dominated	 by	 Hedge	 finance,	 outstanding	 promises	 to	 pay—i.e.	 credit	money	claims—are	predominantly	serviced	by	income	cash	flows	resulting	from	production.	When	Speculative	 finance	dominates,	outstanding	debts	have	 to	be	met	by	rolling	them	over	at	maturity.	At	the	stage	of	Ponzi	 finance	domination,	outstanding	debts	can	only	be	met	by	creating	new	debt	(1986:	200-208).36	Such	a	Ponzi-dominated	system	is	highly	unstable	and	prone	to	runs	on	credit	money	issuing	 financial	 institutions.	 At	 the	 peak	 of	 systemic	 indebtedness,	 termed	‘Minsky	moment’	by	McCulley	(2009),	a	crisis	breaks	out	and	the	process	begins	reversing	itself.	The	financial	system	then	enters	a	deleveraging	process	with	the	monetary	pyramid	contracting	and	becoming	steeper	(Mehrling	2012a).		From	the	perspective	of	the	Money	View,	the	instability	of	credit	money	is	not	necessarily	the	result	of	any	form	of	monetary	mismanagement	but	instead	a	natural	feature	of	such	systems.	On	a	daily	basis,	within	a	vast	web	of	promises	to	pay,	cash	 flows	and	cash	commitments	have	to	be	met,	which	can	always	be	prone	to	interruptions	and	panics	(Mehrling	2011:	8,	12-17).	With	a	future	that	is	 inevitably	 uncertain,	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	 avoided	 that	 some	 payment	commitments	 made	 today	 cannot	 be	 met	 tomorrow.	 Moreover,	 as	 Mehrling	(2015a)	 emphasizes,	 “all	 credit	 (non-bank	 as	well	 as	 bank	 credit)	 seems	 to	 be	subject	to	a	kind	of	positive	feedback	loop	since,	as	more	and	more	people	come	to	have	a	common	view	of	the	possible	 future,	promises	to	pay	in	that	possible	future	 get	 bid	 up	 in	 value	 and	 that	 makes	 it	 easy,	 indeed	 inevitable,	 to	overpromise”.	 The	 crises	 thus	 emerging	 can	 be	 ‘marginal’	 if	 they	 only	 affect	relatively	 insulated	 parts	 of	 the	 financial	 system,	 but	 become	 ‘systemic’	 when	they	 threaten	 the	 stability	 of	 banks	 or	 shadow	 banks,	 which	 have	 issued	 the	credit	money	forms	held	as	assets	by	households,	companies	and	public	bodies,	and	create	the	danger	that	the	entire	net	of	credit	money	creation	might	implode.	
	 Operating	within	 a	 credit	money	 system	 involves	 being	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	that	crises	may	emerge,	but	yet	abstracting	from	the	risk	in	actual	behaviour:		 “This	 fact	 of	 inherent	 instability	 is	 something	 we	 have	 an	 especially	 hard	time	 confronting,	 since	 it	 goes	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 our	 existential	 dilemma.	We	don’t	know	the	future	but	we	are	nevertheless	required	to	behave	as	though	we	 do.	 Indeed,	 the	 commitments	 we	 make	 to	 one	 another	 to	 perform	 in	various	ways	 in	 the	 future	 form	 the	 very	 fabric	 of	 the	 society	 in	which	we	live.	 Marriage	 is	 like	 that,	 and	 so	 is	 credit.	 The	 fact	 of	 financial	 instability	threatens	that	fabric,	indeed	constitutes	a	kind	of	unraveling	of	that	fabric,	as	default	 on	 one	 set	 of	 promises	 undermines	 another	 set	 as	well”	 (Mehrling	2015a).		Hence,	 viewing	 crises	 as	 an	 endogenous	phenomenon	of	 financial	 capitalism—essentially	 following	Minsky’s	 verdict	 that	 stability	 is	 destabilizing—is	 a	major	aspect	that	sets	the	Money	View	apart	from	mainstream	economics	and	allows	it	to	abstract	from	simplifying	assumptions	of	equilibrium	and	to	focus	instead	on	the	actual	‘financial	plumbing’.	
	 	
																																																								36	 Section	3.2	will	go	or	more	into	depth	with	regard	to	this	process.	
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2.4	Conclusion		This	 chapter	has	 set	out	 to	define	 the	Money	View	as	a	 conceptual	 lens	on	 the	capitalist	 monetary	 system	 that	 allows	 overcoming	 the	 Essentialist	 and	 the	Chartalist	 biases	 in	 IPE	 scholarship	 on	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	system.	As	a	credit	theory	of	money,	the	Money	View	takes	the	credit	character	of	modern	money	seriously.	As	market-based	theory	of	money,	it	acknowledges	the	 systematic	 relevance	 of	 private	money	 creation	 beyond	 the	 control	 of	 the	state.		 This	 discussion	 yields	 insights	 about	 various	 ways	 of	 framing	 the	relationship	between	the	economic	categories	of	 ‘money’	and	‘credit’	(cf.	Figure	2.8,	which	 refers	back	 to	 the	 scheme	of	Table	2.3).	As	 this	 study	 contends,	 the	discrepancies	 between	 the	 different	 monetary	 theories	 cannot	 ultimately	 be	solved	on	an	empirical	basis.	Instead,	as	they	refer	to	the	categories	that	we	use	to	 structure	 reality	 for	 us,	 these	 are	 conceptual	 decisions	 taken	 a	 priori.	Accordingly,	 for	 MTCs,	 money	 is	 the	 superior	 concept	 to	 credit.	 Hence,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 establish	 a	 dichotomous	 distinction	 between	 the	 two.	 Metallists	assume	 that	 it	 is	 a	 commodity	 singled	 out	 by	 market	 processes,	 Chartalists	suggests	 that	 it	 is	 a	 token	 declared	 to	 be	money	 through	 legal	 constructs.	 For	CTMs,	in	contrast,	credit	and	money	cannot	be	neatly	divided.	In	the	MMT	logic,	the	‘true’	money	comes	into	being	through	government	fiat	and	is	decisively	not	a	credit	 instrument.	 It	 is	only	 ‘outside	money’,	 to	which	credit	money	as	 ‘inside	money’	 claims	 correspond.	 Longer-term	 IOUs	drop	out	 of	 the	 categorization	of	money,	 but	would	 be	 rather	 termed	 ‘liquid	 assets’.	 It	 is	 a	widespread	 position	among	 adherents	 to	 MMT	 to	 be	 cautious	 about	 calling	 credit	 money	 ‘money;	instead,	 they	 would	 prefer	 to	 just	 refer	 to	 inside	 money	 claims	 as	 ‘deposits’,	‘MMF	 shares’,	 and	 the	 like	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Douglas	 2015;	 Michell	 2016;	 Wray	 2015).			
Chartalism	 Metallism			 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	
Modern	Monetary	Theory		 	 	 Money	View										
Figure	2.8—The	conceptual	relationship	between	money	and	credit	 	
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Finally,	 the	Money	View	 repudiates	 the	notion	of	 fiat	money	 and	 assumes	 that	also	 public	money	 is	 a	 debt	 instrument	 as	 public	 inside	money.	 In	 absence	 of	premodern	commodity	money,	all	money	 is	credit.	What	distinguishes	a	 ‘credit	money’	from	other	forms	of	‘credit’	is	the	promise	to	trade	at	par	on	demand	to	higher	 ranking	money	 forms,	which	 ultimately	 correspond	 at	 par	 value	 to	 the	fictional	unit	of	account.		 From	this	assessment	follows	that	in	the	Money	View	logic,	the	monetary	system—once	 it	 has	 stripped	 off	 the	 premodern	 relicts	 of	 commodity	 money	(Desan	 2014,	 Mehrling	 2016a)—is	 represented	 entirely	 as	 a	 self-referential	
network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable,	 debt	 claims:	 Public	 and	 private	institutions	are	able	to	create	money	today	by	issuing	ever	more	promises	to	pay	in	 the	 future.	 Despite	 rules	 and	 regulations	 to	 restrict	 and	 control	 money	creation,	the	system	is	by	and	large	able	to	inflate	the	volumes	of	credit	money	issued	 without	 strictly	 binding	 limits.	 In	 line	 with	 Haldane	 (2009),	 this	corresponds	to	a	complex	network	structure.	The	credit	money	network,	unless	it	is	halted	by	a	crisis,	is	set	on	a	course	of	continuous	expansion.	If	we	buy	into	this	 perspective,	 the	 capitalist	 monetary	 system	 appears	 as	 an	 extensive,	 all-encompassing	 Ponzi	 scheme.	 With	 all	 money	 created	 as	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	denominated	in	a	fictional	unit	of	account,	the	credit	money	claims	issued	at	the	top	 level	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 ultimately	 are	 promises	 to	 pay	 nothing	 else	 but	themselves.	 Conceiving	 money	 creation	 as	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	 is	 the	 microscopic	structure	 that,	 on	 a	macroscopic	 level,	 induces	 the	 credit	money	 system’s	 self-referentiality.	As	the	creation	of	credit	money	today	entails	the	creation	of	more	credit	 money	 in	 the	 future,	 the	 system	 continuously	 sustains	 and	 reproduces	itself.		 	Conceptualising	 the	 monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	ever-expanding	 debt	 claims—following	 a	 market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	money—allows	 for	 a	 much	 better	 alignment	 with	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	contemporary	 money	 supply	 is	 set	 up	 empirically.	 It	 is	 defined	 via	 different	monetary	 aggregates	 that	 contain	 different	 publicly	 and	 privately	 issued	 IOUs		(cf.	 Section	 1.3).	 As	 a	 conceptual	 lens,	 the	 Money	 View	 differs	 from	 the	 other	approaches	discussed	in	this	chapter,	i.e.	Metallism,	Chartalism	and	MMT,	in	that	it	 acknowledges—if	 not:	 intellectually	 ‘accepts’—that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	underlying	 ‘real’	 money	 which	 derives	 its	 ‘moneyness’	 either	 from	 inherent	commodity	value	or	legal	enforcement,	as	suggested	by	the	Essentialist	bias.	Still,	the	view	that	 the	 initial	act	of	money	creation	relies	on	a	swap	of	 IOUs	 implies	that,	 while	 credit	 money	 can	 be	 created	 out	 of	 nothing,	 it	 cannot	 be	 created	
against	 nothing.	 Any	 credit	 money	 instrument	 is	 an	 IOU	 on	 some	 institution’s	balance	sheet,	which	has	to	correspond	to	some	other,	 longer-term	IOU	held	as	an	asset.	Taken	together,	the	credit	money	system	may	be	thought	of	as	a	large,	all-embracing	Ponzi	scheme.		Further,	the	Money	View	overcomes	IPE’s	Chartalist	bias	in	two	respects:	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 state	 is	 not	 perceived	 as	 paramount	 for	 calling	 a	 given	money	form	into	being.	It	is	very	well	possible	that	private	entities	come	up	with	new	forms	of	credit	money.	The	state	may	play	a	role	in	it,	notably	by	providing	the	legal	and	institutional	background	and	later	by	eventually	guaranteeing	par	
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clearance,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	 indispensable	 component.	 The	 Money	View’s	 swap	 of	 IOU	 logic	 is	 the	 argument	 for	 why	 public	 credit	 money	 is	decisively	 not	 fiat	 money,	 i.e.	 an	 instrument	 that	 derives	 its	 quality	 as	 money	from	government	power	and	the	initial	volitional	act	of	a	public	entity	to	declare	a	 token	 or	 IOU	 to	 be	money.	 Instead,	 it	 is	 an	 IOU	 like	 any	 other	 private	 credit	money	or	inside	money	form.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Money	View	perspective	is	not	 restricted	 to	 the	 nation-state	 focus	 and	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 Westphalian	monetary	 system,	 according	 to	 which	 money	 is	 a	 predominantly	 national	construct	 that	 from	the	domestic	sphere	stretches	 to	 the	 international.	 Instead,	the	monetary	 system	 is	 viewed	as	 a	hierarchy	of	 credit	 instruments	 as	well	 as	‘monetary	jurisdictions’,	which	do	not	necessarily	have	to	correspond	to	nation-states	 and	 whose	 limits	 are	 not	 nation-state	 limits.	 Thus,	 the	 Money	 View	transcends	the	‘naturalized’	pre-conceptions	of	the	nation-state	and	approaches	the	(contemporary)	monetary	system	in	a	more	unbiased	way.		This	 study	 argues	 that	 if	we	want	 to	 set	 out	 to	 analyze	 and	 explain	 the	transformation	of	the	capitalist	monetary	system	in	a	way	that	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	the	empirical	set	up	of	today’s	money	supply,	it	is	necessary	to	embrace	the	properties	of	self-referentiality	and	continuous	credit	expansion	and	to	adopt	a	market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	money	 as	 conceptual	 lens.	 Given	 the	 system’s	inherent	 instability,	 it	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 institutional	 change	 is	 driven	 by	monetary	 crises.	 The	 system’s	 transformation	 then	 implies	 that	 there	 are	inherent	 changes	 in	 the	way	 in	which	 the	different	 credit	money	 claims	 in	 the	system	are	structured	and	how	par	clearance	is	guaranteed	within	the	hybridity	of	 public	 and	 private	money.	 Crisis-driven	 changes	 in	 the	 setup	 of	 public	 and	private	 credit	 money	 are	 what	 this	 study	 calls	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation.	 The	 next	 chapter	will	 establish	 a	 political	 economic	 theory	 of	this	phenomenon.			
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Chapter	3	
Theory:	A	Model	of	Private	Credit	Money	Accommodation			
“During	 economic	 booms	 the	 amount	 of	 money	 defined	 as	
means	of	payment	has	been	 continuously	 expanded	 […].	The	
process	 is	 Sisyphean,	 a	 perpetuum	 mobile;	 the	 history	 of	
money	is	a	story	of	continuing	innovations	so	that	the	existing	
supply	 of	 money	 can	 be	 used	 more	 efficiently	 and	 the	
development	 of	 close	 substitutes	 for	 traditional	 money	 that	
circumvent	 the	 formal	 requirements	 applied	 to	 money”	
(Kindleberger	1978	[2005]:	67).			
3.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	chapter	develops	a	theory	on	the	political	economy	of	private	credit	money	accommodation.	Such	theory	establishes	a	description	as	well	as	an	explanation	of	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	that	is	specific	to	a	modern	credit	money	 system	 and	 goes	 beyond	 the	 existing	 approaches	 in	 IPE	 scholarship,	which—as	 Chapter	1	 has	 argued—are	 based	 on	 the	 Essentialist	 and	 the	Chartalist	 biases	 and	 largely	 neglect	 the	 role	 of	 private	 credit	 money.	 Private	credit	 money	 accommodation	 is	 a	 process	 that	 takes	 place	 repeatedly	 and	provides	an	explanation	of	the	setup	of	today’s	monetary	system,	which	cannot	be	 neatly	 defined	 as	 it	 is	 made	 up	 of	 an	 opaque	 amalgam	 of	 both	 public	 and	private	credit	instruments.		 The	accommodation	theory	 is	based	on	the	Money	View	as	a	conceptual	lens	on	modern	credit	money	systems	(cf.	Chapter	2).	As	a	market-based	credit	theory	 of	 money,	 the	 Money	 View	 regards	 the	 monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims.	 Within	 this	 debt	network,	new	forms	of	privately	created	IOUs	emerge	de-centrally	 in	phases	of	financial	upswings	and	adopt	 the	role	of	private	credit	money	that	can	become	systemically	 relevant.	Once	 the	 financial	expansion	 is	about	 to	 revert	 itself	and	the	credit	money	claims	are	about	to	default,	an	‘accommodation’	of	that	private	credit	 money	 form	 may	 occur	 when	 public	 authorities	 step	 in	 and,	 by	establishing	public	backstops,	assume	responsibility	 for	keeping	up	that	money	form’s	par	clearance,	i.e.	its	‘moneyness’.	The	formerly	private	credit	money	form	then	becomes	public	money	under	the	control	of	the	state.		 In	 this,	 the	accommodation	 theory	builds	upon	 the	 four	key	 concepts	of	the	 Money	 View:	 It	 is	 a	 necessary	 assumption	 for	 the	 accommodation	 theory	that,	 in	the	first	place,	private	money	creation	is	possible	beyond	the	control	of	the	 state.	 This	 idea	 of	 ‘endogenous’	 money	 creation	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 Money	View’s	notion	of	money	creation	as	a	swap	of	 IOUs	as	well	as	 in	 the	concept	of	hybridity.	 The	 accommodation	 itself	 refers	 to	 a	 shift	 within	 this	 hybridity	 of	public	 and	 private	 money.	 Private	 credit	 money	 forms	 are	 dragged	 from	 the	private	to	the	public	credit	money	realm.	The	process	structurally	relies	on	the	idea	of	an	 inherent	 instability	of	 credit	money.	The	accommodation	eventuates	
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when,	in	a	systemic	crisis,	public	authorities	step	in	to	assume	responsibility	for	sustaining	par	clearance	of	that	credit	money	form.	In	this	process,	the	hierarchy	of	money	is	both	a	crucial	element	with	regard	to	the	rise	of	new	private	credit	money	 forms	 as	 they	 are	 established	 as	 innovative	 promises	 to	 pay	 higher	ranking	money,	as	well	as	in	the	moment	of	the	financial	crisis	since	the	defaults	of	payment	commitments	start	in	the	lower	layers	of	the	monetary	pyramid	and	then	spill	over	to	higher	ranking	credit	money	forms.		In	its	general	form,	using	the	conceptual	language	of	the	Money	View,	the	accommodation	 of	 private	 credit	 money	may	 be	 represented	 with	 the	 help	 of	Pozsar’s	 original	Money	Matrix	 (cf.	 Figure	3.1).	A	private	 credit	money	 form	 is	accommodated	in	the	public	money	supply	when	it	shifts	from	the	private	credit	money	realm—either	as	public-private	money	or	as	pure	private	money—into	the	public	 credit	 money	 realm	 and	 becomes	 private-public	 money	 as	 public	authorities	establish	backstops	to	guarantee	its	par	clearance.		
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Figure	3.1—Accommodation	as	political-economic	phenomenon		 As	 a	 caveat,	 it	 should	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 term	 ‘accommodation’	 is	sometimes	 used	 in	 the	 literature	 with	 a	 different	 meaning.	 ‘Monetary	accommodation’	or	‘accommodative	monetary	policy’	is	employed	as	a	synonym	for	expansionary	monetary	policy	or	monetary	easing,	typically	meaning	that	the	central	bank	lowers	its	discount	rate	(cf.	e.g.	BBC	2015;	Kaufman	2009:	59,	110).	Leeper	(1991:	137)	uses	the	term	‘monetary	accommodation’	to	depict	how	the	central	bank	prevents	deficit	shocks	from	increasing	the	interest	rate.	This	study	diverges	 from	 such	 understandings	 and	 coins	 a	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 in	 the	context	of	scholarship	on	money	that	is	more	akin	to	the	use	of	‘accommodation’	by	Hocket	and	Omarova	(2016).	It	describes	the	decision	of	public	authorities	to	assume	responsibility	for	guaranteeing	par	clearance	of	a	formerly	private	credit	money	form	and	integrating	it	in	the	publicly	controlled	money	supply.	 	
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The	 theory	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 responds	 to	 the	general	 problématique	 of	 this	 study,	 namely	 that	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 on	money	 in	 IPE	 is	 not	 well	 capable	 of	 explaining	 the	 empirical	 setup	 of	 the	contemporary	 monetary	 system.	 More	 specifically,	 this	 chapter	 provides	answers	to	the	two	research	questions	of	this	study:	How	(RQ1)	and	why	(RQ2)	is	private	credit	money	accommodated	in	the	public	money	supply?	In	this,	it	will	fill	 the	gap	 in	our	understanding	regarding	the	transformation	of	 the	monetary	system	beyond	the	Essentialist	and	the	Chartalist	bias,	as	described	in	Chapter	1.		In	 terms	 of	 describing	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 via	accommodation	 theory,	 the	 chapter	 brings	 forth	 an	 ideal-typical,	 process-oriented	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	Minskian	 leverage	 cycle.	 As	 Figure	 3.2—based	 on	McCulley	 (2009)—indicates,	the	process	is	made	up	of	two	distinct	phases:	In	Phase	I	(‘pre-accommodation’),	the	 private	 debt	 network	 expands	 as	 new	 leverage	 is	 built	 up.	 Existing	 credit	money	 forms	 increase	 in	volume	and	new	 forms	of	private	 credit	money	come	into	being	due	to	financial	innovation.	Over	time,	the	financial	system	shifts	from	a	dominance	of	Hedge	finance	to	a	dominance	of	speculative	and	Ponzi	finance.	In	Phase	II	(‘accommodation’),	the	debt	expansion	stops	and	threatens	to	revert	itself.	McCulley	(2009)	has	termed	this	situation	a	‘Minsky	Moment’.	Runs	on	the	private	 credit	 money	 forms	 emerge.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	 political	 takes	 on	 the	dominant	 role.	 Policy-makers	 may	 choose	 to	 intervene	 and	 establish	 public	backstops	for	the	private	credit	money	form.	If	they	do	so,	they	create	an	ad	hoc	public-private	 partnership	 to	 guarantee	 that	 par	 exchange	 is	 sustained	 for	 the	formerly	private	credit	money	form.	The	accommodation	occurs.		 													
	
Figure	3.2—Private	credit	money	accommodation	and	Minsky’s	credit	cycle		The	act	of	accommodating	the	credit	money	form	alters	the	setup	of	the	hybrid	monetary	system	on	 the	spot.	 It	 implements	a	 type	of	 institutional	 change	 that	can	be	hardly	imagined	to	be	politically	feasible	in	absence	of	a	Minsky	moment.	However,	 if	 the	new	setup	of	 the	monetary	hybridity	 is	permanent	depends	on	factors	that	only	come	into	play	after	the	accommodation	(cf.	Chapter	7).	In	that	sense,	the	accommodation	in	phase	II	can	be	interpreted	as	a	necessary	but	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	a	lasting	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		
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Generally	 speaking,	 this	 process	 of	 the	 rise	 and	 accommodation	 of	 a	private	 credit	 money	 form	 can	 occur	 in	 any	 sovereign	 monetary	 jurisdiction.	However,	to	the	extent	that	it	is	likely	to	have	a	lasting	impact	and	also	affects	the	way	 in	 which	 the	 money	 supply	 is	 set	 up	 internationally,	 i.e.	 in	 multiple	monetary	jurisdictions,	incidents	of	accommodation	in	peripheral	countries	will	only	have	negligible	international	effects.	Thus,	on	the	basis	of	the	Money	View’s	notion	of	hierarchy	in	the	international	monetary	system,	this	study	suggests	to	treat	the	rise	and	accommodation	of	an	initially	private	credit	money	form	as	a	phenomenon	that	occurs	in	the	apex	of	the	international	monetary	system.	Since	the	 Money	 View	 conceives	 of	 the	 international	 monetary	 system	 as	 a	 web	 of	overlapping	 payment	 communities	 with	 one	 dominant	 jurisdiction	 connecting	the	others	(also	see	Kindleberger	1970:	209),	the	institutional	dynamics	of	global	finance	culminate	in	the	apex.	Institutional	changes	such	as	the	accommodation	of	a	private	credit	money	form	will	occur	in	the	apex	of	the	system.	When	runs	on	a	private	credit	money	form	materialize	in	a	peripheral	jurisdiction,	investors	will	always	have	the	chance	to	flee	to	security	to	the	centre	country.	Only	in	the	centre	country,	the	financial	system	can	be	pushed	to	such	an	extent	at	the	brink	of	collapse	that	substantial	changes	of	the	monetary	system	can	be	implemented.	Moreover,	jurisdictions	further	down	in	the	hierarchy,	if	they	do	not	want	to	be	cut	off	from	the	international	payments	system,	need	to	comply	with	the	rules	in	the	centre	(cf.	Pistor	2013).	An	institutional	change	as	is	the	accommodation	of	private	 credit	money	can	hardly	be	maintained	 in	a	peripheral	 country	against	the	regulations	in	the	apex.		 As	 concerns	 explaining	 the	 transformation	of	 the	monetary	 system,		 the	model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 prima	 facie	 determines	 a	dominance	 of	 private	 agency	 in	 the	 first	 and	 of	 public	 agency	 in	 the	 second	phase.	 Phase	 I	 corresponds	 to	 the	monetary	 system's	 expansion.	 Profit-driven	private	 actors	 behave	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 incentives	 that	 are	 provided	 to	them	by	the	system	and	bring	up	new	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	forms	 via	 financial	 innovation	 (Kindleberger	 1978;	 Minsky	 1986;	 Knafo	 2006,	2009;	 Gabor	 and	 Vestergaard	 2016).	 Phase	 II	 corresponds	 to	 the	 system's	imminent	 contraction.	 Market	 participants	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 sustain	 their	moneyness	in	a	financial	crisis.	Accordingly,	in	times	of	economic	instability,	the	holders	 of	 private	 credit	money	 fear	 that	 they	 could	 lose	 their	wealth	 held	 as	private	credit	money	balances	as	its	issuers	face	bankruptcy.	They	start	a	run	on	the	 private	 issuing	 institutions—which	 eventually	 reaches	 the	 apex	 of	 the	hierarchy	 of	 money—and	 create	 a	 self-fulfilling	 prophecy.	 By	 converting	 their	private	 credit	money	 balances	 into	 higher-ranking	money	 forms,	 they	 produce	the	situation	they	were	initially	afraid	of	and	bring	the	institutions	to	the	brink	of	collapse.	Public	actors	then	may	decide	in	moments	of	extreme	pressure	and	fear	of	 systemic	 collapse	 to	 bail	 out	 the	 defaulting	 private	 institution(s)	 (cf.	 e.g.	Culpepper	 and	 Reinke	 2014;	 Woll	 2014).	 They	 use	 the	 public	 balance	 sheets	under	their	control	to	guarantee	that	the	private	credit	money	form	sustains	par	value	 vis-à-vis	 higher	 ranking	 money	 forms.	 With	 this	 political	 decision,	 the	public	 actors	 establish	 ad	hoc	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 backstops	 for	 the	 issuing	institutions	and	effectively	integrate	the	formerly	private	credit	money	form	into	the	public	money	supply.	 	
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While	we	can	determine	the	respective	roles	for	private	and	public	agency	in	 the	 model,	 the	 political	 economic	 theory	 of	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation	seeks	to	coin	a	strand	of	 functionalist	scholarship	on	money	in	IPE	 that	explains	 the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation	neither	with	 reference	to	the	behaviour	of	private	nor	of	public	actors	alone.	What	is	the	overall	cause	for	 the	 accommodation	 of	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 form?	 Realist	 scholarship	might	attribute	 the	political	 intervention	 to	 the	state’s	power	 interests,	 liberals	to	financial	sector	lobbying,	constructivists	to	ideas	and	structuralists	e.g.	to	class	relations.	 This	 study,	 however,	 traces	 back	 the	 root	 	cause	 of	 the	 monetary	system's	transformation	to	the	system's	very	own	properties	themselves—to	the	self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims	 that	 has	 been	called	into	being	with	the	English	financial	revolution	of	the	16th	century	and	has	subjugated	virtually	the	entire	world	today	with	its	both	creative	and	destructive	forces.	Thus,	 it	 is	a	necessity	deeply	engrained	 in	 the	 logic	of	 the	credit	money	system	that	the	expansion	of	the	debt	network	comes	to	a	halt	at	some	point	and	starts	reverting	itself.	In	this	case,	the	monetary	system’s	implosion	can	only	be	avoided	 by	 an	 ‘external’	 intervention	 that	 preserves	 the	 system.	 The	 only	institution	 that	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 act	 as	 a	deus	 ex	machina	 and	 can	 keep	 the	system	on	track	is	the	state.	It	has	to	find	a	way	to	make	sure	that	the	existing,	and	defaulting,	credit	money	claims	do	not	have	to	be	repaid.	This	may	happen	either	by	making	the	issuing	institution	bankruptcy	remote	or	connecting	them	to	 an	 existing	 institution	 that	 is	 already	 de	 facto	 bankruptcy	 remote—in	 a	nutshell,	by	guaranteeing	par	clearance	and	unintentionally	accommodating	the	credit	money	form	in	the	public	credit	money	supply.		The	remainder	of	the	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:	
	 Section	3.2	addresses	the	stage	preceding	the	act	of	private	credit	money	accommodation,	 i.e.	 the	 rise	 of	 an	 IOU	 to	 a	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 that	becomes	 systemically	 relevant.	 It	 divides	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 systemically	 relevant	private	credit	money	 form	into	three	distinct	analytical	steps:	 the	development	of	a	new	short-term	IOU;	the	establishment	of	par	clearance	for	this	IOU	vis-à-vis	established	money	forms;	and	the	adoption	of	systemic	relevance	by	this	IOU.		Section	 3.3	 addresses	 the	 act	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	itself,	 which	 implies	 that	 public	 authorities	 establish	 ad	 hoc	backstops	 for	 the	credit	money	form	and	thus,	by	setting	up	a	public-private	partnership	for	credit	money	 creation,	 turn	 the	 IOU	 from	 a	 ‘private	 credit	 money	 form’—i.e.	 public-
private	money	or	pure	private	money—into	a	‘public	credit	money	form’,	namely	
private-public	 money.	 The	 accommodation	 will	 by	 analytically	 divided	 into	 a	crisis	and	run	on	the	private	credit	money	system;	the	policy-maker’s	decision-making	in	favour	of	an	emergency	intervention;	as	well	as	the	changes	in	balance	sheet	structures	for	public	and	private	credit	money	issuance.		The	concluding	section	3.4	summarizes	the	key	theses	about	the	theory	of	private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 as	 a	 political-economic	 phenomenon.	 It	provides	 direct	 responses	 to	 the	 two	 research	 questions	 of	 this	 study	 and	outlines	 the	application	of	 the	theory	on	the	three	eminent	cases	which	will	be	scrutinized	in	the	empirical	chapters	of	this	study.	 	
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3.2	Phase	I:	The	rise	of	a	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form		This	section	describes	and	explains	the	first	phase	of	the	process	of	private	credit	money	accommodation,	which	is	marked	by	a	privately	issued	IOU	taking	on	the	role	 of	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money.	 The	 duration	 of	 this	 pre-accommodation	phase	cannot	be	determined	with	certainty,	but	 it	makes	sense	to	think	of	it	as	an	institutional	evolution	that	stretches	well	over	decades.		 Descriptively,	 as	 Figure	 3.3	 highlights,	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 new	 private	 credit	money	form	implies	that	a	new	IOU	‘enters’	the	Money	Matrix:	It	becomes	pure	
private	money	 if	 issued	against	private	assets	 (i.e.	 is	 swapped	against	 the	 long-term	 IOU	 of	 a	 private	 institution),	 and	 public-private	 money	 if	 issued	 against	public	assets	(i.e.	swapped	against	the	long-term	IOU	of	a	public	institution).		
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Figure	3.3—Rise	of	an	IOU	to	a	private	credit	money	form	
	 As	 implication	of	 the	Money	View	 lens,	 a	given	credit	 instrument	has	 to	satisfy	four	criteria	to	be	considered	a	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form:	First,	 from	a	supply	side	perspective,	 it	must	be	a	 short-term	 IOU	 that	 is	held	 by	 the	 issuing	 institution	 as	 its	 liability	 and	 that	 has	 been	 created	 on	 the	basis	of	a	swap	of	IOUs	of	different	maturities	(Mehrling	2015a).	Second,	from	a	demand	side	perspective,	this	short-term	IOU	is	held	as	an	asset	by	agents	who	consider	it	‘cash’,	i.e.	the	most	liquid	form	of	an	asset	capable	of	doing	immediate	purchases	of	commodities	or	other	financial	assets	(Pozsar	2014).	Third,	the	IOU	constitutes	a	promise	to	pay	higher-ranking	money	to	which	it	 trades	at	par	or	quasi-par	 and	 in	 which	 it	 is	 instantaneously	 or	 almost	 instantaneously	convertible.	The	aspect	of	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	forms	is	what	ultimately	makes	the	IOU	‘money’	in	the	sense	of	being	part	of	the	Money	Matrix	(cf.	Mehrling	2011,	Pozsar	2014).	Fourth,	from	a	systemic	perspective,	it	is	 systemically	 relevant	 if	 its	default	would	 lead	 to	a	 systemic	crisis	and	would	revert	the	debt	expansion	of	the	self-referential	monetary	system.	 	
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A	number	of	authors	provide	pieces	of	a	theory	that	addresses	the	rise	of	new	private	substitutes	for	existing	forms	of	money.	Charles	Kindleberger,	in	his	
Manias,	 Panics,	 and	 Crashes,	 points	 in	 abstract	 terms	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 and	even	 frames	 it	 as	 a	 recurrent	 ‘Sisyphean’	 process,	 yet	without	 going	more	 into	depth	and	without	integrating	it	into	a	broader	analysis	of	the	monetary	system’s	transformation:			“In	 many	 cases	 the	 expansion	 of	 credit	 resulted	 from	 the	 development	 of	substitutes	 for	 what	 previously	 had	 been	 the	 traditional	 monies”	(Kindleberger	1978	[2005]:	64).			“The	development	of	new	substitutes	for	the	existing	monies	seems	to	occur	periodically	 in	 response	 to	 different	 changes	 in	 institutional	 arrangements	but	 the	process	 is	 a	 continuing	 one.	Monetary	 expansion	 is	 systematic	 and	endogenous	rather	than	random	an	exogenous.	[…]	The	process	is	Sisyphean,	a	perpetuum	mobile;	the	history	of	money	is	a	story	of	continuing	innovations	so	 that	 the	 existing	 supply	 of	money	 can	 be	 used	more	 efficiently	 and	 the	development	of	close	substitutes	 for	 traditional	money	 that	circumvent	 the	formal	requirements	applied	to	money”	(ibid:	67).		Further	entry	points	 for	describing	 the	rise	of	new	private	credit	money	 forms	are	historically	specific	analyses	such	as	Knafo	(2006,	2009)	on	the	credit	money	revolution	 during	 early	 British	 gold	 standard	 times	 as	 well	 as	 Gabor	 and	Vestergaard	 (2016)	who	 analyze	 the	 rise	 of	 contemporary	 shadow	money,	 yet	without	putting	it	into	comparative	historical	perspective.		 An	explanation	of	 the	 rise	of	 systemically	 relevant	private	 credit	money	forms	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Hyman	 Minsky.	 As	 a	 component	 of	 his	Financial	 Instability	Theory,	Minsky	traces	 the	emergence	of	new	money	 forms	back	to	the	individual	motives	of	profit-seeking	financial	 institutions,	facilitated	by	a	favourable	macroeconomic	environment:		“During	periods	of	 tranquil	expansion,	profit-seeking	 financial	 institutions	invent	 and	 reinvent	 ‘new’	 forms	 of	 money,	 substitutes	 for	 money	 in	portfolios,	and	 financing	 techniques	 for	various	 types	of	activity;	 financial	innovation	is	a	characteristic	of	our	economy	in	good	times”	(Minsky	1986:	178).		It	 is	 thus	a	 characterizing	 feature	of	phases	of	enduring	economic	expansion—e.g.	as	market	economies	systematically	exploit	new	profit	opportunities	and	the	credit	machinery	 is	 at	 a	 high	 capacity—that	 the	 private	money	 supply	 evolves	further.	This	idea	is	well	consistent	to	the	considerations	of	Joseph	Schumpeter,	expressed	 in	 his	 Theory	 of	 Economic	Development	 (1912	 [1934]).	 Under	 those	circumstances,	 new	 types	 of	 private	 IOUs	 are	 incorporated	 into	 the	 monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	expanding,	yet	instable	debt	claims.	Still,	as	 implied	 in	 Minsky’s	 work	 and	 explicitly	 emphasized	 e.g.	 in	 McCulley	 and	Pozsar	 (2013),	 an	 actual	 ‘real	 economic’	 expansion	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 necessary	 to	drive	the	financial	leverage	cycle,	but	only	the	belief	in	it.	This	account	of	the	rise	of	new	private	credit	money	therefore	abstracts	from	the	economy’s	productive	side	and	focuses	just	on	the	monetary	and	financial	side.	 	
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Analytically,	 this	 section	 sub-divides	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 new	 systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form—as	the	prerequisite	of	an	accommodation—into	three	distinct	steps	that	occur	over	a	long	period	of	time:	First,	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	conduct	financial	innovation	and	create	new	forms	of	short-term	IOUs	(3.2.1).	Second,	those	new	short-term	IOUs	establish	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	 forms	 and	 eventually	 take	 on	 the	 role	 of	 private	 credit	money	 (3.2.2).	 Third,	 those	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 become	 systemically	relevant	for	the	financial	system	(3.2.3).	
		
3.2.1	Financial	innovation	and	the	development	of	new	short-term	IOUs		In	the	first	analytical	step	towards	the	rise	of	a	new	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form,	financial	innovation	takes	place	and	new	short-term	IOUs	are	created.	This	satisfies	the	first	(supply-side)	criterion	of	a	private	credit	money	form	according	to	the	Money	View.	To	explain	this	rise	of	new	short-term	IOUs,	it	is	 fruitful	 to	 dig	 a	 little	 deeper	 into	Minsky’s	 analytical	 apparatus:	 on	 the	 one	hand	how	he	views	different	types	of	cash	flows	and,	on	the	other	hand,	how	he	distinguishes	between	hedge,	speculative	and	Ponzi	units.		Minsky	(1986:	200-203)	 introduces	 three	 types	of	cash	 flows	 that	affect	financial	institutions’	balance	sheets,	namely	income,	balance	sheet	and	portfolio	cash	 flows:	 Income	 cash	 flows	 result	 from	 production.	 They	 are	 “wages	 and	salaries,	both	public	and	private,	the	payments	from	one	stage	of	production	and	trade	 to	another,	 and	gross	profits	after	 taxes	of	business”	 (ibid:	200).	Balance	sheet	 cash	 flows	 result	 from	 holding	 financial	 assets.	 They	 are	 “mandated	 by	existing,	 inherited	 liabilities”,	 i.e.	 they	 “can	 be	 determined	 by	 reading	 the	contracts	that	are	the	debt	instruments”	(ibid:	200).	Minsky	further	sub-divides	them	into	“dated	balance	sheet	cash	flows”	(e.g.	an	automobile	finance	contract	or	mortgage),	 “demand	 balance	 sheet	 cash	 flows”	 (typically	 bank	 deposits)	 as	well	as	“contingent	balance	sheet	cash	flows”	(e.g.	life	insurance	or	credit	default	insurance)	(ibid:	201-3).	Portfolio	cash	flows	result	from	selling	financial	assets.	They	are	“the	result	of	transactions	in	which	capital	and	financial	assets	change	hands”,	 i.e.	 they	are	 “the	outcome	of	decisions	 to	acquire	or	 to	sell	assets	or	 to	put	new	liabilities	into	circulation”	(ibid:	200).	Some	portfolio	cash	flows	“are	the	result	of	previous	 commitments;	 this	 is	 especially	 true	of	 the	 cash	 flows	at	 the	completion	 of	 the	 production	 of	 investment	 output	 and	 the	metamorphosis	 of	investment	output	into	capital	assets”	(ibid:	200-1).		Based	 on	 those	 three	 forms	 of	 cash	 flows,	Minsky	 (1986)	 distinguishes	three	 ways	 in	 which	 financial	 institutions	 (broadly	 conceived)	 are	 operated—namely	as	hedge	units,	speculative	units	and	Ponzi	units.	Those	units	differ	with	regard	 to	 the	way	 in	which	 they	 intend	 to	 service	 their	 outstanding	 liabilities.	They	 are	 “characterized	 by	 different	 relations	 between	 cash	 payment	commitments	on	debts	and	expected	cash	receipts	due	to	the	quasi-rents	earned	by	 capital	 assets	 or	 the	 debtor	 contractual	 commitments	 on	 owned	 financial	instruments”	(ibid:	206).	In	this,	hedge	units	intend	to	service	their	outstanding	debts	with	 income	cash	 flows.	They	expect	 that	 “realized	and	expected	 income	cash	 flows	 are	 sufficient	 to	 meet	 all	 the	 payment	 commitments	 on	 the	
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outstanding	 liabilities”	 (ibid:	 203).	 By	 definition,	 units	 engaged	 in	 hedge	financing	do	not	have	a	maturity	mismatch.	Thus,	 “[a]	commercial	bank	cannot	be	a	hedge-financing	unit”	(ibid:	207).			Of	key	 relevance	 for	 financial	 innovation	are	 thus	 speculative	and	Ponzi	units	as	they	are	creators	of	new	short-term	IOUs:	Speculative	units	have	higher	outstanding	debts	than	they	could	service	with	income	cash	flows.	To	meet	their	outstanding	 liabilities,	 they	 have	 to	 roll	 over	 their	 maturing	 debts.	 Such	 a	structure	arises	as	“the	balance-sheet	cash	flows	from	a	unit	can	be	larger	than	the	 expected	 income	 receipts”	 (ibid:	 203).	 A	 speculative	 unit	 has	 a	 maturity	mismatch	 as	 it	 “expects	 the	 cash	 receipts	 in	 later	 periods	 to	 exceed	 the	 cash	payment	 commitments	 in	 those	periods	due	 to	debts	now	on	 the	books”	 (ibid:	207).	 For	 this	 reason,	 banking	 corresponds	 to	 speculative	 finance:	 It	 “involves	the	 short	 financing	 of	 long	 positions.	 Commercial	 banks	 are	 the	 prototypical	speculative	 financial	 organization”	 (ibid:	 207).	 Ponzi	 units,	 similarly	 to	speculative	 units,	 have	 higher	 outstanding	 debts	 than	 they	 could	 service	 with	income	 cash	 flows.	 However,	 to	 meet	 their	 outstanding	 liabilities,	 it	 is	 not	sufficient	 to	merely	 roll	 over	 existing	 debt;	 Ponzi	 units	 even	 have	 to	 “increase	debt	to	pay	debt”	(ibid:	203).	The	reason	for	this	is	that	“for	Ponzi	finance	units	financing	costs	are	greater	than	income,	so	that	the	face	amount	of	outstanding	debt	increases:	Ponzi	units	capitalize	interest	into	their	liability	structure”	(ibid:	207).	Minsky	emphasizes	that	although	“Ponzi	financing	is	quite	often	associated	with	 fringe	or	 fraudulent	 financial	practices,	[…]	 the	 intent	 is	not	necessarily	 to	cheat.	 Interest-	 and	 dividend-paying	 units	 that	 borrow	 to	 pay	 for	 investments	and	 that	 accrue	 income	 engage	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 Ponzi	 financing”	 (ibid:	 208).	Moreover,	a	speculative	unit	“can	be	transformed	into	a	Ponzi	finance	scheme	by	a	rise	in	interest	or	other	costs	or	a	shortfall	in	income”	(ibid:	208).		 From	a	Money	View	perspective,	speculative	and	Ponzi	units,	 in	contrast	to	hedge	units,	purposefully	accept	maturity	mismatches,	 i.e.	they	swap	IOUs	of	different	 maturities	 (cf.	 Figure	 3.4).	 This	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	 key	 ingredient	 for	credit	money	creation	from	a	supply	side	perspective:		 Borrower	 	 Speculative	or	Ponzi	unit	+	short-term	IOU	 +	long-term	IOU		 	 +	long-term	IOU	 +	short-term	IOU		 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	3.4—Financial	innovation	establishing	new	forms	of	short-term	IOUs		Minsky	 (1986)	 emphasizes	 that	 capitalist	 financial	 systems	 are	 always	made	 up	 of	 hedge,	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units.	 However,	 the	 dominance	 of	hedge,	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 varies	 over	 time	 (ibid:	 219-220).	 Times	 of	economic	prosperity	and	financial	stability	are	characterized	by	a	prevalence	of	hedge	units,	which—by	definition—are	able	 to	service	 their	debts	with	 income	cash	flows.	Under	those	conditions,	it	is	profitable	for	some	units	to	engage	in	the	activities	of	speculative-financing	and	Ponzi-financing:		“In	 a	 system	 dominated	 by	 hedge	 finance,	 the	 pattern	 of	 interest	 rates	(short-term	rates	being	significantly	lower	than	long-term	rates)	are	such	that	 profits	 can	 be	 made	 by	 intruding	 speculative	 arrangements.	 The	
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intrusion	of	speculative	relations	into	a	system	of	mainly	hedge	financing	of	 positions	 increases	 the	 demand	 for	 assets	 and	 therefore	 raises	 asset	values—that	 is,	 it	 leads	 to	 capital	 gains.	A	 regime	 in	which	 capital	 gains	are	 being	 earned	 and	 are	 expected	 is	 a	 favorable	 environment	 for	engaging	 in	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 finance.	 Profit	 opportunities	within	 a	robust	 financial	 structure	make	 the	 shift	 from	 robustness	 to	 fragility	 an	endogenous	phenomenon”	(ibid:	210).		Thus,	 it	 is	 the	main	 institutional	 development	 leading	 towards	 the	 rise	 of	 new	private	credit	money	forms	when	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	expand	in	a	system	dominated	by	hedge	finance	and	come	up	with	innovative	short-term	IOUs.		
	 Such	institutional	development	is	consistent	to	what	Kindleberger	(1978	[2005]:	Ch.	2,	4)	develops	in	his	Manias,	panics	and	crashes.	Moreover,	there	is	a	literature	studying	financial	innovation,	yet	without	connecting	it	to	the	theme	of	the	monetary	system’s	transformation,	that	provides	a	link	to	the	origination	of	private	 credit	 money	 via	 financial	 innovation	 (cf.	 Brunnermeier	 2009;	Nesvetailova	 2010;	 Mian	 and	 Sufi	 2014).	 Such	 literature	 holds	 connections	 to	structuralist	scholarship	(cf.	Chapter	1),	which	e.g.	addresses	financialization	and	wider	recurring	patterns	of	capitalism	such	as	extensive	credit	cycles.			
3.2.2	Establishing	par	clearance	for	the	short-term	IOU		The	innovative	short-term	IOUs	brought	forth	by	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	do	not	yet	satisfy	the	criteria	for	a	private	credit	money	form.	From	a	demand-side	perspective,	they	must	also	be	considered	a	functional	substitute	for	established	money	forms.	This	requires	that	they	are	sufficiently	stable	in	value	and	trade	at	par	or	quasi	par	with	higher	ranking	money	forms.	This	makes	them	part	of	the	‘monetary	 pyramid’	 at	 a	 bottom	 layer	 as	 a	 hierarchically-lower	 credit	 money	form	(cf.	Figure	3.5).			
	
Figure	3.5—Establishing	par	clearance	within	the	monetary	pyramid	 	
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‘Par’	in	this	context	means	that	the	new	IOU	has	a	fixed	one-to-one	exchange	rate	with	 the	 established	 money	 form.	 ‘Quasi	 par’,	 in	 contrast,	 implies	 that	 the	exchange	rate	is	not	firmly	one-to-one	but	continues	to	fluctuate,	yet	only	within	a	 small	 margin.	 Provided	 that	 establishing	 par	 clearance	 with	 higher-ranking	money	forms	has	been	successful,	the	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	can	be	seen	as	issuers	of	a	new	private	credit	money	form	(cf.	Figure	3.6):		 Borrower	 	 Speculative	or	Ponzi	unit	+	New	private	credit	money				(short-term	IOU)	 +	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 	 +	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 +	New	private	credit	money				(short-term	IOU)		 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	3.6—Creation	of	a	new	private	credit	money	form		 For	the	issuing	institutions,	it	may	be	part	of	their	business	model	to	tailor	their	products	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 they	directly	 compete	with	more	established	forms	of	money.	This	involves	finding	ways	to	minimize	the	price	volatility	of	the	short-term	IOU	they	 issues.	 In	 this,	 they	meet	 the	demand	that	has	emerged	 in	the	monetary	system	throughout	the	expansionary	phases	to	hold	wealth	in	the	form	of	money-like	short-term	assets	instead	of	less	liquid	long-term	financial	or	real	assets.37	This	 trend	can	be	seen	 in	a	general	 context	of	 financialization	 (cf.	e.g.	 Krippner	 2005,	 2011),	 which	 often	 occurs	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 extended	phases	of	economic	and	financial	expansion	(Arrighi	1994).		In	 which	 ways	 can	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 achieve	 that	 their	 IOUs	become	private	credit	money?			On	 the	 one	 hand,	 clearance	 at	 quasi	 par	 can	 be	 achieved	 while	 solely	relying	on	market	 forces.	This	strategy	 implies	 that	supply	and	demand	for	 the	private	 IOU	 need	 to	 be	 balanced	 in	 a	 de-centralised	 fashion	 such	 that	 a	 stable	price	 relationship	between	 the	private	 IOU	and	higher-ranking	money	 forms	 is	maintained.	With	this	approach,	par	clearance	cannot	be	established	in	nominal	or	 legal	 terms	 but	 only	 de	 facto	 while	 the	 exchange	 rate	 still	 fluctuates.	 The	promise	 of	 par	 clearance	 is	 comparatively	 weak	 and	 the	 susceptibility	 to	 a	financial	panic	and	runs	relatively	high.38	In	theory,	it	could	also	occur	by	chance,	without	purposeful	action	by	the	issuing	institution,	that	quasi	par	is	established.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 issuing	 institutions	 can	 actively	 seek	 for	 a	mechanism	 that	 induces	 par.	 This	 may	 imply	 setting	 up	 a	 specific	 private	institution	that	provides	 the	necessary	elasticity	and	discipline	 in	 the	supply	of	the	 private	 IOU	 and	 minimise	 the	 price	 volatility	 of	 the	 private	 IOU	 vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	 forms.	Typically,	 those	 institutions	will	 take	on	the	 form	of	 clearing	 banks	 or	 bankers’	 banks	 (i.e.	 non-public	 central	 banks).	 As	 they	provide	private	mechanisms	to	reduce	the	susceptibility	to	panics	and	runs,	their	promise	of	par	clearance	is	substantially	higher.39	Legal	constructs	to	guarantee																																																									37		 In	 the	 case	of	 the	 contemporary	 shadow	banking	 system,	Pozsar	et	 al.	 (2012)	attribute	 this	demand	to	the	emergence	of	large	cash	pools.	38	 Such	a	strategy	was	used	e.g.	by	English	country	banks	(cf.	Pressnell	1956).	39	 As	a	historical	example	for	this,	Kindleberger	(1978	[2005]:	65)	refers	to	Clearing	Houses.	
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par	clearance	are	an	alternative.	This	strategy	implies	that	lawmakers—typically	achieved	through	lobbying	strategies—grant	legal	privileges	to	private	IOUs	that	make	 them	particularly	stable	 in	value	(cf.	Pistor	2013).	For	example,	 this	may	involve	special	accounting	rules	that	effectively	abandon	price	volatility	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	 money	 forms.	 This	 strategy	 goes	 along	 with	 a	 very	 strong	promise	of	par	clearance	and	a	low	susceptibility	to	panics	and	runs.40			
3.2.3	Adopting	systemic	relevance	by	the	private	credit	money	form		The	final	aspect	of	 the	pre-accommodation	phase	 is	that	the	new	private	credit	money	 form	 becomes	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims	 and	 thus	 adopts	systemic	relevance.			
Prima	 facie,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 what	 systemic	 relevance	 refers	 to	 in	 the	context	of	private	credit	money,	given	that	the	concept	usually	is	not	associated	with	specific	financial	instruments	but	with	financial	institutions	that	issue	them,	typically	 banks.	 As	 to	 CEP	 (2010),	 the	 label	 ‘systemically	 relevant’	 is	 typically	used	interchangeably	with	the	label	‘too	big	to	fail’	and	implies	that	an	institution	plays	such	an	important	role	for	the	financial	and	real	economy	in	general	that	it	is	not	possible	to	accept	its	insolvency.	This	is	the	case	when	“the	impact	of	the	failure	 or	 impairment	 of	 large,	 interconnected	 global	 financial	 institutions	 […]	can	send	shocks	through	the	 financial	system	which,	 in	 turn,	can	harm	the	real	economy”	 (BCBS	 2012:	 1).	While	 no	 clear,	 uncontested	 definition	 for	 systemic	relevance	exists	(CEP	2010),	the	guidelines	presented	by	the	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision,	which	have	been	endorsed	by	the	Financial	Stability	Board,	suggest	that	the	extent	to	which	a	bank	is	systemically	relevant	depends	on	the	four	 criteria:	 size,	 interconnectedness,	 substitutability	 of	 the	 products	 and	services	it	offers—i.e.	the	degree	to	which	it	holds	a	(natural)	monopoly—as	well	as	its	complexity	(BCBS	2012:	3).		 Based	 on	 those	 considerations,	 this	 study	 translates	 those	 criteria	 from	financial	 institutions	 to	 financial	 instruments.	 Accordingly,	 it	 regards	 a	 private	credit	money	form	as	systemically	relevant	if	 its	failure—i.e.	the	annihilation	of	substantial	 volumes	 of	 private	 credit	money	 balances	 due	 to	 the	 shut-down	of	the	 issuing	speculative	or	Ponzi	units—would	 lead	 to	a	systemic	financial	crisis	(as	opposed	to	a	marginal	financial	crisis,	as	defined	in	2.3.4),	during	which	the	functionality	of	 the	credit	money	system	 in	general	 is	put	at	 risk.	 In	particular,	runs	 on	 a	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	money	 form	would	 spill	 over	 to	higher-ranking	 credit	 money	 forms	 and	 put	 the	 survival	 of	 their	 issuing	institutions	at	risk	as	well.	Following	the	Money	View	logic,	this	implies	that	the	private	 credit	 money	 form	 has	 become	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 enmeshed	 in	 the	monetary	 system—understood	 as	 a	 self-referential	 debt	 network—that	 its	annihilation	would	make	the	network’s	expansion	come	to	a	halt	and	induce	its	reversion.																																																										40	 This	is	the	strategy	that	had	been	e.g.	adopted	by	money	market	funds	(cf.	Baklanova	2012).	
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This	definition	regarding	the	systemic	relevance	of	a	private	credit	money	form	refers	both	to	the	supply	side,	i.e.	the	balance	sheets	of	the	institutions	that	issue	the	private	credit	money	form	as	their	 liabilities,	and	to	the	way	in	which	the	private	credit	money	form	is	used	on	the	demand	side,	i.e.	those	institutions	and	individuals	within	the	respective	‘payment	community’	that	hold	the	private	credit	money	form	as	an	asset	on	their	balance	sheets.	In	line	with	BCBS	(2012),	this	study	distinguishes	four	criteria	that	contribute	to	the	systemic	relevance	of	a	private	credit	money	form	and	suggests	to	interpret	them	as	follows:		The	first	criterion	for	systemic	relevance	of	a	private	credit	money	form	is	its	 size.	 The	 greater	 the	 volume	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 balances	 issued,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	 systemically	 relevant.	 From	 the	 supply	 side,	 this	 implies	 the	aggregate	level	of	private	credit	money	balances	held	as	the	issuing	institutions’	liabilities.	From	the	demand	side,	this	means	the	aggregate	level	of	credit	money	assets	held	by	investors,	which	necessarily	has	to	sum	up	to	the	same	amount.41			 The	 second	 criterion,	 interconnectedness,	 refers	 to	 the	 number	 of	institutions	 issuing	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 on	 the	 supply	 side	 and	 the	number	of	institutions	holding	private	credit	money	balances	as	their	assets	on	the	demand	side.	The	more	interconnected	the	payment	community,	the	higher	the	relevance	of	the	private	credit	money	form	for	the	wider	monetary	system.42		Substitutability	is	the	third	criterion.	The	more	difficult	it	is	for	investors	in	the	private	credit	money	form	to	shift	their	balances	into	other	money	forms,	the	more	 systemically	 relevant	 is	 the	 credit	money	 form.	 This	 implies	 aspects	such	as	time	lag	of	conversion,	possible	volume	of	conversion,	loss	in	asset	value	due	to	the	conversion,	as	well	as	reduction	of	the	asset’s	usefulness	and	liquidity	due	 to	 the	 conversion.	 In	 an	 extreme	 case,	 a	 monopoly	 has	 emerged	 for	 one	private	credit	money	form	if	it	is	not	possible	to	switch	to	the	IOUs	of	a	different	payment	community	at	acceptable	costs.43		The	 final	 criterion	 is	 complexity.	 The	 more	 complex	 the	 issuance	 of	private	 credit	 money,	 the	 more	 likely	 it	 is	 systemically	 relevant.	 This	 study	suggests	 to	 think	of	 complexity	 as	 involving	 the	 suppliers’	 and	 the	demanders’	geographical	 distribution	 within	 one	 national	 payments	 system	 as	 well	 as	 the	international	 payments	 system,	 i.e.	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 private	 payment																																																									41		 Typically,	 the	 actual	 volumes	 of	 a	 private	 credit	money	 form	 are	 very	 difficult	 to	measure.	They	 emerge	 in	 grey	 areas	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 considerable	fluctuations.	Especially	in	the	historical	cases	of	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits,	the	availability	of	data	is	very	sketchy.	For	the	case	study	on	shadow	money,	more	data	is	available	but	it	is	often	 also	 described	 as	 incomplete.	 Still,	 the	 relative	 expansion	 in	 size	 throughout	 a	 given	period	can	be	a	valuable	point	of	reference	for	this	criterion.	42	 The	case	studies	on	bank	notes,	bank	deposits	and	shadow	money	suggest	that	the	number	of	holders	is	more	important	than	the	number	of	issuers	of	that	private	credit	money	form.	43	 The	aspect	of	substitutability	also	corresponds	to	the	position	of	the	respective	credit	money	form	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 money.	 The	 further	 up	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 it	 is,	 the	 less	 likely	 it	 is	substitutable.	All	the	three	credit	money	forms	accommodated	(Bank	of	England	notes,	bank	deposits	as	well	as	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos)	were	higher	up	in	the	hierarchy	than	the	other	 shadow	 money	 forms	 in	 which	 the	 run	 started,	 notably	 country	 bank	 notes,	 trust	deposits	as	well	as	ABCPs.	
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community.44	Moreover,	 it	 may	 refer	 to	 the	 functional	 distribution	 across	 the	monetary	 and	 financial	 system.	E.g.,	 it	would	play	 a	 role	 to	which	extent	other	segments	of	the	financial	system	are	involved	into	the	mechanics	of	credit	money	creation.45		While	these	four	criteria	of	size,	 interconnectedness,	substitutability	and	complexity	of	a	private	credit	money	form	may	be	a	good	auxiliary	for	an	ex	ante	assessment,	 they	do	not	offer	 certainty	as	 to	whether	 the	 failure	of	 the	private	credit	money	form	will	really	lead	to	a	systemic	crisis	or	not.	It	is	in	the	nature	of	the	inherent	instability	of	credit	money	that	we	cannot	know	for	sure.	In	fact,	it	is	only	after	a	systemic	 financial	crisis	 that	we	can	know	for	sure	that	 the	private	credit	money	form	was	systemically	relevant.	Hence,	systemic	relevance	is	most	useful	 as	 an	 ex	 post	 category.	 Ex	 ante,	 determining	 the	 systemic	 relevance	 is	much	 harder	 and	 always	 retains	 an	 element	 of	 speculation	 and	 uncertainty,	which	may	well	be	grasped	by	the	concept	of	‘systemic	risk’.		Still,	for	the	theory	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	a	political-economic	 phenomenon,	 it	 does	 not	 so	 much	 depend	 on	 the	 actual	 systemic	relevance	of	 a	 credit	money	 form.	 Instead,	what	 counts	 to	drive	 the	process	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	are	the	ex	ante	perceptions	regarding	the	systemic	relevance	of	the	private	credit	money	form’s	issuing	 institutions	 that	are	held	among	the	decision-makers	on	the	highest	level	of	political	authority.		
	 	
																																																								44	 We	 can	 establish	 here	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 complexity	 has	 been	much	 higher	 in	 the	 case	 of	shadow	money	with	the	inherently	international	entanglement	of	the	shadow	banking	system	in	 times	 of	 financial	 globalization	 compared	 to	 the	 case	 of	 British	 bank	 notes	 that	 still	remained	fairly	local	in	the	18th	century.	45	 For	example,	the	creation	of	overnight	repos	as	shadow	money	involves	the	use	of	collateral,	which	 is	made	up	of	 both	public	 and	 structured	private	debt	 certificates.	 This	 substantially	increases	the	complexity	of	the	private	credit	money	form.	On	the	other	hand,	English	country	bank	 notes	 were	 issued	 against	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 non-homogenous	 assets,	 which	 also	contributed	to	their	complexity.	
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3.3	Phase	II:	The	accommodation	of	the	private	credit	money	form		This	 section	 describes	 and	 explains	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 the	 accommodation	process	 in	 which	 the	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 is	 put	under	public	control	as	public	authorities	assume	responsibility	to	guarantee	par	clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 forms	 of	 money.	 In	 contrast	 to	 phase	 I,	 the	accommodation	happens	within	a	very	short	period	of	time,	in	a	Minsky	moment,	when	a	run	on	the	credit	money	system	takes	place.		 Descriptively,	 as	 Figure	3.7	 demonstrates,	 the	 accommodation	 of	 the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form	can	be	depicted	as	a	shift	within	the	Money	Matrix	from	the	private	to	the	public	credit	money	realm.	With	public	authorities	 guaranteeing	 par	 clearance,	 an	 ad	 hoc	public-private	 framework	 is	established	to	guarantee	the	moneyness	of	the	credit	money	form,	which	makes	it	become	private-public	public	money.		
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Figure	3.7—Accommodation	via	government	intervention	to	a	crisis		 The	accommodation	phase	begins	when	a	crisis	emerges	 in	the	 financial	system.	 For	 any	 reason	 that	 cannot	 be	 known	 ex	 ante,	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	claims	comes	to	a	halt.	Minsky’s	Financial	Instability	Hypothesis	can	well	explain	the	 collapse	 of	 the	 private	 credit	money	 form	 in	 the	 first	 place	 (Minsky	 1986,	1992).	 The	 imminent	 threat	 sets	 in	 that	 the	 debt	 network	 might	 implode,	expressed	 via	 a	 run	 on	 the	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 issuing	 private	 credit	money,	and	 the	real	chance	of	 their	default.	The	credit	money	system	relies	on	the	(implicit	or	explicit)	promise	that	the	credit	money	forms	can	be	converted	into	a	hierarchically	higher	form	of	money.	If	this	promise	is	no	longer	perceived	as	 credible	among	holders	of	private	 credit	money,	a	panic	materializes	within	
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the	private	credit	money	realm.	The	dynamics	of	such	a	run	have	been	frequently	studied	 in	 the	 economics	 literature	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Fisher	 1911,	 Diamond	 and	 Dybvig	1983,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	2009,	Ricks	2016).	The	run	will	start	with	a	less	safe	private	credit	money	form	and	lead	to	a	flight	to	money	forms	higher	up	in	the	hierarchy.	 Yet,	 by	 definition,	 there	 will	 not	 be	 a	 sufficient	 amount	 of	hierarchically	 higher	 and	 thus	 safer	 money	 available.	 Eventually,	 the	 run	 will	affect	the	institutions	that	issue	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money.	This	brings	 the	monetary	 system,	 and	with	 it	 the	monetary	economy	as	 a	whole,	 to	the	brink	of	 collapse.	 If	noone	wants	 to	accept	private	 credit	money	any	more,	the	‘real	economy’	is	in	danger	of	disintegrating	because	there	would	be	no	more	money	available	to	facilitate	transactions	and	in	the	‘financial	sphere’,	masses	of	wealth—held	in	the	form	of	financial	assets—would	be	destroyed.		Confronted	with	 such	 a	 situation,	 policy-makers	may	 decide	 to	 bail	 out	the	defaulting	 institutions,	which	 issues	 the	private	 credit	money	balances	and	on	which	the	run	takes	place.	This	phenomenon	has	well	been	described	in	the	IPE	literature	on	bailouts	(see	e.g.	Culpepper	2015,	Culpepper	and	Reinke	2014,	Woll	 2014).	 Responsibility	 for	 the	 emergency	 response	 to	 the	 systemic	 crisis	sooner	or	later	ends	up	at	the	highest	levels	of	government	where	the	people	in	charge	 have	 to	 decide	 under	 extreme	 time	 pressure	 and	 uncertainty	 how	 to	respond.	 In	 their	 decision-making	 about	 a	 bailout,	 they	 focus	 on	 the	 actual	institution(s)	facing	the	run	and	the	possible	consequences	of	their	collapse.	The	high-level	 politicians	 are	 confronted	with	 a	 doomsday	 scenario:	 The	 default	 of	those	institutions	would	imply	that	masses	of	wealth	created	prior	to	the	crisis	and	 now	 held	 as	 credit	 money	 balances	 would	 annihilate.	 To	 avoid	 these	consequences,	 policy-makers	may	 be	 willing	 to	 break	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 use	their	‘infrastructural	power’	(cf.	Mann	1984)	to	keep	the	institutions	alive.	They	establish	mechanisms	to	provide	liquidity	and	solvency	support	to	the	defaulting	institutions.	This	calms	down	the	panic	in	the	monetary	system	and	rescues	the	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	issuing	the	systemically	relevant	credit	money	form.			As	 an	 unintended	 side	 effect	 of	 the	 bailout,	 policy-makers	 acknowledge	that	 the	 private	 credit	money	 form	 has	 taken	 on	 a	 systemic	 role	 and	 that	 the	monetary	economy	is	no	longer	able	to	function	smoothly	without	it.	By	granting	emergency	support	 to	 its	 issuer(s),	 they	 let	 the	 issuing	 institution(s)	 tap	public	balance	sheets.	This	establishes	an	ad	hoc	public	 framework	 to	ensure	 that	 the	systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 balances	 do	 not	 annihilate	 via	 a	default	of	their	issuers.	As	long	as	this	public	framework	is	in	place,	it	guarantees	the	survival	of	 the	speculative	and	Ponzi	units,	 in	 the	sense	 that	 they	can	meet	their	 payment	 commitments,	 and	makes	 sure	 that	 the	 credit	money	 they	 issue	sustains	par.	Speaking	with	Keynes	(1930a:	6),	by	establishing	 this	 framework,	the	 state	 uses	 its	 “Chartalist	 prerogative”	 to	 make	 the	 credit	 money-issuing	institutions	bankruptcy	remote	as	 it	 rules	 that	 the	credit	money	 form	becomes	an	ultimate	means	of	payment	or	at	least	a	publicly	guaranteed	equivalent	to	the	ultimate	 means	 of	 payment.	 Via	 this	 framework,	 the	 public	 authorities	unintentionally	 accommodate	 the	 formerly	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 in	 the	public	money	supply.	This	induces	a	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	and	provides	 for	a	new	setup	of	 the	money	supply	with	now	a	new	combination	of	public	and	private	credit	money	forms	co-existing	next	to	each	other.	 	
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What	explains	the	events	in	the	second	phase	of	accommodation	process?	A	 dominating	 view	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature	 is	 that	 the	 bailout—and,	 from	 the	standpoint	of	this	study,	also	the	concomitant	accommodation—takes	place	due	to	the	influence	of	vested	financial	interests	on	the	political	decision-makers.	In	this	context,	Woll	(2014:	4)	distinguishes	between	three	strands	of	explanations	that	 focus	 on	 direct	 lobbying	 influences,	 indirect	 institutional	 factors	 and	ideational	 meaning	 structures,	 respectively.	 Against	 this	 dominant	 view,	 this	study	contends	that—while	such	analyses	certainly	generate	valuable	insights	in	the	factual	processes	that	have	taken	place	empirically—the	fundamental	reason	for	the	bailouts	and	the	concomitant	accommodation	of	the	private	credit	money	form	is	to	be	found	on	a	higher	level	of	abstraction.	This	reason	lies	in	the	very	own	 logic	 of	 the	modern	 credit	money	 system	 itself—the	 financial	 technology	that	 has	been	developed	 in	 the	English	 financial	 revolution	 and	 since	 then	has	become	all-encompassing	for	the	entire	world.		 As	 the	 Money	 View	 lens	 makes	 explicit,	 credit	 money	 is	 inherently	instable	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 self-referential	 debt	 network	 cannot	 go	 on	forever.	 The	 process	 of	 credit	 money	 expansion	must	 come	 to	 a	 halt	 at	 some	point.	 To	 keep	 the	 system	 on	 track	 and	 sustain	 its	 drive	 towards	 self-preservation,	 it	 requires	an	external	 intervention	 that	supports	 the	system	and	ensures	that	not	all	of	the	self-referential	promises	to	pay	have	to	be	redeemed	by	 the	 issuing	 institution.	 The	 state	 as	 the	deus	ex	machina	may	 transform	 the	credit	money	 form,	which	 in	 the	 first	 place	was	 a	 promise	 to	 pay,	 into	 a	 ‘non-debt’	 that	 still	 looks	 like	 a	 promise	 to	 pay	 but	 does	 not	 actually	 require	redemption.	 This	 systemic	 need	 is	 the	 root	 cause	 for	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation	and	the	associated	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.	The	key	point	of	 the	 functionalist	political	 economic	 theory	of	private	 credit	money	accommodation	is	that	both	private	and	public	agents	behave	in	a	way	that	is	in	accordance	with	the	incentives	and	necessities	predetermined	by	the	system.	On	the	one	hand,	 the	 system’s	 expansion	and	 contraction	are	advanced	by	private	agency.	However,	the	profit	motives	during	the	expansion	and	the	self-help	logic	in	 the	 contraction	are	perfectly	 rational	behaviours	of	 individual	units	 that	are	provided	by	the	properties	of	 the	system	itself.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	bailouts	and	the	connected	accommodation	are	driven	by	public	actors.	They	materialize	due	 to	 functional	 necessities	 (‘form	 follows	 function’)	 and	 policy-makers’	decisions	 that	 promise	 to	 provide	 solutions	 to	 problems	perceived	 as	 pressing	(cf.	Mitrany	1948,	Porter	2003).			 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 section	 describes	 the	 process	 of	 private	 credit	money	 accommodation,	 as	 it	 happens	 in	 phase	 II,	 in	 its	 three	 analytical	 steps.	First,	the	run	emerges	on	the	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	that	issue	private	credit	money	 (3.3.1).	 Second,	 policy-makers	 decide	 to	 intervene	 and	 take	 emergency	measures	 to	 bail-out	 the	 defaulting	 financial	 institutions	 (3.3.2).	 Third,	 by	granting	the	defaulting	credit	money	issuers	access	to	public	balance	sheets,	the	public	authorities	assume	responsibility	to	guarantee	par	clearance	for	the	credit	money	forms	they	issue.	They	can	make	the	credit	money	form	non-redeemable	and	thus	accommodate	it	in	the	public	money	supply	(3.3.3).	 	
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3.3.1	Financial	instability	and	a	run	within	the	private	credit	money	realm		During	phase	I,	ever	more	issuers	of	private	credit	money	emerge.	This	coincides	with	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 and	 higher	 volumes	 of	private	 credit	money.	 The	monetary	 pyramid	 expands	 over	 the	 leverage	 cycle	and	receives	more	‘layers’	as	more	IOUs	attain	the	status	of	private	credit	money.	At	the	outset	of	phase	II,	the	monetary	system’s	expansion	comes	to	a	halt	and	a	run	emerges	on	the	private	credit	money	form.	To	the	holders	of	private	credit	money,	 the	 self-referentiality	 of	 the	 system	 becomes	 obvious.	 They	 become	painfully	aware	that	the	only	equivalent	value	to	the	credit	money	balances	they	hold	are	promises	to	pay	money	in	the	future.	As	these	promises	are	contingent	on	the	liquidity	and	solvency	of	their	issuers,	they	are	void	if	the	issuer	defaults.			 The	 crisis	 and	 the	 threatening	 collapse	 of	 a	 private	 credit	 money	 form	may	well	be	explained	on	the	basis	of	Minsky’s	Financial	Instability	Hypothesis,	which	sees	financial	instability	as	endogenous	to	the	financial	system	and	crises	as	the	consequence	of	financial	innovation	during	longer	periods	of	stability	and	tranquility.	 Financial	 instability—according	 to	 Minsky	 (1986)—emerges	 when	due	 to	 the	 profit	 opportunities	 for	 units	 working	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 maturity	transformation,	 the	 system	 shifts	 from	 a	 dominance	 of	 hedge	 units	 to	 a	dominance	 of	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units.	 Moving	 away	 from	 the	 hedge	dominated	system	increases	the	inherent	instability	of	the	system:		“The	mixture	of	hedge,	speculative,	and	Ponzi	finance	in	an	economy	is	a	major	determinant	of	 its	stability.	The	existence	of	a	 large	component	of	positions	 financed	 in	 a	 speculative	 or	 an	 Ponzi	manner	 is	 necessary	 for	financial	instability”	(Minsky	1986:	209).		The	 key	 aspect	 for	 financial	 instability,	 in	Minsky’s	 view,	 is	whether	 units	 use	predominantly	income,	balance	sheet	or	portfolio	cash	flows	for	refinancing:		 “An	 economy	 in	 which	 income	 cash	 flows	 are	 dominant	 in	 meeting	balance-sheet	commitments	 is	relatively	 immune	to	 financial	crises:	 it	 is	financially	robust.	An	economy	in	which	portfolio	transactions	are	widely	used	 to	 obtain	 the	 means	 for	 making	 balance-sheet	 payments	 can	 be	crisis-prone:	it	is	at	least	potentially	financially	fragile”	(ibid:	204).		Hedge	 units	 are	 “vulnerable	 to	 difficulties	 in	 fulfilling	 outstanding	 financial	commitments	only	if	receipts	fall	short	of	expectation”	(i.e.	due	to	distortions	in	the	 productive	 sector).	 Speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units,	 in	 turn,	 are	 “vulnerable	 to	developments	in	financial	markets”	(ibid:	208),	i.e.	vulnerable	to	runs:		 “[S]peculative-	 and	 Ponzi-finance	 units	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 changes	 in	interest	 rates—that	 is,	 to	 financial-market	 developments	 as	 well	 as	 to	product	 and	 factor	 market	 events:	 increases	 in	 interest	 rates	 will	 raise	cash-flow	 commitments	 without	 increasing	 prospective	 receipts.	Furthermore,	as	they	must	continuously	refinance	their	position,	they	are	vulnerable	 to	 financial-market	 disruptions.	 The	 greater	 the	 weight	 of	speculative	and	Ponzi	finance,	the	smaller	the	overall	margins	of	safety	in	the	 economy	 and	 the	 greater	 the	 fragility	 of	 financial	 structure”	 (ibid:	209-210).	 	
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Minsky	 views	 it	 as	 an	 inherent	 feature	 of	 financial	 capitalism	 that	 stability	 is	destabilizing	(Minsky	1992:	8):		 “If	a	particular	mix	of	hedge	and	speculative	financing	of	positions	and	of	internal	and	external	financing	of	investment	rules	for	a	while,	then	there	are,	internal	to	the	economy,	incentives	to	change	the	mix.	Any	transitory	tranquility	 is	 transformed	 into	 an	 expansion	 in	 which	 the	 speculative	financing	of	positions	and	the	external	 financing	of	 investment	 increase”	(Minsky	1986:	219-220).		 The	changing	structure	of	the	financial	system	has	a	direct	implication	for	the	 private	 credit	 money	 supply.	 With	 more	 and	 more	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	units	 that	 operate	 as	 banks	 or	 near-banks	 (cf.	 Minsky	 1992:	 6)	 entering	 the	system,	the	volume	of	private	credit	money	issued	as	those	institutions’	liabilities	will	increase	as	well:		“[T]he	 money	 supply	 increases	 when	 bankers	 and	 their	 business	customers	 are	willing	 to	 increase	 current	 indebtedness.	 This	 will	 occur	only	because	they	both	believe	that	future	business	revenues	will	finance	the	payments	due	on	debts”	(Minsky	1986:	117).		More	 promises	 to	 pay	 higher-ranking	money	 forms	 are	 issued	 on	 the	 basis	 of	maturity	mismatches,	thus	more	short-term	IOUs	that	have	to	be	rolled	over	at	maturity	are	 created.	To	 service	 their	payment	 commitments,	hedge	units	may	turn	into	speculative	units,	and	speculative	units	 into	Ponzi	units	(cf.	 ibid:	207-208).	 In	this,	 the	private	credit	money	supply	 increases	substantially	compared	to	the	system	dominated	by	hedge	finance.	The	Money	Pyramid	expands.	It	may	even	be	argued	that	the	status	of	systemic	relevance	of	the	private	credit	money	form	gives	incentives	to	‘over-issue’	that	financial	product	(cf.	BCBS	2012).		 At	 the	same	 time,	 the	 inherent	vulnerabilities	of	a	 system	dominated	by	speculative	 and	Ponzi	 finance	make	 it	 even	more	 likely	 that	 at	 some	point	 the	promises	to	pay	credit	money	can	no	longer	be	redeemed.	In	a	‘Minsky	Moment’	(McCulley	2009),	the	expansion	of	the	debt	network	comes	to	a	halt	and	starts	to	revert	itself.	Existing	debts	cannot	be	rolled	over	anymore,	and	new	debts	cannot	be	issued	anymore	to	fund	existing	payment	commitments.	After	a	phase	during	which	 the	 private	 debt	 network	 was	 continuously	 expanding,	 the	 financial	system	 reaches	 the	quantitative	peak	of	 its	 credit	money	 supply	 and	begins	 to	implode.	 Holders	 of	 private	 credit	money	 fear	 that	 the	 issuing	 institution	may	face	illiquidity	and	insolvency.	In	this	case,	the	private	credit	money	forms	held	as	their	assets	would	annihilate.	Therefore,	 the	 investors	 flee	to	higher-ranking	money	forms	within	the	Monetary	Pyramid	that	appear	to	be	more	secure.	A	run	on	private	credit	money	emerges:		 “[T]he	money	supply	decreases	as	bank	loans	are	reduced.	A	net	decrease	occurs	when	a	significant	portion	of	bankers	and	of	(potential)	borrowing	businesses	 believe	 that	 future	 profits	 would	 not	 validate	 the	commitments	 that	would	be	embodied	 in	new	debts.	Banks	 fail	 because	cash	due	to	them	on	their	assets	 is	not	 forthcoming,	because	assets	they	offer	to	sell	to	yield	cash	have	fallen	in	price,	or	because	they	cannot	place	(sell)	their	liabilities”	(Minsky	1986:	118).	 	
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The	dynamics	of	such	a	run	have	been	extensively	described	in	the	literature.46	The	actual	panic	 that	 leads	 to	a	 flight	 to	 safety	 is	 connected	 to	a	 change	 in	 the	expectations	about	the	ongoing	expansion	of	the	monetary	system.	This	change	can	 but	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 due	 to	 an	 actual	 external	 event.	 Moreover,	 the	Minsky	moment	 can	 set	 in	 because	 there	 are	 actual	 deteriorations	 within	 the	balance	 sheet	 structure	 of	 the	 issuing	 institutions	 of	 the	 private	 credit	money	form,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 condition	 either.	 ‘Sound’	 financial	 institutions	can	 face	a	run.	Due	 to	 the	self-referentiality	of	 the	system,	runs	on	 the	basis	of	endogenously	changed	expectations	can	be	self-fulfilling	prophecies.47		 As	Figure	3.8	depicts,	the	panic	begins	with	a	run	on	private	credit	money	forms	further	down	in	the	hierarchy	where	the	promises	to	pay	are	less	safe	and	a	higher	quantity	of	 credit	money	 is	prevalent.	The	 contagion	will	 then	 spread	upwards	in	the	monetary	pyramid	until	the	run	affects	the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form.	Holders	of	those	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	 balances	 seek	 to	 convert	 their	 assets	 into	 safer	 money	 forms—either	public	credit	money	or	commodity	money,	depending	on	the	historical	context.	Since	 it	 will	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 convert	 all	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	money	balances	into	safer	money,	which	is	scarcer,	the	crisis	reaches	a	systemic	dimension.			
		
Figure	3.8—Run	on	the	monetary	system	with	upward	contagion	in	the	hierarchy	 																																																									46	 The	most	frequently	studied	type	of	a	run	is	one	on	deposits	when	holders	sought	to	convert	them	into	bank	notes.	Among	the	most	referenced	publications	is	the	model	by	Diamond	and	Dybvig	(1983),	which	offers	a	good	description	of	runs	but	operates	rather	on	the	basis	of	a	state-based	monetary	theory	of	credit.	Similarly,	Fisher	(1911)	presents	a	classical	account	of	a	run	on	deposits.	Runs	on	bank	notes	 to	convert	 them	into	gold	occurred	 frequently	 in	 the	18th	and	19th	century	(see	e.g.	Thornton	1802).	The	run	on	shadow	money	as	the	21st	century	version	of	this	phenomenon	has	been	described	e.g.	by	Gorton	(2010),	Mehrling	(2011)	and	Ricks	(2016).	47		 For	example,	Obstfeld	(1996)	presents	a	model	for	self-fulfilling	currency	crises.	
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3.3.2	Public	bailout	as	political	reaction	to	the	run			At	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 run	 on	 a	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form,	during	a	systemic	financial	crisis,	political	actors	start	to	play	the	dominant	role	in	the	model	of	private	credit	money	accommodation.	In	the	panic,	the	financial	institutions	 are	no	 longer	 able	 to	 support	 themselves.	 They	 require	 an	outside	intervention	to	prevent	the	masses	of	credit	money	balances	 from	annihilating.	Thus,	public	actors	may	decide	to	step	in	and	bail	out	the	struggling	speculative	and	Ponzi	units.	The	run,	which	has	been	ultimately	caused	by	an	overissuance	of	private	 credit	 money,	 appears	 on	 the	 surface	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 the	 struggling	institutions.		As	the	decision	to	step	in	and	prevent	the	run	by	bailing	out	the	struggling	financial	institutions	effectively	is	a	violation	of	the	rule	of	law,	it	requires	such	a	high	degree	of	political	power	that	it	can	merely	be	taken	by	the	highest	political	authorities	 in	 the	 monetary	 jurisdiction.	 In	 line	 with	 Carl	 Schmitt	 (1922),	 the	bailout	may	be	viewed	as	overstepping	the	rule	of	law	in	a	conservative	function,	to	 preserve	 what	 has	 been,	 while	 hazarding	 the	 political	 and	 economic	consequences.48 	Driven	 by	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 government,	 it	 typically	involves	the	president	or	prime	minister	as	well	as	the	heads	of	the	financial	and	monetary	 authorities.	 The	 legislative	 branch	 or	 lower-ranking	 administrative	bodies	and	interest	groups	will	not	be	involved	on	a	formal	level.	One	of	the	main	reasons	for	this	is	the	extreme	time	pressure:	The	bailout	decision	has	to	be	done	within	a	few	hours	or	over	a	weekend.49			 The	key	rationale	that	the	political	actors	have	for	the	bailout	decision	is	a	doomsday	scenario	about	what	happens	if	the	state	does	not	step	in	and	help	out	the	 struggling	 institutions.	 This	 scenario	 is	 presented	 to	 the	 decision-makers	during	 emergency	 meetings	 at	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 run.50 	Due	 to	 the	 systemic	relevance	attributed	to	the	private	credit	money	issuing	institutions,	non-action	is	 perceived	 as	 so	 catastrophic	 that	 the	 entire	 financial	 system	might	 collapse.	Therefore,	 all	 the	 foreseeable	 and	 unforeseeable	 side-effects	 are	 regarded	 as	acceptable	and	a	necessary	evil.	The	protection	of	financial	and	political	stability	becomes	 the	 primary	 goal—to	 achieve	 it,	 the	 end	 justifies	 the	 means.	 This	 is	particularly	 relevant	 as	 the	 bailout	 has	 substantial	 distributional	 effects:	 By	bailing	 out	 the	 issuers	 of	 private	 credit	 money,	 they	 will	 grant	 them	 a	 huge	benefit	amounting	to	a	massive	social	redistribution	towards	those	that	already	own.		 	These	 distributional	 effects	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 financial	 industry	 have	triggered	widespread	debates	 in	the	IPE	literature	about	 the	collusion	between																																																									48	 cf.	Van	’t	Klooster	(2017).	49	 This	finding	applies	to	all	the	three	cases	under	scrutiny:	the	meeting	of	the	Privy	Council	in	1797,	the	Emergency	Banking	Act	 in	1933	as	well	as	the	bailout	decision	during	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis.	50	 The	presence	of	a	doomsday	scenario	is	true	for	all	the	three	cases	under	scrutiny.	Still,	this	study	does	not	seek	to	establish	necessary	and	sufficient	criteria	capable	of	determining	the	decision	 for	or	against	 a	bailout	 in	all	possible	 financial	 crises.	This	has	been	done	 in	other	studies.	It	is	a	different	question	that	would	require	a	different	research	design	(cf.	Chapter	7).	
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finance	 and	 politics.	 This	 is	 typically	 attributed	 to	 the	 financial	 industry’s	lobbying	 capacity	 as	 its	 instrumental	 power	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Pagliari	 and	 Young	 2014,	2016)	 or	 its	 ability	 to	 provoke	 an	 urgent	 necessity	 that	 makes	 bailout	unavoidable	 as	 structural	 power	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Culpepper	 and	 Reinke	 2014).	 Braun	(2016c),	in	turn,	introduces	the	notion	of	infrastructural	power.	Given	the	public-private	 hybridity	 of	 the	 monetary	 system,	 the	 states	 govern	 through	 financial	markets	and	create	infrastructural	environments	that	are	a	source	for	the	power	of	 finance.	Against	 this	 interpretation,	 this	study	 insists	 that	 it	 is	ultimately	 the	very	 ability	 of	 the	monetary	 system	 itself	 to	 create	money	 out	 of	 thin	 air	 that	ultimately	provokes	the	bailout.			Following	Grossman	and	Woll	 (2014:	579),	 a	 bailout	may	 consist	 of	 the	following	four	policies:	issuing	state	guarantees	for	the	solvency	of	the	struggling	institutions	 to	 reassure	 investors;	 providing	 liquidity	 support	 to	 the	 struggling	institutions;	 recapitalizing	 the	struggling	 institutions;	and	 taking	over	 impaired	or	‘toxic’	assets	from	the	struggling	institutions.51	The	latter	two	options	imply	a	one-time	 shift	 of	 balance	 sheet	 items	 in	 between	 public	 institutions	 and	 the	struggling	 private	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units.	 Recapitalization	 refers	 to	 a	transfer	 of	 assets,	 most	 likely	 credit	 money	 balances,	 from	 the	 public	 to	 the	private	 institutions.	Taking	over	 impaired	assets	goes	 in	 the	other	direction;	 to	improve	 the	 balance	 sheet	 situation	 of	 the	 struggling	 institutions,	 public	authorities	 allow	 them	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 some	 balance	 sheet	 items.	 In	 this,	 both	options	merely	amount	 to	a	 change	within	the	 system	and	are	 therefore	not	of	major	 relevance	 for	 the	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation.	 The	establishment	 of	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 backstops,	 in	 contrast,	 can	 potentially	amount	to	a	change	of	the	system.	Hence,	they	are	the	reactions	to	the	run	which	this	model	places	its	emphasis	on.		On	the	one	hand,	the	struggling	issuing	institution	of	private	credit	money	is	 illiquid	 if	 it	 lacks	 sufficient	 reserves	 in	 the	 form	of	 higher-ranking	money	 to	convert	the	private	credit	money	form	upon	its	customers’	request	 into	higher-ranking	money.	The	run	 implies	 that	more	private	credit	money	 is	asked	 to	be	redeemed	 at	 once	 than	 possible	 for	 the	 institution.	 The	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	units	are	not	able	to	meet	their	payment	commitments	immediately.	With	public	liquidity	 backstops,	 public	 authorities	 can	 ensure	 that	 the	 struggling	 issuing	institution	 always	 has	 a	 sufficient	 amount	 of	 higher-ranking	 money	 to	 satisfy	their	 customers’	 wish	 to	 convert	 their	 private	 credit	 money	 balances.	 On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	 struggling	 institution	 is	 insolvent	 if	 the	 equity	 of	 the	 issuing	institution	 is	negative,	 i.e.	 the	volume	of	 its	 liabilities	exceeds	 that	of	 its	assets.	This	 is	not	visible	 immediately	but	 implies	that	 the	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	may	not	able	to	meet	their	payment	commitments	at	all.	The	fear	of	 insolvency	provides	an	incentive	for	holders	of	private	credit	money	to	start	the	run.	With	public	 solvency	 backstops,	 public	 authorities	 ensure	 that	 the	 private	 credit	money	balances	of	the	issuing	institutions	will	be	redeemed	even	in	case	of	their	insolvency	(cf.	e.g.	Minsky	1986;	Mishkin	2009).	 																																																									51	 While	Grossman	and	Woll	(2014)	discuss	bailouts	in	the	context	of	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	with	regard	to	banks	and	deposits,	their	general	depiction	can	be	put	into	a	broader	historical	context	and	may	refer	also	to	other	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	than	banks	and	other	credit	money	forms	than	deposits.	
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At	 the	 peak	 of	 a	 crisis,	 with	 market	 prices	 for	 assets	 being	 severely	distorted,	 illiquidity	 and	 insolvency	 cannot	 always	 be	 neatly	 distinguished	 (cf.	Awrey	et	al	2015).	Overall,	there	are	three	main	forms	to	backstop	the	struggling	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	in	a	crisis,	which	both	help	against	their	immediate	liquidity	and	insolvency	as	they	allow	them	to	meet	their	payment	commitments:	legal	proclamations,	public	guarantees	and	emergency	facilities.		First,	as	a	legal	proclamation,	public	authorities	may	decide	that	the	credit	money	form	is	no	longer	a	promise	to	pay	higher-ranking	money	but	becomes	an	ultimate	means	of	payment	at	the	top	of	the	monetary	pyramid.	In	this	case,	the	IOU	 is	 converted	 into	 a	 promise	 to	 pay	 nothing	 else	 but	 itself.	 It	 will	 be	 core	representation	of	what	Mitchell-Inness	describes	as	the	fictional	unit	of	account	of	 the	 respective	monetary	 jurisdiction.	 In	 the	words	 of	 Keynes	 (1930:	 6),	 the	state	then	declares	that	the	“debt	itself	is	an	acceptable	discharge	of	a	liability”.	Due	 to	 such	 legal	 proclamation,	 the	 struggling	 issuing	 institution	 is	 put	 in	 the	position	 to	 create	 the	 necessary	 emergency	 liquidity	 on	 its	 own.	 It	 cannot	become	illiquid	anymore	as	its	customers	have	lost	their	entitlement	to	exchange	their	credit	money	balances	into	something	else.	At	the	same	time,	as	the	quality	of	their	liabilities	have	changed,	it	also	become	remote	against	insolvency.52		Second,	public	authorities	may	announce	the	guarantee	that	the	state	will	use	 public	 funds	 to	 redeem	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 claims	 if	 the	 issuing	institution	defaults.	This	corresponds	to	an	explicit	or	implicit	insurance	scheme.	The	 redemption	 may	 occur	 via	 higher-	 or	 equal-ranking	 money	 forms.	 The	announcement	 of	 such	 a	 guarantee	 mitigates	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 run	 on	 the	 private	issuing	 institution.	Even	 if	 the	 institution	becomes	 insolvent,	 its	 customers	will	not	 lose	 their	credit	money	balances	as	 the	state	stands	ready	 to	redeem	them	with	 its	 own	 funds.	 If	 such	 a	 guarantee	 is	 announced,	 incentives	 for	 a	 run	 are	inhibited	 and	 the	 danger	 of	 imminent	 illiquidity	 is	 reduced	 as	 holders	 of	privately	 created	 credit	 money	 no	 longer	 have	 to	 fear	 the	 loss	 of	 individual	purchasing	power	due	to	the	private	issuing	institution’s	insolvency.53		Third,	by	establishing	emergency	 facilities,	public	 authorities	 can	decide	that	they	stand	ready	to	endow	the	private	issuing	institutions	with	an	amount	of	higher-ranking	money	to	meet	their	payment	obligations	during	a	run.	Typically,	the	emergency	liquidity	facilities	supply	higher-ranking	money	to	a	very	high	or	even	unlimited	amount,	and	public	authorities	are	able	to	create	those	funds	at	their	 own	 discretion	 on	 public	 balance	 sheets.	 If	 such	 emergency	 liquidity	facilities	 are	 in	 place,	 the	 private	 issuing	 institution	 cannot	 become	 illiquid	anymore	because	the	public	authorities	will	always	supply	the	volume	of	 funds	necessary	 for	 the	 institution	 to	 meet	 its	 payment	 commitments	 during	 a	 run.	Thus,	 a	 higher-ranking	 public	 institution	 supplies	 the	 necessary	 emergency	liquidity	to	the	struggling	institution,	which	also	saves	their	solvency	situation	in	the	crisis.54	 																																																									52	 This	 form	 of	 bailout	 has	 been	 most	 pivotally	 used	 in	 the	 1797	 Bank	 Restriction	 to	 create	backstops	for	Bank	of	England	notes.	See	e.g.	Smith	1936	for	this	interpretation.	53	 This	form	of	bailout	occurred	in	1933	to	end	the	Great	Depression	with	an	implicit	guarantee	for	bank	deposits	as	well	as	in	2009	with	an	explicit	guarantee	for	MMF	shares.	54	 These	emergency	facilities	had	been	established	for	overnight	repos	in	2008	and	2009.	
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3.3.3	The	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	via	public	backstopping	
	The	conventional	account	of	 the	public	bailouts	 focuses	on	 the	 institutions	 that	were	 struggling.	 The	 theory	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation,	 in	 turn,	stresses	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 public	 intervention	 on	 the	 credit	money	 forms	 that	those	 institutions	 issue	 as	well	 as	 the	 implications	 for	 the	monetary	 system	 in	general.	Notably,	the	theory	highlights	that	the	intervention	induces	a	new	setup	of	the	public-private	hybridity	in	the	money	supply	on	the	spot	and	hence	leads	to	 a—potentially	 permanent	 (cf.	 Chapter	 7)—transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	system.		 The	policy-makers’	decision	to	create	public	backstops	against	illiquidity	and	 insolvency	 accommodates	 the	 systemically	 relevant	 credit	 money	 form	 in	the	 public	 money	 supply.	 Effectively,	 the	 backstops	 shift	 the	 systemically	relevant	 credit	money	 from	 the	 private	 credit	money	 realm—either	 as	 public-
private	 money	 or	 as	 pure	 private	 money—into	 the	 public	 credit	 money	 realm	where	it	becomes	private-public	money.	With	the	public	backstops	in	place,	an	ad	
hoc	 public	 framework	 is	 established	 to	 guarantee	 the	 ‘moneyness’	 of	 the	formerly	private	credit	money	form.	Public	authorities	assume	the	responsibility	to	 guarantee	 par	 clearance	 of	 the	 credit	 money	 form	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	credit	money	forms	or	the	‘ideational’	unit	of	account	itself	(cf.	Figure	3.9).		
	
Figure	3.9—Accommodation	as	public	guarantee	to	sustain	par	clearance	
		 In	 this,	 accommodating	 the	private	 credit	money	 form	 is	 an	unintended	side-effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 intervention.	 From	 the	 policy-makers’	 perspective,	 the	decision	 to	 establish	 the	 backstops	 is	 unrelated	 to	 the	 setup	 of	 the	 monetary	system.	 They	 justify	 their	 action	 with	 the	 need	 for	 a	 public	 bail-out	 of	 the	defaulting	financial	 institutions.	Without	public	 intervention,	the	financial	crisis	would	 become	worse	 and	 contagion	 effects	 would	 spread	 further	 through	 the	system.	As	the	private	credit	money	form	is	not	typically	considered	part	of	the	money	 supply	 in	 a	 narrower	 sense,	 the	 monetary	 effects	 are	 left	 aside	 in	 the	
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policy-makers’	consideration.	Still,	the	role	of	public	authorities	can	be	described	as	 the	 exercise	 of	 ‘infrastructural	 power’—not	 by	 private	 actors	 held	 over	 the	state	 (as	 in	 Braun	 2016c),	 but	 held	 by	 the	 state	 over	 the	 privately	 dominated	monetary	system	(cf.	Mann	1984).	Due	to	the	embeddedness	of	the	state	in	the	hybrid	 structure	of	 the	monetary	 system,	 it	 constitutes	an	outside	 force	 that	 is	capable	 of	 preventing	 the	 autodestructive	 forces	 of	 the	monetary	 system	 from	unfolding.		Establishing	the	public	framework	to	guarantee	par	clearance	changes	the	character	of	the	systemically	relevant	credit	money	form.	Within	the	logic	of	the	monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 system	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	claims,	the	private	credit	money	form	had	initially	been	a	promise	made	by	the	private	issuing	institution	to	pay	a	higher-ranking	money	form	on	demand.	The	public	framework	effectively	supports	the	issuing	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	in	meeting	 their	payment	obligation	 in	a	crisis.	Via	a	 legal	proclamation,	 the	state	allows	 the	 issuing	 institution	 to	 decline	 the	 promise	 to	 pay	 higher-ranking	money	 and	 thus	 secures	 that	 par	 can	 be	maintained.	 Via	 public	 guarantees	 or	emergency	facilities,	public	authorities	assume	responsibility	for	the	redemption.	They	stand	ready	to	use	their	own	de	facto	bankruptcy	remote	balance	sheets	to	fulfil	 the	 payment	 commitments	 made	 by	 the	 private	 issuing	 institutions	 and	redeem	the	holders	of	the	credit	money	form	(cf.	Figure	3.10).	
	 	 Public	institution		 +	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 +	Public	credit					money				(short-term	IOU)		 	 	
public	guarantee	to	sustain	
par	clearance		 Borrower	 	 Private	speculative	or	Ponzi	unit	+	Systemically	relevant	credit	money				(short-term	IOU)	
+	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 	 +	Loan	or	Bond				(long-term	IOU)	 +	Systemically	relevant	credit	money				(short-term	IOU)		 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	3.10—Accommodation	via	backstops	on	a	public	institution’s	balance	sheet			 Referring	back	 to	 the	discussion	 in	Chapter	1,	 the	accommodated	 credit	money	 form	 may	 appear	 as	 ‘fiat	 money’	 after	 the	 accommodation.	 It	 may	 be	referred	to	as	‘fiat	money’	because	it	does	not	have	to	be	repaid	or,	alternatively,	there	 is	a	bankruptcy	remote	public	balance	sheet	standing	ready	 to	repay	 it	 if	necessary.	However,	from	the	perspective	of	the	accommodation	theory,	it	would	be	a	wrong	conclusion	to	assume	that	this	instrument	had	emerged	as	fiat	money	in	 the	 first	 place	 and	 has	 always	 been	 fiat	 money.	 To	 assume	 that	 public	authorities	 have	 decided	 at	 some	 point	 that	 a	 given	 ‘token’	 should	 now	 be	‘money’	via	their	government	‘fiat’	is	an	inaccurate	notion.	Rather,	following	the	conceptual	approach	of	this	study,	the	private	credit	money	form	can	become	a	fiat	 money-like	 public	 credit	 money	 form	 due	 to	 the	 state’s	 unintentional	exercise	of	its	infrastructural	power.	 	
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The	 accommodation	 of	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 amounts	 to	 a	substantial	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 that	 is	 likely	 to	 put	 the	monetary	system	on	a	new	path	dependent	trajectory.	55	On	the	one	hand,	a	new	credit	 money	 form	 is	 now	 part	 of	 the	 public	 credit	 money	 system.	What	 was	initially	 only	 an	 opaque	 ‘near	money’	 form,	 co-existing	 next	 to	 ‘money	 proper’	(Keynes	1930a:	6),	now	becomes	‘money	proper’	itself.	The	public	guarantee	to	sustain	 par	 clearance	 implicitly	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 credit	money	 form	 has	taken	 on	 a	 systemic	 role	 and	 that	 the	monetary	 economy	 is	 no	 longer	 able	 to	function	 smoothly	 without	 it.	 Public	 authorities	 can	 now	 start	 experimenting	with	new	 tools	of	monetary	governance	using	 the	new	credit	money	 form	 that	they	 control.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 accommodation,	 new	private	IOUs	will	develop	as	substitutes	for	the	existing	forms	of	‘money	proper’,	i.e.	also	the	newly	accommodated	credit	money	form.	Kindleberger’s	perpetuum	
mobile	is	about	to	set	in	again.	Thus,	with	the	rise	and	accommodation	of	credit	money	forms,	the	accommodation	model	demonstrates	why	the	capitalist	money	supply	 has	 a	 varying	 shape	 but	 is	 always	 made	 up	 of	 some	 public	 and	 some	private	money-like	IOUs.	
	 The	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 via	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation	 follows	 along	 a	 dynamic	 that	 comes	 out	 of	 its	 very	 own	properties	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims.	The	monetary	system’s	ability	to	create	private	credit	money	out	of	nothing	by	swapping	 IOUs	brings	along	 the	built-in	necessity	 that,	 to	avoid	 the	collapse	of	the	debt	house	of	cards,	public	authorities	are	confronted	with	the	problem	that	issuers	of	private	credit	money	are	about	to	collapse	and	have	to	find	a	technical	solution	 to	 avoid	 systemic	meltdown.	This	 is	 a	 functionalist	 explanation	which	assumes	that	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	is	driven	by	functional	necessities	of	the	system	(cf.	Mitrany	1948,	Porter	2003).	At	the	same	time,	it	is	a	political	 economic	 theory	 because	 it	 determines	 specific	 roles	 for	 public	 and	private	 actors	 and	 their	 interaction	 to	 explain	 the	 monetary	 system’s	transformation.	However,	 the	 fundamental	 causes	 is	neither	 to	be	 found	 in	 the	state	 and	 public	 authorities	 (realism)	 nor	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 private	 agents	(liberalism);	 it	 is	also	not	due	to	their	shared	cognitive	beliefs	(constructivism)	or	 broader	 historical	 processes	 such	 as	 financialisation	 or	 class	 struggle	(structuralism).	 The	 functionalist	 logic	 suggests	 that	 both	 private	 and	 public	agents	 behave	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 in	 accordance	 to	 the	 incentives	 and	 necessities	provided	 by	 the	 system.	 Due	 to	 the	 system’s	 properties,	 private	 financial	institutions	 have	 clear	 incentives	 to	 conduct	 financial	 innovations	 in	 phase	 I.	Individual	 institutions	 could	 decide	 against	 innovating	 but	 would	 be	 slowly	driven	 out	 of	 the	market	 by	 competition.	 In	 phase	 II,	 the	 system	 provides	 the	incentives	 for	 the	 run—an	 individually	 rational	 decision	 by	 holders	 of	 private	credit	money	balances—as	well	as	the	reasons	for	public	authorities	to	establish	backstop	and	accommodate	via	the	state’s	infrastructural	power.	 																																																									55	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 the	 accommodation	will	 entail	 a	 number	 of	 follow-up	 processes	that	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	The	status	of	the	credit	money	form	within	the	Money	Matrix	 is	 by	 no	 means	 fix.	 In	 an	 ensuing	 regulatory	 process,	 it	 may	 remain	 private-public	
money,	 become	pure	public	money,	 be	 shifted	 back	 into	 the	 ‘private	 credit	money	 realm’	 or	even	be	 ‘de-monetized’,	 i.e.	drop	out	of	 the	Money	Matrix	as	 it	breaks	par	 to	higher-ranking	money.	
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3.4	Conclusion	
	This	 chapter	 has	 developed	 a	 theory	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation.	While	using	the	conceptual	apparatus	provided	by	the	Money	View	framework,	it	has	established	a	 two-phase	model	 that	points	out	how	a	systemically	relevant	private	 credit	money	 form	 first	 emerges	 in	 a	 pre-accommodation	phase	 and	 is	subsequently	 put	 under	 public	 control	 in	 the	 moment	 of	 a	 systemic	 financial	crisis.	The	model	suggests	two	ideal-typical	answers	to	the	research	questions	of	this	study,	which	subsequently	are	to	be	empiricized:		RQ1:	 How	 does	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 affect	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system?	 Private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	
transforms	the	public	money	supply	by	shifting	the	delineation	between	public	and	
private	 credit	money.	 It	 is	 preceded	by	a	 long	period	of	 financial	 stability	during	
which	 private	 profit-oriented	 institutions	 conduct	 financial	 innovation.	 They	
develop	novel	 short-term	 IOUs,	which	 eventually	 become	private	 credit	money	as	
they	 establish	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 money	 forms	 and	 attain	
systemic	 relevance	 as	 they	 grow	 in	 size,	 interconnectedness,	 non-substitutability	
and	complexity.	The	private	credit	money	form	is	accommodated	at	a	very	specific	
moment	 in	 time	 that	 coincides	 with	 a	 ‘Minsky	moment’,	 i.e.	 a	 systemic	 financial	
crisis,	 when	 public	 balance	 sheets	 are	 used	 to	 create	 backstops	 against	 the	
illiquidity	 and	 insolvency	 of	 the	 defaulting	 institutions	 that	 have	 issued	 the	
systemically	relevant	credit	money	form.			RQ2:	 Why	 is	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodated	 in	 the	 public	 money	supply?	Private	credit	money	accommodation	is	driven	by	the	very	own	properties	
of	 the	 monetary	 system	 itself,	 notably	 its	 ability	 to	 create	 credit	 money	 out	 of	
nothing.	 As	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims,	 the	
monetary	system’s	ability	to	bring	forth	new	forms	of	private	credit	money	sooner	
or	 later	 leads	 to	 an	 imminent	 threat	 of	 implosion.	 This	 creates	 the	 necessity	 for	
political	 authorities	 to	 bail	 out	 the	 struggling	 institutions	 that	 issue	 the	
systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form.	 As	 private	 agency	 dominates	
during	the	rise	of	the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form,	public	actors	
only	 react	 ex	 post	 to	 the	 technical	 necessities	 in	 a	 crisis	 to	 prevent	 a	 systemic	
meltdown.	 The	 accommodation—i.e.	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	
that	 induces	 a	 change	 in	 the	 public-private	 setup	 of	 the	 money	 supply	 while	
exercising	 the	 state’s	 infrastructural	 power—is	 the	 unintentional	 side-effect	 of	
those	 bail-outs,	 decided	 upon	 on	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 government	 under	 extreme	
time	pressure	and	uncertainty	while	fearing	a	doomsday	scenario	for	the	financial	
system	and	the	wider	political	economy.		
	Private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 is	 a	 functionalist	 institutionalist	theory	about	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	that	attributes	a	crucial	role	to	private	credit	money	and	can	repeat	itself	historically.	In	a	broader	sense,	the	 theory	 is	 capable	 of	 explaining	 the	 empirical	 setup	 of	 today’s	 monetary	system.	 In	 this,	 it	 responds	 to	 the	problématique	described	 in	 the	 Introduction	and	 depicted	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 Chapter	1,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 current	scholarship	on	money	in	IPE	is	unable	to	make	sense	of	the	opaque	amalgam	of	credit	 instruments	 issued	 by	 public	 and	 private	 institutions	 that	 actually	
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constitutes	the	money	supply	today.	This	is	due	to	the	Essentialist	and	Chartalist	biases,	 the	neglect	 of	 taking	 the	debt	properties	 of	modern	money	 and	private	money	creation	seriously,	which	lead	to	a	blind	spot	on	the	role	of	private	credit	money	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature	on	monetary	 transformation.	 It	 is	 the	 claim	of	 this	study	 that	 the	 accommodation	 theory	 allows	 taking	 an	 innovative	 and	 more	empirically	and	historically	accurate	look	at	the	real-world	monetary	system.		In	this,	the	accommodation	theory	has	no	predictive	ex	ante	power	about	future	 cases	 of	 accommodation.	 “The	 Owl	 of	 Minerva“,	 as	 Hegel	 writes	 in	 his	
Rechtsphilosophie,	“takes	flight	only	as	the	dusk	begins	to	fall.”	Still,	to	adequately	respond	to	the	problématique	and	explain	the	setup	of	today’s	money	supply,	we	can	empiricize	ex	post	and	reconstruct	how	what	today	occupies	the	public	credit	money	 realm	 has	 attained	 this	 position	 through	 the	 process	 of	 private	 credit	money	accommodation	in	the	past.	This	is	what	the	empirical	part	of	this	study	set	 out	 to	 do.	 In	 this,	 the	 two-phase	 model	 developed	 in	 this	 chapter	 will	 be	applied	on	the	relevant	historical	cases,	and	empirical	instances	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	will	be	carved	out	via	process	tracing.		 In	order	to	determine	the	relevant	empirical	cases	of	private	credit	money	accommodation,	we	may	start	with	an	empirical	version	of	the	Money	Matrix	as	we	 can	 find	 it	 today.	 Following	 Pozsar	 (2014)	 and	 Murau	 (2017),	 the	contemporary	 Money	 Matrix	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 3.10.	Accordingly,	 there	 are	 three	 different	 types	 of	 public	 credit	 money	 that	 have	been	 private	 credit	money	 in	 the	 past:	 bank	 notes,	 which	 today	 are	 issued	 as	liabilities	of	the	central	bank	and	are	pure	public	money;	bank	deposits,	which—		
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	Central	Bank	liabilities	
• Currency	(Notes,	Coins)	
• Central	bank	deposits	
 
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	
	
	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	Commercial	bank	liabilities	
• Insured	bank	deposits		Securities	dealers’	liabilities	
• RPs	(o/n)	of	government	desk	
• RPs	(o/n)	of	credit	desk		MMF	liabilities	
• Shares	of	Government	MMFs	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	Commercial	bank	liabilites	
• Uninsured	bank	deposits	
	
Figure	3.11—The	contemporary	empirical	Money	Matrix	 	
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to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 are	 covered	 by	 deposit	 insurance—are	 private-public	
money	and	are	issued	by	commercial	banks;	as	well	as	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos,	which	are	 referred	 to	as	 ‘shadow	money’	 in	 the	 literature	 (Pozsar	2014,	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	2016),	are	issued	by	shadow	banks	and	are	also	private-
public	money	today	(Murau	2017).	
	The	subsequent	case	studies	will	analyze	the	accommodation	of	the	three	quintessential	 forms	 of	 credit	 money	 that	 constitute	 the	 public	 money	 supply	today.	Chapter	4	addresses	bank	notes	which	developed	as	private	credit	money	throughout	 18th	 century	 in	 England.	Main	 suppliers	were	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	(founded	 in	 1694)	 and	 the	 English	 country	 banks,	 which	 emerged	 from	 1750	onwards.	The	accommodation	occurred	in	1797	when	the	government	initiated	the	 ‘Restriction	Period’,	 decoupled	Bank	of	England	notes	 from	 their	 gold	base	and	 gave	 them	 public	 backstops.	 Chapter	 5	 studies	 bank	 deposits	 which	 have	existed	even	longer	than	bank	notes	but	only	became	systemically	relevant	as	a	private	 credit	money	 form	 after	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 notes	 in	 the	 19th	century.	 The	 accommodation	 occurred	 in	 the	U.S.	 during	 the	 Great	Depression	through	 an	 implicit	 100%	government	 guarantee	 for	 bank	deposits	 by	passing	the	Emergency	Banking	Act	in	March	1933.	Chapter	6	focuses	on	shadow	money	which	arose	from	the	1970s	onwards	with	the	emergence	of	the	shadow	banking	system	to	circumvent	existing	regulations	for	deposit	banking.	The	key	forms	of	shadow	 money	 were	 ABCPs,	 MMF	 shares	 and	 overnight	 repos.	 The	accommodation	 of	 shadow	 money	 took	 place	 in	 2008	 when	 public	 backstops	were	created	through	emergency	facilities	of	the	Fed	as	backstops	for	overnight	repos	and	guarantees	of	the	Treasury	to	protect	par	clearance	of	MMF	shares.		At	the	same	time,	this	sketch	of	the	empirical	case	studies	to	be	discussed	in	 the	 next	 chapters	 also	 points	 to	 some	 of	 the	 limitations	 that	 the	 theory	 of	private	credit	money	accommodation	has	as	it	is	presented	in	this	chapter.	There	are	at	least	two	shortcomings	(cf.	Chapter	7	for	more	details):	On	the	one	hand,	as	 the	 contemporary	 empirical	Money	Matrix	 shows,	 the	 accommodated	 credit	money	does	not	necessarily	have	to	keep	its	status	as	private-public	money.	As	in	the	case	of	bank	notes,	post-crisis	 regulation	can	 lead	 to	 further	change	within	the	 Money	 Matrix	 and	 turn	 it	 e.g.	 into	 pure	 public	 money.	 Alternatively,	 the	accommodation	could	also	just	remain	temporary	and	be	reverted	after	a	while.	The	 subsequent	 empirical	 chapters	 will	 briefly	 refer	 to	 the	 aftermath	 of	 each	instance	of	accommodation.	Systematically	analyzing	 this	post-crisis	 regulatory	process,	however,	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	On	the	other	hand,	the	three	quintessential	 cases	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 accommodation	 processes	 which	turned	out	 essential	 for	 the	 setup	of	 today’s	money	 supply	 always	occurred	 in	the	 respective	 apex	 of	 the	 IMS.	With	 its	 notion	 of	 international	 hierarchy,	 the	Money	View	can	explain	why	this	is	the	case.	However,	while	this	study	assumes	that	such	an	accommodation	in	the	apex	spills	over	to	the	periphery,	it	does	not	analyse	 the	 specific	mechanisms	 that	 translate	 such	 institutional	 change.	 Since	textbook	knowledge	and	ad	hoc	empirical	evidence	suggest	that	 in	the	Western	advanced	capitalist	economies	the	same	forms	of	credit	money	occupy	the	public	monetary	 realm,	 there	 must	 be	 spill	 over	 processes	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Wagner	 1862	 for	bank	 notes	 and	 Laeven	 2004	 for	 bank	 deposits).	 However,	 at	 this	 point,	 the	accommodation	model	is	neither	able	to	adequately	describe	nor	explain	them.	
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Chapter	4	
Case	I:	Bank	Note	Accommodation	in	England			
“This	 suspension	 of	 cash	 payments	 was	 procured	 by	 the	
Government	by	Act	of	Parliament	 in	order	 to	meet	a	critical	
situation	 in	 which	 the	 Bank	 was	 faced	 by	 a	 ‘run’	 at	 a	 time	
when	it	already	had	an	extremely	weak	reserve	position.	The	
Government’s	 action	 amounted	 to	 a	 legalisation	 of	 the	
bankruptcy	of	the	Bank,	and	it	created	a	precedent	which	led	
the	public	in	future	always	to	expect	the	Government	to	come	
to	the	aid	of	the	Bank	in	difficult	circumstances”	(Smith	1936:	
14-15).			
4.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	 chapter	 analyzes	 and	 explains	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 notes	 which	occurred	 in	 England	 in	 1797.	 Bank	 notes	 as	 a	 private	 credit	 money	 form	developed	from	the	17th	throughout	the	18th	century,	with	the	Bank	of	England	and	 country	 banks	 as	 main	 issuers.	 The	 accommodation	 took	 place	 when	 the	government—as	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 depletion	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 bullion	reserve	in	a	financial	crisis—initiated	the	‘Restriction	Period’	by	suspending	the	guaranteed	conversion	of	Bank	of	England	notes	 into	gold.	Via	an	Order	of	 the	Privy	 Council	 and	 later	 backed	 by	 Parliament,	 the	 Restriction	 turned	 Bank	 of	England	notes	 into	private-public	money:	Public	backstops	were	established	via	the	legal	proclamation	that	Bank	of	England	notes	were	a	promise	to	pay	nothing	else	 but	 themselves	 and	 the	 government’s	 guarantee	 to	 accept	 an	 unlimited	amount	of	Bank	of	England	notes	for	tax	payments	(cf.	Figure	4.1).	
	
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	
	
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	
	
																											Bank	of	England	
																											Notes		
	
	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	
	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	
	
																											Bank	of	England	
																											Notes		
																											Country	Bank	
																											Notes		
Figure	4.1—Bank	note	accommodation	via	the	1797	Order	of	the	Privy	Council	 	
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This	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:		Section	 4.2	 addresses	 the	 rise	 of	 bank	 notes	 as	 a	 private	 credit	 money	form	in	England	throughout	the	17th	and	the	18th	century	(phase	I).	To	this	end,	the	section	develops	a	Money	View	perspective	on	the	creation	of	bank	notes	as	a	swap	of	 IOUs.	The	 analysis	draws	on	 the	work	of	Henry	Thornton	and	Francis	Baring	as	early	credit	money	theorists.	It	stands	in	contrast	to	the	conventional	narrative	 about	 the	 evolution	 of	 bank	 notes	 issuance	 via	 fractional	 reserve	banking	due	to	fraudulent	financial	practices	of	goldsmiths	(4.2.1).	Subsequently,	to	 sketch	 the	 setup	 of	 the	 public-private	money	 hybridity	 in	 late	 18th	 century	England,	the	section	discusses	the	institutional	details	of	bank	note	issuance	by	the	 Bank	 of	 England	 after	 its	 foundation	 in	 1694	 as	well	 as	 by	 country	 banks	from	the	1750s	onwards.	This	allows	understanding	how	bank	notes	developed	par	 clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	 forms	 (4.2.2).	Finally,	 the	 section	discusses	 how	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 as	 well	 as	 country	 bank	 notes	 attained	systemic	relevance	in	the	middle	of	the	18th	century	(4.2.3).		Section	 4.3	 studies	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 notes	 during	 the	 1797	financial	 crisis	 (phase	 II).	 In	 this,	 it	 interprets	 the	1793	and	 the	1797	crises	as	complementary	events.	The	section	first	depicts	how	the	English	system	of	bank	note	 issuance	endogenously	got	 into	 financial	distress—starting	 in	 the	 country	banking	system	and	spilling	over	to	the	Bank	of	England	(4.3.1).	Subsequently,	it	discusses	the	public	measures	taken	in	reaction	to	the	crisis,	notably	the	Order	of	the	 Privy	 Council	 and	 the	 Bank	 Restriction	 Act	 (4.3.2).	 Finally,	 the	 section	develops	 the	 argument	 for	 why	 the	 1797	 Bank	 Restriction	 constitutes	 an	accommodation	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 by	 establishing	 public	 liquidity	 and	solvency	 backstops,	 which	 amounts	 to	 an	 unintentional	 transformation	 of	 the	monetary	system	(4.3.3).		The	 concluding	 section	 4.4	 presents	 a	 brief	 outlook	 on	 the	 follow-up	processes	of	 the	accommodation—notably	 the	end	of	Bank	Restriction	and	 the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act—and	points	out	how	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	has	solidified.	
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4.2	Phase	I:	The	rise	of	bank	notes	as	private	credit	money	
	This	 section	 applies	 phase	 I	 of	 the	 accommodation	 model	 on	 bank	 notes	 and	studies	their	rise	as	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	in	17th	and	18th	century	 England.	 Drawing	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Henry	 Thornton,	 the	section	 argues	 against	 a	 widespread	 narrative	 according	 to	 which	 bank	 notes	emerged	 as	 gold	 certificates	 based	 on	 the	 essentially	 fraudulent	 practice	 of	London	goldsmiths.	Instead,	it	interprets	their	origin	as	a	swap	of	IOUs,	created	primarily	by	the	profit-driven	financial	business	of	discounting	bills	of	exchange	(4.2.1).	 The	 section	 then	 sketches	 how	 bank	 notes	 adopted	 a	 role	 as	 private	credit	 money	 by	 establishing	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 forms	 of	money	and	how	this	affected	the	wider	monetary	system	in	the	late	18th	century	(4.2.2).	Finally,	the	section	discusses	to	which	extent	Bank	of	England	notes	and	country	bank	notes	were	systemically	relevant	in	the	late	18th	century	(4.2.3).			
4.2.1	Financial	innovation	and	bank	note	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	
	The	financial	innovation	that	took	place	towards	the	emergence	of	bank	notes	in	England	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 17th	 century.	 According	 to	 a	 widespread	narrative,	 bank	 notes	 developed	 out	 of	 the	 essentially	 fraudulent	 financial	activities	 of	 goldsmiths	 in	 London.	 For	 example,	 Gilbart	 (1854:	 289)	 dates	 the	origin	 of	 bank	 notes	 back	 to	 the	 year	 1645	 when	 “a	 new	 era	 occurred	 in	 the	history	 of	 banking”	 as	 the	 “goldsmiths,	 who	 were	 previously	 only	 money-changers,	 now	 became	 also	money-lenders”.	 Sgambati	 (2016)	 summarizes	 the	way	in	which	the	story	is	commonly	told	as	follows:		“[D]ishonest	goldsmith	bankers	[…]	began	to	offer	safe-keeping	services	to	people	 who	 feared	 for	 the	 safety	 of	 their	 valuables.	 To	 certify	 these	bailment	contracts,	goldsmiths	issued	certificates	against	all	precious	metal	and	 coins	 kept	 in	 their	 vault.	 Because	 of	 goldsmiths'	 reputation,	 these	certificates	were	 deemed	 to	 be	 'as	 good	 as	 gold'	 and,	 in	 time,	 depositors	began	 to	 pay	 for	 their	 purchases	 by	 handing	 their	 certificates	 over.	 The	certificates	 thus	 started	 to	 circulate	 widely.	 Smelling	 an	 opportunity,	goldsmiths	began	to	accept	deposits	for	free	and	even	pay	interest	on	time	deposits	 to	 add	more	 capital	 to	 their	 portfolio.	 But	 then	 […]	 they	did	 not	just	 simply	 lend	 at	 interest	 the	 coins	 kept	 in	 custody	 to	make	 a	 profit	 in	conformity	with	the	principles	of	 fractional	reserve	banking.	 Instead,	 they	began	to	 issue	anonymous	gold	certificates	redeemable	on	demand	to	 the	bearer	in	excess	of	their	deposits,	that	is,	certificates	that	did	not	circulate	on	behalf	of	cash,	as	a	 'veil'	of	creditor-debtor	relations,	but	in	addition	to	it,	as	a	'net	worth'”	(Sgambati	2016:	278,	italics	in	original).			As	 Sgambati	 notes	 further,	 this	 view	 of	 the	 “greedy	 and	 dishonest	 goldsmith	bankers	 has	 been	 reproduced	 countless	 times	 in	 mainstream	 as	 well	 as	alternative	 texts”	 (ibid).	 It	 explains	 the	 origin	 of	 bank	 notes	 as	 private	 credit	money	 out	 of	 an	 ultimately	 illicit	 trick:	 By	 creating	 bank	 notes,	 goldsmiths	pretended	to	lend	something	out	which	they	did	not	actually	possess.	Bank	notes	were	 entitlements	 to	 owning	 an	 amount	 of	 ‘gold’	 or	 ‘real	money’	 that	was	 not	actually	there.	 	
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Taking	into	account	a	credit	theory	of	money,	however,	this	story	misses	the	point.	A	more	accurate	account	of	what	happened	 in	 the	17th	century	 is,	as	Sgambati	puts	it,	 that	“other	than	dissimulating	fractional	reserve	banking	with	fake	 certificates	 of	 deposit,	 goldsmiths	 learned	 how	 to	 discount	 other	 people's	debts	 with	 their	 own	 IOUs	 in	 a	 way	 as	 to	 expand	 their	 'credit'	 beyond	 their	original	 portfolio	 in	 a	 sustainable	 fashion”	 (ibid).	 Thus,	 from	 a	 Money	 View	perspective,	the	tale	about	the	goldsmiths	and	their	contribution	to	the	invention	of	bank	notes	as	credit	money	fails	to	acknowledge	that	the	actual	balance	sheet	operation	for	bank	note	creation	is	a	swap	of	IOUs	(cf.	Figure	4.2):		 Bank	 	 Counterparty	+	Long-term	IOU	 +	Bank	note				(short-term	IOU)	 	 +	Bank	note				(short-term	IOU)	 +	Long-term	IOU		 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	4.2—Bank	note	issuance	as	a	swap	of	IOUs		The	bank	as	issuer	of	bank	notes	and	its	counterparty	exchange	debt	certificates	of	different	maturities.	In	this	process	of	swapping	IOUs,	banks	act	as	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	in	a	Minskian	sense:	They	accept	the	maturity	mismatch	between	the	notes	they	issue	as	short-term	IOUs	and	the	longer-term	IOUs	they	accept	in	return.	While	gold	is	required	as	the	unit	of	account	to	denominate	the	debt,	it	is	not	necessary	that	gold	is	actually	deposited.	Given	that	no	actual	endowment	of	gold	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 bank	 notes,	 the	 normative	 argument	according	to	which	the	goldsmiths	tricked	their	customers	by	pretending	to	hand	out	an	entitlement	to	something	that	does	not	exist,	is	misleading.		 In	this	balance	sheet	example,	the	‘long-term	IOUs’	in	exchange	for	which	the	bank	hands	out	 its	notes	can	be	either	private	or	public	debt.	This	explains	why	bank	notes	may	both	be	pure	public	money	or	public-private	money.	As	Table	4.1	 demonstrates,	 the	 bank	 will	 attain	 them	 either	 by	 buying	 bonds	 (e.g.	 by	discounting	 bills	 of	 exchange	 or	 buying	 government	 bonds)	 or	 by	 extending	loans	 to	 counterparties	 from	 the	 private	 (e.g.	 merchants,	 companies	 or	individuals)	or	public	sphere	(government)	(cf.	Ricardo	1810:	4,	Thornton	1802).	
	 	 Private	 Public	
Buying	Bonds	 Private	securities,	esp.	bills	of	exchange	 Government	bonds	
Extending	Loans	 Loans	to	merchants,	companies,	individuals	 Loans	to	the	Government		
Table	4.1—Long-term	IOUs	against	which	banks	issue	notes		By	 far	 the	 most	 important	 debt	 certificate	 that	 English	 banks	 took	 on	 their	balance	 sheet	 in	 the	 late	18th	 century	 in	 exchange	 for	bank	notes	were	bills	 of	exchange.	Via	their	business	of	discounting	bills	of	exchange,	private	banks	were	most	 active	 in	 creating	 bank	 notes	 as	 private	 credit	 money	 (cf.	 Itoh	 and	Lapavitsas	1998:	Ch.	2).		Such	a	view	on	bank	notes	as	genuine	private	credit	money	can	be	backed	with	 the	 arguments	 that	 Henry	 Thornton	 makes	 in	 his	 1802	 Enquiry	 into	 the	
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Nature	 and	 Effects	 of	 the	 Paper	 Credit	 of	 Great	 Britain.	 In	 this	 book,	 Thornton	(1802)	systematically	studies	the	English	financial	system	based	on	the	issuance	of	 bank	 notes	 (“paper	 credit”)	 and	 analytically	 derives	 their	 origin	 out	 of	“commercial	credit”,	 i.e.	the	“confidence	which	subsists	among	commercial	men	in	respect	to	their	mercantile	affairs”	and	which	“disposes	them	to	lend	money	to	each	 other,	 to	 bring	 themselves	 under	 various	 pecuniary	 engagements	 by	 the	acceptance	and	 indorsement	 [sic!]	of	bills,	and	also	 to	sell	and	deliver	goods	 in	consideration	 of	 an	 equivalent	 promised	 to	 be	 given	 at	 a	 subsequent	 period”	(ibid:	75)—hence,	the	mercantile	system	based	on	the	willingness	to	use	bills	of	exchange.	Thornton	then	emphasizes	with	regard	to	the	creation	of	bank	notes:	“This	 commercial	 credit	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 paper	 credit”	 (ibid:	 76,	 italics	 in	original).	In	this,	he	points	to	the	Money	View’s	notion	of	the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	expanding,	yet	instable	debt	claims.		Thornton’s	approach	underpins	that	bank	note	creation	neither	requires	gold	as	a	higher-ranking	form	of	money	nor	occurs	with	the	intention	to	ever	pay	or	receive	gold	for	notes.	Gold	merely	serves	as	a	unit	of	account:		“It	is	perfectly	well	understood	among	all	commercial	men,	that	gold	coin	is	not	an	article	 in	which	all	payments	(though	 it	 is	so	promised)	are	at	any	time	intended	really	to	be	made;	that	no	fund	ever	was	or	can	be	provided	by	the	bank	which	shall	be	sufficient	for	such	a	purpose;	and	that	gold	coin	is	 to	 be	 viewed	 chiefly	 as	 a	 standard	 by	which	 all	 bills	 and	 paper	money	should	have	their	value	regulated	as	exactly	as	possible;	and	the	main,	and,	indeed,	the	only,	point	is	to	take	all	reasonable	care	that	money	shall	in	fact	serve	as	that	standard”	(Thornton	1802:	111).		Instead,	he	stresses	that	bank	notes	are	in	effect	created	by	swapping	IOUs:		 “Paper	 constitutes,	 it	 is	 true,	 an	 article	 on	 the	 credit	 side	 of	 the	 books	 of	some	men;	but	it	forms	an	exactly	equal	item	on	the	debit	side	of	the	books	of	 others.	 It	 constitutes,	 therefore,	 on	 the	 whole,	 neither	 a	 debit	 nor	 a	credit.	The	banker	who	issues	twenty	thousand	pounds	in	notes,	and	lends	in	consequence	twenty	thousand	pounds	to	the	merchants	on	the	security	of	 bills	 accepted	 by	 them,	 states	 himself	 in	 his	 books	 to	 be	 debtor	 to	 the	various	holders	of	his	notes	to	the	extent	of	the	sum	in	question;	and	states	himself	 to	be	the	creditor	of	 the	accepters	of	 the	bills	 in	his	possession	to	the	same	amount”	(Thornton	1802:	79-80).	
	 When	and	how	did	 the	 financial	 innovation	occur	 that	 led	 to	 the	 rise	of	bank	notes	as	a	novel	short-term	IOU?	Enquiring	 into	the	 ‘true	origins’	of	bank	notes	beyond	the	English	context	is	an	equally	“moot	question”	as	enquiring	into	the	origins	of	bills	of	exchange	as	private	credit	money	(cf.	Cameron	1967:	19).	It	can	 hardly	 ever	 be	 answered	 in	 a	 historical	 accurate	 way	 with	 certainty.	 The	actual	 events—not	 only	 in	 England	 but	 also	 other	 places—are	 rather	 an	anthropological	question	and	not	of	the	greatest	relevance	to	this	study	(see	e.g.	Graeber	 2011).	 Still,	 there	 is	 sufficient	 historical	 evidence	 to	 sketch	 how	 bank	note	 issuance	 developed	 by	 the	 three	 most	 notable	 issuing	 institutions	 in	England:	the	London	banks;	the	Bank	of	England;	as	well	as	the	English	country	banks.	 	
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First,	 London	 banks’	 notes	 originated	 in	 the	mid-17th	 century	 from	 the	London	 goldsmith’s	 profit-driven	 activity	 of	 discounting	 bills	 of	 exchange	(Sgambati	2016:	279).	The	goldsmith’s	 system	was	 inherently	 crisis	prone	and	often	 portrayed	 as	 dubious.	 An	 imminent	 example	 for	 the	 difficulties	 of	 the	goldsmith’s	early	business	model	of	bank	note	 issuance	 is	 the	1672	Stop	of	 the	Exchequer,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 many	 goldsmiths	 (Knafo	 2013:	 51-52).	Two	 decades	 later,	 it	 was	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 foundation	 that	 marked	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 end	 of	 the	 London	 banks’	 bank	 note	 issuance	 as	 they	 were	superseded	by	Bank	of	England	notes.	Hence,	London	banks	withdrew	from	the	note	issuing	business	in	the	early	18th	century	(Joslin	1954:	170).		Second,	Bank	of	England	notes	were	issued	in	massive	volumes	early	after	the	Bank’s	 establishment	 in	1694.	 Sgambati	 (2016:	285)	 refers	 to	 the	 financial	innovation	going	along	with	this	event	as	a	“monetary	revolution	[…]	connected	to	the	securitisation	of	the	English	national	debt,	the	progressive	construction	of	a	 financial	 market	 for	 public	 securities	 and	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 Bank	 of	England	 IOUs	 as	 the	 new	 currency”.	 Indeed,	 what	 made	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	special	 was	 the	 unique	 combination	 of	 a	 private	 institution	 as	 joint-stock	company	 that	 received	 a	 number	 of	 legal	 privileges	 and	 exchanges	 committed	itself	to	act	as	the	main	creditor	for	government	debt	and	for	administering	the	public	finances.	As	the	Bank	also	engaged	in	the	business	of	discounting	bills	of	exchange,	it	issued	its	bank	notes	both	against	public	and	private	debt	(Thornton	1802,	 Liepmann	 1933).	 In	 the	 early	 18th	 century,	 the	 Bank	 even	 received	 a	de	
facto	 note	 issuing	 monopoly	 for	 the	 London	 area:	 “Since	 1708,	 the	 issuing	 of	notes	or	receipts	due	to	payment	on	demand	was	forbidden	for	companies	that	had	more	than	six	partners,	with	the	exception	of	the	Bank	of	England”	(Arnon	2011:	30).			Third,	 country	 bank	 notes	 started	 to	 develop	 at	 around	 1750	 and	were	“the	 most	 important	 feature	 of	 the	 English	 banking	 system”,	 as	 to	 Cameron	(1965:	15).	They	were	a	financial	innovation	specific	to	the	industrial	revolution,	as	 they	 allowed	 supplying	 means	 of	 payment	 and	 funding	 investment	 in	 the	industrializing	peripheral	areas	of	England	that	had	had	barely	been	integrated	in	 the	London	money	market.	Next	 to	money	scriveners	and	remitters	of	 funds	between	 London	 and	 the	 countryside,	 country	 banks	 as	 bank	 note	 issuers	developed	due	to	the	profit	opportunities	spotted	by	“industrialists,	whose	main	concern	was	to	provide	a	local	means	of	payment”	(Pressnell	1956:	13).	Country	banks	 discounted	 bills	 of	 exchange	 and	 sent	many	 of	 them	 to	 London,	 with	 a	London	 bank	 acting	 as	 its	 correspondent	 (Hawtrey	 1932:	 118).	 As	 Thornton	(1802:	 169)	 argues,	 country	 banks	 developed	 in	 villages	 typically	 out	 of	 other	businesses	 such	as	 traders,	manufacturers	 and	 shopkeepers	when	 they	 started	discounting	bills	of	exchange	for	their	customers.	At	some	point,	“[f]or	the	sake	of	drawing	custom	to	his	house,	the	shopkeeper,	having	as	yet	possibly	little	or	no	 view	 to	 the	 issuing	 of	 bank	 notes,	 printed	 "The	 Bank"	 over	 his	 door,	 .and	engraved	these	words	on	the	checks	on	which	he	drew	his	bills”	(ibid).		The	notion	that	bank	note	creation	relies	on	a	private	swap	of	IOUs	refers	to	all	three	banking	entities	in	18th	century	England.	Not	only	London	banks	and	
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country	banks	were	private	institutions	but	also	the	Bank	of	England.	Thornton	points	out	the	independent	status	of	the	Bank	of	England	as	a	private	institution:		“The	Bank	of	England	is	quite	independent	of	the	executive	government.	It	has	an	 interest,	 undoubtedly	 (of	 the	 same	kind	with	 that	of	many	private	individuals),	 in	 the	 maintenance	 of	 our	 financial	 as	 well	 as	 commercial	credit.	[…]	The	government	of	Great	Britain	is	under	little	or	no	temptation	either	to	dictate	to	the	Bank	of	England,	or	to	lean	upon	it	in	any	way	which	is	inconvenient	or	dangerous	to	the	bank	itself.	[…I]t	is	not	easy	to	believe,	that	a	government	which	can	raise	at	once	twenty	or	thirty	millions,	will	be	likely,	for	the	sake	of	only	four	or	five	millions	(for	the	loan	of	which	it	must	pay	nearly	the	same	interest	as	for	a	loan	from	the	public),	to	derange	the	system,	distress	the	credit,	or	endanger	the	safety	of	the	Bank	of	England”	(Thornton	1802:	105-107).		That	Bank	of	England	notes	are	private,	not	public	credit	money	 is	particularly	emphasized	by	Francis	Baring	 in	his	1797	Observations	on	the	Establishment	of	
the	Bank	of	England	and	on	the	Paper	Circulation	of	the	Country:		“Very	few	foreigners	have	understood	the	principles	on	which	the	Bank	is	established;	they	have	always	considered	their	Notes	as	Government	paper	[…].	They	could	not	distinguish	between	paper	issued	for	the	sole	purpose	of	 circulation,	 limited	 in	 its	 amount,	 and	 under	 the	 authority	 and	responsibility	of	a	corporate	body,	absolutely	independent—and	that	paper	which	 Government	 could	 issue	 ad	 libitum,	 bearing	 an	 interest,	 which	rendered	it	an	object	for	persons	to	purchase	as	a	productive	investment	of	their	capitals—they	were	very	much	astonished	to	find	the	total	amount	of	Notes	 in	 circulation	 to	 be	 so	 small,	 compared	 with	 the	 commerce	 and	wealth	of	the	country;	and	equally	so,	that	after	all,	Bank	Notes	continued	to	 circulate	 at	 par.	 Those	 opinions,	 however,	 did	 not	 prevail	 at	 home,	 for	the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 sources	 from	 whence	 those	 Notes	 issued,	 namely,	deposits	 of	 bullion,	 loans	 to	 Government,	 and	 commercial	 discounts”	(Baring	1797:	10-12).		It	 is	 thus	 a	 crucial	difference	between	 the	English	bank	note	 system	and	other	paper	money	systems—e.g.	that	of	 John	Law,	 implemented	and	failed	in	France	in	 the	early	18th	 century—that	all	bank	notes	used	 to	be	private	 credit	money.	Credit	money	 creation	via	bank	notes	 in	 the	pre-1793	era	 solely	 occurred	 in	 a	private	realm.	Public	institutions	did	not	play	a	role	in	backstopping	activities	of	bank	note	issuance	(cf.	Figure	4.3).	
	
	
	
	
Figure	4.3—Bank	note	creation	as	a	private	business	without	public	backstops	 	
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4.2.2	Establishing	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	forms	of	money	
	To	qualify	as	private	credit	money	from	a	Money	View	perspective,	bank	notes	as	privately	 created	 IOUs	 have	 to	 trade	 at	 par	 or	 quasi-par	 with	 higher-ranking	money,	which	at	the	time	was	commodity	money,	first	and	foremost	gold.	Hence,	it	needs	to	be	asked	if,	how	and	when	such	par	exchange	was	established	in	the	case	of	bank	notes.	This	question	refers	to	the	two	eminent	forms	of	bank	notes	in	the	18th	century—Bank	of	England	notes	and	country	bank	notes.			 Bank	of	England	notes,	 on	 the	one	hand,	 are	 a	 coherent	 form	of	private	credit	 money	 as	 they	 are	 only	 issued	 by	 a	 single	 institution.	 The	 specific	challenge	in	keeping	up	par	was	thus	associated	with	the	mechanics	on	only	one	balance	 sheet.	 In	 particular,	 it	 relied	 on	 the	 Bank’s	 ability	 to	 keep	 up	 the	promised	convertibility	into	gold.	As	to	Baring	(1797:	12-13),	it	was		 “from	a	confidence	in	the	conduct	of	the	Directors,	as	a	corporate	body,	that	they	would	maintain	 and	preserve	 the	 independence	of	 the	Bank	 in	 their	transactions	with	Government,	notwithstanding	the	partial	influence	which	now	 and	 then	 prevailed,—that	 their	 Notes	 continued	 to	 circulate	 at	 par,	with	 the	 same	 facility	 and	 convenience	 to	 the	 public	 as	 before,	 and	 that	confidence	was	 restored	 to	 a	degree	much	beyond	what	 could	have	been	expected”.			Vilar	(1969:	281)	points	out	that			 “[i]n	 1745	 a	 dynastic	 crisis	 of	 the	 English	 Crown—the	 threat	 of	 a	 Stuart	restoration—started	 a	 panic	 and	 a	 run	 on	 the	 Bank.	 […]	What	 saved	 the	Bank,	however,	was	a	proclamation	by	the	merchants	of	London,	that	they	would	 accept	 and	 encourage	 payment	 in	 bank	 notes.	 In	 1773,	 another	obstacle	to	the	acceptance	of	the	note	as	currency	was	overcome	when	the	death	 penalty	 was	 introduced	 for	 forging	 notes	 on	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	thereby	putting	them	on	a	par	with	coin”.	
	The	 Bank	 thus	 used	 market	 processes,	 its	 own	 balance	 sheet	 as	 well	 as	 its	particular	 reputation	 to	 keep	 up	 par.	 It	 may	 be	 assumed	 that	 it	 succeeded	 in	doing	 so	 early	 on	 after	 its	 foundation.	 Later,	 with	 the	 threat	 of	 capital	punishment,	legal	constructs	were	applied	to	ensure	par	clearance.		 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 how	 par	 was	 established	 for	 country	 bank	 notes	 is	more	 difficult	 to	 reconstruct.	 As	 they	 were	 created	 by	 many	 different	 issuing	institutions,	they	are	not	a	coherent	IOU	but	rather	a	group	of	different	IOUs.	The	specific	difficulty	with	country	bank	notes,	as	Liepmann	(1933)	emphasizes,	was	that	holders	did	not	have	a	lot	of	information	about	the	liquidity	and	solvency	of	the	issuers.	Hence,	the	acceptability	of	country	bank	notes	used	to	be	rather	low,	and	often	a	premium	was	charged	on	the	face	value	of	the	notes.	Therefore,	par	clearance	of	 country	bank	notes	vis-à-vis	Bank	of	England	notes	as	 the	higher-ranking	credit	money	form	was	far	from	certain;	rather,	they	traded	occasionally	at	quasi-par.	Yet,	as	Pressnell	(1956)	points	out,	some	country	bankers	accepted	each	other’s	notes	at	face	value	and	thus	likely	were	willing	to	convert	them	into	Bank	of	England	notes	as	par.	While	par	was,	 if	at	all,	primarily	established	via	
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market	 processes	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 country	 banking,	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	London	 Clearing	 House—as	 a	 specific	 private	 institution	 to	 improve	 the	efficiency	of	the	English	banking	system—in	1773	is	likely	to	have	contributed	to	reducing	the	price	volatility	of	country	bank	notes	(Kindleberger	1984:	78).		Still,	 once	 bank	 notes	 have	 established	 par	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	money,	we	can	 think	of	 them	as	a	private	credit	money	 form	and	discuss	 their	status	within	the	wider	monetary	system	using	the	Money	Matrix	as	a	heuristic.	Figure	 4.4—compiled	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 various	 sources—presents	 the	 empirical	setup	of	the	Money	Matrix	in	England	prior	to	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes.	Accordingly,	the	English	monetary	system	in	the	late	18th	century	was	made	up	of	 various	 forms	 of	 commodity	money,	 public	 credit	money	 and	 private	 credit	money	 that	 all	 co-existed	 next	 to	 each	 other.	 The	 money	 forms	 were	 used	 in	different	de-centralized	payment	communities;	the	monetary	system	relied	on	a	distinct	operational	logic	on	the	countryside	than	in	London.		
Commodity	Money		 	 Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
Outside	Money		Metallic	currency	
• Guineas	
• Other	gold	currency	
• Silver	currency	
	 	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money		Government	liabilities	
• Exchequer	orders	
• Exchequer	bills	
• Malt	and	lottery	tickets	
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	Bank	of	England	liabilities	
• Bank	of	England	Notes	
• Deposits	(BoE)		London	Bank	liabilities	
• London	Bank	Deposits	
	 	 	
(2)	Private-public	Money		
	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	Bank	of	England	liabilities	
• Bank	of	England	Notes	
• Bank	of	England	Deposits		London	Bank	liabilities	
• London	Bank	Deposits		Country	Bank	liabilities	
• London	Bank	Notes	
• London	Bank	Deposits		Merchant	liabilities	
• Bills	of	Exchange		
Figure	4.4—The	Money	Matrix	prior	to	the	1793	Crisis	(empirically)		 In	 the	commodity	money	realm	of	 the	 late	18th	 century,	 the	core	unit	of	account	in	the	English	monetary	system	was	gold.	However,	from	at	least	the	6th	century	to	the	18th	century,	the	main	metal	used	as	a	currency	standard	had	been	silver.	Only	in	the	14th	century,	gold	coins	found	their	way	into	circulation.	From	then	on,	the	country	was	operating	a	bimetallic	system	(Feaveryear	1963:	23).	It	was	the	1717	decision	taken	by	then-Master	of	the	Mint	Isaac	Newton	to	fix	the	Mint	price	of	gold	at	the	(overvalued)	price	of	£3	17s.	10½d.	per	ounce	which	lay	
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the	 foundation	of	 the	gold	 standard	and	put	 in	place	a	 century-long	process	of	de-monetizing	silver	(Feaveryear	1963:	154).	A	law	of	1774	formally	guaranteed	a	gold	currency	and	 legally	downgraded	silver	 to	a	secondary	role	 (Vilar	1969:	300).	 The	dominant	 role	 of	 gold	had	 further	 been	 supported	by	 a	 law	of	 1754	which	 discontinued	 the	 issuance	 of	 copper	 coins	 (Cameron	 1967:	 18-19).	 The	main	 gold	 coin	 in	 circulation	 pre-1793,	 next	 to	 many	 other	 forms,	 was	 the	‘guinea’.	 Its	 origin	 can	 be	 traced	back	 to	 1663	when	 it	was	 first	 produced	 and	made	legal	currency.	Its	initial	nominal	value	was	one	pound	sterling	(cf.	Stride	1955).	Silver	coins	continued	to	be	issued	after	1717	but	the	good	quality	coins	were	often	immediately	melted	down	to	export	them.	The	condition	of	the	actual	silver	 coins	 in	 circulation	 was	 therefore	 very	 bad.	 They	 were	 clipped	 and	regarded	merely	as	a	token	(Cameron	1967:	18-19,	Fetter	1965:	11).		 The	 public	 credit	money	 realm	was	made	 up	 of	 liabilities	 issued	 by	 the	government.	Those	public	IOUs	were	tradable	on	a	secondary	market	and	used	for	the	purchase	of	commodities	or	the	payment	of	taxes.	There	were	three	main	types	of	 instruments	 that	may	count	as	public	credit	money:	Firstly,	exchequer	orders	 were	 tax	 receipts	 issued	 from	 the	 17th	 century	 onwards.	 Upon	 a	parliamentary	 decision	 in	 1667,	 they	 replaced	 the	 ‘tallie	 sticks’,	 which	 had	originally	 performed	 that	 function.	 Tallies	 are	 sealed	 logs	 of	 wood,	 which—according	 to	 Arnon	 (1991:	 11)—had	 adopted	 the	 role	 of	 private	 money	substitutes	 at	 some	 point.	 tallies	 were	 replaced	 by	 paper	 receipts	 called	Exchequer	orders.	Secondly,	exchequer	bills	(or	exchequer	bonds)	were	interest	bearing	 bonds	 issued	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 government.	 As	 a	method	 for	raising	short-term	loans,	they	were	a	serious	alternative	for	private	bank	notes	at	the	time	(Feaveryear	1963:	160).	Thirdly,	malt	tickets	and	lottery	tickets	were	forms	of	publicly	issued	IOUs	circulating	as	money	substitutes	(ibid:	159).			The	private	credit	money	realm,	on	 the	one	hand,	was	made	up	of	bank	IOUs.	The	most	straightforward	private	credit	money	form	issued	was	the	bank	notes	of	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	country	banks.	In	contrast,	all	three	types	of	banking	 institutions	 issued	 bank	 deposits,	 which	 were	 the	 historically	 older	instrument	 but	 less	 widely	 in	 use.	 Figure	 4.5—based	 on	 Arnon	 (2011:	 32)—provides	an	overview	on	the	English	banking	system	with	the	Bank	of	England	at	its	 apex	 and	 shows	 how	 the	 balance	 sheets	 of	 the	 three	 types	 of	 banking	institutions	were	connected:	
	
Bank	of	England	(BoE)	Gold	(and	silver)	 BoE	Notes	Public	securities	Private	securities	 BoE	Deposits	>	London	banks		>	Non-banks		
London	Banks	(LBs)	 	 Country	Banks	(CBs)	Gold	(and	silver)	 LB	Deposits	 	 Gold	(and	silver)	 CB	Notes		BoE	notes	CB	Notes	Deposits	at	BoE	Public	securities	Private	securities	
>	Country	banks	>	Non-banks		 	 BoE	Notes	Public	securities	Private	securities	Deposits	at	LBs	
CB	Deposits	>	Non-banks	
	
Figure	4.5—Balance	sheets	of	the	English	banking	system	pre-1793	 	
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 authors	 argue	 that	 bills	 of	 exchange	were	 a	 form	 of	private	 credit	money.	 Bills	 of	 Exchange	 are	 private	 IOUs	 typically	 issued	 upon	reception	of	commodities,	which	promise	to	pay	a	specific	amount	of	money	to	the	person	named	on	the	bill	either	on	demand	or	at	a	given	future	point	in	time.	Bills	 of	 exchange	 had	 been	 used	 in	 international	 trade	 at	 least	 since	 the	 13th	century	(Kohn	1999b).	Making	bills	negotiable,	i.e.	passing	them	on	as	a	means	of	payment,	 had	 been	 a	 common	 practice	 of	 merchants	 for	 a	 long	 time	 and	 was	recognized	 in	English	Common	Law	at	 the	end	of	 the	17th	 century	 (Feaveryear	1963:	99-100).	Tooke	(1844:	27-28)	illustrates	that	bills	of	exchange	circulated	as	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 particularly	 in	 the	 countryside.	 He	 cites	 the	interview	of	a	country	banker	who	pointed	out	that	in	1792	around	10%	of	the	circulation	had	been	 carried	 out	with	Bank	of	 England	notes	 and	 at	 least	 90%	with	bills	of	exchange.		 To	 contextualize	 the	 quantitative	 volume	 of	 bank	 notes	 in	 relation	 to	other	 forms	 of	 money,	 Figure	 4.6—based	 on	 the	 numbers	 in	 Cameron	 (1967:	42)—gives	an	overview	on	the	quantitative	evolution	of	four	major	money	forms	in	 England	 for	 the	 period	 under	 consideration.	 In	 the	 diagram,	 specie	 in	
circulation	refers	to	gold	and	silver	coins;	bank	notes	to	those	notes	issued	by	the	Bank	of	England	as	well	as	country	banks;	bank	deposits	to	the	balances	held	at	the	Bank	of	England,	the	London	private	banks	as	well	as	the	country	banks;	and	
others	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 credit	 instruments	 functioning	 as	 private	 credit	money,	 primarily	 bills	 of	 exchange	 but	 also	 bank	 deposits	 for	 the	 time	 before	1800.	As	Cameron	(1967:	43-46)	emphasizes,	the	data	has	been	compiled	on	the	basis	of	various	sources	and	is	very	shaky,	especially	for	the	18th	century.	Still,	it	provides	an	impression	of	the	evolutionary	trends	of	the	English	money	supply	and	the	relative	shares	of	the	money	forms	therein.			
	
Figure	4.6—Quantities	of	money	forms	in	England,	1750-1850	(in	million	£)	 	
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4.2.3	The	systemic	relevance	of	Bank	of	England	and	country	bank	notes	
	This	 section	 discusses	 the	 status	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 as	 well	 as	 country	bank	notes	in	terms	of	their	systemic	relevance	for	the	English	monetary	system	in	 the	 late	 18th	 century,	 using	 the	 four	 criteria	 of	 size,	 interconnectedness,	complexity	and	substitutability.			Bank	 of	 England	 notes,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 size	 of	 their	 issuance,	 grew	massively	in	volume	after	the	Bank’s	foundation	in	1694	and	soon	overpowered	London	banks.	The	Bank,	as	to	Joslin	(1954),	“[b]y	its	immense	size,	its	privileged	position	 in	 relation	 to	government	 finance,	and	by	 the	 large	volume	of	notes	 it	issued,	 […]	 came	 immediately	 to	 occupy	 a	 unique	 place	 in	 the	 London	money	market.	 […I]t	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	 transition	 to	 the	 use	 of	 the	Bank	 of	 England	note	as	the	major	bank-note	circulation	in	the	metropolis	was	extremely	rapid”	(Joslin	1954:	170).	Accordingly,	the	Bank	issued	notes	in	the	volume	of	£764,196	in	1696,	£1,340,000	in	1698	and	£2,480,000	in	1720,	whilst	the	note	issuance	of	London	banks56	rather	 fluctuated	 around	 levels	 of	 £10,000	 (ibid).	 Figure	 4.7—based	 on	 Arnon	 (2011:	 184)—gives	 an	 overview	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 Bank	 of	England	notes	issued	(“circulation”),	put	in	comparison	to	the	amount	of	bullion	in	its	vault.		
	
Figure	4.7—Bank	of	England	notes	and	bullion,	1750-1793	(in	thousand	£)		As	to	the	interconnectedness	of	Bank	of	England	notes,	they	were	issued	only	 by	 a	 single	 institution	 (which	 arguably	 reduces	 their	 interconnectedness)	but	 held	 as	 assets	 by	 a	 great	 number	 of	 financial	 market	 participants—from	corporations	 within	 the	 banking	 system	 over	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	 English	crown	to	merchants	and	the	broader	populace.	As	to	Thornton	(1802:	104-105),																																																									56		 Joslin	(1954:	170)	problematizes	that	the	data	on	note	issuance	by	London	banks	is	extremely	shaky.	If	the	London	bank	referred	to	by	example	may	be	seen	as	representative,	is	unclear.	
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“London	is	[…	]	to	the	whole	island,	in	some	degree,	what	the	centre	of	a	city	is	to	the	 suburbs	 […].	 The	 larger	London	payments	 are	 effected	 exclusively	 through	the	paper	of	the	Bank	of	England;	for	the	superiority	of	its	credit	is	such,	that,	by	common	agreement	among	the	bankers,	whose	practice,	 in	 this	respect,	almost	invariably	guides	 that	of	other	persons,	no	note	of	a	private	house	will	pass	 in	payment	 as	 a	 paper	 circulation	 in	 London”.	 The	 Bank’s	 notes	 were	 thus	interconnected	throughout	the	entire	country,	and	also—with	the	rise	of	England	as	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 world	 financial	 system—attained	 a	 key	 role	 on	 an	international	level.		 Regarding	 their	 complexity,	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 were	 used	 for	 a	number	 of	 different	 functions,	 e.g.	 as	 a	 means	 of	 payment,	 for	 settlement	between	other	banks	and	as	reserve	assets.	The	payment	communities	in	which	they	 were	 used	 for	 those	 different	 functions	 stretched	 across	 various	geographical	 distributions,	 from	 London	 over	 the	 countryside	 to	 abroad.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	the	Bank	of	England	issued	its	note	both	against	private	debt	by	discounting	bills	of	exchange	and	public	debt	by	 lending	to	the	English	government	 substantially	 demonstrates	 their	 greater	 complexity	 compared	 to	other	 credit	 money	 forms.	 This	 has	 key	 implications	 for	 the	 substitutability	criterion:	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 were	 indispensable	 for	 the	 English	 money	market.	 In	 particular,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 note-issuing	 monopoly	 that	 Bank	 has	received	 in	1708,	which	had	driven	out	 the	note	 issuance	of	 other	banks,	 they	could	not	be	replaced	on	short	notice	with	acceptable	costs	by	any	other	form	of	credit	 or	 commodity	 money:	 Neither	 the	 Bank’s	 deposits	 or	 other	 public	 or	private	 IOUs	 could	 have	 taken	 over	 their	 functions;	 and	 the	 supply	 of	 gold	 or	other	metals	is	extremely	inelastic.	It	may	thus	be	assessed	that	early	on	after	the	Bank’s	 foundation,	 say	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 18th	 century,	 Bank	 of	 England	notes	 became	 a	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form—for	 the	country	in	general,	and	for	London	in	particular.		For	 country	banks,	 starting	with	 the	 criterion	of	 size,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	give	any	adequate	account	of	how	many	of	their	notes	had	been	issued	in	the	18th	century.	Not	only	is	this	due	to	the	limited	availability	of	statistical	data,	but	also	because	the	definition	of	a	country	bank	was	incoherent	as	country	banks	could	unite	different	business	models	in	one	single	entity.	Data	on	country	banks	was	only	 systematically	 collected	 in	 the	19th	 century.	Quantitative	estimates	 for	 the	18th	 century	 can	 be	 found	 e.g.	 in	Macleod	 (1866),	 Thornton	 (1802),	 Liepmann	(1933:	226)	and	Pressnell	(1956:	6-7,	11),	but	differ	greatly	and	often	seem	to	be	based	on	hearsay.	Following	the	approach	of	Pressnell	(1956),	we	can	look	at	the	balance	sheets	of	individual	country	banks	and	assume	that	the	development	in	the	 volume	 of	 their	 note	 issuance	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 general	 underlying	tendencies	that	apply	to	the	country	banking	sector	in	general.	Table	4.2—taken	from	 Pressnell	 (1956:	 519)—thus	 presents	 the	 liabilities	 held	 on	 the	 balance	sheet	 of	 the	Newcastle	 bank	Bell	 &	 Co,	 established	 in	 1755,	 for	 selected	 years	from	1756	 to	1777.	The	overview	demonstrates	on	 the	one	hand	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	volume	of	country	bank	notes	 issued	 increased	sharply	 in	 those	 two	decades,	but	could	also	eventually	contract	sharply.	On	the	other	hand,	the	data	shows	 how	 the	 country	 banking	 business	 became	 more	 and	 more	 profitable,	given	that	the	profits	were	five	times	as	high	in	1777	as	twenty	years	earlier.	 	
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	 1756	 1771	 1773	 1774	 1776	 1777	Capital	 2,000	 2,000	 2,000	 8,000	 8,000	 …	Profit	and	Loss	 1,018	 3,705	 3,000	 …	 5,712	 …	Deposits	 10,000	 …	 …	 …	 85,000	 37,000	
Note-Issue	 13,524	 82,000	 102,000	 170,000	 179,996	 128,000	Unidentified	Items	 2,465	 53,635	 33,000	 56,660	 …	 18,037	
TOTAL	 29,007	 141,340	 140,000	 234,660	 278,708	 183,037		
Table	4.2—Liabilities	on	the	balance	sheet	of	Bell	&	Co,	1756-1777	(in	£)		As	 to	 the	 interconnectedness	 of	 country	bank	notes,	we	may	 argue	 that	with	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 institutions	 issuing	 country	 bank	 notes	 across	 the	country	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 regional	 use	 and	 setting	 up	 links	 to	 London,	 the	interconnectedness	 of	 the	 private	 credit	money	 form	 increases.	 The	 first	 thing	that	then	stands	out	in	comparison	to	Bank	of	England	notes	is	that	there	were	many	 note-issuing	 country	 banks	 and	 not	 a	 single	 one.	 After	 country	 banks	developed	 in	 the	 1750s,	 their	 business	 model	 became	 profitable,	 leading	 to	 a	strong	 rise	 in	 their	 number	 (Thornton	 1802:	 169).	 In	 particular,	 during	 a	construction	boom	in	the	1780s,	many	new	note-issuing	country	banks	appeared	on	the	stage	(Pressnell	1956).	In	this,	the	numbers	given	by	various	sources	on	the	number	of	country	banks	differ	greatly.	Figure	4.8—compiled	on	the	basis	of	numbers	 given	 in	 Pressnell	 (1956:	 11)	 and	 Liepmann	 (1933:	 226-227)—presents	different	competing	estimates	on	the	numbers	of	country	banks	starting	from	the	mid-18th	century.		
		
Figure	4.8—Number	of	country	banks,	1750-1875		Based	on	these	rough	numbers,	we	may	assume	that	the	 interconnectedness	of	country	bank	notes	was	high..	Country	bank	notes	could	be	used	as	a	means	of	payment	in	their	respective	districts	and	sometimes	in	other	districts,	and	were	often	 sent	 to	 London.	 This	 results	 in	 complex	 interlinkages	 throughout	 the	country.	Compared	to	Bank	of	England	notes,	country	bank	notes	were	thus	used	for	other	purpose	and	primarily	in	local	payment	communities,	but	had	arguably	had	an	equally	high,	if	not	higher,	degree	of	interconnectedness.	 	
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Turning	to	the	complexity,	the	geographical	distribution	of	country	bank	notes	 was	 primarily	 limited	 to	 specific	 regions;	 they	 were	 not	 necessarily	accepted	 in	other	districts.	Still,	as	 they	connect	 the	English	periphery	with	the	financial	centre,	they	also	flowed	into	London	(Thornton	1802:	168-169).	Finally,	the	substitutability	of	 country	bank	notes	was	comparatively	high.	First,	 it	was	relatively	easy	to	shift	from	one	type	of	country	bank	note	to	another.	Second,	it	would	have	been	possible	 to	 further	up	the	hierarchy	and	use	Bank	of	England	notes,	though	their	supply	was	naturally	scarcer	than	that	of	country	bank	notes.	Third,	country	bank	notes	could	be	substituted	e.g.	with	bills	of	exchange,	which	we	can	also	consider	as	a	private	credit	money	form	(cf.	Tooke	1844:	27-28).	For	this	reason,	country	bank	notes	may	have	played	an	integral	and	growing	role	for	their	local	payment	communities	in	which	they	were	issued.	However,	they	were	a	 by	 far	 less	 important	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 for	 the	 English	 monetary	system	in	general	and	therefore	do	rather	not	qualify	as	systemically	relevant.		 To	 sum	 up,	 we	 may	 contend	 that	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 were	 the	systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 that	 kept	 the	 self-referential	network	of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	debt	 claims	 running.	 Its	 systemic	 relevance	accrues	from	said	criteria,	and	also	corresponds	to	the	effective	perception	at	the	time	 (Baring	 1797;	 Thornton	 1802).	 This	 is	 much	 less	 true	 for	 country	 bank	notes.	 Figure	 4.9	 translates	 these	 findings	 into	 an	 account	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 of	money	at	the	time.	Accordingly,	gold	was	at	the	top	layer.	It	promised	to	trade	at	par	 to	 the	 notes	 issued	 by	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	 which	 relied	 on	 a	 private	guarantee	by	the	Bank	and	was	maintained	via	its	balance	sheet.	At	a	lower	level	in	 the	 hierarchy,	 country	 banks	 sought	 to	 establish	 quasi-par	 vis-à-vis	Bank	 of	England	 notes.	 In	 their	 case,	 it	 is	 rather	 questionable	 that	 they	 had	 systemic	relevance	for	the	wider	system	or	were	perceived	as	such	(cf.	Pressnell	1956).			
		
Figure	4.9—The	hierarchy	of	gold,	Bank	of	England	notes	and	country	bank	notes	 	
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4.3	Phase	II:	The	accommodation	of	bank	notes	in	the	public	money	supply		This	section	studies	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes—or	more	precisely:	Bank	of	England	notes.	 It	 starts	by	addressing	 the	 financial	 crises	of	1793	and	1797,	which	originated	in	the	country	banking	system	and	spilled	over	to	the	Bank	of	England	(4.3.1).	In	February	1797,	as	an	emergency	crisis	intervention,	an	Order	of	 the	Privy	Council	 stopped	the	convertibility	of	Bank	of	England	 in	gold.	This	unprecedented	 government	 intervention	 bailed	 out	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 as	 it	established	unprecedented	public	liquidity	and	solvency	backstops	(4.3.2).	With	this	 action,	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 were	 accommodated	 and	 shifted	 from	 the	private	into	the	public	credit	money	realm.	This	was	the	unintentional	side-effect	of	an	attempt	to	rescue	the	Bank	of	England’s	operationability	in	wartimes	due	a	doomsday	scenario	circulating	within	the	Prime	Minister’s	cabinet	(4.3.3).	
	
	
4.3.1	Financial	instability	and	the	runs	of	1793	and	1797		Financial	 crises	 and	 bank	 runs	 were	 a	 frequent	 phenomenon	 in	 18th	 century	England.	 Hoppit	 (1986:	 44)	 lists	 thirteen	 different	 crises;	 those	 happened	 in	1701,	 1710,	 1715,	 1720,	 1726,	 1745,	 1761,	 1763,	 1772,	 1778,	 1793	and	1797.	However,	the	crises	after	1770	were	particular	as	they	had	been	associated	with	massive	expansion	of	private	credit	money:		 “Because	 of	 the	 business	 community's	 heavy	 dependence	 on	 credit	instruments,	 the	 stability	 of	which	was	 largely	maintained	by	 confidence,	because	those	instruments	were	easy	to	create	and,	finally,	because	growth	encouraged	 risk-taking	 and	 speculation,	 genuine	 expansion	 found	 itself	periodically	 beset	 by	 a	 debility	 in	 private	 finance	 that	 bordered	 on	complete	paralysis.	 […]	 In	particular	 it	was	 the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	 bills	 of	 exchange	 that	 were	 problematic,	 being	 at	 one	 moment	advantageous	 but	 at	 the	 next	 destructive.	 […]	 After	 1770	 financial	 crises	usually	 resulted	 from	private	 finance	 getting	 out	 of	 hand,	 after	 the	 initial	foundations	for	growth	had	been	overtaken	by	speculation”	(Hoppit	1986:	51).			The	 runs	of	1793	and	1797	were	 turning	points	 in	English	 financial	 history	 as	they	 were	 the	 first	 in	 a	 long	 series	 of	 financial	 crises	 that	 originated	 in	 the	country	banking	system	and	spilled	over	to	the	London	money	market	as	well	as	the	 operations	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England.	 Given	 that	 they	 both	 took	 place	 in	conjunction	 with	 and	 were	 eventually	 triggered	 by	 the	 French-English	Revolutionary	War,	they	can	be	regarded	as	complementary	phenomena	and	two	waves	of	the	same	overarching	crisis.	Such	complementary	view	of	the	two	crises	is	 not	 very	 common	 in	 the	 literature	 but	 supported	 e.g.	 by	 the	 assessment	 of	Baring	(1797:	15)	who	establishes	a	clear	connection	between	1793	and	1797:		 “What	 happened	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 1793	was	 […]	 far	 beyond	 any	 thing	which	preceded,	or	has	followed	it,	in	magnitude,	it	pervaded,	more	or	less,	every	 part	 or	 place	 in	 both	 islands,	 and	 affected	 every	 description	 of	property.	The	last,	and	most	important	event,	in	one	respect,	is	that	which	compelled	the	Bank	of	England	to	suspend	their	payments.”.	 	
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The	crisis	of	1793	represents	 the	 first	wave	of	bank	runs	 in	 the	French-English	 War	 and	 was	 “one	 of	 the	 worst	 financial	 and	 commercial	 crises	 that	England	had	experienced	up	to	that	time”	(Fetter	1965:	13).	It	manifested	itself	in	 a	 panic	 in	 the	 English	 banking	 system	 that	 was	 triggered	 by	 the	 French	declaration	 of	 war	 against	 Britain	 on	 1	 February	 1793	 (Hoppit	 1986:	 55).	Beginning	with	 the	 bankruptcies	 of	 two	 country	 banks	 in	mid-February	 1793,	namely	the	corn	traders	Messrs.	Donald	&	Burton	and	Messrs.	Lane,	Son	&	Fraser	engaged	in	American	trade,	the	crisis	peaked	in	the	last	weeks	of	March	with	six	country	 banks	 failing,	 among	 them	 the	 well-known	 Caldwell	 &	 Co	 (Pressnell	1956:	457-458;	also	see	Hayek	1939:	38).	As	to	Feaveryear	(1963:	178),	“panic	spread	like	wildfire	throughout	the	country”.			 While	 the	outbreak	of	 the	war	with	France	was	of	major	 importance	 for	triggering	the	crisis	(cf.	Baring	1797:	19),	Pressnell	(1956:	457)	emphasizes	that	there	was	an	“independent	existence	of	strain	in	the	country’s	credit	system”.	In	particular,	the	creation	of	private	credit	money	in	the	form	of	country	bank	notes	had	played	a	major	 role	 in	building	up	structural	vulnerabilities	 (Hoppit	1986:	51).	Three	structural	 conditions	had	 led	 to	 those	vulnerabilities	 in	 the	banking	system:	First,	the	volume	of	country	bank	notes	had	substantially	increased	from	the	 late	1780s	onwards.	Tooke	 (1838:	194)	explains	 that	 “rising	prices	of	 corn	and	 farming	 stock,	 and	 the	 consequently	 improved	 state	 and	 credit	 of	 the	farmers,	 have	 been	 among	 the	 principal	 occasions	 of	 an	 increased	 issue	 and	circulation	by	the	country	banks;	and	this	was	a	state	of	things	which	prevailed	between	1787	and	1791”.	Second,	due	 to	an	 investment	boom	which	had	been	associated	with	low	interest	rates	and	which	manifested	itself	e.g.	in	a	massively	increased	activity	of	canals	construction,	 “liquid	 funds	were	transformed	 into	a	less	 liquid	 state”	 (Pressnell	 1956:	 457).	 Hence,	 as	 they	 held	 more	 long-term	loans,	the	reserve	position	of	country	banks	had	deteriorated	and	their	ability	to	redeem	their	notes	 into	specie	or	Bank	of	England	notes	had	decreased.	Third,	the	 years	 before	 the	 1793	 crisis	 got	 along	 with	 a	 substantial	 reduction	 of	government	 debt.	 This	 was	 led	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 William	 Pitt.	 His	 policies	“reduced	the	national	debt	by	£10,250,000	between	1786	and	1793”	(Andréades	1909:	 175).	 The	 banking	 system	 had	 thus	 become	 even	 more	 dependent	 on	private	assets	against	which	private	credit	money	was	issued.		 The	 struggles	 of	 the	 country	 banks	 soon	 spilled	 over	 to	 London	 and	caused	an	internal	drain	at	the	Bank	of	England.	Baring	(1797:	20-21)	notes	that	“[i]n	 this	 predicament	 the	 country	 at	 large	 could	 have	 no	 other	 resource	 but	London;	 and,	 after	 having	 exhausted	 the	 Bankers,	 that	 resource	 finally	terminated	in	the	Bank	of	England.	In	the	mean	while,	the	alarm	in	the	country	continued	 to	 increase;	 confidence	 in	 their	 Banks	 vanished;	 every	 creditor	was	clamorous	 for	 payment,	 which	 he	 insisted	 should	 be	made	 in	 gold,	 and	which	was	complied	with,	until	the	Bankers	in	London	were	exhausted”.	Horner	(1802:	192-193)	 explains	 that	 “[t]he	 pressure	 originated	 in	 an	 extraordinary	 demand	for	guineas,	 in	the	country;	but	the	want	of	bank	notes	in	London	soon	became	the	principal	evil.	The	notes,	previously	in	circulation,	were	not	below	the	usual	number;	 but	 that	 was	 rendered,	 by	 a	 slower	 circulation,	 insufficient	 for	 the	necessary	payments”.	 	
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At	the	peak	of	the	crisis,	the	Bank	of	England	applied	procyclical	measures	and	 intensified	 the	 panic.	 Instead	 of	 satisfying	 the	 demand	 for	 more	 Bank	 of	England	notes,	 it	did	 the	opposite.	By	 curtailing	 its	discounts,	 it	 contracted	 the	note	 supply	 (Hayek	 1939:	 38-39).	 Baring	 (1797:	 22)	 criticized	 this	 behaviour	and,	as	a	counterfactual,	brought	up	the	historically	first	account	of	the	view	that	Bank	of	England	should	play	the	role	of	a	lender	of	last	resort	in	a	crisis:	“In	such	cases	the	Bank	are	not	an	intermediate	body,	or	power;	there	is	no	resource	on	their	refusal,	 for	they	are	the	dernier	resort”	(Baring	1797:	22).	To	alleviate	the	run,	 the	 government	 issued	 Exchequer	 bills	 as	 innovative	 emergency	measure	(ibid:	 31-33)	 that	 was	 decided	 upon	 following	 up	 on	 the	 recommendation	 by	representatives	from	the	City	of	London	to	Prime	Minister	Pitt	(Fetter	1965:	13-14).	57	It	 succeeded	 to	 calm	down	 the	 financial	 strains	 (Hayek	1939:	 39).	As	 to	Hawtrey	(1932:	120),	the	issuance	of	Exchequer	bills	gave	the	Bank	of	England	a	new	reliable	asset	against	which	it	could	issue	its	bank	notes	in	times	of	financial	stress	when	 bills	 of	 exchange	were	 unreliable.	 Moreover,	 it	 brought	 along	 the	signalling	effect	that	something	was	done	at	all	(also	see	Thornton	1802:	98-99).		 After	the	1793	crisis,	the	private	credit	money	system	became	the	object	of	heated	critical	debates.	In	particular,	the	question	was	whether	country	banks	were	 to	 blame	 for	 the	 financial	 strains.	 Pressnell	 (1956:	 458)	 insists	 that	 the	1793	 crisis	 was	 “a	 mercantile	 crisis	 which	 affected	 the	 country	 banks	 and	exposed	their	weaknesses,	but	which	was	not	caused	by	them”.	Some	observers,	however,	 put	 heavy	 blame	 on	 the	 “country	 bankers	 who,	 by	 investing	 in	 the	funds	 and	 issuing	 large	 amounts	 of	 paper	 notes,	 both	 created	 the	 crisis	 and	ensured	that	public	and	private	finance	were	disastrously	linked”	(Hoppit	1986:	55).	For	example,	Baring	(1797)	blames	the	country	banks	 for	 their	practice	 to	offer	interest	rates	on	deposits	to	attract	funds	and	thus	taking	on	too	much	risk:	“A	Banker	 in	London	never	 allows	 interest	 to	his	 customers,	 and	 can	 afford	 to	reserve	a	proportion	of	his	deposits,	to	enable	him	to	answer	sudden	demands,	or	a	run	on	his	house;	as	he	thereby	sustains	no	real	loss,	but	only	diminishes	the	amount	of	his	profit.	The	country	Banker	 is	 in	a	very	different	situation,	 for	he	allows	interest	on	deposits,	and	therefore	he	cannot	afford	to	suffer	even	a	small	sum	 to	 remain	 dormant	 and	 unproductive”	 (Baring	 1797:	 15-16).	 Therefore,	country	 banks	 had	 an	 incentive	 to	 overissue	 notes	 and	 not	 keep	 sufficient	reserves	 in	 stock:	 “Thus	 it	 will	 appear,	 that	 whilst	 the	 circulation	was	 greatly	increased,	 and	 its	 beneficial	 effects	 enjoyed,	 […]	 it	 was	 founded	 on	 the	 most	insecure	principle,	and	liable	to	almost	instantaneous	convulsion,	by	unforeseen,	and	even	 trifling	circumstances”	 (ibid:	18-19).	He	concludes	 that	private	credit	money	 creation	 by	 country	 banks	 had	 to	 be	 prohibited:	 “It	 is	 therefore	 most	earnestly	 to	be	wished,	 that	a	 law	should	pass,	 to	prevent	Country	Banks	 from	issuing	 Notes	 payable	 on	 demand,	 as	 they	 never	 can	 be	 in	 a	 situation	 to	 pay	without	 some	 notice;	 and	 the	 country	 ought	 to	 be	 protected	 against	 those	convulsions	which	have	arisen,	and	will	continue	to	arise	from	such	a	practice”	(Baring	1797:	18-19).58	 	
																																																								57	 See	Fetter	(1965:	14-16)	for	further	details	on	the	political	process.	58		 Some	arguments	of	the	country	banks’	critics	have	remarkable	similarities	to	the	discourse	on	shadow	money	creation	in	the	21st	century	(cf.	Chapter	6).	
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In	 1797,	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 bank	 runs	 in	 the	 French-English	 War	materialized.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	1793	crisis,	 the	British	 financial	 structure	had	continued	to	deteriorate.	In	this	situation,	rumours	about	a	French	invasion	led	 to	 further	 financial	 troubles.	 According	 to	 Chadha	 and	Newby	 (2012:	 6),	 a	badly	 prepared	 landing	 of	 a	 group	 of	 French	 soldiers	 did	 indeed	 take	 place	 at	Fishguard	in	Wales	on	22	February	1797	(also	see	Fetter	1965:	21).	Bank	runs,	however,	 had	 begun	 already	 on	 18	 February	 (Arnon	 1991:	 19):	 As	 to	 Fetter	(1965:	21),	farmers	in	Newcastle	“brought	their	livestock	and	produce	into	town	and	on	 receiving	went	 to	 the	banks	and	 converted	 their	notes	 into	 specie.	The	following	Monday	the	Newcastle	banks	suspended	payments,	as	did	the	Durham	and	Sunderland	banks.	Bank	runs	followed	in	other	towns”.	Those	runs	not	only	caused	sudden	failures	of	a	number	of	country	banks	in	the	north	of	England,	but	also	had	significant	effects	on	London	(Thornton	1802:	113):	On	the	one	hand,	as	in	1793,	the	demand	for	Bank	of	England	notes	increased	sharply	as	holders	of	hierarchically	 lower	 credit	 money	 instruments	 viewed	 them	 as	 a	 safe	 haven;	Thornton	estimates	that	the	interest	rates	for	those	notes	reached	16	or	17	per	cent.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 holders	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 wanted	 to	 convert	their	notes	into	guineas	in	order	to	satisfy	the	demand	that	came	especially	from	the	countryside	(ibid).			 Prior	 to	 1797,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 bullion	 reserve	 had	 been	 severely	depleted;	it	dropped	from	£7	million	in	February	1794	to	£1	million	in	February	1797	 (Fetter	 1965:	 18).	 This	 brought	 along	 the	 imminent	 danger	 that	 Bank	 of	England	notes	were	deprived	of	 their	 commodity	base.	The	 situation	had	been	provoked	by	a	simultaneous	external	and	internal	drain:	Externally,	the	English	balance	 of	 trade	 had	 become	 unfavourable	 prior	 to	 1797,	 leading	 to	 bullion	flowing	out	of	the	country	(Thornton	1802:	113).	In	particular,	France’s	return	to	the	 gold	 standard	 in	 August	 1795	 contributed	 to	 the	 gold	 outflow	 (Boyle	 and	Geary	2003:	3).	Internally,	heavy	gold	borrowings	by	the	government—Stanhope	(1862:	15)	refers	to	an	order	of	magnitude	of	£	10.5	million—for	war	finance	had	a	 similar	 effect.	 As	 Smith	 (1936:	 14)	 explains,	 Prime	Minister	 Pitt	 had	made	 a	deal	with	 the	Bank	 of	 England	 in	 1793	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	war	with	 France.	Upon	 request	 of	 the	 Bank,	 Pitt	 had	 passed	 a	 law	 that	 indemnified	 the	 Bank	against	 liability	 for	 loans	 it	had	made	to	the	government.	However,	Pitt	did	not	insert	a	 limiting	clause	 in	 the	bill,	which	effectively	enabled	 the	government	 to	borrow	 from	 the	 Bank	 without	 any	 limits.	 “By	 1795	 these	 borrowings	 had	become	so	excessive	as	 to	affect	 the	 foreign	exchanges	and	seriously	endanger	the	Bank’s	reserve	position,	and	the	Bank	directors	appealed	to	the	Government	asking	 Pitt	 to	 keep	 down	 his	 demands	 on	 the	 Bank,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	contracted	discounts	 to	private	customers.	What	Pitt	did,	however,	was	to	 take	all	 possible	 steps	 to	 facilitate	 the	 Bank’s	 lending	 to	 the	 Government”	 (Smith	1936:	14-15).			Due	to	those	structural	circumstances,	the	acute	financial	panic	arising	in	the	country	banking	system	in	mid-February	1797	brought	the	Bank	of	England	to	 the	 brink	 of	 bankruptcy.	 The	 internal	 and	 external	 drain	 on	 the	 Bank	 was	complemented	by	a	 continuous	 reduction	of	 the	volume	of	 country	bank	notes	issued.	 As	 to	 Tooke	 (1838:	 203),	 the	 volume	 of	 country	 bank	 notes	 had	
	 126	
witnessed	 an	 increase	 in	 1796	 to	 then	 fall	 sharply	 in	 early	 1797.	 Table	 4.3—taken	from	Pressnell	(1956:	460)—depicts	the	reduced	issuance:		 	 1792	 1794	 Summer	1796	–	Jan	1797	 End	of	Feb	1797	Six	Bristol	banks	 100	 39	 55	 38	A	Newcastle	bank	 100	 114	 65	 47	Devon	banks	 100	 50	 50	 16	Eleven	corresponding	banks	of	Down,	Thornton	&	Co.	 100	 70	 87	 44	
	
Table	4.3—Decline	in	the	volume	of	country	bank	notes	issued	after	1793	(in	%)	
	In	 this	 situation,	with	 the	supply	of	 country	bank	notes	being	 low,	 the	demand	for	Bank	of	England	notes	was	high,	which	implied	a	higher	vulnerability	of	the	Bank	 of	 England	 in	 case	 of	 a	 sudden	 run	 to	 convert	 its	 notes	 into	 specie.	 The	doomsday	scenario	was	suddenly	real	that	the	Bank	of	England	could	default	and	break	the	promise	to	convert	its	notes	into	gold	at	face	value		
	 Using	 the	 analytical	 language	 of	 the	 Money	 View,	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	debt	claims	came	to	a	halt	and	started	 reverting	 itself	with	 the	 crises	 of	 1793	 and	 1797.	 This	 followed	 up	 on	decades	 of	 expansion	 in	 the	 credit	money	 system,	 connected	 to	 the	 Industrial	Revolution.	This	endangered	par	clearance	between	the	various	forms	of	credit	money.	Figure	4.10	depicts	 the	contagion	effects	 that	materialized	 in	 the	crises	1793	 and	 1797.	 Both	 runs	 started	 with	 a	 run	 on	 country	 bank	 notes	 and	threatened	the	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	Bank	of	England	notes	as	higher-ranking	money.	 Only	 in	 1797,	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 the	 run,	 also	 the	 promise	 for	 par	clearance	between	Bank	of	England	notes	and	gold	was	endangered.			
		
Figure	4.10—The	1793	and	1797	runs	with	upward	contagion	in	the	hierarchy	 	
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4.3.2	Bank	Restriction	as	Public	Bailout	in	Reaction	to	the	Run		On	Sunday,	26	February	1797,	when	the	panic	was	about	to	reach	its	peak	and	upon	 the	 imminent	 threat	 that	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 could	 face	 illiquidity	 and	insolvency	due	to	the	depletion	of	 its	gold	reserves,	the	Privy	Council—a	small,	and	 somewhat	 secretive,	 executive	 organ	 of	 the	 King	 (cf.	Wilding	 and	 Laundy	1971:	601)—gathered	for	an	emergency	crisis	meeting.	Among	the	participants	of	 the	 meeting	 were	 the	 King,	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 the	 Chancellor	 of	 the	Exchequer	 (Chadha	 and	 Newby	 2012:	 6;	 Bank	 of	 England	 1797).	 This	 highest	political	 executive	 body,	 to	 prevent	 the	 default	 of	 England’s	 core	 monetary	institution,	decided	that	the	Bank	of	England	should	suspend	the	convertibility	of	its	notes	 into	gold.	This	political	 crisis	 reaction	was	unprecedented	at	 the	 time	and	marked	the	beginning	of	the	so-called	‘Restriction	Period’.	In	today’s	words,	it	amounted	to	a	public	bailout	of	the	Bank	of	England.			 The	political	process	leading	to	the	Restriction	started	when	news	about	the	landing	of	French	troops	reached	London	on	Saturday,	25	February:			“[A]n	 emergency	 meeting	 of	 ‘His	 Majesty’s	 Most	 Honourable	 Privy	Council’	was	called	for	on	Sunday.	George	III	himself	came	from	Windsor	and	the	meeting	was	held	at	 the	Council	Chamber,	Whitehall,	on	Sunday	the	26th	February	1797”	(Chadha	and	Newby	2012:	6).		Stanhope	(1862:	16)	points	out	that	the	meeting	was	called	for	by	Prime	Minister	Pitt	 because	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 “Directors,	 in	 dire	 perplexity,	 addressed	themselves	 to	 Pitt	 for	 counsel	 and	 guidance”.	 The	 order	 of	 the	 Privy	 Council	originated—as	 to	 Stanhope	 (1862:	 15-16)—from	 the	 determinacy	 of	 Prime	Minister	Pitt.	He	decided	that,	to	avoid	a	depletion	of	the	Bank	of	England’s	gold	reserves,	 holders	of	Bank	notes	 should	no	 longer	be	 able	 to	 convert	 them	 into	gold,	 although	 nominally	 that	 is	what	 they	 are	 entitled	 to.	 The	 order	with	 the	instructions	was	 sent	 to	 the	 Bank’s	 directors	 on	 the	 same	 evening,	 instructing	them	to	no	longer	hand	out	gold	for	Bank	of	England	notes:		 “The	 outcome	 of	 this	 meeting	 was	 an	 Order	 of	 the	 Privy	 Council	 to	suspend	 the	 cash	 payments	 which	 was	 communicated	 to	 the	 Bank	 of	England	by	the	Council	late	on	a	Sunday	night.	The	council	‘ordered	that	a	copy	of	this	minute	be	transmitted	to	the	directors	of	the	Bank	of	England,	and	they	are	hereby	required,	on	the	grounds	of	the	exigency	of	the	case,	to	 conform	 thereto	 until	 the	 sense	 of	 parliament	 can	 be	 taken	 as	aforesaid’”	(Chadha	and	Newby	2012:	6).		When	the	Directors	received	the	Order,	 they	acted	 in	accordance	with	 it	(Secretary’s	Department	of	the	Bank	of	England	1797.	On	Monday,	27	February	1797,	 the	Privy	Council’s	order	was	announced,	 framed	as	a	message	 from	 the	King	(Chadha	and	Newby	2012:	6),	and	published	by	attaching	the	following	note	to	the	Bank	of	England	doors:		“Upon	the	Representation	of	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	stating	that	from	 the	 Result	 of	 the	 Information	 which	 he	 has	 received,	 and	 of	 the	Enquiries	which	it	has	been	his	Duty	to	make	respecting	the	Effect	of	the	unusual	Demands	for	Specie,	that	have	been	made	upon	the	Metropolis,	in	
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Consequence	 of	 ill-founded	 or	 exaggerated	 Alarms	 in	 different	 Parts	 of	the	Country,	 it	 appears	 that	 unless	 some	Measure	 is	 immediately	 taken,	there	may	be	Reason	to	apprehend	a	Want	of	a	sufficient	Supply	of	Cash	to	 answer	 the	 Exigencies	 of	 the	 Publick	 Service.	 It	 is	 the	 unanimous	opinion	 of	 the	 Board,	 that	 it	 is	 indispensably	 necessary	 for	 the	 Publick	service,	that	the	Directors	of	the	Bank	of	England,	should	forbear	issuing	any	Cash	 in	Payment,	until	 the	Sense	of	Parliament	can	be	taken	on	that	Subject,	and	the	proper	Measures	adopted	thereupon,	for	maintaining	the	Means	of	Circulation,	and	supporting	the	Publick	and	Commercial	Credit	of	 the	 Kingdom	 at	 this	 important	 Conjuncture;	 and	 it	 is	 ordered	 that	 a	Copy	 of	 this	 Minute	 be	 transmitted	 to	 the	 Directors	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	England,	and	they	are	hereby	required	on	the	Grounds	of	the	Exigency	of	the	Case	to	conform	thereto	until	the	Sense	of	Parliament	can	be	taken	as	aforesaid”	(Bank	of	England	1797).		That	Monday,	the	Bank	of	England	also	published	a	statement	saying	that	despite	the	restriction	of	convertibility,	it	wanted	to	continue	with	the	rest	of	its	banking	business	as	usual,	notably	discounting	bills	of	exchange:		“[i]n	 consequence	 of	 an	 order	 of	 his	Majesty’s	 Privy	 Council,	 notified	 to	the	 bank	 last	 night,	 […t]he	 directors	 mean	 to	 continue	 their	 usual	discounts	 for	 the	accommodation	of	 the	commercial	 interest,	paying	 the	amount	in	bank	notes,	and	the	dividend	warrants	will	be	paid	in	the	same	manner”	(cited	after	Chadha	and	Newby	2012:	7).		As	 to	 Stanhope	 (1862),	 the	 private	 sector	 complied	 with	 this	 strategy	 of	continuing	 to	 use	Bank	 of	 England	notes	 although	 they	were	no	 longer	 tied	 to	gold:		 “[a]	 meeting	 of	 the	 merchants	 of	 London	 was	 immediately	 summoned,	and	 held	 next	 day	 at	 noon	 in	Guildhall,	 the	 Lord	Mayor	 presiding.	 They	resolved	unanimously	that	they	would	accept	bank-notes	in	any	payment	which	they	had	to	receive,	and	tender	bank-notes	in	any	payment	which	they	had	to	make.	A	Resolution	to	this	effect	was	signed	by	all	the	persons	present”	(Stanhope	1862:	17).		Thus,	 the	 suspension	 of	 cash	 payments—as	 an	 emergency	 crisis	 intervention	decided	upon	by	the	executive	branch	of	government—was	backed	by	all	other	relevant	public	and	private	institutions:		 “[A]t	the	point	of	the	suspension	all	political	institutions	such	as	the	Bank,	Parliament	 and	 the	 government	 but	 also	 the	 London	 Money	 Markets	showed	considerable	 concordance.	Their	objective	 seemed	 to	have	been	to	ensure	smooth	operations	of	the	credit	markets	in	spite	of	the	war	and	suspension	 of	 convertibility.	 In	 the	 name	 of	 monetary	 stability	 the	authorities,	which	were	accustomed	to	make	autocratic	decisions,	 in	this	occasion	 paid	 a	 special	 attention	 to	 communicate	 their	 policy	 actions	openly	and	systematically	to	the	markets	and	the	wider	public.	The	Bank,	as	 can	 be	 read	 from	 its	 announcement,	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 its	 other	businesses	 continued	 as	 usual:	 there	 were	 no	 changes	 in	 discounting,	private	 or	 public	 loans	 or	 in	 relationship	with	 its	 proprietors”	 (Chadha	and	Newby	2012:	7-8).	 	
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On	 3	 May	 1797,	 the	 Parliament	 issued	 an	 ex	 post	 legitimization	 of	 the	Privy	Council’s	decision	by	passing	the	Bank	Restriction	Act59,	 titled	 ‘An	Act	for	confirming	 and	 continuing,	 for	 a	 limited	Time,	 the	Restriction	 contained	 in	 the	Minute	of	Council	of	the	Twenty-sixth	of	February	One	thousand	seven	hundred	and	ninety-seven,	on	Payments	of	Cash	by	the	Bank’	(Public	Act,	37	George	III,	c.	45).	 The	 bill	 which	 led	 to	 Act	 had	 for	 the	 first	 time	 been	 introduced	 into	parliament	 already	 on	9	March	1797	but	 took	 two	months	 until	 it	was	 passed	(Stanhope	1862:	19-20).	The	debates	 leading	up	the	Act	were	heated;	the	Bank	Restriction	faced	sharp	opposition.	Stanhope	(1862:	18),	with	great	sympathy	for	Pitt’s	decision,	states	that	“the	ardour	of	political	contention	[…was]	at	all	times	and	 in	 every	 party	 hard	 to	 be	 relinquished”,	 which	 led	 to	 “invectives	 of	 Pitt	without	 stint,	 measure,	 or	 reserve”.	 For	 example,	 Long	 Fox	 (1797:	 4)—in	 a	pamphlet	 published	 only	 days	 after	 the	 Restriction—finds	 it	 necessary	 to	“condemn	 the	 conduct	of	Mr.	Pitt”	 and	his	 “fatal	 abuse	of	power”.	He	bemoans	the	 theft	 of	 property,	 and	 sees	 in	 the	 Restriction	 the	 act	 of	 a	 tyrant.	 Sheridan,	another	member	of	parliament,	expressed	the	fear	that	“the	paper	of	this	country	would	ultimately	experience	 the	 fate	of	 the	French’	assignats	or	mandats	 since	‘both	contained	the	idea	of	compulsion’”	(cited	in	Hollander	1911:	441).	And	the	Marquis	 of	 Lansdowne	 argued:	 “If	 you	 attempt	 to	 make	 bank-notes	 a	 legal	tender,	their	credit	will	perish.	This	is	not	matter	of	conjecture,	but	of	experience.	A	fever	is	as	much	a	fever	in	London	as	in	Paris	or	Amsterdam,	and	the	stoppage	of	 payment	 must	 be	 the	 same	 in	 whatever	 country	 it	 shall	 happen”	 (cited	 in	Stanhope	1862:	18).		Despite	 the	widespread	 criticism	 and	 fear	 about	 the	 suspension	 of	 cash	payments,	 exemplified	by	 the	parliamentary	debate,	why	did	 the	Privy	Council	decide	 to	 issue	 its	order	 for	bank	restriction	 in	 the	 first	place?	 In	 line	with	 the	view	adopted	in	this	study	about	the	inherent	instability	of	private	credit	money,	Chadha	and	Newby	(2012:	6)	argue	that	authorities	had	not	many	options.	They	could	 let	 things	 play	 out	 and	 risk	 a	 complete	 depletion	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 bullion	reserve,	or	take	action:		 “During	 that	weekend	 in	 February	 1797	 the	monetary	 authorities	were	faced	with	two	options:	(i)	let	the	currency	exhaust	the	gold	supply,	as	the	ongoing	 run	 on	 the	 currency	would	 surely	 bring	 about;	 or	 (ii)	 suspend	cash	 payments	 and	 ensure	 that	 the	 extant	 monetary	 gold	 stock	 was	protected”	(Chadha	and	Newby	2012:	6).		In	 this,	 inaction	was	connected	 to	a	doomsday	scenario	according	 to	which	 the	financial	system	was	at	the	brink	due	to	the	internal	and	the	external	drain:			 “Anticipating	 a	 panic	 and	 a	 bank	 run	 to	 break	 out	 on	 the	 following	Monday,	the	Privy	Council	[…]	decided	to	keep	the	Bank’s	doors	closed	to	the	public	in	order	to	prevent	the	bearers	of	the	Bank	of	England’s	notes	from	 converting	 them	 to	 gold	 and,	 consequently,	 emptying	 the	 Bank’s	gold	reserves”	(ibid).	 																																																									59		 The	duration	of	the	Act	was	at	 first	 limited	to	24	June	1797	(Public	Act,	37	George	III,	c.	45,	Sec.	XII).	However,	primarily	due	to	the	Franco-English	war,	it	was	renewed	many	times	and	remained	in	place	until	1821.	
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Hence,	from	the	policy-makers’	point	of	view,	there	was	literally	no	alternative	to	implementing	 the	Restriction.	 This	 interpretation	 corresponds	 to	 the	 narrative	that	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Thornton	 (1802)	 and	 Horner	 (1802).	 Out	 of	 fear	 for	 the	worst	and	under	extreme	time	pressure,	also	given	the	wartime	context,	Prime	Minister	Pitt	decided	in	favour	of	the	bailout	as	the	lesser	of	two	evils.		 However,	 there	are	also	competing	 interpretations.	Walter	Boyd	(1801),	for	 example,	 insinuated	 that	 Pitt	 had	 provoked	 the	 suspension	 to	 serve	 the	interest	of	the	banking	industry.	As	to	Arie	Arnon,	Boyd	believed	that			“the	policies	implemented	during	the	months	before	the	Restriction	were	calculated	 to	 create	 a	 shortage	 in	 the	 circulation	 so	 that	 the	 public,	suffering	 from	 this	 scarcity,	 would	 be	 ready	 to	 accept	 new	 measures”	(Arnon	2011:	85).		Accordingly,	Boyd	writes	in	his	Letter	to	Pitt:		 “When	 I	 call	 to	mind	 the	conduct	pursued	by	 the	Bank	of	England,	 for	a	considerable	time	previous	to	the	suspension	of	the	payment	of	its	notes,	there	 appear	 in	 it	 many	 circumstances	 which	 almost	 warrant	 the	suspicion	that,	instead	of	really	dreading	that	suspension	as	an	evil,	they	rather	looked	to	it	as	an	advantage.	At	what	particular	period	the	idea	of	turning	this	real	calamity	into	an	imaginary	benefit,	was	first	conceived	it	is	impossible	to	ascertain;	but	it	seems	natural	enough	to	conclude,	that	is	must	have	speedily	followed	that	of	the	supposed	necessity	of	suspending	the	payment	of	Bank	notes.	 If	 this	be	true,	 it	will	account	 for	that	 line	of	conduct	which	the	Bank	pursued	for	many	months	previous	to	the	26th	of	February	1797.	For,	 if	 it	had	been	 really	 in	 contemplation	 to	 reduce	 the	means	 of	 circulation	 to	 that	 extreme	 scarcity	 which	 might	 prepare	 the	public	mind	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 any	 system,	 however	 exceptionable,	that	should	promise	relief,	the	Bank	of	England	could	not	have	acted	more	consistently	 than	 they	 did,	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 such	 an	 effect”	 (Boyd	1801:	69-70).		 Feaveryear	 (1963),	 in	 turn,	puts	 the	restriction	 in	a	broader	context.	He	stresses	that	the	actual	origins	dated	back	to	the	1793	crisis	and	to	the	country	banking	system.	Accordingly,	the	Bank	of	England	directors			“were	 faced	with	 a	widespread	 loss	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 country	 banks	owing	 to	 the	 fear	of	what	 the	effects	of	 an	attempted	 invasion	might	be	upon	those	banks.	The	root	of	the	trouble	lay	in	the	banking	system	itself.	The	 mere	 declaration	 of	 war	 in	 1793	 had	 brought	 down	 scores	 of	 the	country	 banks	 and	 had	 caused	 grave	 loss	 and	 even	 ruin	 to	 many	thousands	 of	 people.	 The	 banks	 had	 never	 really	 recovered.	 […]	 At	 the	mere	 threat	 of	 invasion	many	 of	 these	 shaky	 little	 houses	might	 topple	over,	 and	 when	 that	 threat	 came	 no	 amount	 of	 mere	 credit	 accommo-dation	from	the	Bank	could	enable	those	houses	to	meet	their	customers’	insistent	demand	for	hard	metal.	If	the	Bank	had	held	its	8-million	reserve	of	1791	it	might	have	been	able	to	 face	such	a	situation.	But	the	reserve	had	 wasted	 to	 a	 shadow	 of	 its	 former	 self	 […],	 and	 with	 such	 a	 credit	system,	 standing	 upon	 such	 a	 reserve,	 a	 scare	 of	 invasion	 was	 almost	bound	to	cause	a	stoppage	of	payment”	(Feaveryear	1963:	186).	 	
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4.3.3	Accommodating	Bank	of	England	notes	as	systemic	transformation		The	suspension	of	cash	payments	in	1797	has	received	great	scholarly	attention	ever	since.	Newby	(2007:	2)	calls	 it	 “[t]he	world’s	 first	successful	paper	money	regime”;	 for	Arnon	(2011:	63)	 it	 constitutes	 “a	crucial	 turning	point	 for	money	and	credit	in	both	theory	and	practice”.	Yet	interpretations	of	this	incident	vary	substantially	 (cf.	 Newby	 2007:	 2).	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 study,	 the	Restriction	 corresponds	 to	 an	 accommodation	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes.	 As	Figure	 4.11	 highlights,	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 were	 shifted	 from	 the	 private	credit	 money	 realm—as	 both	 a	 form	 of	 public-private	money	 and	 pure-private	
money—into	the	public	credit	money	realm	and	became	private-public	money.		
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Figure	4.11—The	Bank	Restriction	as	an	accommodation	of	bank	notes		 A	conventional	 reading	of	 the	events	around	 the	Restriction	emphasizes	the	decoupling	of	bank	notes	from	their	gold	base.	The	Restriction	is	then	seen	as	a	‘theft’	of	private	property	as	holders	of	Bank	of	England	notes	were	deprived	of	the	gold	that	they	are	actually	entitled	to	get.	This	approach	corresponds	to	the	narrative	 of	 bank	 note	 origination	 via	 the	 goldsmiths	 who	 create	 credit	instruments	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 specie	 they	 physically	 hold	 in	 stock.	 The	underlying	gold	is	taken	as	the	true	source	of	‘value’	for	the	bank	notes.	This	is	an	interpretation	subject	 to	 the	Chartalist	and	 the	Essentialist	bias	 (cf.	Chapter	1).	From	a	Money	View	perspective,	however,	the	connection	of	bank	notes	to	gold	had	not	been	actually	necessary	for	bank	note	issuance	in	the	first	place	as	bank	notes	 are	 derived	 out	 of	 private	 credit	 creation—i.e.	 discounting	 private	 debt	such	 as	 bills	 of	 exchange	 or	 public	 debt	 such	 as	 government	 securities.	 The	Restriction	thus	has	to	been	seen	from	a	different	angle:	It	is	not	so	much	a	loss	of	gold	as	‘real	money’	that	takes	place.	Instead,	only	the	way	changes	in	which	it	is	ensured	that	Bank	of	England	notes	keep	their	purchasing	power:	It	is	shifted	away	from	the	commodity	base	to	a	form	of	government	guaranty.	 	
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The	Order	of	the	Council	and	the	Bank	Restriction	Act	effectively	created	public	backstops	for	keeping	up	the	Bank	of	England’s	liquidity	and	solvency.	In	late	February	1797,	 the	Bank	was	at	 the	brink	of	 illiquidity.	Had	the	outflow	of	bullion	 continued	 in	 the	 same	pace,	 the	Bank’s	 gold	 reserves	would	have	been	depleted	 in	 a	 very	 short	 time	 (Chadha	 and	 Newby	 2012:	 6).	 The	 British	government,	 to	 avoid	 the	 collapse	 of	 its	 leading	 financial	 institution,	 granted	permission	 to	 the	 Bank	 to	 continue	 its	 operations	 even	 though	 it	was	 illiquid.	With	 its	 executive	 powers,	 the	 Privy	 Council	 effectively	 created	 a	 liquidity	backstop	 for	 the	Bank,	which	 later	was	confirmed	by	the	 legislator.	By	 law,	 the	Bank	 was	 made	 remote	 against	 illiquidity.	 As	 Smith	 (1936:	 15)	 puts	 it,	 “[t]he	Government’s	action	amounted	to	a	legalisation	of	the	bankruptcy	of	the	Bank”.	In	 consequence,	 the	 Bank	 received	 the	 permission	 to	 issue	 its	 bank	 notes	 as	debts	that	it	did	not	have	to	repay;	its	liabilities	were	turned	into	an	entitlement	to	nothing	else	but	themselves.	Bank	of	England	notes	thus	took	on	the	status	of	an	 ultimate	 means	 of	 payment	 under	 political	 control.	 Every	 payee	 had	 to	 be	satisfied	 by	 receiving	 the	 amount	 due	 in	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes.	 As	 to	 Cannan	(1925:	 xiii),	 the	Bank	 of	 England	 “was	 relieved	 from	 all	 fear	 of	 being	 asked	 to	give	other	money	for	its	notes”.		In	addition,	with	the	1797	Act,	 the	government	announced	that	 it	would	accept	 an	 unlimited	 amount	 of	 non-convertible	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 for	 all	kinds	 of	 payments	 that	 it	was	 to	 receive	 as	 public	 revenue.	Moreover,	 it	 ruled	that	 also	 in	 the	private	 sphere,	payments	 in	Bank	of	England	notes	were	 to	be	treated	as	 if	 they	were	 in	 ‘cash’,	 i.e.	 specie.	With	 this	proclamation,	 the	English	government	 established	 a	de	facto	100%	guarantee	 for	Bank	of	England	notes.	Due	to	the	governmental	guarantee,	Bank	of	England	notes	received	a	backstop	on	the	English	government’s	balance	sheet.	As	private	tax	debt	could	always	be	cancelled	 out	 by	 paying	 with	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes,	 those	 notes	 kept	 their	purchasing	power,	even	if	a	 ‘run’	on	them	was	imminent.	With	this	decision,	as	Liepmann	puts	it,	the	English	state	used	legal	proclamation	to	integrate	Bank	of	England	notes	into	the	public	monetary	system:		 “In	 this	 law,	 the	 state	 agreed	 to	 accept	 the	 notes	 of	 the	 Bank	 for	 all	payments	 due	 to	 it	 as	 ‘public	 revenue’	 to	 an	 unlimited	 extent.	 By	 legal	proclamation,	 it	 thus	 included	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 notes,	 a	 privately	issued	means	 of	 payment,	 in	 its	 public	monetary	 system	 and	 granted	 a	more	 comprehensive	 basis	 to	 their	 use	 in	 circulation	 than	 to	 any	 other	means	of	payment”	(Liepmann	1933:	34-35;	author’s	translation).	60		Following	up	on	this	 thought,	Wolter	(1917:	27)	argues	that	with	this	decision,	were	“public	money”,	despite	their	private	issuance.61	 	
																																																								60	 The	original	quote	reads:	“Der	Staat	erklärte	sich	nämlich	in	diesem	Gesetz	bereit,	die	Noten	der	 Bank	 bei	 allen	 Zahlungen,	 die	 ihm	 als	 ‘public	 revenue’	 zu	 leisten	 seien,	 unbeschränkt	anzunehmen.	 Damit	 nahm	 er	 durch	 gesetzliche	 Proklamation	 die	 Noten	 der	 Bank	 von	England,	 ein	 Zahlungsmittel	 privater	 Emission,	 in	 sein	 staatliches	 Geldwesen	 auf	 und	 gab	ihrer	zirkulatorischen	Verwendbarkeit	dadurch	eine	so	umfassende	Grundlage	und	so	sichere	Gewähr,	wie	sie	kein	anderes	Zahlungsmittel	besaß”	(Liepmann	1833:	34-35)	61		 “Der	Staat	nahm	da,	wo	er	Geld	zu	verlangen	hatte,	 als	 solches	die	Noten	der	Bank	an,	 also	waren	sie	trotz	ihrer	privaten	Emission	staatliches	Geld”	(Wolter	1917:	27).	
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Figure	 4.12	 presents	 a	 sketch	 of	 how	 a	 public	 framework	 had	 been	established	to	backstop	Bank	of	England	notes:		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	4.12—Public	liquidity	and	solvency	backstops	for	Bank	of	England	notes		With	this	framework,	the	now	publicly	backstopped	Bank	of	England	notes	were	shifted	 to	 the	 top	 of	 the	 domestic	 hierarchy	 of	 money.	 As	 to	 Cannan	 (1925),	“[t]he	£1	of	the	note	issue	became	the	standard	£1”.	Or,	as	Walter	Boyd	puts	it,	“the	paper	of	the	Bank	of	England	has	[...]	become	(what	the	coin	of	the	country	only	ought	to	be)	the	ultimate	element	into	which	the	whole	paper	circulation	of	the	 country	 resolves	 itself“	 (Boyd	 1801:	 20).	 In	 this,	 the	 state	 effectively	guaranteed	that	Bank	of	England	notes	always	trade	at	par	to	the	unit	of	account.	Figure	4.13	illustrates	this	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		
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When	 the	 Privy	 Council	 ordered	 to	 stop	 the	 conversion	 of	 Bank	 of	England	 notes	 into	 gold,	 which	 it	 could	 only	 legitimize	 ex	 post	with	 the	 Bank	Restriction	Act,	the	policy-makers	involved	did	not	have	in	mind	that	they	would	alter	 the	 status	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	notes	 and	 transform	 the	monetary	 system.	Their	primary	interest	was	to	rescue	the	Bank	of	England	as	the	core	institution	of	English	finance	and	the	government	bank	that	administered	the	funds	of	 the	English	 Crown.	 The	 accommodation	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 was	 thus	 an	unintentional	side-effect	of	Prime	Minister	Pitt’s	determinacy.			While	debates	at	 the	 time	and	 long	 in	 its	aftermath	have	 focused	on	 the	‘true’	 reasons	 for	 the	Restriction,	 this	 study	sees	 it	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 rise	of	bank	 notes	 as	 private	 credit	money	 throughout	 the	 18th	 century.	 The	 Bank	 of	England	 and	 English	 country	 banks	 were	 able	 to	 create	 credit	 money	 out	 of	nothing	by	swapping	IOUs	denominated	in	gold	as	the	unit	of	account.	At	some	moment	in	time—here	it	was	associated	with	the	outbreak	of	the	Franco-English	war—a	 point	 had	 to	 be	 reached	 at	 which	 the	 credit	money	 expansion	 started	reverting	 itself.	 As	 there	 were	 no	 endogenous	 forces	 left	 to	 stabilize	 the	expanding,	yet	instable	network	from	within,	only	an	outside	intervention	could	prevent	 the	 collapse	of	 the	debt	house	of	 cards.	Pitt’s	decision	on	26	February	1797	 mobilized	 the	 state’s	 infrastructural	 power	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 functional	necessity	 to	 keep	 the	 English	 credit	 money	 system	 afloat.	 With	 the	 Bank	 of	England	 continuing	 to	 discount	 bills	 of	 exchange—i.e.	 conducting	 the	 swap	 of	IOUs	between	bank	notes	and	bills	of	exchange—without	the	underlying	ability	to	 transcend	the	credit	money	claim	in	 the	commodity	money	sphere,	 the	pure	self-referentiality	 of	 the	 activity	 was	 made	 obvious	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	accommodation	 and	 became	 backed	 by	 the	 state.	 This	 also	 had	 an	 effect	 on	country	bank	notes:	The	1810	Bullion	Report	expresses	the	view	that	“so	long	as	the	Cash	payments	of	 the	Bank	are	suspended,	 the	whole	paper	of	 the	Country	Bankers	is	a	superstructure	raised	upon	the	foundation	of	the	paper	of	the	Bank	of	England”	(Cannan	1925:	61).	
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4.4	Conclusion		This	chapter	has	traced	the	rise	of	bank	notes	as	a	private	credit	money	form	in	England	from	the	mid-17th	century	and	the	accommodation	of	Bank	of	England	notes	 in	 1797	 with	 the	 Order	 of	 the	 Privy	 Council.	 This	 political	 intervention	unintentionally	transformed	the	English	monetary	system	by	establishing	public	liquidity	 and	 solvency	 backstops	 and	 thus	 shifting	 the	 delineation	 between	public	and	private	credit	money	within	the	hybridity	of	the	self-referential	credit	money	system.			 The	 chapter	 has	 applied	 the	 two-phase	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation	on	the	18th	century	context	of	England	as	the	then	centre	of	the	world’s	 financial	 system	and	 the	 international	 core	country	 in	 industrialization	and	the	rise	of	capitalism.	It	demonstrated	how	the	Bank	of	England	and	country	banks	 as	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units,	 while	 using	 the	 techniques	 earlier	developed	 by	 London	 goldsmiths,	 established	 an	 encompassing	 and	 expanding	credit	 money	 system	 in	 England,	 with	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 eventually	becoming	 systemically	 relevant.	 In	 the	 1793	 crisis—which	 Hoppit	 (1986:	 55)	describes	 as	 “the	 worst	 of	 the	 century	 […]	 because	 there	 was	 a	 very	 general	failure	of	paper	credit	that	reduced	‘many	respectable,	prudent,	and,	ultimately,	very	 solvent	 persons	 to	 the	 mortifying	 necessity	 of	 stopping	 payment’”—the	expansionary	tendency	reverted	itself.	While	the	first	round	of	bank	runs	did	not	yet	affect	Bank	of	England	notes	as	the	systemically	relevant	credit	money	form,	this	happened	in	1797,	setting	 free	the	technical	necessity	to	accommodate	the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form,	following	the	functionalist	logic	embedded	in	the	credit	money	system	which	allows	money	creation	ex	nihilo.		 What	 happened	 to	 the	 accommodated	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 in	 the	aftermath	of	1797?	Was	the	accommodation	and	the	concomitant	transformation	of	 the	monetary	 system	 permanent?	 How	 did	 it	 affect	 the	 setup	 of	 the	money	supply	as	we	know	it	today?		The	Bank	Restriction	had	been	 implemented	 as	 an	 emergency	measure.	The	Act	had	provided	that	the	suspension	of	cash	payments	should	only	remain	in	 place	 for	 a	 little	 more	 than	 seven	 weeks.	 In	 the	 next	 years,	 however,	 the	suspension	 was	 continuously	 extended	 such	 that	 the	 Restriction	 Period	 was	ultimately	 kept	 up	 until	 1821	 (Liepmann	 1933).	 In	 this	 time,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	Money	 Matrix,	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 were	 private-public	money	 and	 country	bank	 notes	 remained	pure	private	money.	 Between	 1804	 and	 1819,	 a	 range	 of	parliamentary	 investigations	 were	 conducted	 that	 either	 directly	 or	 indirectly	touched	upon	the	status	of	bank	notes.	Most	prominently,	the	Bullion	Report	of	1810—the	final	document	of	the	Select	Committee	on	the	High	Price	of	Bullion—called	for	a	return	to	convertibility,	which	was	extensively	debated	in	parliament	and	 became	 an	 important	 reference	 point	 in	 the	 public	 discourse	 (cf.	 Fetter	1959).	 The	 status	 of	 country	 bank	 notes	 remained	 unaffected	 during	 the	Restriction	Period.	As	Feaveryear	(1963:	190)	notes,	“[c]onfidence	in	the	country	banks	was	 completely	 restored.	 Their	 number,	which	 in	 1793	 had	 been	 about	400,	and	which	had	been	reduced	in	the	panic	of	that	year	by	about	80,	increased	in	the	thirteen	years	after	1797	to	over	750.”		 	
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The	 work	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 committees	 that	 had	 been	 established	during	 the	Restriction	Period	was	 connected	 to	 vivid	 intellectual	 controversies	about	monetary	theory.	Those	controversies	found	their	way	into	history	books	as	the	‘Bullionism	Debate’,	which	took	place	in	three	rounds	and	overlapped	with	the	 analyses	 in	 the	 committees—both	 with	 regard	 to	 timing	 and	 the	 persons	involved.	In	these	debates,	‘Bullionists’	wanted	the	Bank	of	England	to	return	to	convertibility,	whilst	Anti-Bullionists	supported	the	suspension	of	convertibility	(Arnon	 2011:	 73;	 cf.	 also	 2.2.1).	 One	monetary	 idea	 that	 had	 been	 established	and	popularized	during	the	Bullionism	debates	refers	to	the	question	of	control	over	the	issuance	of	country	bank	notes	and	effectively	introduced	the	logic	of	a	state-based	monetary	theory.	As	to	Humphrey	(1988:	4),	what	he	calls	the	‘strict	bullionists’,	brought	forth		“the	monetarist	 notion	 of	 control	 of	 the	money	 stock	 through	 the	 high-powered	monetary	 base.	With	 respect	 to	 base	 control,	 they	 argued	 that	the	Bank	of	England	could,	through	its	own	note	issue,	regulate	the	note	issue	of	the	country	(non-London)	banks	as	well	as	other	privately	issued	means	of	payment	(bills	of	exchange	and	checking	deposits)”.		After	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 had	 received	 a	 de	 iure,	 not	 only	 de	 facto,	status	 as	 legal	 tender	 in	 1811	 (Wolter	 1917:	 90),	 the	 political	 decision	 for	 re-enacting	the	convertibility	of	Bank	of	England	notes	into	gold	was	made	with	the	Resumption	Act	 in	1819—a	legislation	often	referred	to	as	the	 ‘First	Peel’s	Act’	(Liepmann	1933).	The	Act	 suggested	 that	 from	1819	 to	1821,	 the	Bank	should	reduce	the	price	of	gold	until	 it	reached	the	mint	price.	At	the	same	time,	while	effectively	 following	 Ricardo’s	 notorious	 ‘Ingot	 Plan’	 (Bonar	 1923:	 282;	 cf.	Ricardo	 1816),	 the	 Bank	 should	 only	 hand	 out	 bullion,	 not	 coins,	 in	 order	 to	avoid	 an	 exchange	 of	 notes	 into	 coins	 for	 the	 domestic	 circulation.	 After	 the	Resumption	 Act	 was	 passed,	 there	 was	 very	 little	 interest	 for	 getting	 Bank	 of	England	 notes	 redeemed	 in	 bullion	 (Fetter	 1965:	 96).	 Notably,	 during	 the	Restriction,	the	people	had	become	accustomed	to	using	non-metallic	currency.	In	May	1821,	the	Bank	of	England	decided	to	return	to	convertibility	earlier	than	foreseen.	In	May	1821,	a	law	was	passed	making	it	possible	to	exchange	Bank	of	England	notes	into	coins	again	(Liepmann	1933).		What	 did	 the	 return	 to	 convertibility	 imply	 for	 the	 status	 of	 Bank	 of	England	 notes?	 Did	 their	 accommodation	 prevail?	 Despite	 the	 intention	 of	 the	1819	Act,	Bank	of	England	notes	were	arguably	not	shifted	back	into	the	private	money	 realm	 and	 remained	private-public	money	 as	 their	 public	 backstops	 did	not	 disappear.	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 the	 government	 stopped	accepting	 an	 unlimited	 amount	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 for	 all	 kinds	 of	payments	as	decided	upon	in	1797	and	further	confirmed	in	1806.		Secondly,	it	is	true	that	the	backstop	that	turned	Bank	of	England	notes	into	the	ultimate	means	of	payment	by	legal	proclamation	was	removed	in	its	explicit	form	as	commodity	money	was	put	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy	of	money	again.	Formally,	the	Bank	of	England	was	no	longer	in	the	position	to	issue	debts	that	it	did	not	have	to	repay;	its	 liabilities	 were	 no	 longer	 an	 entitlement	 to	 nothing	 else	 but	 themselves.	However,	implicitly	the	backstop	remained	in	place:	It	was	widely	expected	that	if	necessary,	 the	Restriction	could	be	repeated	and	a	 law	be	re-introduced	 that	would	make	the	Bank	illiquidity	remote	again	(cf.	Liepmann	1933).	 	
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The	 main	 step	 of	 re-regulating	 the	 bank	 note	 supply	 after	 the	 1797	accommodation	occurred	with	the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act.	The	Act	followed	the	intellectual	debate	between	the	Currency	School	and	the	Banking	School,	which	may	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 struggle	 between	 monetary	 theories	 of	 credit	 and	 credit	theories	 of	 money	 as	 well	 as	 between	 a	 state-based	 and	 a	 market-based	approach	to	money	creation	(cf.	Chapter	2.2).	As	Figure	4.14	indicates,	the	Act	re-regulated	 the	 status	 of	 bank	 notes	 both	 in	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private	 credit	money	realm:			
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Figure	4.14—Re-regulating	the	bank	note	supply	via	the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act			Accordingly,	on	the	one	hand,	the	Act	split	up	the	Bank	of	England	into	an	Issue	Department	and	a	Banking	Department.	The	Issue	Department	was	in	charge	of	note	 issuance	and	 international	 transactions;	 the	Banking	Department	held	 the	responsibility	 for	 acting	 as	 regular	 bank	 in	 the	 domestic	 financial	 system	 and	was	in	charge	of	acting	as	the	government’s	bank	and	discounting	bills.	The	Act	introduced	 a	 100%	 coverage	 for	 all	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 in	 the	 circulation	(‘circulation’	 was	 defined	 as	 either	 lying	 the	 Banking	 Department	 or	 being	indeed	 out	 in	 the	 hand	 of	 the	 general	 public).	 In	 theory,	 the	 notes	 accordingly	received	 the	 status	 of	 being	 purely	 certificates	 for	 precious	 metal.	 This	 novel	regulation	of	Bank	of	England	notes	turned	them	into	pure	public	money	because	their	issuance	was	not	put	under	a	legal	mandate	and	got	committed	to	serve	the	public	interest	(cf.	2.3.3).	On	the	other	hand,	country	bank	notes	lost	their	status	as	pure	private	money	and	were	demonetized.	As	the	circulation	of	country	bank	notes	was	not	 allowed	 to	 increase,	 country	banks	 effectively	 lost	 their	 right	 to	issue	notes,	with	 the	 intention	 to	gradually	 convert	 them	 into	Bank	of	England	notes	(Liepmann	1933).	 	
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In	the	aftermath	of	the	1844	Act,	the	approach	to	regulate	bank	notes	as	
pure	public	money	spilled	over	 to	other	 countries,	 yet	with	a	 considerable	 time	lag.	For	example,	in	the	United	States,	non-convertible	bank	notes	as	legal	tender	were	only	introduced	in	1863	during	the	Civil	War	(Giannini	2004:	71).	Wagner	(1862)	publishes	his	analysis	of	the	monetary	and	credit	theory	of	the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act	in	the	context	of	plans	by	the	government	of	Austria	to	regulate	the	Austrian	 bank	 note	 supply	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 English	model	 (ibid:	 III).	 In	retrospect,	 without	 delving	 deeper	 into	 the	 associated	 mechanisms,	 we	 can	contend	 that	 the	use	of	bank	notes	as	pure	public	money	is	 the	norm	 today	 (cf.	Pozsar	 2014).	 The	 decisive	 step	 leading	 to	 this	 setup	 in	 today’s	 public-private	hybridity	of	 the	monetary	system	was	Prime	Minister	Pitt’s	decision	to	bail	out	the	Bank	of	England	in	1797	and	the	concomitant	unintentional	accommodation	of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes,	 which	 shifted	 them	 from	 the	 private	 to	 the	 public	credit	money	realm.	
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Chapter	5	
Case	II:	Bank	deposit	accommodation	in	the	United	States			
“[T]he	 Bank	 Holiday	 that	 began	 on	March	 6,	 1933,	 marked	
the	end	of	an	old	regime,	and	the	Fireside	Chat	a	week	 later	
inaugurated	a	new	one.	The	Emergency	Banking	Act	of	1933,	
passed	by	Congress	on	March	9—combined	with	the	Federal	
Reserve’s	 commitment	 to	 supply	 unlimited	 amounts	 of	
currency	 to	 reopened	 banks—created	 de	 facto	 100	 percent	
deposit	insurance”	(Silber	2009:	20).			
5.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	chapter	analyzes	and	explains	 the	accommodation	of	bank	deposits	which	occurred	in	the	United	States	in	1933.	Bank	deposits	emerged	even	earlier	than	bank	notes;	they	are	expressions	of	the	debt	owed	by	the	bank	to	their	customers	and	 are	 hence	 a	 byproduct	 of	 double-entry	 book	 keeping,	 which	 was	 already	common	in	Renaissance	Italy.	Still,	they	developed	into	a	fully	functional	private	credit	money	form	only	after	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes,	first	in	England	and	 later	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 accommodation	 took	 place	 after	 the	 1929	Financial	 Crisis	 when	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 system	 was	 subject	 to	 a	 multi-annual	crisis,	which	 appeared	 in	 four	waves	 of	 bank	 runs	 between	 1930	 and	 1933.	 It	could	 only	 be	 stopped	 when	 President	 Franklin	 Delano	 Roosevelt	 declared	 a	National	 Banking	 Holiday	 and,	 by	 passing	 the	 Emergency	 Banking	 Act	 and	holding	his	First	Fireside	Chat	in	March	1933,	announced	an	implicit	100	percent	government	 guarantee	 for	 deposits.	 This	 turned	 deposits	 into	 private-public	
money	(cf.	Figure	5.1).	
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Figure	5.1—Bank	deposit	accommodation	via	the	1933	Emergency	Banking	Act	 	
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This	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:		Section	5.2	addresses	the	rise	of	bank	deposits	as	a	private	credit	money	form,	with	a	focus	on	the	U.S.	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	century	(phase	I).	To	this	end,	 the	 section	 develops	 a	 Money	 View	 perspective	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 bank	deposits	as	a	swap	of	 IOUs.	The	analysis	draws	on	the	work	of	Charles	Dunbar	and	Basil	 J.	Moore,	who	stress	 that	banks	are	autonomous	creators	of	deposits.	Deposit	 issuance	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 financial	 innovation	 by	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	units	 that	 occurred	 very	 early	 in	 the	 case	 of	 traditional	 Italian	 Renaissance	commercial	banks	and	 in	 the	1870s	 in	 the	 case	of	U.S.	 trust	 companies	 (5.2.1).	Subsequently,	 the	 section	 discusses	 the	 institutional	 details	 of	 bank	 deposit	issuance	 by	 commercial	 banks	 and	 trust	 companies	 to	 understand	 how	 they	established	par	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	forms.	Based	on	this	discussion,	the	section	sketches	 the	public-private	money	hybridity	 in	 the	U.S.	prior	 to	 the	Great	 Depression	 (5.2.2).	 Finally,	 the	 section	 discusses	 how	 the	 deposits	 of	commercial	banks	and	 trust	 companies	had	attained	systemic	 relevance	by	 the	early	20th	century	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System	(5.2.3).		Section	5.3	studies	the	accommodation	of	bank	deposits	at	the	end	of	the	Great	 Depression	 (phase	 II).	 The	 section	 first	 depicts	 how	 the	 U.S.	 banking	system	 got	 into	 deep	 financial	 stress	 following	 up	 on	 the	 1929	 stock	 market	crash.	In	this,	it	regards	the	1929	Stock	market	crash	and	the	ensuing	four	waves	of	bank	runs	as	complementary	events	 (5.3.1).	 In	March	1933,	 the	nation-wide	run	on	commercial	banks	and	the	extensive	withdrawal	of	deposits	could	only	be	ended	when	President	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt—as	one	of	the	first	measures	after	 assuming	 office—announced	 a	 National	 Bank	 Holiday,	 passed	 the	Emergency	 Banking	 Act	 and	 held	 his	 First	 Fireside	 Chat	 (5.3.2).	 Finally,	 the	section	 develops	 the	 argument	 for	why	 Roosevelt’s	 unprecedented	 emergency	measures	 constitute	 an	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 deposits.	 Accordingly,	 the	government	 established	 an	 implicit	 100%	 deposit	 guarantee	 by	 creating	 a	solvency	 backstop	 on	 public	 balance	 sheets	 for	 deposit-issuing	 commercial	banks	and	thus	shifted	deposits	from	the	private	to	the	public	money	realm.	This	amounted	to	an	unintentional	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	(5.3.3).		The	 concluding	 section	 5.4	 presents	 a	 brief	 outlook	 on	 the	 follow-up	processes	of	the	accommodation—notably	the	Banking	Acts	of	1933	and	1935—and	points	out	how	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	was	solidified.	 	
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5.2	Phase	I:	The	rise	of	bank	deposits	as	private	credit	money	
	This	section	applies	phase	I	of	the	accommodation	model	on	bank	deposits	and	studies	 their	 rise	 as	 a	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	money	 form	with	 a	focus	 on	 the	 U.S.	 in	 the	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	 century.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	Charles	Dunbar	and	Basil	 J.	Moore,	the	section	interprets	bank	deposit	creation	as	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	 that	 banks,	 as	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units,	 developed	 and	conducted	 endogenously,	 independently	 of	 the	 state’s	 influence	 (5.2.1).	 The	section	 then	 sketches	 how	 bank	 deposits	 adopted	 the	 role	 as	 private	 credit	money,	in	particular	after	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes,	by	establishing	par	clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 forms	 of	 money	 and	 how	 this	 affected	 the	wider	U.S.	monetary	system	in	the	early	20th	century	(5.2.2).	Finally,	the	section	discusses	to	which	extent	commercial	bank	and	trust	deposits	were	systemically	relevant	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System	(5.2.3).			
5.2.1	Financial	innovation	and	bank	deposit	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	
	A	common	view	on	bank	deposits,	which	developed	roughly	in	the	middle	of	the	20th	century	and	has	largely	been	naturalized	today,	is	that	deposit	creation	does	not	 occur	 upon	 the	 autonomous	 discretion	 of	 commercial	 banks	 and	 can	 be	directly	or	 indirectly	controlled	by	public	authorities,	notably	 the	central	bank,	as	it	requires	a	higher-ranking	form	of	money	for	the	deposit	creation	process	to	start.	For	example,	Basil	Moore	critically	refers	to	this	notion:		 “Mainstream	economic	analysis	takes	the	view	that	central	banks	have	it	in	 their	 power	 to	 initiate	 exogenous	 changes	 in	 the	 nominal	 supply	 of	money,	 simply	 by	 increasing	 or	 reducing	 the	 high-powered	base	 and	 so	the	total	volume	of	bank	deposits.	The	argument	appears	straightforward,	logical,	 supported	by	empirical	evidence,	and	 intuitively	persuasive.	The	monetary	base	(currency	and	bank	reserves)	constitutes	the	liabilities	of	the	central	bank.	These	are	necessarily	equal	to	its	total	assets,	and	so	are	affected	 by	 its	 purchase	 or	 sale	 of	 securities	 on	 the	 open	 market.	Commercial	banks	are	also	observed	to	maintain	a	relatively	stable	ratio	of	 total	 reserves	 to	 deposits.	 Ergo	 the	 money	 supply	 appears	 to	 be	exogenous”	(Moore	1988:	ix,	italics	in	original).		From	a	Money	View	perspective,	however,	deposit	creation	is	nothing	but	a	swap	of	IOUs	between	a	bank	and	its	counterparties.	The	deposit	is	denominated	in	the	common	unit	of	account,	here	the	U.S.	Dollar,	and	constitutes	a	promise	to	pay	a	respectively	higher-ranking	form	of	money,	typically	notes	or	coins.	To	create	a	deposit,	however,	it	is	not	necessary	that	a	dollar	note	or	coin	is	actually	around.	Deposit	 issuance	by	banks	creates	 credit	money	 literally	out	of	nothing.	Figure	5.2	denotes	the	balance	sheet	mechanics	involved	(cf.	McMillan	2014:	21-33):		 Bank	 	 Counterparty	+	Loan				(long-term	IOU)	 +	Deposit				(short-term	IOU)	 	 +	Deposit				(short-term	IOU)	 +	Loan				(long-term	IOU)		 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	5.2—Bank	deposit	issuance	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	 	
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Accordingly,	banks	issue	deposits	endogenously	as	a	short-term	IOU	in	exchange	for	 a	 long-term	 (or	 ‘longer-term’)	 IOU	 issued	 by	 the	 counterparty.	 Typically,	deposits	 have	 the	 shortest	 possible	maturity	 as	 they	 are	 available	 on	 demand	and	 instantaneously	 convertible	 into	 a	 money	 form	 that	 is	 higher	 up	 in	 the	hierarchy.	 However,	 there	 are	 also	 deposit	 forms	 with	 a	 longer	 maturity	 (cf.	Brady	 1911).	 The	 counterparties’	 IOUs	 usually	 are	 loans	 that	 the	 commercial	bank	grants	to	 its	customers,	or	securities	(e.g.	bills	of	exchange	or	commercial	paper)	that	the	bank	discounts.			That	deposit	creation	ultimately	relies	on	a	swap	of	IOUs	is	made	evident	in	 the	 Chapters	 on	 the	 Theory	 and	 History	 of	 Banking	 by	 Charles	 Dunbar,	originally	published	in	1885	as	a	university	textbook:		 “The	depositor,	or	the	creditor	of	a	bank,	who	has	to	make	a	payment	to	some	other	person,	has	his	choice	between	two	methods	of	making	it.	He	may	 demand	 money	 from	 the	 bank,	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 his	 right	 as	 a	creditor,	 and	 deliver	 this	 money;	 or,	 with	 the	 assent	 of	 the	 person	 to	whom	he	has	 to	make	payment,	he	may	give	 to	 this	person	an	order	on	the	bank	for	the	money,	or	what	is	commonly	called	a	check.	If	he	adopts	the	 latter	 method,	 a	 payment	 for	 goods	 or	 of	 a	 debt	 is	 effected	 by	 the	simple	 transfer	 of	 a	 right	 to	 demand	money	 from	 the	 bank	 […].	 To	 this	extent	 the	 check	 is	 plainly	made	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	 sum	 of	money	 for	which	it	calls.	It	represents	no	particular	money	or	groups	of	coins,	for,	as	we	 have	 seen,	 the	 deposit	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 been	 created	 by	 the	 bank	 in	exchange	for	some	security	bought	by	it,	and	is,	therefore,	a	naked	right	to	demand,	and	not	a	claim	to	any	particular	cash”	(Dunbar	1885:	39-40).		 Historically,	 as	 a	 private	 IOU,	 bank	 deposits	 emerged	 earlier	 than	 the	Bank	 of	 England-style	 private	 bank	 notes.	 Deposit-issuing	 commercial	 banks	originated	in	Italy	during	the	Late	Middle	Ages	and	the	Early	Modern	Period,	and	can	thus	be	viewed	as	the	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	of	their	time.	An	important	aspect	of	their	business	was	to	have	accounts	on	how	much	money	they	owed	to	their	 customers—those	 records	 were	 the	 early	 versions	 of	 deposits	 (cf.	Kindleberger	 1984:	 49).	 Why	 did	 early	 commercial	 banks	 offer	 deposits	 as	 a	service	for	their	customers?	The	Bank	of	Amsterdam,	for	example,	required	that	bills	of	exchange	of	a	certain	amount	were	transacted	at	the	Bank,	which	forced	merchants	to	hold	deposit	accounts	there.	Holding	these	accounts	offered	certain	conveniences	 such	 as	 safe	 storage	 or	 the	 guarantee	 to	 receive	 money	 of	 a	satisfactory	quality	once	it	was	withdrawn	(Kindleberger	1984).	Early	deposits,	however,	were	not	easily	transferable	on	secondary	markets,	as	this	required	the	evolution	 of	 advanced	 checking	 and	 clearing	 systems.	 Such	 institutions	 only	developed	 and	 spread	 in	 the	 18th	 century,	 with	 Britain	 in	 the	 lead	 (Giannini	2004).		In	 the	 U.S.,	 deposit	 banking	 transformed	 substantially	 throughout	 its	different	 eras.	 Its	 traditional	 institutional	 structure	 is	 a	mix	 of	 relicts	 from	 the	‘Free	Banking	Era’	(1837-1863)	and	the	National	Banking	System	(1863-1913),	which	was	established	during	the	Civil	War	(cf.	Smith	1936:	146-167).	Figure	5.3	sketches	 the	 different	 types	 of	 deposit	 issuing	 banks	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 19th	century,	with	state-chartered	banks,	national	banks	and	trust	companies:	 	
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Figure	5.3—Categories	of	deposit-issuing	banks	in	the	National	Banking	System			 The	 private	 commercial	 banks	 operational	 in	 the	 antebellum	 period	typically	 were	 ‘state	 banks’	 or	 ‘state-chartered	 banks’	 that	 had	 received	 their	licenses	from	one	of	the	various	U.S.	states.	The	rules	concerning	their	business	models,	 in	 particular	 the	 issuance	 of	 private	 bank	 notes	 and	 bank	 deposits,	differed	from	state	to	state.	Some	of	those	rules	even	dated	back	to	the	colonial	period	when	the	banking	business	was	not	yet	clearly	developed	and	overlapped	with	other	business	 forms	(Willis	1915:	4-5).	 In	1838,	 the	rules	 for	conducting	the	 banking	 business	 became	 even	 more	 loose	 when	 the	 state	 of	 New	 York	pronounced	 the	 so-called	 Free-banking	 Law	 according	 to	which	 any	 person	 or	institution	was	made	free	to	issue	notes	(Smith	1936:	42-51).		During	 the	Civil	War,	 the	regulations	 for	 the	 issuance	of	bank	notes	and	bank	 deposits	 were	 fundamentally	 altered.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 National	Currency	Act	of	1863	created	a	 ‘bond	currency’	and	removed	 the	characters	of	bank	 notes	 as	 an	 ‘asset	 currency’	 tied	 to	 precious	 metals.	 The	 act	 created	‘national	 banks’	 that—as	 opposed	 to	 state	 banks—were	 incorporated	 under	federal	 law.	To	 issue	notes,	national	banks	had	to	purchase	government	bonds,	the	amount	of	which	was	limited.	Thus,	the	provision	effectively	made	the	bank	note	supply	inelastic	and	dependent	on	the	provision	of	government	debt.	At	the	same	time,	while	the	note	 issuance	by	state	banks	was	not	formally	prohibited,	state	 bank	 notes	 were	 virtually	 taxed	 out	 of	 existence	 (Young	 1929:	 289).62		As	Mehrling	(2002:	207)	explains,		“[t]he	intention	was	to	support	the	market	for	government	bonds	issued	to	 finance	 the	 war	 effort,	 but	 the	 long-run	 consequence	 was	 to	 fix	 the	supply	 of	 note	 currency.	 Even	 after	 redemption	 of	 the	 greenback	 issue	and	 successful	 return	 to	 the	 gold	 standard	 in	 1879,	 the	 quantitative	constraint	on	the	national	bank	note	issue	remained.”		 	
																																																								62	 With	the	tight	regulation	of	bank	note	issue	according	the	currency	principle	(cf.	Young	1929:	294),	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	was	made	more	 akin	 to	 the	 British	 system	 of	 bank	 notes	 as	public	money,	which	had	been	 implemented	 in	Britain	 via	 the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act.	 Still,	turning	 bank	 notes	 into	 pure	 public	money	 was	 only	 completed	 when	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	System	was	introduced	and	the	Federal	Reserve	itself	had	effectively	developed	into	a	public	institution	(cf.	Conti-Brown	2016).	
National	Banking	System	
National	Banks	
Central	Reserve	City	Banks	
Trust	Companies	and	Others	State	Banks	
Reserve	City	Banks	 Country	Banks	
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On	the	other	hand,	the	National	Banking	Act	of	1864	modified	the	system	of	deposit	banking.	While	the	rules	for	state	banks	were	not	affected,	minimum	reserve	 requirements	 were	 introduced	 for	 national	 banks	 by	 law	 to	 have	 an	instrument	of	control	over	deposit	creation.	Accordingly,	national	banks	had	to	hold	a	certain	amount	of	legal	tender,	i.e.	hierarchically	higher	money,	to	be	able	to	 issue	bank	deposits.	To	determine	 the	 reserve	 requirements,	national	banks	were	 split	 up	 in	 three	 categories:	 ‘Central	 Reserve	 City	 Banks’	 in	 New	 York,	Chicago	and	Saint	Louis	had	to	keep	a	25%	reserve	 in	the	 form	of	 legal	 tender.	‘Reserve	City	Banks’	in	other	cities	had	to	hold	25%	reserves	as	well,	while	half	of	 it	 could	 be	 kept	 in	 the	 form	 of	 deposits	 at	 the	 Central	 Reserve	 City	 Banks.	‘Country	Banks’	had	to	keep	a	reserve	ratio	of	15%,	three	fifths	of	which	could	be	held	via	deposits	at	Central	Reserve	or	Reserve	City	Banks	(Young	1929:	295).		The	 new	 legislation	 had	 a	 range	 of	 important	 effects	 on	 the	 role	 of	deposits	in	the	banking	system.	First,	it	led	to	a	significant	rise	in	the	importance	of	bank	deposits	vis-à-vis	notes.	As	the	number	of	bank	notes	issues	depended	on	the	 amount	 and	 the	 profitability	 of	 government	 debt,	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	National	Banking	System		“tended	to	increase	deposit	creation	disproportionately	to	the	increase	in	note	issue.	In	parts	of	the	country	where	people	insisted	on	having	notes,	banks	charged	a	higher	rate	of	interest	than	in	those	parts	of	the	country	where	 borrowers	 could	 be	 induced	 to	 take	 deposit	 credits	 and	 where	check	 payments	 predominated	 over	 demands	 for	 currency	withdrawals	in	the	form	of	notes”	(Smith	1936:	149).			Second,	 it	 increased	the	vulnerability	of	deposit	banking	to	 financial	panic.	The	strict	reserve	requirements,	instead	of	making	the	system	more	resilient,	did	not	provide	more	 elasticity	 to	banks	but	 increased	 the	pressure	on	 them	 to	 call	 in	loans	in	times	of	stress.	Moreover,	the	pyramiding	of	reserves	between	the	three	categories	of	national	banks	was	problematic	 insofar	as	 it	 fueled	speculation	 in	the	 centers,	 particularly	 New	 York,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 led	 to	massive	 spill-overs	of	 financial	 strains	 from	central	 reserve	cities	 to	country	banks,	and	vice	versa.	Finally,	the	continued	prohibition	of	branch	banking	forced	country	banks	to	 invest	 in	 the	 money	 markets	 making	 their	 positions	 rather	 illiquid	 and	susceptible	to	runs	(Smith	1936:	151-160).		 With	 the	 dual	 system	of	 national	 and	 state	 banks	 as	 issuers	 of	 deposits	established	 during	 the	 Civil	War,	 trust	 companies	 entered	 the	 picture	 as	 third	category	 of	 institutions	 that	 created	 bank	 deposits.	 Whilst	 the	 first	 U.S.	 trust	company	had	been	founded	in	1822	(Herrick	1909:	2),	deposit	issuance	by	trust	companies	 developed	 at	 around	 Civil	War	 times	 (Barnett	 1911:	 12ff.,	 also	 see	Herrick	1909:	6).	As	Bruner	and	Carr	(2009:	66)	explain,			 “[o]riginally	 organized	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 to	 handle	 various	financial	tasks	for	private	estates	and	corporations,	the	sphere	of	activity	for	 trust	 companies	 gradually	 expanded	 to	 offer	 services	 little	 different	from	those	of	traditional	banks.”			 	
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Among	those	services	were	accepting	deposits,	making	of	loans	as	well	as	acting	“as	 trustees,	 underwriters,	 and	 distributors	 of	 new	 securities”	 (ibid:	 67).	 This	occurred	 in	 a	 legal	 space	 that	 the	 National	 Banking	 System	 had	 left	 rather	unregulated:		 “Despite	 their	 functional	 similarity	 to	 national	 and	 state	 banks,	 trust	companies	were	 generally	 less	well	 regulated.	They	were	permitted,	 for	instance,	 to	 hold	 a	 wider	 variety	 of	 assets;	 unlike	 national	 banks,	 trust	companies	 could	 own	 stock	 equity	 directly.	 Also,	 unique	 among	 large	financial	 institutions,	 trusts	 were	 not	 required	 to	 hold	 reserves	 against	deposits	before	1906”	(ibid).		In	 this,	 trusts	had	quite	similar	roles	as	 the	English	country	banks	discussed	 in	Chapter	4	and	may	be	seen	as	the	‘shadow	banking	sector’	of	the	age.		 Taken	 together,	 all	 three	 deposit-issuing	 financial	 institutions—national	banks,	 state	 banks	 and	 trust	 companies—acted	 as	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	that	 created	 deposits	 by	 swapping	 IOUs	 of	 different	 maturities.	 In	 contrast	 to	their	European	 counterparts,	U.S.	 banks	did	 this	 swap	primarily	 against	 stocks	and	 bonds,	 not	 bills	 of	 exchange.	 In	 Britain	 but	 also	 in	 France	 and	 Germany,	deposits	 were	 primarily	 created	 by	 discounting	 bills	 of	 exchange	 and	 issuing	acceptances.	This	corresponded	to	the	idea	of	‘sound	banking’	and	was	reflected	in	the	so-called	‘Real	Bills	Doctrine’.	Accordingly,	the	private	creation	of	deposits	was	 ‘sound’	as	 long	as	 the	deposits	were	 issued	against	commercial	 credit	 that	corresponded	 to	 an	 actual	 trade	 of	 tangible	 goods	 (cf.	 Mints	 1945).	 Those	countries	 therefore	 possessed	 a	 liquid	 discount	 market	 on	 which	 bills	 of	exchange	were	 traded.	 In	 the	National	 Banking	 System,	 in	 contrast,	 due	 to	 the	legal	interpretation	of	the	1864	National	Banking	Act,	banks	were	not	allowed	to	issue	acceptances	(Jacobs	1910:	4).			Similar	 to	 its	 European	 counterparts,	 however	 the	 commercial	 banks	issuing	deposits	were	private	institutions	that	did	not	have	access	to	backstops	on	public	balance	sheets.	In	the	National	Banking	System,	commercial	banks	did	not	 have	 a	 public	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 they	 could	 turn	 to	 in	 case	 of	 a	 liquidity	shortage.	 This	 role	 was	 occasionally	 and	 in	 an	 ad	 hoc	manner	 taken	 over	 by	privately	run	clearing	houses,	which	were	typically	controlled	by	the	major	local	banks.	From	1913	onwards,	this	role	was	taken	on	by	the	Federal	Reserve,	which	however	 also	 was	 a	 private	 institution—a	 bankers’	 bank—and	 not	 yet	 under	substantial	 public	 control	 (Conti-Brown	 2016).	 Thus,	 U.S.	 deposit	 creation	 via	swapping	IOUs	occurred	exclusively	in	the	private	realm	(see	Figure	5.4):	
	
	
	
Figure	5.4—Deposit	creation	as	a	private	swap	of	IOUs	 	
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Loan	(long-term	IOU)	
	 146	
5.2.2	Establishing	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	forms	of	money		While	today	bank	deposits	are	very	commonly	referred	to	as	a	form	of	‘money’,	this	position	was	by	no	means	the	dominant	view	in	the	19th	century.	At	the	time	of	the	National	Banking	System,	the	term	‘money’	was	commonly	used	for	coins	and	notes	while	bank	deposits	were	referred	to	as	a	form	of	‘credit’.	This	can	be	demonstrated	on	the	basis	of	two	selected	representative	examples.		 On	the	one	hand,	the	view	can	be	identified	in	the	works	of	the	National	Monetary	 Commission,	 which	 published	 extensive	 analyses	 on	 money	 and	banking	towards	the	very	end	of	the	National	Monetary	System’s	existence.	In	his	1910	report	The	Use	of	Credit	Instruments	in	Payments	in	the	United	States,	David	Kinley	makes	clear	that	in	his	view,	bank	deposits	are	not	‘money’:		“In	 all	 industrial	 communities	 exchanges	 are	 made	 in	 three	 ways:	 by	direct	 barter;	 by	 direct	 money	 payment;	 and	 by	 indirect	 barter,	 or	exchanges	wherein,	instead	of	money,	credit	documents	of	some	kind	are	given,	which	cancel	on	another	partly	or	wholly,	and	so	render	the	use	of	money	necessary	only	 for	the	settlement	of	balances,	 if	at	all.	 […A]	third	volume	of	goods	produced	and	entered	into	market	are	sold	on	the	basis	of	a	price	established	by	the	money	exchanges,	but	are	not	paid	for	with	money	 in	 any	 form.	 For	 a	 large	majority	 of	 these	 purchases	 checks	 are	given	 either	 at	 the	 time	 of	 purchase	 or	 soon	 after.	 These	 checks	 are	deposited	 with	 the	 banks;	 by	 means	 of	 book-keeping	 they	 are	 set	 off	against	one	another,	and	the	balances	only	call	for	money	payment.	Even	these	 balances,	 however,	 may	 not	 call	 for	 the	 use	 of	 money	 for	 their	settlement;	they	may,	and	indeed	frequently	are,	entered	to	the	credit	of	the	owner	on	the	books	of	his	bank,	and	in	time	canceled	by	the	payments	against	him	coming	in	at	a	later	period”	(Kinley	1910:	2-3).		 On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 same	 logic	 is	prevalent	when	Allyn	Young	wrote	his	 text	 The	 Mystery	 of	 Money.	 How	 Modern	 Methods	 of	 Making	 Payments	
Economize	the	Use	of	Money.	Published	 in	1924	for	the	 first	 time	and	revised	 in	1929,	Young	is	a	blunt	as	one	can	get	with	regard	to	the	status	of	bank	deposits.	He	evidently	does	not	see	a	qualitative	difference	between	the	credit	instruments	the	bank	issues	as	its	liability	(i.e.	deposits)	and	the	credit	instruments	it	holds	as	its	assets	(i.e.	a	promissory	note	or	a	bill	of	exchange):		“Nine	 tenths	 of	 the	 business	 transactions	 in	 a	 country	 like	 the	 United	States	 are	performed	with	 the	 aid	 of	 credit	 rather	 than	of	money.	 From	the	purely	quantitative	point	of	view,	credit	is	vastly	more	important	than	money.	 […W]ho	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 say	 that	 we	 could	 dispense	 with	money	and	get	along	very	well	by	the	use	of	debts	as	means	of	payment?	The	objection	is	obvious.	A	debt	can	hardly	be	a	means	of	payment,	for	it	itself	 is	something	to	be	paid.	[…]	A	bank	is	an	institution	which	deals	in	debts.	 It	 buys	 the	 debts	 of	 its	 customers	 and	 sells	 its	 own	 debts.	 Its	customers'	debts	come	to	 it	 in	 the	 form	of	promissory	notes	and	bills	of	exchange.	A	promissory	note	is,	of	course,	a	promise	to	pay	money	either	on	demand	or,	more	usually,	on	or	before	a	certain	date.	A	bill	of	exchange	or	 draft	 is	 an	 order	 to	 pay,	 drawn	by	 a	 creditor	 upon	 a	 debtor”	 (Young	1929a:	271-272).	 	
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From	a	Money	View	perspective,	 it	 is	not	surprising	and	easy	 to	explain	that	bank	deposits	were	 rather	 considered	 ‘credit’	 and	not	 ‘money’:	 In	a	 credit	money	 system,	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘money	 ‘	 and	 ‘credit’,	 though	 often	 used	 as	dichotomous	oppositions	(if	operating	within	the	logic	of	a	 ‘monetary	theory	of	credit’),	 are	 in	 fact	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin.	Whether	 a	 given	 instrument	 is	perceived	as	money	or	credit	depends	on	the	relative	perspective.	For	the	issuer	of	 the	 credit	money	 form,	 the	 financial	 instrument	 tends	 to	be	 ‘credit’.	 For	 the	person	or	 institution	that	holds	 the	 instrument	as	 its	asset	and	uses	 it	 to	make	payments	or	store	value,	it	rather	constitutes	‘money’.	Hence,	a	clear	distinction	between	 ‘money’	 and	 ‘credit’	 is	 not	 possible	 but	 a	 matter	 of	 standpoint	 and	terminology.	 It	 seems	 to	be	 a	 regularity	 though	 that	 financial	 instruments	 that	have	taken	on	the	role	of	private	credit	money	are	not	commonly	referred	to	as	‘money’	but	‘credit’,	which	changes	after	their	accommodation.	Being	integrated	into	the	public	money	supply	lets	them	appear	as	a	form	of	‘money	proper’.63		To	 qualify	 as	 private	 credit	 money	 in	 a	 strict	 Money	 View	 sense,	 bank	deposits	 as	 privately	 created	 IOUs,	 based	 on	 swapping	 IOUs	 of	 different	maturities,	have	to	trade	at	par	or	quasi	par	with	higher-ranking	money.	At	the	time,	this	was	commodity	money,	first	and	foremost	gold,	as	well	as	bank	notes.	This	gives	rise	to	the	question	when	and	how	such	par	clearance	was	established	for	 the	 three	eminent	 forms	of	bank	deposits—those	 issued	by	national	banks,	state	 banks	 as	 well	 as	 trust	 companies.	 Providing	 a	 detailed	 quantitative	 and	qualitative	analysis	of	when	exactly	 this	occurred	 for	 the	various	types	of	bank	deposits	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 and	 intent	 of	 this	 study.	 Not	 only	 would	 it	 face	severe	challenges	for	data	collection,	it	is	also	very	unlikely	that	the	adoption	of	par	exchange	 for	bank	deposits	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	 throughout	 the	U.S.	was	a	homogenous	development.	Instead,	the	key	argument	for	the	theory	of	private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 is	 to	 show	 that	 deposits	 have	 gradually	adopted	 par	 clearance.	 Thus,	 this	 section	 argues	 that,	 concomitantly	 to	 the	various	 stages	 of	 U.S.	 banking	 history,	 bank	 deposits	 incrementally	 solidified	their	 promise	 to	 trade	 to	 higher-ranking	 money	 at	 par.	 While	 the	 promise	 to	trade	 at	 par	was	 very	weak	 during	 the	 Free	 Banking	 Era,	 when	 the	 dominant	form	of	private	credit	money	were	still	bank	notes	 (cf.	Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963),	 the	 systematic	 use	 of	 deposits	 as	money	 substitute	 developed	 after	 the	centralisation	of	bank	notes	issuance	(cf.	Liepmann	1933).	This	manifested	itself	first	in	the	National	Banking	System	and	later	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System.		In	the	National	Banking	System,	claims	for	par	clearance	mainly	relied	on	market	 mechanisms	 and	 private	 pooling	 arrangements.	 The	 National	 Banking	System	 was	 characteristically	 marked	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 central	 bank—a	feature	 that	 had	 developed	 in	 the	 decades	 before	 the	 Civil	War	 and	made	U.S.	banking	 predominantly	 rely	 on	 private	 credit	money	 creation.	 In	 1791,	 after	 a	struggle	 between	 Alexander	 Hamilton	 and	 Thomas	 Jefferson,	 the	 U.S.	 had	established	the	First	Bank	of	the	United	States,	a	de	facto	central	bank	with	the	powers	of	note	 issue,	government	 funding	and	acting	as	a	state	agent.	 In	1811,	the	First	Bank	was	abrogated	as	Congress	blocked	the	renewal	of	its	charter.	The																																																									63		 Arguably,	only	in	the	1930s,	in	the	context	of	the	Great	Depression	and	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes,	scholars	started	treating	them	explicitly	as	money	(cf.	e.g.	Meade	1934).	
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same	happened	to	the	Second	Bank	of	the	United	States,	which	was	established	in	 1816	 and	 closed	 in	 1836	 when	 President	 Andrew	 Jackson	 vetoed	 charter	renewal	 (Giannini	 2004:	 67-70).	 In	 absence	 of	 a	 centralized	 institution,	 the	necessary	 task	 of	 interbank	 clearing	 was	 conducted	 by	 privately	 run	 clearing	houses,	 which	 were	 established	 in	 the	 major	 financial	 centers	 and	 typically	controlled	 by	 the	 leading	 local	 banks.	 The	 activity	 of	 central	 clearing	 was	particularly	 important	as	 the	U.S.	had	a	unit	banking	system	that	did	not	allow	branch	 banking,	 which	 left	 the	 banking	 sector	 in	 a	 highly	 atomized	 and	decentralized	 shape	 (cf.	 Dunbar	 1885).	 Sometimes	 the	 Treasury	 took	 on	 the	functional	 role	 of	 a	 central	 bank.	 Provided	 that	 it	 had	 a	 fiscal	 surplus,	 the	Treasury	 intervened	 in	 the	 financial	market	by	purchasing	securities	similar	 to	open	market	operations	or	lent	directly	to	banks	as	central	banks	would	do	via	the	discount	window	(Smith	1936:	163).			Upon	the	assumption	that	bank	deposits	gradually	adopted	par	clearance	within	the	National	Banking	System	and	may	thus	count	as	private	credit	money,	Figure	 5.5—compiled	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 various	 sources—presents	 the	 empirical	Money	Matrix	for	the	U.S.	at	the	turn	of	the	century:			
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(1)	Pure	Public	Money		Treasury	liabilities	
• Greenbacks	
• Gold	certificates	
• Silver	certificates	
• Treasury	notes	of	1890		
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	National	Bank	liabilities	
• National	Bank	Notes	
	 	 	
(2)	Private-public	Money		
	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	National	Bank	liabilities	
• Bank	Deposits		State	Bank	liabilities	
• Bank	Deposits		Trust	Companies’	liabilities	
• Trust	Deposits			
Figure	5.5—The	Money	Matrix	in	the	early	20th	century	(empirically)			Accordingly,	 next	 to	 bank	 deposits	 as	 forms	 of	 pure	 private	 money	 issued	 by	national	banks,	state	banks	and	trust	companies,	bank	notes	were	public-private	
money	issued	only	by	national	banks.			At	the	top	of	the	monetary	hierarchy	was	still	commodity	money.	During	the	 Civil	 War,	 the	 U.S.	 went	 off	 the	 gold	 standard.	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Treasury	
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Salmon	P.	Chase	negotiated	a	loan	from	the	big	banks	of	New	York,	Boston	and	Philadelphia	to	the	government	of	the	Northern	States	and	insisted	that	it	was	to	be	fully	paid	in	gold.	As	a	consequence,	virtually	all	gold	reserves	were	pooled	at	the	Treasury,	which	forced	the	banking	system	to	suspend	convertibility	of	bank	notes	 into	 gold	 (Smith	 1936:	 42-56).	 After	 the	 Civil	 War,	 the	 U.S.	 adopted	 a	bimetallic	 system	with	 fixed	 exchange	 rates	 between	 gold	 and	 silver.	 In	 1879,	bimetallism	 was	 replaced	 by	 a	 pure	 gold	 standard	 again.	 Controversies	 had	accompanied	the	bimetallic	standard	since	its	re-enactment	because	the	price	of	silver	 had	 been	 too	 low,	making	 silver	 coinage	 unprofitable.	 After	 the	 Franco-Prussian	War	of	1870-71,	the	newly	founded	German	Empire	decided	in	favour	of	the	gold	standard,	de-monetized	silver	and	caused	a	further	global	price	slump	of	silver.	With	the	Coinage	Act	of	1873,	the	U.S.	effectively	ended	the	production	of	 silver	 dollars.	 After	 years	 of	 struggle,	 the	 decision	was	 taken	with	 the	 1878	Bland-Allison	Act	to	join	the	international	gold	standard	but	to	keep	some	silver	in	 circulation	 (Young	 1929:	 281-286).	 The	 crucial	 importance	 of	 gold	 was	cemented	with	the	Gold	Standard	Act	of	1900	(cf	U.S.	Congress	1900).			The	public	credit	money	realm	of	the	National	Banking	System	was	made	up	of	two	categories	of	‘pure	public	money’	issued	as	liabilities	of	the	Treasury:	‘Greenbacks’,	 on	 the	one	hand,	were	 initially	 an	 emergency	money	 form	 in	 the	Civil	War.	To	deprive	banks	of	 their	gold	reserves	and	concentrate	 them	at	 the	Treasury	for	the	purpose	of	war	finance,	Treasury	Secretary	Chase	created	them	as	 a	 liability	 that	 was	 not	 based	 on	 assets	 but	 solely	 on	 the	 guarantee	 of	 the	government	 to	 redeem	 them.	 By	 proclaiming	 that	 they	 are	 legal	 tender,	 banks	were	forced	to	hand	out	gold	in	demand	for	their	notes	and	accept	greenbacks	as	an	 ultimate	 means	 of	 payment	 instead.	 Prior	 to	 the	 Civil	 War,	 issuing	 paper	money	that	only	relied	on	government	guarantees	had	been	a	taboo.	Subject	to	strong	 inflation	during	the	war,	greenbacks	were	cancelled	out	 in	 its	aftermath	by	accepting	them	for	tax	payment	without	re-issuing	them	(Young	1929:	283).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 certificates	 for	 precious	 metals	 were	 a	 second	 form	 of	Treasury	 liabilities.	 Gold	 and	 silver	 certificates	 constituted	 forms	 of	 paper	currency	 in	 domestic	 circulation,	 which	 did	 not	 usually	 have	 a	 100	 percent	backing	 and	hence	were	 a	 form	of	 public	 credit	money.	While	 gold	 certificates	were	 first	 introduced	 in	 the	 Civil	War	 (Woelfel	 1991),	 silver	 certificates	 were	created	 as	 a	 concession	 to	 silver	 miners	 who	 felt	 disadvantaged	 by	 the	abolishment	of	the	bimetallic	standard.	With	the	1878	Bland-Allison	Act,	the	U.S.	Treasury	was	urged	to	buy	a	monthly	amount	of	silver	bullion	and	mint	 it	 into	coin	while	paying	with	silver	certificates	as	legal	tender	(Knox	1892:	148-156).			In	the	National	Banking	System’s	private	credit	money	realm,	commercial	banks	 could	not	 count	 on	 guaranteed	 emergency	 liquidity	 or	 solvency	 support	from	 any	 public	 institution.	 If	 a	 bank’s	 assets	 shrunk	 under	 the	 amount	 of	 its	outstanding	 liabilities,	 the	 bank	 had	 to	 close	 and	 the	 counterparties	 lost	 their	deposits,	 which	 they	 held	 as	 assets.	 Bank	 failures	 were	 the	 normality,	 their	possibility	was	well-known,	which	frequently	gave	rise	to	panics	and	bank	runs,	often	creating	self-fulfilling	prophecies.	The	most	influential	crisis	was	the	panic	of	1907	that	arose	after	the	failure	of	the	Knickerbocker	Trust	Company.	After	a	series	 of	 runs	 on	deposits—first	 on	 trusts,	 then	 also	 on	 commercial	 banks—in	New	York	 in	October,	 the	 crisis	 spilled	over	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country	 (Bruner	
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and	Carr	2009:	135-139;	Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	159).	In	a	typical	fashion	for	 the	 time,	 the	 banker	 J.	 Pierpont	 Morgan	 bailed	 out	 the	 deposit	 issuing	commercial	banks	by	establishing	a	private	emergency	backstop	through	which	he	supplied	liquidity	to	the	distressed	banking	system	(cf	Figure	5.6).		
		
Figure	5.6—J.	P.	Morgan’s	private	backstop	cushioning	other	banks’	losses		Following	up	on	the	1907	crisis,	a	vivid	political	process	emerged	that	ultimately	led	to	the	abolition	of	the	National	Banking	System,	and	with	some	detours,	the	establishment	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	with	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Act	 in	1913	(cf.	e.g.	Warburg	1930).		 The	 creation	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	 was	 a	 major	 step	 forward	towards	sustaining	par	 for	bank	deposits	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money.	 In	 its	orginal	 version,	 i.e.	 in	 its	 setup	 until	 after	 the	 Great	 Depression,	 the	 Federal	Reserve	was	more	of	a	de-centralized	bankers’	bank	and	hence	a	private,	not	a	public	 institution	 (Conti-Brown	 2016).	 As	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Act	 (U.S.	Congress	 1913),	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	was	 supposed	 to	 be	made	 up	 of	eight	to	twelve	reserve	districts.	National	banks	were	free	to	decide	whether	to	subscribe	 to	 the	 capital	 stock	 of	 the	 regional	 Federal	 Reserve	 Banks	 (Sec.	 2),	state	banks	had	to	apply	for	membership	(Sec.	9).	Hence,	the	member	banks	are	the	‘owners’	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Banks.	Each	Federal	Reserve	Bank	should	be	supervised	and	controlled	by	a	board	of	directors,	made	up	of	nine	directors	who	are	 in	 office	 for	 three	 years,	 two	 thirds	 of	 which	 were	 chosen	 by	 the	 private	sector.	The	Federal	Reserve	Board,	in	turn,	was	supposed	to	be	made	up	of	seven	members,	 including	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Treasury	 and	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	Currency	as	well	as	five	members	appointed	by	the	President	with	the	consent	of	the	Senate	(Sec.	10).	It	was	granted	supervisory	powers	for	each	Federal	Reserve	Bank	and	each	member	bank	(Sec.	11a,	details	 in	Sec.	21	and	22).	As	Friedman	and	Schwartz	(1963:	190)	note,	this	organizational	structure		“gave	 rise	 to	 numerous	 conflicts	 within	 the	 System,	 the	 most	 notable	being	the	continual	struggle	for	power	between	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	 New	 York	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board,	 with	 the	 balance	 shifting	from	time	to	time	depending	largely	on	the	personalities	involved”.		With	regard	 to	deposit	 creation,	 the	Federal	Reserve	Act	 implemented	a	shift	towards	the	discounting	of	short-term	credit	and	permitting	the	issuance	of	acceptances.	Federal	Reserve	Banks	were	allowed	to	discount	notes,	drafts	and	bills	 of	 exchange	with	maturities	 of	 up	 to	 90	 days	 if	 they	were	 “arising	 out	 of	actual	commercial	transactions”	and	not	“covering	merely	investments	or	issued	
J.P.Morgan									
Commercial	
Banks	
Banks’	
Counterparties	
Deposits	(short-term	IOU)	
Loan	(long-term	IOU)	
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or	 drawn	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 carrying	 or	 trading	 in	 stocks,	 bonds,	 or	 other	investment	securities,	except	bonds	and	notes	of	 the	Government	of	 the	United	States”	 (Sec.	 13).	 This,	 of	 course,	 corresponded	 to	 the	 Real	 Bills	 Doctrine	 (cf.	Mints	 1945).	The	 act	 centralized	 reserve	 holding	 at	 the	 Federal	Reserve	Banks	and	thus	put	an	end	to	the	pyramiding	of	reserves,	which	had	characteristically	shaped	 the	 National	 Banking	 System.	 Accordingly,	 country	 banks	 had	 to	 keep	12%	 reserves,	 reserve	 city	 banks	15%	and	 central	 reserve	 city	 banks	18%	 for	demand	deposits;	for	time	deposits,	all	banks	had	to	keep	a	reserve	ratio	of	5%	(Sec.	 19).	 Concomitantly,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Act	 established	 the	 category	 of	Federal	 Reserve	 deposits	 as	 liabilities	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Banks.	 Against	those	deposits,	the	Federal	Reserve	banks	had	to	keep	a	35%	percent	reserve	in	the	 form	 of	 gold	 or	 lawful	 money,	 i.e.	 money	 that	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 would	exchange	for	gold	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	195-196).	The	Federal	Reserve	Board	was	put	in	the	position	to	determine	the	interest	rate,	i.e.	“require	Federal	reserve	banks	to	rediscount	the	discounted	paper	of	other	Federal	reserve	banks	at	 rates	 of	 interest	 to	 be	 fixed	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board”	 (Sec.	 11b),	 and	modify	the	reserve	requirements	for	banks	in	special	circumstances	(Sec.	11c).	
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5.2.3	The	systemic	relevance	of	bank	deposits	
	This	section	discusses	the	status	of	commercial	bank	and	trust	deposits	in	terms	of	their	systemic	relevance	for	the	U.S.	monetary	system	in	the	early	decades	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	using	 the	 four	 criteria	of	 size,	 interconnectedness,	complexity	and	substitutability.			 With	 regard	 to	 the	 size	 of	 their	 issuance,	 deposit	 creation	 increased	massively	in	the	late	19th	century,	with	a	short	reduction	due	to	the	1907	crisis,	but	 then	 further	 until	 1929.	 Figure	 5.7—based	 on	 the	 data	 of	 Herrick	 (1909:	20)—shows	the	growth	of	deposits	issued	by	various	types	of	commercial	banks	as	well	as	 trust	companies	 from	1875	to	1908.	Figure	5.8—taken	 from	Federal	Reserve	Board	(1959:	12)—expands	this	overview	on	deposit	 issuance	by	non-national	 banks	 until	 its	 peak	 in	 1929,	 but	 does	 not	 distinguish	 between	 trust	companies	and	other	commercial	banks.		
	
Figure	5.7—Deposits	issued	by	different	institutions,	1875-1908	(in	million	USD)	
	
	
Figure	5.8—Deposits	issued	by	non-national	banks,	1896-1933	(in	million	USD)	 	
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As	 to	 the	 interconnectedness,	 bank	 deposits	 were	 issued	 by	 many	different	 individual	 institutions.	 In	 particular,	 due	 to	 the	 prohibition	 of	 branch	banking,	 the	 interconnectedness	 between	 different	 institutions	 was	 very	 high.	Figure	5.9—taken	from	Herrick	(1909:	19)—shows	the	 increase	 in	the	number	of	 trust	 companies,	 which	 was	 particularly	 sharp	 at	 around	 the	 turn	 of	 the	century.	Still,	it	needs	to	be	cautioned	that	credible	statistics	on	trust	companies	are	 shaky	 and	 hard	 to	 obtain,	 not	 the	 least	 because	 trust	 companies	 are	 not	 a	coherent	category	of	financial	institutions	(ibid:	1-2).		
	
	
Figure	5.9—Number	of	trust	companies	based	on	different	sources,	1896-1908	
	Concerning	 the	complexity,	both	commercial	banks	and	 trust	companies	had	 an	 increase	 in	 their	 interconnectedness	 throughout	 the	 monetary	 and	financial	 system.	 Trust	 companies	 were	 particularly	 opaque	 financial	instruments	(cf.	Cator	1902,	Herrick	1909,	Barnett	1911,	Bruner	and	Carr	2009).	Figure	5.10—taken	from	Frydman	et	al	(2013:	38)—sketches	the	scheme	of	trust	companies	 that,	with	 its	 attempt	 to	 corner	 the	market,	 caused	 the	 1907	panic.	Concerning	their	substitutability,	deposits	issued	by	commercial	banks	and	trust	companies	could	be	substituted	among	each	other	relatively	easily	but	not	fully	be	substituted	by	higher-ranking	money	forms,	notably	bank	notes	and	Federal	Reserve	 deposits.	 Given	 the	 sharp	 rise	 in	 deposit	 issuance	 in	 the	 early	 20th	century,	 no	 alternative	 short-term	 IOUs	would	 have	 been	 available	 into	which	the	balances	could	have	been	shifted	all	at	once.		To	sum	up,	we	may	contend	that,	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System	prior	to	the	 1929	 Financial	 Crisis,	 bank	 deposits	 have	 become	 a	 systemically	 relevant	private	 credit	 money	 form	 in	 the	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	instable	debt	claims.	The	deposits	of	national	banks—not	the	 least	due	to	 their	preferential	 treatment	 in	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Act—were	 hierarchically	 higher	and	treated	more	preferentially	than	those	of	state	banks.	Trust	deposits,	on	the	other	hand,	were	less	seen	as	a	key	financial	instrument	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System.	Data	about	them	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System	is	difficult	to	obtain	(cf.	Frydman	et	al.	2013);	as	the	literature	rarely	focuses	on	them	post-1913,	we	may	assume	that	their	relative	relevance	declined.	 	
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Figure	5.10—Trust	company	conglomerate	causing	the	1907	crisis			Figure	5.11	translates	these	findings	into	an	account	of	the	hierarchy	of	money	at	the	time.	Accordingly,	gold	was	at	the	top	layer.	With	the	Federal	Reserve	Act,	the	issuance	 of	 bank	 notes	 had	 been	 centralized	 at	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Federal	Reserve	notes	were	issued	against	commercial	credit	and	redeemable	in	gold	at	face	 value	 on	 demand,	 inducing	 par	 clearance	 (U.S.	 Congress	 1913:	 Sec.	 16).	National	bank	deposits	were	the	key	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form	 below	 notes	 in	 the	 hierarchy,	 promising	 to	 trade	 at	 par	 on	 demand,	followed	by	state	bank	and	trust	deposits.			
	
Figure	5.11—The	hierarchy	of	gold,	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits	 	
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5.3	Phase	II:	The	accommodation	of	deposits	in	the	public	money	supply		This	section	studies	the	accommodation	of	bank	deposits.	It	starts	by	addressing	the	1929	Stock	Market	Crash	and	the	four	waves	of	bank	runs	ensuing	it	between	1930	and	1933,	in	which	depositors	sought	to	convert	their	deposits	into	higher-ranking	money	 (5.3.1).	 The	 series	 of	 runs	 could	 only	 be	 stopped	 when	 newly	elected	president	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt	bailed	out	the	banks	by	announcing	a	 National	 Bank	 Holiday,	 holding	 his	 First	 Fireside	 Chat	 and	 passing	 the	Emergency	Banking	Act	in	March	1933	(5.3.2).	This	unprecedented	government	intervention	 accommodated	 deposits	 as	 it	 established	 an	 implicit	 100	 percent	deposit	guarantee	and	shifted	them	from	the	private	into	the	public	credit	money	realm.	This	 transformation	of	 the	monetary	system	was	the	unintentional	side-effect	 of	 rescuing	 attempts	 for	 the	 banking	 system	 to	 prevent	 a	 doomsday	scenario	 that—after	years	of	unsuccessful	management	by	President	Hoover—was	seen	as	imminent	(5.3.3).			
5.3.1	Financial	Instability	and	the	runs	from	1930	to	1933		The	Great	Depression	which	ensued	the	1929	stock	market	crash	marks	the	most	substantial	 failure	of	deposit	banking	in	modern	economic	history.	The	prelude	to	the	1929	Financial	Crisis	was	that	the	bull	market,	which	had	been	developing	since	1925	and	led	to	what	Galbraith	(1954:	xx)	describes	as	a	‘speculative	orgy’,	reached	 its	 peak	 on	 7	 September	 and	 declined	 in	 the	 following	 weeks.	 As	Ahamed	 (2009:	 308)	 puts	 it:	 “By	 1929,	 anywhere	 from	 two	 to	 three	 million	households,	one	out	of	every	ten	in	the	country,	had	money	invested	in	and	were	engaged	 with	 the	 market.	 Trading	 stocks	 had	 become	 more	 than	 a	 national	pastime—it	 had	 become	 a	 national	 obsession”.	 On	 24	October	 1929,	 the	 Black	Thursday,	 a	 panic	 emerged:	 “blocks	 of	 securities	were	 dumped	 on	 the	market	and	nearly	13	million	shares	were	traded”	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	305).			 To	provide	an	analytical	perspective	on	the	Great	Depression	with	a	focus	on	 bank	 deposits,	 this	 section	 adopts	 the	 periodization	 of	 Wicker	 (1996)	 and	divides	 the	era	 into	 five	different	phases	during	which	 the	U.S.	banking	system	was	affected	 in	various	 fashions.	Accordingly,	 in	 the	 initial	phase	 from	October	1929,	 the	banking	system	was	hardly	hit	 thanks	 to	 the	decisive	 intervention	of	the	 New	 York	 Fed.	 This	 initial	 period	 of	 relative	 calmness	 was	 followed	 by	 a	series	 of	 bank	 runs,	which	 appeared	 in	 four	waves:	The	 first	wave	 (November	1930	to	January	1931)	peaked	around	a	series	of	runs	following	the	bankruptcy	on	 the	Bank	of	 the	United	 States	 in	New	York	City.	The	 second	wave	 (April	 to	August	1931)	 remained	 region-specific	 in	 the	greater	Chicago	area	and	had	no	nation-wide	 effects.	 The	 third	 wave	 (September	 to	 October	 1931)	 was	mainly	precipitated	 by	 Britain’s	 suspension	 of	 the	 gold	 standard.	 It	 caused	 major	disruptions	in	the	U.S.	banking	system	and	was	followed	by	a	range	of	innovative	political	 measures	 adopted	 by	 the	 Hoover	 administration	 to	 cope	 with	 the	situation.	Finally,	in	the	fourth	wave	(November	1932	to	March	1933),	the	panic	reached	 an	 unprecedented	 level	 with	 a	 nation-wide	 run	 and	 an	 unparalleled	volume	of	deposits	defaulting.	Figure	5.12	visualizes	the	four	waves	in	relation	to	the	monthly	volume	of	deposits	suspended	in	the	U.S.	(cf.	FRB	1937:	909).	 	
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Figure	5.12—Monthly	suspensions	of	bank	deposits,	1929-1934	(in	billion	USD)	
		 The	1929	crash	first	 left	the	banking	system	remarkably	unaffected.	The	number	of	 deposits	 suspended	due	 to	bank	 failures	 remained	 at	 the	usual	 low	level.	“Because	the	big	New	York	City	banks	held	their	reserves	in	the	form	of	call	loans	 to	stockbrokers,	a	collapse	 in	stocks	 inevitably	raised	concerns	about	 the	safety	of	one	bank	or	 the	other,	often	 leading	 to	a	 run	on	 the	system,	which	 in	turn	 led	 to	 a	withdrawal	of	 liquidity	 from	 the	market,	which	 in	 turn	drove	 the	market	down	further”	(Ahamed	2009:	357).	However,	a	spill-over	to	the	banking	system	 could	 be	 avoided	 because	 the	 New	 York	 Fed	 acted	 promptly	 and	effectively.	It	supplied	additional	reserves	to	the	New	York	banking	system	by,	in	the	 words	 of	 Governor	 George	 Harrison,	 ‘keeping	 its	 discount	 window	 wide	open’	and	through	open	market	purchases	of	government	securities	amounting	to	$	160	million	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	339).		With	this	intervention,	although	it	was	successful,	Governor	Harrison	had	overstepped	 his	 competences	 within	 the	 checks	 and	 balances	 of	 the	 Federal	Reserve	System	because	he	had	not	consulted	with	the	Board	in	Washington:			 “That	purchase	was	far	in	excess	of	the	amount	the	System's	Open	Market	Investment	 Committee	 had	 been	 authorized	 to	 purchase	 for	 System	account.	 It	was	made	by	 the	New	York	Bank	on	 its	own	 initiative	 for	 its	own	 account	 without	 consulting	 either	 the	 Open	 Market	 Investment	Committee	 or	 the	 Board.	 Though	 subsequently	 ratified,	 it	 was	 […]	 the	occasion	 for	 another	 battle	 in	 the	 struggle	 between	 the	 Bank	 and	 the	Board,	which	had	important	effects	on	Federal	Reserve	policy	during	the	rest	of	the	contraction”	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	339).		The	 Board	 was	 very	 irritated	 about	 Harrison’s	 independent	 initiative	 and	perceived	his	failure	to	get	approval	from	Washington	first	as	a	violation	of	the	code	of	conduct.	This	led	to	ongoing	struggles	about	the	competencies	between	Washington	 and	 New	 York.	 While	 the	 Board	 sought	 to	 further	 restrict	 the	autonomy	of	the	New	York	Fed,	Harrison	suggested	postponing	the	bureaucratic	quarrels	over	legal	authority	until	after	the	crisis	(Ahamed	2009:	359).	 	
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The	first	wave	of	bank	runs	during	the	Great	Depression	occurred	roughly	one	year	after	the	stock	market	crashed.	Bank	failures	began	in	the	periphery	in	November	 1930,	 when	 256	 banks	 with	 $	180	 million	 of	 deposits	 failed,	 and	affected	New	York	City	in	December	with	352	banks	failing	and	$	370	million	of	deposits	lost	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	10-11,	308-311).	This	changed	the	monetary	 character	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 a	 substantial	 way.	 Bank	 customers	 now	systematically	sought	to	convert	their	holdings	of	bank	deposits	as	private	credit	money	 into	 hierarchically	 higher,	 yet	 scarcer,	 bank	 notes.	 This	 made	 banks’	liquidity	 and	 solvency	 positions	 deteriorate	 and	 often	 induced	 self-fulfilling	prophecies:		 “Many	 banks,	 seeking	 to	 accommodate	 cash	 demands	 or	 increase	liquidity,	 contracted	 credit	 and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 liquidated	 assets.	 This	reduced	 the	quantity	of	 cash	available	 to	 the	 community	which,	 in	 turn,	placed	additional	 cash	demands	on	banks.	Banks	were	 forced	 to	 restrict	credit	 and	 liquidate	 assets,	 further	 depressing	 asset	 prices	 and	exacerbating	 liquidity	 problems.	 As	 more	 banks	 were	 unable	 to	 meet	withdrawals	 and	 were	 closed,	 depositors	 became	 more	 sensitive	 to	rumors.	Confidence	in	the	banking	system	began	to	erode	and	bank	‘runs’	became	more	common”	(FDIC	1984:	33).			 The	 initial	 events	 took	 place	 following	 the	 failure	 of	 Caldwell	 and	Company,	 an	 investment	 banking	 firm	 from	 Nashville,	 Tennessee,	 which	 “had	invested	 aggressively	 in	 low-grade	 municipal	 bonds	 on	 pyramided	 credit	provided	by	his	 chain	of	banks	 and	 insurance	 companies”	 (Kindleberger	1973:	130).	As	Caldwell	controlled	the	largest	chain	of	banks	and	insurance	groups	in	the	 South,	 its	 failure	 affected	 four	 states—Tennessee,	 Kentucky,	 Arkansas	 and	North	Carolina—with	70	banks	failing	in	Arkansas	alone	(Wicker	1996:	32-33).	Caldwell’s	collapse	took	place	in	a	strained	financial	environment.	A	few	months	before,	the	Fed	had	stopped	its	liquidity	injections,	given	that	Governor	Harrison	had	 expressed	 his	 conviction	 that	 the	most	 severe	 part	 of	 the	 crisis	 was	 over	(Ahamed	2009:	370).	After	the	failure	of	Caldwell,	the	Federal	Reserve	Banks	of	Richmond	 and	 Atlanta	 eased	 the	 monetary	 conditions	 by	 increasing	 their	purchases	 of	 bills	 and	 government	 securities.	 However,	 the	 St.	 Louis	 Fed	 in	whose	 district	 Caldwell	 was	 located,	 remained	 inactive.	 The	 New	 York	 Fed’s	action,	in	turn,	was	contractionary	throughout	November	(Wicker	1996:	54-55).	Thus,	the	initial	response	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System	was	not	unanimous	and	most	likely	contributed	to	exacerbating	the	problem.	
	In	 December	 1930,	 the	 banking	 crisis	 reached	 New	 York.	 The	 events	unfolding	 are	 closely	 connected	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 Bank	 of	 the	 United	 States	(BUS)—a	 rather	 small	 commercial	 bank	 located	 in	 the	 Bronx	 whose	 resonant	name	made	 it	appear	much	more	significant	 than	 it	actually	was.	The	BUS	was	heavily	invested	into	real	estate	projects.	While	it	seemed	healthy	in	its	books,	its	actual	 exposure	 was	 hidden	 through	 affiliate	 companies.	 On	 10	 December,	rumours	spread	that	the	bank	was	in	trouble.	Depositors	lined	up	outside	of	the	bank,	waiting	to	convert	their	deposits	into	notes	(Ahamed	2009:	385-386).	On	11	December,	 the	BUS	had	to	close.	By	volume	of	deposits,	 this	was	the	 largest	bank	failure	in	U.S.	history	at	the	time	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	308-310).	As	a	consequence,	with	confidence	in	the	banking	system	deteriorating,	the	same	
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happened	to	the	Bankers’	Trust	of	Philadelphia	on	22	December	and	the	Chelsea	Bank	 and	 Trust	 in	 New	 York	 on	 23	 December	 (Wicker	 1996:	 36).	 Notably,	 a	private	 rescuing	 attempt	 facilitated	 by	 the	 New	 York	 Fed	 did	 not	 materialize.	Shortly	before	finishing	the	deal,	the	Clearing	House	banks	involved	had	second	thoughts.	They	cancelled	the	deal	as	they	did	not	consider	BUS’s	problem	to	be	one	of	liquidity,	which	could	be	resolved	by	emergency	lending,	but	of	solvency	(Ahamed	2009:	387).	This	assessment	had	been	put	into	doubt	later	on,	leaving	it	an	open	question	why	the	BUS	was	actually	denied	a	kind	of	support	that	had	been	common	in	many	instances	before	(Wicker	1996:	55-56).		Despite	these	drawbacks,	the	first	wave	of	the	crisis	did	not	last	long,	with	bank	failures	declining	sharply	at	the	beginning	of	1931	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	312).	After	 the	BUS	had	 failed,	 the	New	York	Fed	became	very	 active	 to	minimize	 the	side-effects	on	 the	money	market	caused	by	excess	conversion	of	deposits	into	higher-ranking	money:			 “In	the	face	of	large	depositor	withdrawals,	the	New	York	Fed	purchased	for	 its	 own	 account	 $40	 million	 of	 government	 securities	 on	 Saturday,	December	 13.	 Federal	 Reserve	 notes	 in	 circulation	 in	 the	 New	 York	District	 increased	 $71	million	 between	 December	 11	 and	 December	 17	and	another	$46	million	in	the	following	statement	week.	Bills	discounted	and	bills	bought	increased	$103	million.	Increased	accommodation	at	the	discount	 window	 and	 the	 purchase	 of	 acceptances	 plus	 security	purchases	were	able	to	more	than	offset	the	effects	of	increased	hoarding	on	bank	reserves.	Nevertheless,	reserves	fell	by	$	57	million.	The	increase	in	 Federal	 Reserve	 notes	 in	 circulation	 relative	 to	 the	 fall	 in	 reserve	deposits	led	to	an	increase	in	the	monetary	base”	(Wicker	1996:	55-56).	
	Government	policies	during	the	first	wave,	as	the	memoirs	of	President	Hoover	demonstrate,	did	not	pay	great	attention	to	the	banking	system.	At	the	core	of	the	administration’s	agenda	was	the	fight	against	unemployment	that	had	arisen	in	the	aftermath	of	the	stock	market	crash	(Hoover	1952:	41-60).		
	The	second	wave	of	bank	runs	took	place	from	April	to	August	1931	when	563	banks	failed	with	losses	of	deposits	amounting	to	$497	million.	In	contrast	to	the	other	waves,	Wicker	(1996:	62-65)	determines,	the	literature	does	not	agree	on	 an	 exact	 periodization	 (cf.	 Friedman	 and	 Schwartz	 1963:	 313-315	 who	employ	a	different	approach)	and	has	not	developed	a	coherent	narrative	about	the	 order	 of	 events.	 In	 geographical	 terms,	 the	 panic	was	 concentrated	 on	 the	greater	 Chicago	 area	 and	 did	 not	 have	 any	 perceptible	 nation-wide	 effects	(Wicker	 1996:	 68).	 The	 financial	 strains	 were	 exacerbated	 by	 distortions	 in	Europe,	which	 had	 effects	 on	 American	 finance	 as	 U.S.	 commercial	 banks	 held	significant	 amounts	 of	 foreign	 short-term	 obligations.	 Especially	 the	 failure	 of	Austria’s	Kreditanstalt	in	May	1931	and	the	closing	of	banks	in	Germany	in	July	had	repercussions.	Public	authorities	remained	inactive	and	missed	the	gradual	erosion	in	confidence.	The	Federal	Reserve	only	used	open	market	operations	to	react	 to	 usual	 seasonal	 movements	 (Friedman	 and	 Schwartz	 1963:	 314).	 The	Hoover	 administration	 was	 extremely	 busy	 dealing	 with	 the	 deteriorating	situation	in	Europe	and	the	world	economy	but	did	not	undertake	extraordinary	measures	with	regard	to	domestic	banking	(cf.	Hoover	1952:	61-80).	 	
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The	third	wave	of	bank	runs	followed	directly	upon	the	second,	yet	put	it	on	a	different	 scale	and	made	 the	previously	 regional	banking	 crisis	 a	national	one	 (Wicker	 1996:	 77-78).	 Precipitated	 by	 the	British	 announcement	 to	 go	 off	the	gold	standard	in	September	1931,	the	U.S.	monetary	and	banking	system	was	simultaneously	confronted	with	an	external	and	an	internal	drain.	The	decision	of	the	United	Kingdom	to	go	off	the	gold	standard	was	an	external	shock	for	the	U.S.	banking	system	and	led	to	an	international	run	on	U.S.	gold	reserves	causing	a	 massive	 outflow	 of	 gold	 (cf.	 Friedman	 and	 Schwartz	 1963:	 315-316).	Concomitantly,	bank	runs	emerged	all	over	the	country,	with	customers	seeking	to	 convert	 their	 deposits	 into	 notes	 and	 inducing	 bank	 failures	 and	 the	annihilation	 of	 private	 credit	money	 balances.	 In	 September	 and	 October,	 817	banks	 failed	 and	 $	47	 million	 of	 deposits	 were	 suspended	 (Wicker	 1996:	 62).	Geographically,	 the	 most	 affected	 areas	 of	 this	 internal	 drain	 were	 Ohio,	Pittsburgh	 and	 Philadelphia	 (Ahamed	 2009:	 435),	 while	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	district	 of	New	York	 remained	 rather	 unaffected	 (Wicker	 1996:	 78).	 In	August	and	September,	banks	with	deposits	of	$	414	million,	i.e.	more	than	one	percent	of	 total	 commercial	 bank	deposits,	 closed	 their	 doors	 (Friedman	 and	 Schwartz	1963:	316).	The	hoarding	of	currency	became	a	nation-wide	issue.	In	November	and	 December,	 the	 panic	 calmed	 down.	 However,	 the	 notes	 that	 had	 been	withdrawn	 were	 kept	 in	 various	 hiding	 places.	 A	 substantial	 return	 to	 the	banking	 system	did	not	materialize	 (Wicker	1996:	 72-73;	Ahamed	2009:	 435).	Table	 5.1—taken	 from	 Wicker	 (1996:	 87)—presents	 an	 overview	 on	 the	simultaneous	emergence	of	the	external	and	internal	drain.		
Date	 Change	in	monetary	gold	
stock	(external	drain)	
Change	in	currency	in	
circulation	(internal	drain)	23	Sep	1931	 -114	 +76	30	Sep	1931	 -156	 +82	7	Oct	1931	 -99	 +185	14	Oct	1931	 -218	 +42	21	Oct	1931	 -87	 +32	28	Oct	1931	 -48	 	
	
Table	5.1—External	and	internal	drain	during	the	third	wave	(in	million	USD)		 The	 New	 York	 Fed	 intervened	 by	 raising	 interest	 rates	 from	 1.5	 to	 2.5	percent	on	9	October,	and	to	3.5	percent	on	16	October	(Friedman	and	Schwartz:	1963:	317).	In	this,	it	decided	to	act	against	the	external	drain	in	order	to	cushion	the	international	effects,	while	exacerbating	the	internal	drain,	i.e.	the	conversion	of	deposits	into	notes.	Moreover,	the	Fed	did	not	conduct	open	market	purchases	to	counteract	the	internal	drain	but	sold	government	securities	(FDIC	1984:	35-36)	 and	 thus	 increased	 the	 deflationary	 pressure	 in	 an	 already	 deflationary	environment	 (Ahamed	 2009:	 436).	 This	 policy	 decision	 has	 been	 debated	extensively	and	criticized	widely.	As	to	Ahamed	(2009:	435-436),	the	Fed	sought	to	 defend	 the	 provision	 given	 in	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	Act	 that	 its	 notes	 should	have	a	40	percent	gold	backing.	Wicker	 (1996:	88-90),	 in	 contrast,	 argues	 that	the	New	York	Fed’s	main	concern	was	to	defend	the	monetary	base,	i.e.	the	sum	of	Federal	Reserve	notes	and	deposits.	Friedman	and	Schwartz	(1963:	317-318)	note	that	it	had	a	direct	impact	on	the	number	of	bank	failures,	which	spiked	in	the	direct	aftermath	of	the	decision.	 	
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To	cope	with	the	deteriorating	situation	in	the	banking	system,	President	Hoover	 announced	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	National	 Credit	 Corporation	 (NCC)	 in	October—a	 private	 organization	 among	 bankers	 responsible	 for	 forwarding	loans	 to	 struggling	 banks	 in	 order	 to	 ease	 liquidity	 problems	 (FDIC	1984:	 36).	This	 reflected	 his	 preference	 for	 a	market-based	 solution	without	 government	involvement	 in	 support	 of	 the	 Fed.	 The	 NCC	 should	 function	 similar	 to	 J.P.	Morgan’s	1907	rescue	scheme	but	was	far	less	successful	and	proved	ineffective	after	a	few	weeks	(Hoover	1952:	84-85,	97;	Wicker	1996:	95).	When	the	failure	of	 the	 NCC	 became	 obvious,	 Hoover	 turned	 to	 stronger	 political	 measures.	 In	January	 1932,	 he	 founded	 the	 Reconstruction	 Finance	 Corporation	 (RFC)	 as	 a	government	controlled	version	of	 the	NCC.	 It	was	tasked	to	provide	short-term	funding	 to	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions,	 but	 also	 non-financial	institutions	 such	 as	 railroad	 companies.	 It	 should	 support	 the	 Fed’s	 lender-of-last-resort	 function,	which	was	only	 allowed	 to	provide	 emergency	 liquidity	 to	its	member	banks	against	strict	collateral	requirements.	With	this	task,	the	RFC	clearly	 interfered	with	 the	 Fed’s	mandate	 and	 blurred	 the	 difference	 between	illiquidity	 and	 insolvency,	 which	 had	 guided	 the	 Fed’s	 policy	 in	 beforehand	(Jones	 1951:	 ix,	Wicker	 1996:	 109).	 The	RFC	 succeeded	 insofar	 as	 its	 liquidity	support	 enabled	more	 than	4,000	banks	 to	 remain	open	until	 the	 end	of	 1932	(FDIC	1984:	36)	and	brought	the	rise	in	hoarding	to	a	halt	(Jones	1952:	16).		The	 fourth	 wave	 of	 bank	 runs	 began—as	 the	 previous	 ones—in	 the	periphery.	 Nine	 bank	 failures	 in	 Idaho	 in	 August	 1932	 had	 left	 the	 situation	strained.	On	1	November	1932,	 the	 governor	 of	Nevada	declared	 a	 twelve-day	banking	holiday	when	the	biggest	banking	corporation	of	the	state	was	about	to	fail	and	the	RFC	refused	to	make	a	repeated	emergency	loan.	In	total,	13	banks	were	 suspended	 in	 Nevada	 that	month,	 amounting	 to	 $	 19	million	 of	 deposits	lost.	 The	 events	 are	 of	 special	 relevance	 because	Nevada	was	 the	 first	 state	 to	announce	 a	 bank	 moratorium,	 which	 introduced	 a	 novel	 source	 for	 the	uncertainty	of	depositors	and	became	a	vehicle	for	panic	and	contagion	(Wicker	1996:	108,	115).	The	banking	panic	 took	on	a	nation-wide	dimension	with	 the	failure	 of	 the	 Union	 Guardian	 Trust	 Company	 of	 Detroit,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	which	Michigan	Governor	William	A.	Comstock	declared	a	banking	holiday	on	14	February	1933.	That	decision	was	preceded	by	a	struggle	between	Henry	Ford,	the	largest	depositor	of	Union	Guardian,	and	Arthur	Ballantine,	Under	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	on	the	conditions	of	the	trust	company’s	insolvency.	Ballantine	and	 the	 RFC	 insisted	 that	 Ford	 should	 “play	 a	 principal	 role	 in	 the	 bailout	 by	subordinating	$7.5	million	in	deposits	and	contributing	$4	million	in	new	capital	to	the	Guardian	Group.	The	negotiations	collapsed	when	Henry	Ford	said	that	he	expected	 the	 RFC	 to	 grant	 the	 loan	without	 any	 further	 commitment	 from	 the	Ford	family.	He	simply	did	not	believe	that	the	RFC	would	allow	Guardian	Trust	to	 fail”	 (Wicker	 1996:	 118;	 also	 see	Wigmore	 1985:	 438-439).	 Without	 a	 run	happening	before,	the	Michigan	moratorium	affected	more	than	500	banks	that	held	$	1.5	billion	in	deposits	(Wicker	1996:	118).	The	moratorium	caused	a	run	on	 cash	 all	 over	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 contagion	 immediately	 affected	 Ohio,	Indiana	and	Illinois.	By	3	March	1933,	half	of	the	U.S.	states	had	declared	a	bank	holiday	(Shaw	2015:	46).	“For	the	first	time,	also,	the	internal	drain	partly	took	the	 form	 of	 a	 specific	 demand	 for	 gold	 coin	 and	 gold	 certificates	 in	 place	 of	Federal	Reserve	notes	or	other	currency”	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	326).	 	
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The	Federal	Reserve	reacted	to	the	events	in	a	similar	way	as	in	the	third	wave.	“It	raised	discount	rates	in	February	1933	in	reaction	to	the	external	drain,	and	 it	 did	 not	 seek	 to	 counter	 either	 the	 external	 or	 internal	 drain	 by	 any	extensive	open	market	purchases”	(Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	326).	 In	this,	the	 Fed	was	 caught	 up	 again	 in	 struggles	 between	New	York	 and	Washington.	While	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Governor	 Harrison	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Fed	 would	 have	implemented	 a	 more	 active	 crisis	 resolution	 strategy	 by	 making	 open	 market	purchases,	his	discretion	in	this	respect	had	been	severely	limited	by	a	decision	of	the	Board	on	4	January	1933,	which	had	established	a	ceiling	for	the	holding	of	government	 securities.	 Still,	 the	 New	 York	 Fed	 was	 able	 to	 provide	 some	remedies	 through	 its	 bill	 buying	 policies	 and	 successfully	 prevented	 a	 money	market	panic	by	making	it	possible	to	smoothly	transfer	funds	to	and	from	New	York	without	paying	excessive	interest	rates	(Wicker	1996:	134-138).	However,	Wicker	 (1996:	 137-138)	 critizises	 that	 the	 Fed	 should	 have	 recognized	 “its	lender-of-last-resort	responsibilities	and	extended	its	support	to	troubled	banks	even	if	they	were	of	questionable	solvency	with	insufficient	collateral	and	whose	demise	 would	 spread	 fear	 and	 uncertainty	 to	 other	 banks	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	country.	There	was	no	solid	basis	 for	 their	having	relinquished	their	 lender-of-Iast-resort	responsibilities	to	the	RFC.”	
	Overall,	using	the	analytical	language	of	the	Money	View,	the	expansion	of	the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	debt	claims	had	started	to	revert	itself	with	the	1929	crash	and	kept	on	shrinking	during	the	four	waves	of	bank	runs	in	the	Great	Depression.	This	continuously	endangered	par	clearance	of	deposits	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	bank	notes	and	led	to	the	annihilation	of	vast	private	credit	money	balances	held	 in	 the	 form	of	deposits.	 In	 the	 fourth	wave,	even	the	par	convertibility	of	notes	into	gold	was	put	into	question.	Figure	5.13	depicts	the	contagion	effects	that	materialized	between	1930	and	1933.			
	
Figure	5.13—Bank	runs	with	upward	contagion	in	the	hierarchy,	1930-1933	 	
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5.3.2	The	Emergency	Banking	Act	as	public	bailout	in	reaction	to	the	run	
	The	 fourth	wave	 of	 bank	 runs	 during	 the	Great	Depression	 coincided	with	 the	absence	 of	 clear	 political	 leadership,	 which	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 for	 the	deteriorating	banking	situation	(Silber	2009:	23).	In	the	presidential	elections	on	8	November	1932,	President	Hoover	was	defeated	by	his	Democratic	contender	Franklin	 Delano	 Roosevelt.	 The	 months	 after	 the	 election,	 before	 Roosevelt	assumed	office	on	4	March	1933,	Hoover	was	no	longer	able	to	exercise	decisive	action;	he	was	widely	perceived	as	 a	 ‘lame	duck’	 (Wigmore	1985:	421).	At	 the	same	 time,	 there	 was	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 next	 administration’s	 policy.	Rumours	 asserted	 that	 Roosevelt	 was	 planning	 a	 massive	 inflationary	programme	 by	 suspending	 the	 gold	 standard,	 which	 further	 fueled	 cash	withdrawals	 and	 hoarding	 (Kindleberger	 1973:	 194-195).	 On	 17	 February,	Hoover	asked	Roosevelt	in	a	letter	to	publicly	commit	to	a	balanced	budget	and	avoiding	inflation	or	devaluation	in	order	to	calm	down	the	banking	panics.	Such	a	commitment	would	have	 involved	abandoning	 large	parts	of	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal	 programme,	 so	 the	 President-elect	 never	 replied	 (Ahamed	 2009:	 444).	Moreover,	 in	 July	 1932,	Roosevelt’s	 vice-presidential	 candidate	 and	 Speaker	 of	the	House	John	H.	Garner	had	insisted	that	FRC	loans	were	to	be	made	public—a	decision	that	tended	to	accelerate	bank	runs	(Kindleberger	1973:	195).		 One	 of	 the	 first	 actions	 taken	 by	 Roosevelt	 after	 he	 had	 assumed	 office	was	 to	 declare	 a	 national	 bank	 holiday	 on	 5	 March	 1933.	 With	 a	 measure	unprecedented	in	U.S.	history,	banks	were	forced	to	remain	closed	until	9	March;	that	day,	the	moratorium	was	again	extend	for	three	days	(Silber	2009:	19).			“After	his	inauguration,	which	was	on	a	Saturday,	the	new	President	was	confronted	with	the	news	that	the	New	York	banks	would	not	be	able	to	open	on	the	following	Monday.	The	closing	of	the	banks	was	a	preemptive	strike,	 aimed	 to	 prevent	 a	 further	 cataclysmic	 explosion	 of	 bank	 and	financial	 institution	 failures	 which	 would	 be	 accompanied	 by	 a	horrendous	 decline	 of	 asset	 prices.	 The	 closing	 of	 the	 banks	moved	 the	solution	 of	 the	 immediate	 problem	 of	 broad	 insolvency	 of	 banks	 to	 the	legislative	 sphere	 of	 Washington,	 rather	 than	 leaving	 it	 to	 the	machinations	of	the	financial	community”	(Minsky	1995:	xi).			With	 his	 decision,	 Roosevelt	 effectively	 implemented	 a	 plan	 developed	 by	 the	Hoover	administration.	In	mid-February,	the	New	York	Fed’s	governor	Harrison	had	 already	 presented	 such	 a	 proposal.	 However,	 it	 was	 not	 implemented	 as	President	Hoover	and	Eugene	Meyer,	head	of	 the	Federal	Reserve	Board,	could	not	agree	on	how	to	move	ahead	and	who	should	take	responsibility.	On	2	March,	the	 gold	 reserves	 of	 the	New	York	Fed	had	 fallen	below	 the	minimum	 reserve	ratio.	 “Harrison	 called	 the	 president,	 begging	 him	 once	 again	 to	 declare	 a	national	banking	holiday.	Hoover	replied	that	he	‘did	not	want	his	last	official	act	in	office	to	be	the	closing	of	the	banks’”	(Ahamed	2009:	445).	It	was	thus	left	to	Roosevelt	 to	 take	 this	 action	 as	 his	 first	measure	 in	 office.	 “To	 the	 surprise	 of	many,	 Americans	 adapted	 to	 life	 without	 banks	 remarkably	 well—the	 initial	reaction	was	not	chaos	but	cooperation.	Store-keepers	liberally	extended	credit,	while	doctors,	lawyers,	and	pharmacists	continued	to	provide	services	in	return	for	personal	IOUs.	[…]	Other	places	resorted	to	barter”	(ibid:	451-452).	 	
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With	the	announcement	of	the	national	bank	holiday,	President	Roosevelt	had	exhausted,	if	not	overstepped,	his	formal	competences.	As	the	legal	basis,	he	had	 invoked	 “an	 obscure	 provision	 of	 the	 1917	 Trading	 with	 the	 Enemy	 Act,	designed	 to	 prevent	 gold	 shipments	 to	 hostile	 powers”	 (Ahamed	 2009:	 451).	Four	days	after	the	announcement,	Congress	passed	the	Emergency	Banking	Act	(EBA),	which	not	only	provided	an	ex	post-legitimization	of	Roosevelt’s	action	by	expanding	 the	 presidential	 authority	 in	 a	 banking	 crisis	 (U.S.	 Congress	 1933a:	Title	 I,	Sec.	1)	but	also	presented	a	 legislative	package	on	how	to	deal	with	 the	closed	banks	and	how	to	re-organize	the	Federal	Reserve’s	competences.		On	 the	one	hand,	 the	EBA’s	provisions	 for	 the	 closed	banks	 entitled	 the	Comptroller	 of	 the	 Currency	 to	 appoint	 a	 conservator	 for	 each	 bank	who	 then	should	“take	such	action	as	may	be	necessary	to	conserve	the	assets	of	such	bank	pending	 further	 disposition	 of	 its	 business	 as	 provided	 by	 law”	 (ibid:	 Title	 II,	Sec.	3).	Hence,	the	conservator	had	to	decide	if	the	bank	was	solvent	and	allowed	to	reopen	(ibid:	Title	II,	Sec.	5)	or	 if	parts	of	 its	assets	were	to	be	set	aside	and	distributed	among	its	depositors	(ibid:	Title	II,	Sec.	6).	To	raise	new	capital,	the	EBA	 allowed	 banks	 to	 issue	 ‘preferred	 stock’,	 provided	 the	 approval	 of	 the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency	(ibid:	Title	III,	Sec.	1).	The	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	in	turn,	could	instruct	the	RFC	“to	subscribe	for	preferred	stock	[…]	or	to	make	loans	 secured	 by	 such	 stock	 as	 collateral”	 (ibid:	 Title	 III,	 Sec.	 4).	 This	 was	 a	remarkable	expansion	of	the	RFC’s	powers	to	remedy	the	crisis	(FDIC	1984:	39).		On	the	other	hand,	 the	re-organization	of	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	role	and	competences	entailed	two	major	changes	with	regard	to	bank	deposits.	First,	the	EBA	 empowered	 the	 President	 to	 “investigate,	 regulate,	 or	 prohibit	 […]	 any	transactions	 in	 foreign	 exchange,	 transfers	 of	 credit	 between	 or	 payments	 by	banking	institutions	[…]	and	export,	hoarding,	melting,	or	earmarking	of	gold	or	silver	coin	or	bullion	or	currency”	(U.S.	Congress	1933a:	Title	I,	Sec.	2).	The	act	stipulated	 further	 that	 “no	member	 bank	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	 shall	transact	 any	 banking	 business	 except	 to	 such	 extent	 and	 subject	 to	 such	regulations,	limitations	and	restrictions	as	may	be	prescribed	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	with	the	approval	of	the	President”	(ibid:	Title	I,	Sec.	4).	Thus,	the	federal	 government	 received	 full	 authority	 over	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System,	effectively	 abolishing	 central	 bank	 autonomy	 and	 turning	 the	 Fed	 into	 a	government	 branch	 (cf.	 Ahamed	 2009:	 454-455).	 Second,	 the	 EBA	 entitled	 the	Fed—in	 “exceptional	 and	 exigent	 circumstances,	 and	 when	 any	 member	 bank	has	 no	 further	 eligible	 and	 acceptable	 assets	 available	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 obtain	adequate	credit	accommodations	through	rediscounting”—to	“make	advances	to	such	member	 bank	 on	 its	 time	 or	 demand	 notes	 secured	 to	 the	 satisfaction	 of	such	Federal	reserve	bank”	(U.S.	Congress	1933a:	Title	IV,	Sec.	2).	Thus,	the	Fed	was	 granted	 the	 emergency	power	 to	 fulfil	 its	 lender-of-last-resort	 function	by	accepting	any	kind	of	collateral	at	its	discretion.	In	addition,	Treasury	Secretary	William	Woodin	committed	that	 the	Treasury	would	 indemnify	the	Fed	for	any	losses	it	would	occur	in	bailing	out	the	banking	system	(Silber	2009:	26).		While	 the	EBA	granted	 the	 administration	 the	necessary	 instruments	 to	rehabilitate	the	banking	system,	it	was	Roosevelt’s	First	Fireside	Chat,	a	nation-wide	 radio	 broadcast	 on	 Sunday,	 12	 March	 1933,	 that	 restored	 confidence	 in	
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banks	among	the	U.S.	population	and,	in	this	completed	the	successful	short-term	government	intervention.	In	his	announcement,	Roosevelt	(1933)	explained:			 “The	 bank	 holiday	 […]	 is	 affording	 us	 the	 opportunity	 to	 supply	 the	currency	necessary	to	meet	the	situation.	Remember	that	no	sound	bank	is	a	dollar	worse	off	than	it	was	when	it	closed	its	doors	last	week.	Neither	is	 any	 bank	 which	 may	 turn	 out	 not	 to	 be	 in	 a	 position	 for	 immediate	opening.	The	new	 law	allows	 the	 twelve	Federal	Reserve	Banks	 to	 issue	additional	currency	on	good	assets	and	thus	the	banks	that	reopen	will	be	able	 to	meet	 every	 legitimate	 call.”	 Further	he	 stated:	 “I	do	not	promise	you	that	every	bank	will	be	reopened	or	that	individual	losses	will	not	be	suffered,	but	 there	will	be	no	 losses	 that	possibly	could	be	avoided;	and	there	would	have	been	more	and	greater	losses	had	we	continued	to	drift.	I	can	even	promise	you	salvation	for	some,	at	least,	of	the	sorely	pressed	banks”	(Roosevelt	1933).		To	underpin	his	promises,	Roosevelt	pointed	out	how	his	administration	was	going	to	deal	with	the	closed	banks—a	procedure	he	had	established	with	an	executive	order	 issued	on	10	March.	Accordingly,	 the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	was	 to	 issue	 licenses	 allowing	banks	 to	 reopen	 (Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	422).	 Banks	were	 divided	 into	 three	 categories:	 those	 that	 could	 be	 reopened	without	 any	 support,	 those	 that	 required	 a	 capital	 infusion	 from	 the	 RFC	 and	those	that	had	to	be	liquidated	(Minsky	1995:	xi):		“There	 was	 no	 time	 for	 individual	 bank	 examinations.	 Decisions	 were	made	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 whatever	 information	 was	 available	 at	 the	 time	which	in	most	cases	was	bank	examiners'	reports	at	the	last	examination	date.	 Since	 there	were	decisions	pending	 to	open	or	not	 to	open	18,000	banks	in	no	more	than	four	days,	the	task	was	an	especially	gruelling	one.	For	a	bank	to	be	denied	a	license	to	reopen	appeared	to	be	on	the	face	of	it	arbitrary	and	capricious,	particularly	since	 there	was	no	provision	 for	appeal,	 and	 the	 standards	 of	 evaluation	 were	 not	 fixed	 in	 advance.	 It	would	be	difficult	to	conceive	of	a	more	arbitrary	act	of	government	short	of	nationalization	of	the	banks”	(Wicker	1996:	146).		The	Fireside	Chat	indeed	calmed	the	situation.	When	the	banks	reopened	on	13	March,	 depositors	 returned	 their	 hoarded	 cash.	 More	 than	 half	 of	 the	 notes	hoarded	were	 returned	within	 two	weeks	after	 the	Fireside	Chat	 (Silber	2009:	19).	At	the	same	time,	the	U.S.	banking	landscape	was	fundamentally	altered:		“Only	one-half	of	the	nations'	banks	with	90	percent	of	the	total	banking	resources	were	judged	capable	of	resuming	business	on	March	15;	these	banks	 were	 presumably	 safe	 which	 meant	 that	 they	 were	 solvent.	 The	government	 guaranteed	 the	 soundness	 of	 each	 of	 the	 reopened	 banks.	The	 other	 half	 remained	 unlicensed;	 45	 percent	 of	 these	 were	 placed	under	the	direction	of	‘conservators’	whose	function	it	was	to	reorganize	the	banks	for	the	purpose	of	eventually	restoring	all	of	them	to	solvency.	The	 remaining	 5	 percent	 (about	 1,000	 banks)	 would	 have	 to	 be	 closed	permanently”	(Wicker	1996:	145-146).		Taken	 together,	 the	 rescuing	 operations	 of	 the	 Roosevelt	 administration	 in	March	1933	sum	up	to	a	large,	nation-wide	bailout	of	the	U.S.	banking	system.	 	
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3.5.3	Accommodating	bank	deposits	as	systemic	transformation		President	 Roosevelt’s	 New	 Deal,	 and	 notably	 his	 first	 100	 days	 in	 office,	 have	risen	 to	pre-eminent	historical	prominence	and	were	 subject	 to	wide	 scholarly	debates	 (cf.	Alter	2006).	This	 study	adds	 an	 additional	perspective:	Within	 the	Money	View	 framework,	 the	 Emergency	Banking	Act—in	 line	with	 Roosevelt’s	promises	made	to	the	U.S.	population	in	his	First	Fireside	Chat—established	an	implicit	100	percent	guarantee	by	the	government	for	deposits.	By	creating	a	de	
facto	solvency	backstop,	in	addition	to	putting	the	Federal	Reserve	System	under	federal	control	and	extending	the	lender-of-last-resort	responsibilities,	deposits	received	 comprehensive	 governmental	 protection.	 As	 Figure	 5.14	 highlights,	Roosevelt’s	 intervention	 thus	 constitutes	 an	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 deposits,	which	 were	 shifted	 from	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 realm—as	 both	 a	 form	 of	
public-private	 money	 and	 pure	 private	 money—into	 the	 public	 credit	 money	realm	and	became	private-public	money.	
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Figure	5.14—Bank	deposit	accommodation	via	the	1933	Emergency	Banking	Act		 Silber	 (2009)	 details	 how	 the	 implicit	 deposit	 insurance	 worked.	 Most	important	was	the	Fed’s	“commitment	to	supply	unlimited	amounts	of	currency	to	reopened	banks”	(ibid:	20),	which	could	be	credibly	made	by	Roosevelt	due	to	the	 expanded	 presidential	 powers.	 This	 commitment	 went	 well	 beyond	 mere	liquidity	 support	but	also	addressed	 the	banks’	 solvency—a	 line	 that	had	been	blurred	substantially	during	the	 four	waves	of	bank	runs.	The	Fed’s	action	was	backstopped	 by	 the	 Treasury’s	 assurance	 to	 indemnify	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	banks	for	all	losses	they	might	possibly	incur.	In	addition,	the	RFC’s	guarantee	to	inject	 capital	 into	 all	 banks—not	 only	 member	 banks	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	System	but	also	non-member	national	banks,	state	banks	and	trust	companies—through	the	purchase	of	preferred	stock	was	a	second	dimension	of	the	solvency	backstop	for	bank	deposits	(see	Figure	5.15).	 	
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Further,	Silber	(2009:	27)	insists	that	the	implicit	deposit	guarantee	had	been	well	understood	by	 the	population.	He	hypothesizes	 that	 to	communicate	the	 guarantee,	 there	was	 actually	 a	 concerted	 plan	 going	 on,	 even	 beyond	 the	proclamation	of	the	guarantee	via	the	Fireside	Chat.	Thus,	in	the	Minutes	of	the	Board	of	Directors	of	the	New	York	Fed	on	10	March	1933,	it	says:			“Under	this	law,	enacted	as	a	part	of	the	program	for	reopening	the	banks,	the	Federal	Reserve	Banks	become	in	effect	guarantors	of	the	deposits	of	the	 reopened	 banks.	 While	 they	 are	 not	 legally	 bound	 there	 is	 a	 large	moral	responsibility”	(cited	after	Silber	2009:	27).			Two	days	later,	coinciding	with	the	Fireside	Chat,	the	New	York	Times	wrote:			 “Some	 bankers	 who	 were	 here	 today	 […]	 interpreted	 the	 emergency	banking	 act	 as	 a	 measure	 under	 which	 the	 government	 practically	guarantees,	not	officially	but	morally,	 the	deposits	 in	 the	banks	which	 it	permits	 to	 re-open.	This	point	of	view	was	based	on	 the	 fact	 that	banks	permitted	to	open	are	characterized	as	100	per	cent	sound	and	assured	of	sufficient	currency	to	meet	all	obligations”	(cited	after	Silber	2009:	25).			Years	later,	Francis	Awalt,	in	1933	Acting	Controller	of	the	Currency,	confirmed	that	the	administration	had	intended	to	announce	such	an	implicit	guarantee:		 “It	 was	 felt	 that	 the	 various	 Federal	 Reserve	 Banks	 must	 back	 the	reopened	banks	 to	 the	hilt,	and	that	 it	was	no	 time	 for	any	conservative	head	 of	 a	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 to	 exercise	 his	 conservatism,	 should	demand	be	made	for	currency.	We	reasoned,	therefore,	that	if	the	Federal	Reserve	agreed	to	a	reopening	of	a	particular	bank,	 it	would	necessarily	be	forced	to	back	it	one	hundred	percent”	(cited	after	Silber	2009:	26).		 Altogether,	Roosevelt	set	up	an	ad	hoc	public	framework	to	guarantee	that	deposits	maintain	par	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	(Figure	5.16):		
	
Figure	5.16—	Accommodation	as	public	guarantee	to	sustain	par	for	deposits	 	
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Establishing	 the	 public	 framework	 to	 guarantee	 par	 clearance	 changed	 the	character	of	deposits	as	credit	money.	 In	 the	 logic	of	 the	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	expanding,	yet	instable	debt	claims,	bank	deposits	had	initially	been	a	promise	made	by	the	private	issuing	institution	to	pay	a	higher-ranking	money	form	on	demand.	The	public	framework	effectively	exempted	the	issuing	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	 from	meeting	 their	payment	obligation	 in	a	crisis	 as	 the	 state	 from	 then	 on	 declared	 to	 stand	 ready	 and	 take	 over	 the	payment	 commitments.	 The	 banks	 that	 were	 re-opened	 after	 the	 1933	 bank	holiday	were	made	effectively	bankruptcy	remote.	This	changed	the	character	of	deposits	and	amounted	to	a	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.			 In	 this,	 accommodating	 bank	 deposits	 in	 the	 public	 money	 supply	 and	thus	 transforming	 the	 monetary	 system	 was	 not	 the	 primary	 goal	 of	 the	President	 but	 an	 unintentional	 side-effect.	When	 the	 Roosevelt	 administration	set	up	the	implicit	deposit	insurance	scheme,	their	primary	focus	was	to	rescue	the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	 and	 stop	 the	 disintegration	 banks	 as	 deposit-issuing	speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 after	 years	 of	 a	 secular	 banking	 crisis.	 A	 great	number	of	remedial	measures	had	been	tried	between	October	1929	and	March	1933,	but	none	had	ultimately	been	able	 to	provide	 a	 satisfactory	 remedy.	 For	this	 reason,	 there	were	 not	many	 alternative	 proposals	 left	 on	 the	 table	 other	than	 a	 strong	 and	 decisive	 government	 intervention	 when	 Franklin	 Delano	Roosevelt	assumed	office	(cf.	Ahamed	2009:	453-454).	Confronted	with	a	nation-wide	 bank	 run,	 he	 had	 to	 take	 far	 reaching	 measures	 under	 extreme	 time	pressure	 and	with	 the	 terminal	 disintegration	 of	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	 as	 a	realistic	 scenario.	 Introducing	 a	 public	 guarantee	 for	 deposits	 had	 been	discussed	already	after	 the	1907	crisis,	 and	 in	1932—during	 the	 third	wave	of	bank	runs—a	bill	for	explicit	deposit	insurance	had	been	sponsored	in	Congress	by	Representative	Henry	B.	Steagall.	The	bill	had	passed	the	House	but	was	killed	in	 the	 Senate	 Banking	 and	 Currency	 Committee	 on	 28	 May	 1932	 due	 to	 the	intense	opposition	of	Senator	Glass	 (Friedman	and	Schwartz	1963:	434).	Thus,	President	 Roosevelt	 implemented	 plans	 that	 had	 been	 on	 the	 table	 before	 but	had	 lacked	 an	 actual	majority.	 In	 a	 quasi-dictatorial	manner,	 positioned	 at	 the	highest	executive	position,	he	pushed	through	the	plan	as	the	ultima	ratio	in	the	Great	Depression,	hazarding	all	accompanying	consequences.		As	to	the	functionalist	logic	of	the	accommodation	theory,	the	underlying	reason	for	the	deposit	accommodation	to	materialize	in	1933	was	not	President	Roosevelt’s	 individual	 determinacy,	 nor	 can	 it	 be	 attributed	 to	 errors	 that	 had	been	made	 before	 he	 assumed	 office,	 such	 as	 President	Hoover’s	 hesitation	 to	intervene	forcefully	or	the	decision	of	the	Federal	Reserve	to	raise	interest	rates	instead	 of	 reducing	 it.	 Instead,	 the	 root	 cause	 for	 the	 accommodation	 was	 a	property	deeply	rooted	in	the	credit	money	system	itself—namely	the	ability	to	create	credit	money	out	of	nothing,	which,	over	time,	had	turned	bank	deposits	into	 a	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 through	 a	 process	 of	financial	expansion	that	at	some	point	had	to	revert	 itself.	Then,	to	prevent	the	collapse	of	the	debt	house	of	cards,	the	state’s	infrastructural	power	to	backstop	the	collapsing	credit	money	system	had	to	be	exercised.	This	technical	necessity	eventuated	 when	 newly	 inaugurated	 President	 Roosevelt	 implemented	 the	accommodation	with	his	quasi-dictatorial	actions	in	March	1933.	 	
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5.4	Conclusion	
	This	chapter	has	traced	the	rise	of	bank	deposits	as	a	private	credit	money	form	with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 19th	 century	 U.S.	 and	 their	 accommodation	 via	 the	establishment	of	an	 implicit	100	percent	deposit	guarantee	by	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt	via	the	1933	Emergency	Banking	Act	and	his	First	Fireside	Chat.	This	political	 intervention	unintentionally	 transformed	 the	U.S.	monetary	 system	by	permanently	 shifting	 the	 delineation	 between	 public	 and	 private	 credit	money	within	the	hybridity	of	the	self-referential	credit	money	system.		 The	 chapter	 has	 applied	 the	 two-phase	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation	on	the	U.S.	in	the	early	20th	century	as	the	then	emerging	centre	of	the	world’s	financial	system.	It	demonstrated	how	deposit-issuing	commercial	banks	 and	 trust	 companies	 as	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 rose	 in	 importance	throughout	 the	 National	 Banking	 System	 and	 were	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 early	Federal	Reserve	System.	In	the	Great	Depression,	with	the	ongoing	system-wide	failure	of	deposit-issuing	institutions,	the	expansionary	tendency	reverted	itself.	While	 the	 first	 three	 waves	 of	 bank	 runs	 did	 not	 yet	 trigger	 a	 political	intervention	 that	 would	 have	 gone	 beyond	 the	 established	 lines	 of	 granting	primarily	 private	 liquidity	 support,	 it	was	 only	 the	 fourth	wave	with	 its	 sheer	dimension	 of	 bank	 failures	 that	 set	 free	 the	 necessity	 to	 accommodate	 the	systemically	relevant	deposits,	following	the	functionalist	logic	embedded	in	the	credit	money	system	which	allows	money	creation	ex	nihilo.		What	happened	to	the	accommodated	bank	deposits	after	the	Emergency	Banking	Act?	Were	 the	accommodation	and	 the	 concomitant	 transformation	of	the	 monetary	 system	 permanent?	 How	 did	 it	 affect	 the	 setup	 of	 the	 money	supply	as	we	know	it	today?		The	 implicit	 deposit	 guarantee	had	been	 implemented	 as	 an	 emergency	measure	which	was	justified	only	months	later,	in	June,	with	the	Banking	Act	of	1933	 (U.S.	 Congress	 1933b).	 The	 1933	 Act	 contains	 a	 great	 number	 of	 new	provisions	 for	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 system	 and	 various	 amendments	 to	 the	 1913	Federal	Reserve	Act.	Most	importantly,	the	Act	confirmed	the	accommodation	of	bank	 deposits	 and,	 by	 founding	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Corporation	(FDIC),	 turned	 the	 implicit	deposit	 guarantee	 into	an	explicit	 one	 (ibid:	 Sec.	8).	Moreover,	by	 implementing	 the	provisions	commonly	referred	 to	as	 the	 ‘Glass-Steagall	Act’	(ibid:	Sec.	16,	20,	21	and	32,	cf.	Carpenter	and	Murphy	2010:	5-7),	commercial	 and	 investment	 banking	 were	 separated.	 As	 it	 granted	 a	 special	status	 to	 commercial	 banks	 as	deposit	 issuers,	 deposit	 creation	was	 effectively	declared	an	activity	different	from	and	standing	out	compared	to	other	forms	of	credit	creation.	Moreover,	bank	deposits	were	made	more	similar	to	bank	notes	by	prohibiting	interest	payments	on	demand	deposits—a	provision	also	known	as	 ‘Regulation	 Q’	 (U.S.	 Congress	 1933b:	 Sec.	 11).	 The	 authorization	 of	 branch	banking	aimed	at	making	deposit	creation	safer	and	banks	more	resilient	(ibid:	Sec.	5).	Finally,	the	Act	strengthens	the	centralized	control	over	deposit	creation	within	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	 by	making	 the	 Board	 responsible	 for	 open	market	operations	(ibid:	Sec.	8).	Figure	5.17	sketches	the	new	setup	of	the	public	framework	for	deposit	creation	to	guarantee	par	established	with	the	1933	Act.	 	
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Figure	5.17—Explicit	deposit	guarantee	via	the	newly	established	FDIC		 	Many	 observers	 and	 politicians	 had	 regarded	 the	 Banking	 Act	 of	 1933	merely	as	a	preliminary	legislation	decided	upon	under	high	time	pressure	and	expected	further	 legislation	to	follow	(cf.	Phillips	1995:	58).	This	was	delivered	with	 the	Banking	Act	of	1935,	which	modified	 the	 regulations	 for	 the	FDIC	 (cf.	FDIC	 1984)	 and	 completed	 the	 centralization	 of	 power	 in	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	System	 by	 strengthening	 the	 Board	 in	Washington,	 effectively	 turning	 the	 Fed	into	a	public	institution	(cf.	Conti-Brown	2016).	The	banking	community	voiced	strict	 opposition	 to	 this	 politicization	 and	 argued,	 in	 line	 with	 many	 other	bankers,	 that	 the	 provisions	were	 against	 all	 intentions	 of	 the	 original	 Federal	Reserve	 System.	 The	 press	 even	 feared	 ‘economic	 dictatorship’	 by	 the	government	over	the	banking	system	(Burns	1974:	139-140,	149-169).				Still,	 there	 was	 also	 disappointment	 about	 the	 absence	 of	 stricter	regulations	 for	 deposit	 creation.	Most	 notably,	 the	 so-called	 ‘Chicago	Plan’	 had	been	advertised,	primarily	by	a	group	of	academics	around	Henry	Simons,	who	called	 for	 the	 “outright	 abolition	 of	 deposit	 banking	 on	 the	 fractional-reserve	principle”	(Simons	1933,	cited	in	Phillips	1995:	65).	The	idea	was	to	divide	banks	into	 two	 parts:	 one	 to	 administer	 the	 part	 of	 the	 payments	 system	 that	 uses	deposits	 subject	 to	 check;	 the	 other	 to	 participate	 in	 financing	 of	 the	 ‘capital	development	of	 the	economy’.	 “The	 ‘Chicago	Plan’	called	 for	deposits	subject	 to	check	to	be	offset	on	the	books	of	the	banks	with	100	percent	reserves”	(Minsky	1995:	xii).	The	intention	was	to	deprive	banks	of	their	ability	to	create	deposits	autonomously	as	credit	money—in	 fact,	 the	 translation	 to	deposits	of	what	 the	1844	Bank	Charter	Act	had	been	 for	bank	notes.	 For	 the	banking	 industry,	 the	Chicago	Plan	was	the	even	bigger	evil.	Hence,	the	presence	of	an	alternative	that	would	 have	 brought	 along	 even	 more	 government	 involvement	 may	 have	increased	their	consent	to	the	1935	Act	(Burns	1974:	130).	 	
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Figure	 5.18	 demonstrates	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 Banking	 Acts	 of	 1933	 and	1935	had	on	the	status	of	bank	deposits	in	the	empirical	Money	Matrix.	While	the	Emergency	 Banking	 Act	 had	 only	 provided	 for	 an	 implicit,	 ad	 hoc	 deposit	guarantee	based	on	very	widely	interpreted	presidential	powers	and	not	put	into	tangible	 law,	 the	 Banking	 Acts	 of	 1933	 and	 1935	 made	 the	 status	 of	 bank	deposits	private-public	money	explicit	and	legally	binding.				
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	
	
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	
	
	
	
	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	
	
																											Bank	deposits	
																											(issued	against	
																											public	and	
																											private	debt)	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
			
	
Figure	5.18—Re-regulating	deposits	via	the	1933	and	1935	Banking	Acts			This	approach,	 throughout	the	20th	century,	became	the	 international	norm	(cf.	Laeven	 2004)	 and	 is	 authoritative	 for	 the	 role	 of	 bank	 deposits	 in	 the	money	supply	 today.	 The	 decisive	 step	 leading	 to	 this	 setup	 in	 today’s	 public-private	hybridity	of	the	monetary	system	was	President	Roosevelt’s	decision	to	bail	out	the	U.S.	 banking	 system	 in	 1933	 and	 the	 concomitant	 accommodation	 of	 bank	deposits,	which	shifted	them	from	the	private	to	the	public	credit	money	realm.		
June	1933	&	
August	1935	
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Chapter	6	
Case	III:	Shadow	Money	Accommodation	in	the	United	States			
“September	2008	was	the	moment	when	the	Fed	moved	from	
lender	of	last	resort	to	dealer	of	last	resort,	in	effect	taking	the	
collapsing	 wholesale	 money	 market	 onto	 its	 own	 balance	
sheet.	 […]	 This	 financial	 crisis	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 subprime	
mortgage	crisis	or	even	a	shadow	banking	crisis;	it	is	a	crisis	
of	 the	 entire	 market-based	 credit	 system	 that	 we	 have	
constructed	since	1970”	(Mehrling	2011:	122-123).			
6.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	chapter	analyzes	and	explains	the	accommodation	of	shadow	money	which	occurred	 in	 the	 U.S.	 in	 2008.	With	 the	 financial	 liberalization	 of	 the	 1970s,	 in	what	was	later	termed	the	shadow	banking	system,	three	privately	created	IOUs	gradually	 took	 on	 the	 role	 of	 shadow	money:	 asset-backed	 commercial	 papers	(ABCPs),	 overnight	 repurchase	 agreements	 (repos)	 and	 money	 market	 fund	(MMF)	shares.	The	accommodation	took	place	in	the	2007-9	Crisis	when	the	Fed	and	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 intervened	 to	 backstop	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system.	Overnight	 repos	 were	 turned	 into	 private-public	money	 via	 the	 Fed’s	 Primary	Dealer	Credit	Facility	and	the	Term	Securities	Lending	Facility,	MMF	shares	via	the	Treasury’s	Temporary	Guaranty.	ABCPs,	in	contrast,	were	not	accommodated	as	their	market	had	been	dried	out	already	in	2007	(cf.	Figure	6.1).		
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(3)	Public-private	Money	
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																											ABCPs		
	
Figure	6.1—Shadow	money	accommodation	via	Fed	and	Treasury	interventions	 	
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This	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:		Section	6.2	addresses	the	rise	of	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	as	 private	 credit	money	 forms	 in	 the	United	 States,	which	 took	 place	 after	 the	collapse	of	the	Bretton	Woods	System	(phase	I).	To	this	end,	the	section	develops	a	Money	View	perspective	on	the	creation	of	shadow	money	as	a	swap	of	IOUs.	The	 analysis	 draws	 primarily	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Perry	 Mehrling,	 Zoltan	 Pozsar,	Daniela	 Gabor	 and	 Morgan	 Ricks	 as	 the	 main	 authors	 in	 the	 shadow	 money	discourse.	 The	 core	 argument	 to	 view	 shadow	 banking	 as	 a	 monetary	phenomenon	 is	 that	 the	mechanics	 on	 the	 balance	 sheets	 of	 the	 issuers	 of	 the	three	 shadow	money	 forms—Special	 Purpose	 Vehicles,	 Securities	 Dealers	 and	Money	 Market	 Funds—have	 crucial	 parallels	 to	 those	 of	 deposit-issuing	commercial	 banks	 (6.2.1).	 Subsequently,	 the	 section	 discusses	 the	 institutional	details	 of	 shadow	 money	 creation	 to	 understand	 how	 shadow	 money	 forms	established	par	vis-à-vis	bank	deposits.	In	particular,	 it	will	be	pointed	out	how	shadow	 money	 has	 been	 specifically	 invented	 to	 offer	 more	 profitable	alternatives	 to	 deposits.	 This	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 sketch	 the	 public-private	money	hybridity	 in	 the	U.S.	prior	 to	 the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	 (6.2.2).	Finally,	the	 section	 discusses	 how	 to	 which	 extent	 shadow	 money	 forms	 attained	systemic	relevance	throughout	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	century	(6.2.3).		 Section	 6.3	 studies	 the	 accommodation	 of	 shadow	 money	 during	 the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	(phase	II).	In	this,	it	interprets	the	crisis	in	its	essence	as	a	run	on	the	shadow	banking	system	that	occurred	in	three	waves	in	2007	and	2008.	 The	 section	 first	 depicts	 how	 the	 shadow	banking	 system	 endogenously	got	 into	 financial	 distress—the	 collapse	 of	 the	 housing	 market	 affected	 ABCP	issuance	which	spilled	over	on	the	repo	market	and	finally	affected	MMF	shares	(6.3.1).	Subsequently,	 it	discusses	the	public	measures	taken	in	response	to	the	crisis,	 notably	 the	 emergency	 liquidity	 facilities	 established	 by	 the	 Federal	Reserve	and	the	temporary	guarantee	for	money	market	funds	announced	by	the	Treasury	 (6.3.2).	 Finally,	 the	 section	 develops	 the	 argument	 for	 why	 those	interventions	represent	an	accommodation	of	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	by	 establishing	 public	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 backstops,	 which	 amounts	 to	 an	unintentional	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	(6.3.3).		The	 concluding	 section	 6.4	 presents	 a	 brief	 sketch	 of	 the	 follow-up	processes	 of	 the	 accommodation	 which—although	 a	 range	 of	 important	decisions	 have	 already	 been	 taken—must	 be	 considered	 as	 still	 ongoing.	Primarily,	 it	 focuses	 on	 decisions	 taken	 by	 the	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	Commission	 to	 re-regulate	 ABCPs	 and	 MMF	 shares	 as	 well	 as	 institutional	innovations	implemented	by	the	Federal	Reserve.	 	
	 174	
6.2	Phase	I:	The	Rise	of	Shadow	Money	as	Private	Credit	Money	
	This	 section	applies	phase	 I	 of	 the	 accommodation	model	 on	ABCPs,	 overnight	repos	 and	 MMF	 shares,	 the	 three	 eminent	 shadow	 money	 forms,	 and	 studies	their	 rise	 as	 systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 in	 the	 United	 States.	Drawing	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Perry	 Mehrling,	 Zoltan	 Pozsar,	 Daniela	Gabor	 and	Morgan	 Ricks,	 the	 section	 substantiates	 the	 argument	 that	 shadow	banking—as	 is	 specific	 for	 the	 contemporary	 financial	 system—is	 a	monetary	phenomenon.	ABCPs,	overnight	 repos	and	MMF	shares	are	accordingly	 created	by	 profit-driven	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 by	 swapping	 IOUs	 of	 different	maturities	 (6.2.1).	 The	 section	 then	 sketches	 how	 ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	shares	adopted	a	role	as	private	credit	money	by	establishing	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	 deposits	 as	 higher-ranking	 money	 forms	 and	 how	 this	 affected	 the	monetary	 system	 in	 the	 late	 20th	 and	 early	 21st	 century	 (6.2.2).	 Finally,	 the	section	 discusses	 the	 extent	 to	which	 shadow	money	 has	 become	 systemically	relevant	by	the	time	when	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	set	in	(6.2.3).			
6.2.1	Financial	innovation	and	shadow	money	creation	as	a	swap	of	IOUs		The	 term	 ‘shadow	 banking’	 has	 been	 coined	 by	 Paul	 McCulley	 in	 a	 speech	 at	Jackson	Hole	in	2007	to	provide	an	analytical	account	of	the	financial	structures	which,	 at	 that	 point,	 were	 at	 the	 brink	 of	 collapsing	 (cf.	 McCulley	 2009).	According	 to	 the	authoritative	definition	of	 the	Financial	 Stability	Board	 (FSB),	shadow	banking	is	to	be	understood	as	‘credit	intermediation	involving	entities	and	 activities	 outside	 the	 regular	 banking	 system’	 (FSB	 2011:	 1).	 This	 section	looks	 at	 the	 financial	 innovation	 that	 has	 materialized	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 the	shadow	banking	 system.	 It	 develops	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 issuance	 of	 ABCPs,	overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 corresponds	 to	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	 and	 is	 thus	conceptually	in	line	with	a	Money	View	understanding	of	credit	money	creation.			 The	 dominant	 view	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature	 suggests	 that	 the	 origin	 of	shadow	banking	is	best	to	be	explained	by	regulatory	arbitrage	(cf.	Nesvetailova	2015)	 as	well	 as	 tax	 and	 credit	 rating	 arbitrage	 (Bryan	 et	 al.	 2016).	 This	 view	treats	 shadow	 banking	 essentially	 as	 a	 non-monetary	phenomenon.	 Those	 IPE	contributions	 tackle	both	conceptual	and	empirical	aspects	of	 shadow	banking.	The	 conceptual	 studies	 predominantly	 analyze	 the	 decisions	 of	 regulators	 and	financial	policy-makers,	concomitantly	to	the	strategies	of	the	financial	industry,	to	 understand	 and	 explain	 the	 complex	web	 of	 ‘shadow	 intermediaries’.	 Many	works	 focus	 on	 the	 U.S.	 shadow	 banking	 sector	 (Fein	 2013,	 Gerding	 2011,	McIntire	 2014,	 Riles	 2014,	 Schwarcz	 2012);	 others	 take	 into	 account	 the	 EU	(Bieling	 2014,	 Thiemann	 2014a,	 2014b),	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (Sennholz-Weinhardt	 2014),	 China	 (Elliott	 et	 al.	 2015)	 or	 the	 ‘de-territorialization’	 of	shadow	banking,	which	is	reflected	in	the	prominent	role	of	tax	havens	and	off-shore	 financial	 centres	 (Palan	and	Nesvetailova	2014,	Rixen	2013).	Conceptual	contributions	 to	 shadow	 banking	 in	 a	 broader	 sense	 focus	 on	 financial	innovation	 (Engelen	 et	 al.	 2010,	 Nesvetailova	 2014,	 2015,	 Seabrooke	 and	Tsingou	 2010)	 and	 the	 process	 of	 financialization	 (Kessler	 and	Wilhelm	 2013,	Nersisyan	 and	 Wray	 2010).	 More	 empirically	 oriented	 contributions	 to	 this	
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strand	of	 the	shadow	banking	 literature	analyse	particular	market	segments	 in	the	shadow	banking	conglomerate.	Securitization,	asset-backed	securities	(ABSs)	and	ABCPs	are	particularly	addressed	by	Acharya	et	al.	 (2013),	Lysandrou	and	Nesvetailova	(2015),	Nesvetailova	and	Sandu	(2015)	and	Thiemann	(2012).	 In-depth	analyses	of	the	repo	market	and	collateral	intermediation	are	to	be	found	in	Gabor	(2012,	2013,	2014a,	2015),	Gabor	and	Ban	(2016),	Lysandrou	(2011),	Riles	 (2011),	 Singh	 (2013,	 2014a,	 2014b)	 as	 well	 as	 Singh	 and	 Stella	 (2013).	Studies	on	MMFs	have	been	published	by	Admati	and	Hellwig	(2013),	Baba	and	McCauley	 (2009),	Baklanova	 (2012),	Baklanova	and	Tanega	 (2014),	Peirce	and	Greene	 (2014)	 and	 Perlow	 (2011).	 IMF	 (2014)	 and	 Harutyunya	 et	 al.	 (2015)	present	quantitative	estimations	of	the	international	shadow	banking	system.		 From	a	Money	View	perspective,	however,	shadow	banking	is	a	monetary	phenomenon	 as	 one	 of	 its	 key	 aspects	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 substitutes	 for	 bank	deposits—it	 is	 the	mere	 continuation	 of	 traditional	 banking	 by	 other	means.64	This	notion,	or	“imaginary”	(cf.	Gabor	2013),	has	explicitly	been	introduced	and	fleshed	 out	 in	 Pozsar	 (2014),	 but	 the	 idea	 also	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 Pozsar	 (2011,	2015),	Mehrling	(2011,	2012a,	2012b,	2012c,	2013a,	2013b,	2013c,	2015a)	and	Mehrling	et	al.	2013).	Likewise,	Ricks	(2011)	presents	a	thorough	argument	for	why	the	liabilities	of	shadow	banks	are	functionally	equivalent	to	bank	deposits.	This	idea	is	further	developed	and	spelled	out	in	Ricks	(2012a,	2012b,	2013	and	2016)	as	well	as	Claessens	et	al.	(2014),	Gabor	(2014b),	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	(2016),	McMillan	(2014),	Moe	(2012,	2014)	and	Turner	(2012).	Adrian	(2014),	in	his	 literature	review	on	 the	economics	of	 shadow	banking,	 identifies	private	money	 creation	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	 features	 attributed	 to	 shadow	 banking	 and	points	 to	 Gorton	 and	 Metrick	 (2012),	 Moreira	 and	 Savov	 (2012)	 as	 well	 as	Sunderam	(2012)	as	the	most	relevant	papers	stressing	this	point.	Gorton	(2010)	explicitly	analyses	the	quality	of	repos	as	a	substitute	to	bank	deposits.		The	 rise	 of	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system	 is	 connected	 to	 financial	innovation	and	the	development	of	new	financial	instruments	that	are	based	on	a	swap	of	IOUs	of	different	maturities.	Some	of	those	instruments	have	come	to	be	called	‘shadow	money’	by	proponents	of	treating	shadow	banking	as	a	monetary	phenomenon.	While	there	are	different	ways	of	conceptualizing	shadow	money,	this	study	follows	the	approach	of	Mehrling	(2011)	and	Ricks	(2011)	who	argue	that	 there	 are	 three	 relevant	 financial	 instruments	 created	 in	 the	 shadow	banking	 system	 that	 function	 as	 shadow	 money:	 ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	 shares.		 These	 are	 issued	by	different	 speculative	 and	Ponzi	 units	 that	 in	this	 regard	 function	 as	 ‘shadow	 banks’.65	ABCPs	 are	 the	 liabilities	 of	 Special	Purpose	Vehicles	(SPVs)66—entities	typically	set	up	by	large	commercial	banks,	which	 use	 them	 as	 off-balance-sheet	 institutions	 to	 conduct	 banking	 functions	while	 circumventing	 capital	 requirements	 (Covitz	 et	 al.	 2009:	 6-7).	 Overnight	repos	are	private	debt	instruments	constructed	around	the	sale	and	repurchase																																																									64		 Cf.	Michell	 (2016)	 for	 an	excellent	discussion	of	 the	antagonism	between	a	monetary	and	a	non-monetary	perspective	on	shadow	banking.	65		 Interpretations	of	the	term	‘shadow	bank’	differ	in	the	literature.	Lysandrou	and	Nesvetailova	(2015)	e.g.	restrict	the	term	primarily	to	SPVs	as	banks’	off-balance	sheet	entities.	66	 Other	 terms	 for	 SPVs	 that	 are	 legally	 different	 but	 functionally	 equivalent	 are	 ‘Structured	Purpose	Vehicle’,	‘Special	Investment	Vehicles’,	‘ABCP	conduits’	or	‘ABCP	programmes’.	
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of	 securities.	 The	 repo	 market	 is	 run	 by	 securities	 dealers	 who—as	 they	 are	willing	 to	 buy	 and	 sell	 repos	 at	 different	 prices	 and	maturities—act	 as	market	makers	(Mehrling	2013b,	2013c).	MMF	shares	are	the	liabilities	of	MMFs,	which	pool	 the	 funds	 of	 households	 and	 institutional	 investors	 on	 the	 retail	 money	market	to	invest	them	in	the	shadow	banking	system	(ICI	2014:	196).	MMFs	can	be	 categorized	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 investment	 strategies:	 Government	MMFs	invest	 at	 least	 99,5%	 of	 their	 assets	 into	 cash,	 government	 securities	 or	 fully	collateralized	 repos,	 prime	 MMFs	 in	 floating	 or	 variable	 rate	 debt	 and	commercial	 papers,	 and	 tax-exempt	 MMFs	 in	 obligations	 of	 state	 and	 local	jurisdictions	that	are	exempt	from	income	tax.	Figure	6.2—based	on	Baklanova	(2012:	108)—visualizes	this	typology.			
	
	
Figure	6.2—Types	of	U.S.	money	market	funds		Historicall,y	ABCPs	developed	as	a	financial	innovation	in	the	mid-1980s:	“ABCP	 conduits	 were	 primarily	 sponsored	 by	 major	 commercial	 banks	 as	 a	means	 of	 providing	 trade	 receivable	 financing	 to	 their	 corporate	 customers“	(Bate	 et	 al.	 2003:	 5).	 In	 this	 sense,	 ABCPs	 were	 an	 important	 tool	 for	 banks’	liability	 management	 that	 helped	 them	 ‘optimize’	 their	 credit	 money	 issuance	under	 the	 condition	of	 a	 starkly	 regulated	deposit	banking	 system	 (cf.	D’Arista	and	 Schlesinger	 1993).	 However,	 the	 ABCP	market	 “only	 became	 a	 significant	source	of	 funding	 in	the	1990s”	(ibid:	16).	Figure	6.3—taken	from	FitchRatings	(2001:	2)	—shows	the	quantitative	rise	in	ABCP	issuance.		
	
Figure	6.3—Rise	of	ABCP	issuance,	1989-2001	 	
All	U.S.	Money	Market	Funds	(MMFs)	
Municipal	MMFs	(Tax-free	MMFs)	 Taxable	MMFs	
National	Municipal	MMFs	 Single	State	Municipal	MMFs	 Prime	MMFs	 Government	MMFs	
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Overnight	 repos,	 as	 a	 financial	 instrument	used	 in	 the	 inter-dealer	 repo	market,	 developed	 as	 a	 financial	 innovation	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s	 but	 have	their	 roots	 already	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century.	 As	 to	 Skyrm	 (2013),	 the	 classical	repurchase	 agreement	 developed	 during	 the	 First	 World	 War	 and	 was	 used	between	 banks	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	 With	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 Treasury-Federal	Reserve	Accord	of	1951,		“the	 Fed	was	 given	 the	mandate	 to	 control	 inflation	 and	 […]	 began	 using	Repurchase	Agreements	 to	 inject	 cash	 into	 the	market	 to	 control	 interest	rates	 more	 actively.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Repo	 became	 a	 financing	 tool	 for	securities	dealers	and	money-center	banks.	The	first	use	of	Matched-Sales	occurred	 in	 1966	 when	 the	 Fed	 needed	 to	 drain	 excess	 liquidity	 that	resulted	from	a	sudden	surge	in	bank	reserves.	The	Repo	market	continued	to	 grow	 and	 was	 even	 given	 a	 boost	 after	 the	 Fed	 exempted	 Repo	 from	banks’	 reserve	 requirement	 calculations	 in	 1969.	 At	 this	 time,	 there	 still	were	no	‘customers’	in	the	market,	it	was	an	inter-dealer	market	primarily	used	 for	 funding	 long	positions,	or	 for	money-center	banks	 to	 invest	cash	[…].	Repo	was	generally	just	overnight	and	settled	for	cash”	(ibid).		 MMF	shares	came	up	as	a	financial	innovation	in	the	in	the	early	1970s	to	circumvent	 Regulation	 Q,	 which	 limited	 the	 amount	 of	 interest	 that	 U.S.	commercial	banks	were	allowed	to	pay	on	savings	accounts:			“In	 January	 1970	 banks	 were	 offering	 only	 4.5	 per	 cent	 interest	 on	depositor’s	 passbook	 saving	 accounts,	 while	 3-month	 US	 Treasury	 bills	earned	 eight	 per	 cent	 and	 the	 yield	 on	 3-month	 banks’	 certificates	 of	deposit	was	hovering	close	to	nine	per	cent.	The	catch	was	that	certificates	of	deposit	were	only	sold	in	$100,000	denominations	and,	therefore,	were	largely	 unavailable	 to	 investors	 with	 smaller	 cash	 balances.	 Henry	 B.R.	Brown	 and	Bruce	R.	 Bent—both	 are	 now	 credited	 as	 inventors	 of	money	market	 mutual	 funds—came	 up	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 how	 to	 help	 small	investors	to	access	the	market	rates	only	available	to	wealthier	depositors.	Brown	and	Bent	decided	to	pool	small	cash	balances	into	a	larger	portfolio,	or	a	mutual	fund,	to	achieve	the	required	investment	scale.	A	prospectus	of	the	Reserve	Fund,	the	first	US	money	market	fund,	was	approved	by	the	US	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	in	the	fall	of	1972”	(Baklanova	2012:	97-98).		 Figure	 6.4—based	 on	 Claessens	 et	 al.	 (2012)—demonstrates	 how	 the	creation	of	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	is	systematically	connected	within	the	shadow	banking	system.	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	are	produced	via	two	main	channels	of	shadow	banking	(cf.	McMillan	2014:	65-79):	the	 ‘repo	channel’	 (connected	 to	collateralized	 lending)	and	 the	 ‘ABCP	channel’	(operating	 via	 securitization	 of	 structured	 assets).	 MMFs	 connect	 both	 these	channels	with	 institutional	 investors	 and,	 to	 a	much	 lesser	 extent,	 households.	Taken	 together,	 this	 market-based	 credit	 system	 conducts	 ‘money	 market	funding	 of	 capital	 market	 lending’	 (Mehrling	 et	 al.	 2013:	 2).	 Following	 the	analytical	perspective	of	Pozsar	et	al.	 (2012),	what	a	classical	commercial	bank	did	on	 its	own	singular	balance	sheet	occurs	 in	 the	shadow	banking	system	on	different	connected	balance	sheets	“through	a	daisy-chain	of	non-bank	financial	intermediaries	in	a	multi	step	process”	(Pozsar	et	al.	2012:	10).	 	
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With	 regard	 to	 the	 balance	 sheet	 mechanics	 involved,	 as	 Figure	 6.5	demonstrates,	 the	 issuance	of	ABCPs,	overnight	 repos	and	MMF	shares	 implies	swapping	 IOUs	 of	 different	 maturities	 (cf.	 2.3.1;	 Mehrling	 2015a):	 SPVs	 swap	ABCPs	as	short-term	IOUs	against	ABSs	as	longer-term	IOUs	(Acharya	et	al.	2010:	1).	 Securities	dealers	 swap	overnight	 repos—i.e.	 repos	of	 the	 shortest	possible	maturity—against	 term	repos	with	 longer	maturities.	Finally,	MMFs	swap	their	shares	 with	 instantaneous	 maturity	 against	 ABCPs	 or	 repos,	 which	 have	 still	slightly	longer	maturities	(cf.	Jackson	2013:	379)	(see	Figure	6.5).			 Assets	 Liabilities		 	 	SPVs	 ABSs	(long-term	IOUs)		 ABCPs	(short-term	IOUs)	Securities	Dealers	 Term	repos	(long-term	IOUs)		 Overnight	repos	(short-term	IOUs)	MMFs	 ABCPs	and	overnight	repos	(short-term	IOUs)	 MMF	shares	(very	short-term	IOUs)		
Figure	6.5—Shadow	money	created	as	a	swap	of	IOUs		 	As	a	caveat,	while	Figure	6.5	presents	the	Money	View’s	key	rationale	for	regarding	 ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 as	 shadow	 money,	 this	assessment	is	far	from	being	uncontested	in	the	shadow	money	literature.	In	fact,	there	 is	no	unique,	broadly	accepted	definition	about	what	constitutes	 ‘shadow	money’	and	what	not.		As	a	first	point	of	disagreemt,	some	scholars	put	the	view	into	doubt	that	repos	 are	 actually	 a	 credit	 instrument	 while	 pointing	 to	 the	 legal	 structure	 of	repo	deal.	Accordingly,	repo	transactions	are	conventionally	portrayed	as	a	two-step	sale	and	repurchase	of	a	security.	 In	the	case	of	overnight	repos,	 the	MMF	pays	deposits	today	to	attain	a	security	(‘first	 leg’)	and	receives	back	its	money	the	next	day	with	interest	(‘second	leg’):		
Today	 MMF	 	 Securities	Dealer	–	Deposit	 	 	 +	Deposit	 	+	Security	 	 	 –	Security		 		
Tomorrow	 MMF	 	 Securities	Dealer	+	Deposit	 	 	 –	Deposit	 	–	Security	 	 	 +	Security	 	
	
Figure	6.6—Non-monetary	perspective	on	repo	issuance		In	this	representation,	the	two	transactions	are	separate	from	each	other	and	do	not	formally	imply	the	issuance	of	an	IOU.	Following	this	line	of	argumentation,	it	is	not	obvious	why	repo	transactions	should	be	a	 form	of	private	credit	money	creation	(cf.	Copeland	et	al.	2010,	2011,	2012,	Singh	2013,	2014,	Choudhry	2006,	as	 well	 as	 Interview	 3).	 Regarding	 repo	 issuance	 as	 credit	 money	 creation	
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becomes	 sensible	 only	 if	 we	 adopt	 an	 economic	 perspective	 on	 the	 deal	 and	emphasize	what	 the	Securities	Dealer	does	 today,	namely	 lending	money	while	promising	to	repay	it	tomorrow	and	thus	issuing	a	repo	certificate	as	an	IOU.	The	security’s	 transfer	 of	 ownership	 is	 then	 seen	 as	 a	 mere	 byproduct	 of	 the	transaction.	 Following	 this	 approach,	 which	 is	 emphasized	 e.g.	 by	 Mehrling	(2011,	2013c),	Pozsar	(2014),	Gorton	(2010)	and	Ricks	(2011),	we	can	identify	the	established	balance	sheet	mechanics	for	credit	money	creation	as	denoted	in	Figure	6.5	(also	see	Interviews	5,	6,	7,	8).		 A	 second	 point	 of	 controversy	 is	 that	 scholars	 bring	 forth	 a	 different	selection	 of	 shadow	 money	 forms	 than	 adopted	 in	 this	 study.	 Pozsar	 (2014)	focuses	on	repos	and	MMF	shares;	others	would	bring	in	a	broader	picture	and	also	regard	asset-backed	securities	as	shadow	money	(Interview	1).	Ricks	(2016)	also	considers	eurodollars	to	be	shadow	money.	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	(2016),	in	turn,	single	out	repos	as	the	quintessential	shadow	money	form	and	assign	a	subordinate	 role	 to	 ABCPs	 and	MMF	 shares.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 argue	 that	repos	 are	 distinctive	 because	 the	 use	 of	 collateral	 enhances	 their	 promise	 to	trade	 at	 par.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 by	 focusing	 on	 repos,	 they	 stress	 the	 role	 of	commercial	banks	creating	shadow	money	and	of	 the	Treasuries	as	well	as	 the	sovereign	bond	market	 in	 running	 it	 (Gabor	and	Vestergaard	2016:	2-3).	Their	approach,	while	in	many	respects	compatible	to	the	analysis	of	this	study,	places	a	 different	 emphasis	 in	 its	 account	 of	 the	market-based	 finance	 system	as	 it	 is	less	 driven	 by	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 of	 a	 market-based	 credit	 theory	 on	 money	when	it	comes	to	alternative	forms	of	money	creation.			 As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	in	the	approach	adopted	in	this	study,	there	are	three	main	 criteria	 for	 a	 financial	 instrument	 to	be	 considered	a	private	 credit	money	 form:	First,	 from	a	supply	side	perspective,	 it	must	be	a	short-term	IOU	that	is	held	by	the	issuing	institution	as	its	liability	and	that	has	been	created	on	the	 basis	 of	 a	 swap	 of	 IOUs	 of	 different	 maturities	 (Mehrling	 2015a).	 Second,	from	a	demand	side	perspective,	this	short-term	IOU	is	held	as	an	asset	by	agents	who	 consider	 it	 ‘cash’,	 i.e.	 the	 most	 liquid	 form	 of	 an	 asset	 capable	 of	 doing	immediate	 purchases	 of	 commodities	 or	 other	 financial	 assets	 (Pozsar	 2014).	Third,	 the	 IOU	 constitutes	 a	 promise	 to	 pay	 higher-ranking	money	 to	which	 it	trades	 at	 par	 or	 quasi-par	 and	 in	 which	 it	 is	 instantaneously	 or	 almost	instantaneously	convertible.	The	aspect	of	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	forms	is	what	ultimately	makes	the	IOU	‘money’	in	the	sense	of	being	part	of	 the	 Money	 Matrix	 (cf.	 Pozsar	 2014).	 In	 line	 with	 the	 analyses	 of	 Mehrling	(2011)	and	Ricks	(2011),	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	satisfy	these	criteria.	 Moreover,	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 term	 repos,	 when	 they	 are	 close	 to	maturity	or	marked	to	market,	also	correspond	to	such	understanding	of	shadow	money.	 In	 this	 case,	 we	 may	 think	 of	 them	 as	 broadly	 corresponding	 to	 the	category	of	overnight	repos	in	the	context	of	this	study.		 	
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6.2.2	Establishing	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	forms	of	money	
	From	a	Money	View	perspective,	to	qualify	as	private	credit	money,	the	privately	created	 IOUs	 created	 in	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system	 need	 to	 trade	 at	 par	 or	quasi-par	with	higher-ranking	money	forms,	first	and	foremost	deposits.	Hence,	it	needs	to	be	asked	if,	how	and	when	such	par	exchange	was	established	in	the	case	of	ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	and	MMF	shares.	As	 to	be	demonstrated,	 three	factors	apply	to	the	three	private	IOUs	and	contributed	to	establishing	par	vis-à-vis	bank	deposits:	By	making	them	as	simple	in	use	as	bank	deposits,	the	issuers	stabilized	 the	 money	 demand	 for	 their	 liabilities;	 they	 made	 use	 of	 specific	accounting	 techniques	 to	 induce	 quasi-par	 clearance;	 and	 they	 had	 private	backstops	in	place.		 First,	 ABCPs	 are	 IOUs	with	 very	 short-term	maturities.	 The	majority	 of	ABCPs	 had	 maturities	 of	 one	 to	 four	 days	 (Covitz	 et	 al.	 2009:	 2).	 This	 short-termness	made	them	money-like	and	virtually	trade	at	par:	“In	the	ABCP	market,	[…]	 investors	 expect	 to	 be	 able	 to	 access	 their	 funds	 on	 demand	 at	 par	 value”	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	2).	When	an	ABCP	matures,	its	holder	can	choose	to	keep	the	funds	 deposited	 by	 rolling	 them	 over	 or	 liquidate	 them	 by	 not	 doing	 so.	 This	makes	 them	as	easy	and	 convenient	 as	bank	deposits.	ABCP-issuing	SPVs	have	private	sponsors	 that	guarantee	par	exchange.	As	off-balance	sheet	 institutions	of	 commercial	banks,	 SPVs	can	 tap	 the	balance	 sheet	of	 their	 ‘sponsors’,	which	typically	have	issued	explicit	guarantees	to	back	the	SPVs	in	case	of	default	(see	Figure	6.7).	 “ABCP	 is	 thought	 to	be	 liquid	because	 investors	can	 liquidate	 their	positions,	 as	 often	 as	 every	 day,	 with	 no	 price	 impact”	 (Covitz	 et	 al	 2009:	 7).	ABCP	 issuance	 is	based	on	“securitization	without	risk	 transfer”	(Acharya	et	al.	2009),	 which	 implies	 the	 sponsors	 have	 “to	 pay	 off	 maturing	 ABCP	 at	 par	independently	of	underlying	asset	values”	(Acharya	and	Schnabl	2010:	40).		
		
Figure	6.7—Special	purpose	vehicles	in	the	ABCP	markets	 	
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Second,	 overnight	 repos	 are	 offered	 by	 securities	 dealers	 to	MMFs	who	then	‘deposit’	their	funds	by	purchasing	the	IOU	and	the	security.	The	MMF	can	decide	on	the	next	day	whether	to	roll	over	the	repo	for	another	night	or	not.	The	MMF	may	keep	the	repo	certificate	or	would	even	be	able	to	sell	it	on	to	a	third	party	 on	 a	 secondary	 market,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 re-hypothecation	 (cf.	 Gorton	 2010).	 The	 very	 short-termness	 of	 overnight	 repos	reduces	 their	 price	 volatility	 and	 uses	 market	 forces	 to	 induce	 quasi-par	 to	deposits	 as	 higher-ranking	 money	 form:	 Overnight	 repos	 are	 “high-quality,	highly	liquid,	short-term	IOUs	[…	that	as]	a	result	of	these	characteristics	[…]	are	subject	 to	negligible	price	 fluctuation”	 (Ricks	2011:	79).	 In	addition,	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	 (2016:	 2,	 22)	 note	 that	 the	 use	 of	 collateral	 in	 repo	 transactions	enhances	the	promise	to	pay	par,	and	that	mark-to-market	practices	of	collateral	portfolios	help	maintain	par	also	for	repos	with	maturity	longer	than	overnight.	In	 the	 organizational	 structure	 of	 the	 U.S.	 repo	 market,	 there	 are	 two	 main	market	 segments:	 the	bilateral	 (or	 ‘delivery-versus-payment’)	 repo	market	and	the	tri-party	repo	market	(see	Figure	6.8,	based	on	Copeland	et	al.	2012):		
	
Figure	6.8—Securities	dealers	in	the	bilateral	and	tri-party	repo	markets		In	 both	 market	 segments,	 the	 dealers	 interact	 with	 their	 counterparties,	exchange	cash	against	various	forms	of	collateral	and	issue	IOUs.	In	the	bilateral	repo	market,	the	dealer	and	its	counterparty	are	processing	the	repo	transaction	on	 their	own.	 In	 the	 tri-party	repo	market,	 they	bring	 in	a	 ‘custodian	bank’	 (or	‘clearing	 bank’)	 as	 third	 party	 to	 facilitate	 the	 repo	 transaction:	 The	 custodian	bank	allows	 the	 repo	 transactions	 to	be	 settled	on	 its	balance	 sheet	 and	offers	custodial	 and	 collateral	 management	 services	 (Copeland	 et	 al.	 2011).	 As	 an	additional	byproduct,	the	custodian	bank	provides	intra-day	credit	to	the	dealers	in	the	period	between	the	settlement	of	expiring	repos	and	the	issuance	of	new	
Securities	
Dealers	
Bilateral	cash	
Investors:	
• Hedge	
Funds	
• Asset	
managers	
• Others	
Tri-party	cash	
Investors:	
• MMFs	
• Securities	
lenders	
• Others	
Dealers’	
Clients:	
• Prime	
Brokerage	
• Hedge	
Funds	
• Others	
Bilateral	Repo	
markets	
Tri-party	
Repo	market	
Deposits	
Repos,	Securities	
JPMC/BNYM	
	 183	
repos	 (Copeland	 et	 al.	 2012:	 2).	 Due	 to	 its	 operational	 ease	 and	 efficiency	compared	to	the	bilateral	market,	 the	dealer	community	perceives	the	tri-party	repo	 market	 as	 highly	 advantageous	 (Global	 Investor	 2010).	 This	 made	 it	possible	 to	 design	 overnight	 repos	 “as	 ‘simple	 as	 bank	 deposits’,	 but	 with	 the	added	security	of	 the	collateral“	 (Jones	1997:	28).	The	 tri-party	 repo	market	 is	run	by	two	big	custodian	banks:	JPMorgan	Chase	(JPMC)	and	Bank	of	New	York	Mellon	(BNYM).	Participation	in	tri-party	repo	is	subject	to	charge;	any	financial	institution	that	wishes	to	participate	must	register	with	one	of	the	clearing	banks	in	 beforehand	 (Interview	 2).	 Among	 the	 financial	 institutions	 registered	 as	securities	dealers	on	tri-party	repo	are	all	the	‘primary	dealers’	that	also	serve	as	counterparties	for	open	market	transactions	with	the	Fed.	In	2007,	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Financial	Crisis,	this	also	embraced	the	‘big	five’	U.S.	investment	banks	 Merrill	 Lynch,	 Goldman	 Sachs,	 Bear	 Stearns,	 Lehman	 Brothers	 and	JPMorgan.	 Thus,	 the	 tri-party	 system	 offered	 two	 different	 mechanisms	 to	provide	for	private	liquidity	backstops:	on	the	one	hand	via	the	intraday	credit	of	the	custodian	banks;	on	the	other	hand	via	the	institutional	 linkages	within	the	bigger	financial	conglomerates.		 Third,	 MMF	 shares—just	 as	 bank	 deposits—are	 deposited	 on	 the	respective	accounts	and	can	typically	be	withdrawn	instantaneously.	Over	time,	to	 provide	 the	 same	 comforts	 as	 bank	 accounts,	 MMFs	 introduced	 cash	management	 options	 such	 as	 check	writing,	 credit	 and	 debit	 cards	 (Baklanova	2012:	98).	This	stabilized	the	money	demand	for	MMF	shares.	However,	the	key	feature	 of	 MMFs	 to	 sustain	 par	 between	 their	 shares	 and	 bank	 deposits	 were	specific	accounting	rules.	As	to	Baklanova	(2012:	100-101),			“[t]o	 prevent	 share	 prices	 from	moving	 up	 and	 down	 following	 dividend	distribution,	 these	 funds	 declare	 dividends	 daily	 and	 accrue	 and	 pay	 out	dividends	 monthly.	 Typically,	 money	 market	 funds	 compute	 their	 share	price	 using	 the	 amortised	 cost	method,	 but	 also	 round	 the	 share	 price	 to	the	 nearest	 cent.	 The	 overarching	 rationale	 behind	 introduction	 of	 these	share	price	computation	techniques	was	the	historical	observation	that	the	daily	market	price	volatility	of	typical	money	market	securities	is	low.	This	means	 that	 high	 quality	 short	 maturity	 securities	 comprising	 money	market	 fund	 portfolio	 do	 not	 change	much	 in	 value	 on	 day-to-day	 basis.	Therefore,	 if	 a	 money	 market	 fund	 is	 invested	 in	 such	 low	 volatility	securities,	its	share	price	calculated	with	help	of	these	methods	is	likely	to	be	 very	 close	 to	 that	 calculated	 using	 the	 securities’	 market	 prices.	Persuaded	 by	 this	 analysis,	 in	 1977	 the	 US	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	Commission	approved	use	of	both	an	amortised	cost	method	and	a	penny-rounding	 method	 for	 a	 few	 funds.	 Within	 two	 years,	 the	 Commission	allowed	these	two	accounting	methods	for	use	in	money	market	funds	on	a	permanent	basis.”		As	to	Fink	(2011:	253),	the	promise	to	maintain	a	one	dollar	per	share	net	asset	value	lay	at	the	core	of	the	MMF’s	business	model.	Investors	buying	MMF	shares	were	guaranteed	 to	be	paid	back	 ‘one	buck	on	 the	dollar’.	Often,	MMF’s	parent	institutions	 gave	 implicit	 guarantees	 to	 prevent	 breaking	 the	 buck	 (Jackson	2013:	379).	Figure	6.9	 represents	how	Prime	and	Governments	MMFs	are	knit	into	the	shadow	banking	system,	taking	into	account	that	one	third	of	MMF	share	holders	were	retail	and	two	thirds	institutional	investors	(ICI	2014:	198).	 	
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Figure	6.9—Money	market	funds	in	the	two	shadow	banking	channels		 Taken	 together,	 ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 are	 held	 by	agents	who	consider	them	‘cash’,	i.e.	the	most	liquid	form	of	an	asset	capable	of	doing	 immediate	 purchases	 of	 commodities	 or	 financial	 assets	 (Pozsar	 2014).	From	 a	 demand	 side	 perspective,	 this	 makes	 them	 similar	 to	 deposits	 in	 a	functional	 sense	 and	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 reasons	 for	 considering	 them	 forms	 of	‘shadow	money’.	This	 is	not	 a	 coincidence	as	 those	 shadow	money	 forms	have	been	purposefully	developed	to	provide	deposit	alternatives,	especially	to	 ‘cash	pools’	 such	 as	 pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	 other	 institutional	investors.	According	to	Pozsar	(2015:	29),	“[f]or	institutional	cash	pools,	money	begins	 where	 M2	 ends”.	 Once	 ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 have	established	par	vis-à-vis	bank	deposits,	we	can	think	of	them	as	a	private	credit	money	form	and	discuss	their	status	within	the	wider	monetary	system	using	the	Money	Matrix	as	a	heuristic.	Given	that	the	commodity	money	standard	had	been	dropped	 in	 1973	 with	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 System,	 the	 U.S.	monetary	 system	prior	 to	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis	was	made	up	 entirely	 of	credit	money	 forms.	Within	 the	monetary	 system,	 various	 forms	 of	 public	 and	private	 credit	money	 co-existed	 next	 to	 each	 other	 and	were	 used	 in	 different	overlapping	payment	communities.		 In	the	public	credit	money	sphere,	currency	and	central	bank	deposits	(or	‘reserves’)	were	issued	by	the	Federal	Reserve.	Since	they	are	directly	created	on	the	 balance	 sheet	 of	 the	 Fed,	 which	 today	 qualifies	 as	 a	 public	 institution	 (cf.	Chapter	5),	they	qualify	as	pure	public	money.67	Both	form	what	is	conventionally																																																									67		 A	contested	issue	is	whether	short-term	debt	issued	by	the	Treasury,	e.g.	treasury	bills,	may	count	as	public	credit	money	as	well.	As	Pozsar	(2014:	12)	argues,	they	are	even	situated	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy	of	money	as	they	are	“backed	by	the	government’s	full	faith	and	credit	and	 authority	 to	 tax”.	While	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 pay	with	 them	 in	 the	 real	 economy	or	 the	‘retail	money	market’,	 Treasury	 bills	may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 credit	money	 on	 the	 ‘wholesale	money	market’,	where	they	 function	as	money	for	a	specific	payment	community.	 Issued	by	the	Treasury,	 they	are	pure	public	money.	Pozsar	 (2014:	8)	argues	 that	similar	public	assets	could	also	be	U.S.	Treasury	note,	agency	debt	and	residential	mortgage-backed	securities.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	this	study	leaves	them	out	of	the	picture.	
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referred	to	as	the	‘monetary	base’	or	the	monetary	aggregate	M0	(cf.	Chapter	1).	In	 fact,	 both	 currency	 and	 central	 bank	 deposits	 might	 be	 thought	 of	 as	previously	 accommodated	 private	 credit	money	 forms.	Private-public	money	 is	made	 up	 of	 insured	 bank	 deposits,	 based	 on	 the	 insurance	 limit	 of	 the	 FDIC,	which	as	of	2007	had	been	capped	at	$100,000.	According	to	the	Fed’s	definition,	they	fall	under	the	aggregates	M1	and	M2.		The	private	credit	money	supply,	in	turn,	was	made	up	of	uninsured	bank	deposits—i.e.	 those	 individual	 deposit	 holdings	 that	 were	 not	 covered	 by	 the	FDIC—as	well	as	the	three	forms	of	‘shadow	money’.	If	the	shadow	money	forms	are	issued	against	public	securities,	they	qualify	as	public-private	money.	This	is	true	for	overnight	repos	issued	against	public	debt	on	the	‘government	desk’	and	for	shares	of	government	MMFs	(which	from	here	on	also	are	assumed	to	refer	to	municipal	 MMFs).	 If	 the	 shadow	 money	 forms	 are	 issued	 against	 private	securities,	they	are	pure	private	money.	This	applies	for	ABCPs,	which	are	issued	against	commercial	paper,	overnight	repos	of	the	‘credit	desk’	and	the	shares	of	prime	MMFs	(cf.	Pozsar	2014).	In	terms	of	the	monetary	aggregates,	retail	MMF	shares	are	part	of	M2	and	overnight	repos	were	 included	in	M3,	which	the	Fed	ceased	 to	measure	 in	2006	but	 is	 still	used	e.g.	by	 the	ECB	(Gorton	2010:	176-177).	 	Figure	6.10	summarizes	these	findings	and	compiles	the	empirical	Money	Matrix	prior	to	the	accommodation	of	shadow	money:			
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	Central	Bank	liabilities	
• Currency	(Notes,	Coins)	
• Central	bank	deposits			
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	Securities	dealers’	liabilities	
• Overnight	repos	of	government	desk		MMF	liabilities	
• Shares	of	Government	MMFs	
	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	Commercial	bank	liabilities	
• Insured	bank	deposits			
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	SPV	liabilities	
• ABCPs	Securities	dealers’	liabilities	
• Overnight	repos	of	credit	desk	MMF	liabilities	
• Shares	of	Prime	MMFs	Commercial	bank	liabilites	
• Uninsured	bank	deposits		
Figure	6.10—The	Money	Matrix	in	the	early	21st	century	(empirically)	 	
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6.2.3	The	systemic	relevance	of	shadow	money	
	This	section	discusses	the	status	of	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	as	shadow	money	forms	in	terms	of	their	systemic	relevance	for	the	U.S.	monetary	system	 in	 the	 early	 21st	 century,	 using	 the	 criteria	 of	 size,	 interconnectedness,	substitutability	and	complexity.			In	 terms	 of	 the	 size	 of	 shadow	 money	 issuance,	 the	 volumes	 in	 which	ABCPs,	 overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 were	 issued,	 had	 been	 increasing	massively	 over	 the	 decades	 before	 2007.	 While	 the	 rise	 of	 shadow	 money	issuance	 had	 been	 gradual	 for	 most	 of	 the	 time,	 quantitative	 development	 of	shadow	money	 balances	 had	 become	 almost	 exponential	 in	 the	 2000s.	 Figure	6.11—taken	from	Acharya	and	Schnabl	(2010:	39)—shows	that	after	a	change	in	capital	regulation	in	2004,	ABCP	issuance	increased	sharply	and	reached	a	peak	in	 July	2007.	 In	early	2007,	shortly	before	the	outbreak	of	 the	crisis,	ABCP	was	“the	 largest	 short-term	 debt	 instrument	 with	 more	 than	 $1.2	 trillion	outstanding”	(ibid:	38).	ABCP	issuers	profited	in	particular	from	the	changes	 in	accounting	 rules	 introduced	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	 Enron	 scandal,	 which	 unveiled	Enron’s	fraudulent	use	of	off-balance-sheet	vehicles	and	led	to	new	regulations.	“In	October	2003,	U.S.	bank	regulators—the	Board	of	Governors	of	 the	Federal	Reserve	 System,	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Corporation,	 the	 Office	 of	 the	Comptroller	 of	 the	 Currency,	 and	 the	 Office	 of	 Thrift	 Supervision—issued	 an	interim	 ruling	 that	 permitted	 banks	 sponsoring	 ABCP	 conduits	 to	 ignore	 the	consolidated	conduit	assets	 for	 the	purpose	of	calculating	risk-weighted	assets.	In	 July	 2004,	 these	 agencies	 issued	 a	 final	 ruling	 that	 required	 banks	 to	 hold	capital	against	eligible	liquidity	enhancement	at	a	10	percent	conversion	factor.	This	ruling	implied	that	assets	in	conduits	required	90	percent	less	capital	than	assets	on	balance	sheets.	Moreover,	 this	ruling	allowed	banks	to	 leave	conduits	off	the	bank	balance	sheet”	(ibid:	50).		
		
Figure	6.11—Volumes	of	ABCPs	issued,	2001-2009	(in	billion	USD)	 	
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In	a	similar,	yet	not	equally	strong	fashion	as	in	the	case	of	ABCPs,	Figure	6.12—taken	 from	 Task	 Force	 (2010)—exhibits	 a	 continuous	 rise	 in	 overnight	 repos	issued	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 2007,	 and	 Figure	6.13—taken	 from	 Nutting	 (2013)—sketch	the	strong	increase	in	MMF	shares	holding,	which	was	only	interrupted	by	the	burst	of	the	dot-com	bubble	in	the	early	2000s:			
		
Figure	6.12—Volumes	of	overnight	repos	issued,	2002-2010	(in	trillions	of	USD)				
	
	
Figure	6.13—Volumes	of	MMF	shares	issued,	1975-2012	(in	billion	USD)	 	
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As	to	the	interconnectedness	of	shadow	money,	shadow	money	forms	are	created	 by	 a	 great	 number	 of	 different	 issuers—SPVs,	 securities	 dealers	 and	MMFs—and	held	as	assets	also	by	a	great	number	of	institutions	and	individuals	(in	the	case	of	MMFs).	This	is	true	both	for	within	and	outside	the	United	States.	Therefore,	 shadow	money	 issuance	 needs	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 highly	 interconnected.	This	has	some	implications	 for	their	substitutability:	Within	the	 ‘daisy	chain’	of	the	shadow	banking	system,	 shadow	money	 forms	could	be	substituted	among	each	 other,	 in	 particular	 between	 the	 securitization	 and	 the	 collateral	intermediation	channel,	i.e.	between	repos	and	ABCPs.	However,	they	could	not	be	fully	substituted	by	higher-ranking	money	forms,	notably	deposits.	Given	the	sharp	 rise	 in	 shadow	 money	 balances	 especially	 throughout	 the	 2000s,	 no	alternative	short-term	IOUs	would	have	been	available	 into	which	the	balances	could	have	been	shifted	all	at	once.		Regarding	the	complexity,	shadow	money	issuance	must	be	considered	as	extremely	 interwoven,	 opaque	 and	 multi-faceted.	 First,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	international,	 if	 not	 global,	 entanglement	 of	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system.	 In	particular,	 the	 SPVs	 that	 issued	 ABCPs	 were	 very	 often	 located	 in	 offshore	financial	centres,	which	contributed	substantially	to	the	system’s	opaqueness	(cf-	Lysandrou	 and	Nesvetailova	2015).	 Second,	 as	 indicated	by	Figure	6.4	 and	 the	famous	 ‘map’	 of	 shadow	 banking	 presented	 by	 Pozsar	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 shadow	money	issuance	is	connected	to	virtually	all	parts	of	the	financial	system,	in	ways	that	 were	 largely	 uncomprehended	 at	 the	 time	 (cf.	 Mehrling	 et	 al.	 2013,	 who	describe	 shadow	banking	as	money	market	 funding	of	 capital	market	 lending).	Third,	 the	 technique	of	 securitization—i.e.	 slicing	up	 financial	 instruments	 and	putting	 them	 together	 as	 a	 new	 instrument—has	 added	 enormously	 to	 the	complexity	and	opacity	of	shadow	money	issuance,	 in	particular	with	regard	to	overnight	 repos	 and	 ABCPs.	 Overnight	 repos	 stand	 out	 in	 this	 regard	 as	 their	functionality	 as	 shadow	money	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 ‘two	 legs’	 of	 its	 operation.	With	regard	 to	ABCPs,	Covitz	et	al.	 (2009:	9-10)	note	 that	 there	was	very	 little	knowledge	and	high	uncertainty	about	the	underlying	assets.		To	sum	up,	the	shadow	money	supply	in	general	appears	to	have	become	systemically	relevant,	in	particular	due	to	its	massive	rise	in	volume,	which	made	it	non-substitutable	in	an	immediate	manner.	Still,	the	individual	shadow	money	forms,	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 wholesale	 money	 market,	 were	 substitutable	 into	each	other.	Hence,	the	systemic	relevance	did	not	necessarily	affect	each	specific	shadow	 money	 form	 individually.	 In	 this,	 it	 is	 not	 straightforward	 how	 to	conceptualize	 the	 internal	 hierarchy	 among	 the	 three	 shadow	 money	 forms.	Gabor	 and	Vestergaard	 (2016:	 14)	 argue	 that	 repos	 had	 a	 higher	 status	 in	 the	hierarchy	because	they	are	collateralized	and	therefore	perceived	as	safer	 than	ABCPs	 and	 MMF	 shares,	 which	 are	 uncollateralized	 instruments.	 This	 study,	however,	 suggests—in	 line	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 ‘daisy	 chain’	 represented	 in	Figure	6.4—to	view	MMF	shares	as	the	most	high-ranking	shadow	money	form.	On	the	one	hand,	with	 their	special	accounting	rules	guaranteeing	constant	net	asset	value,	MMF	shares	traded	nominally	at	par.	On	the	other	hand,	they	were	not	 ‘only’	 a	wholesale	 but	 even	 a	 retail	 instrument	 and	 hence	 the	most	 direct	substitute	for	deposits.	As	they	were	also	used	by	households,	they	may	thus	be	
	 189	
considered—at	 least	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 policy-makers—as	 the	 most	systemically	relevant	form	of	shadow	money.		Figure	6.14	 translates	 these	 findings	 into	an	account	of	 the	hierarchy	of	money	 at	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system’s	 expansion	 in	 early	 2007.	Accordingly,	 Federal	 Reserve	 IOUs	 were	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy,	 as	 the	primary	representation	of	the	U.S.	Dollar	as	the	unit	of	account.	In	this,	the	status	of	Federal	Reserve	notes	may	be	seen	as	a	consequence	of	the	English	bank	note	accommodation	 in	 the	 18th	 century	 and	 its	 subsequent	 gradual	 transition	 into	the	U.S.	monetary	 system.	The	next	 layer	 in	 the	hierarchy	were	bank	deposits,	which	 traded	at	par	 to	higher-ranking	money	due	 to	 the	public	 framework	 for	deposit	 creation	 that	 had	 been	 installed	 in	 conjunction	 with	 their	accommodation	 in	 1933.	 The	 shadow	 money	 forms	 occupy	 the	 subsequent	layers	with	their	concomitant	promises	to	trade	at	par	or	quasi-par.	MMF	shares	as	 a	 retail	 instrument	were	 at	 the	 top,	 followed	by	 repos	 as	 collateralized	 and	ABCPs	as	uncollateralized	wholesale	instruments.			
	
Figure	6.14—The	hierarchy	of	Federal	Reserve,	bank	and	shadow	bank	money	
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6.3	Phase	II:	The	accommodation	of	shadow	money	in	the	public	money	
supply		This	 section	studies	 the	accommodation	of	 shadow	money—or	more	precisely:	overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	 shares.	 It	 starts	 by	 addressing	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	Crisis,	 following	 the	 interpretation	 that	 it	 was	 a	 run	 on	 the	 shadow	 banking	system.	After	the	burst	of	the	U.S.	real	estate	bubble	in	2007,	the	run	started	in	the	market	 for	 ABCPs	 but	 could	 be	 calmed	 down	 and	mitigated	 as	 holders	 of	ABCP	balances	were	able	to	shift	to	other	assets.	Only	after	the	near-collapse	of	Bear	 Stearns	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers,	 a	 system-wide	 panic	 set	 in	because	 no	 short-term	 asset	 seemed	 safe	 any	 more	 and	 also	 affected	 MMFs	(6.3.1).	 From	 March	 2008	 onwards,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 used	 its	 emergency	powers	 to	 establish	 innovative	 liquidity	 facilities	 and	 bail	 out	 repo-issuing	securities	dealers.	In	September	2008,	the	Treasury	introduced	backstops	for	the	MMF	 industry	by	announcing	an	explicit	 temporary	guarantee	 for	MMF	shares.	Those	 activities	 succeeded	 in	 calming	down	 the	panic	 (6.3.2).	With	 this	 action,	overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 were	 accommodated	 and	 shifted	 from	 the	private	into	the	public	credit	money	realm.	This	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	 was	 the	 unintentional	 side-effect	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 rescue	 the	 U.S.	monetary	 and	 financial	 system	 and	 to	 prevent	 a	 complete	 systemic	meltdown,	which	was	 an	 imminent	 doomsday	 scenario	 that	 circulated	within	 the	 highest	circles	of	the	U.S.	administration	(6.3.3).	
	
	
6.3.1	Financial	Instability	and	the	runs	of	2007	and	2008		In	 the	 literature	 that	 views	 shadow	 banking	 as	 a	 monetary	 phenomenon,	 the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	is	frequently	referred	to	as	a	run	on	the	shadow	banking	system	that	had	developed	since	the	1970s.	As	the	run	occurred	on	the	wholesale	money	market,	 it	was	not	as	visible	as	bank	runs	during	 the	Great	Depression,	with	 long	queues	of	depositors	 lining	up	in	front	of	commercial	bank	branches.	Leaving	this	aspect	aside,	however,	there	were	barely	any	functional	differences	to	previous	runs	(Gorton	2010).	This	run	occurred	in	three	waves	(cf.	Table	6.1):	The	 first	 was	 associated	 with	 the	 near-failure	 of	 Countrywide	 Securities	 in	August	 2007,	 the	 second	with	 the	 shut-down	 and	 takeover	 of	 Bear	 Stearns	 in	March	 2008,	 and	 the	 third	 with	 the	 bankruptcy	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers	 in	September	2008	(Mehrling	2011:	119-121,	Brunnermeier	2009).			
1st	wave	(08/2007)	 2nd	wave	(03/2008)	 3rd	wave	(09/2008)	Run	on	ABCP-issuing	SPVs	(Countrywide	Securities)	 	 			Strains	on	tri-party	repo	custodian	bank	(Bank	of	New	York	Mellon)	 Run	on	tri-party	repo	dealer	(Bear	Stearns)	 Run	on	tri-party	repo	dealer	(Lehman	Brothers)		 			 Run	on	MMFs	(Reserve	Primary	Fund)		
Table	6.1—Three	waves	of	runs	on	shadow	money	in	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	 	
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The	first	wave	of	the	runs	on	shadow	money	is	closely	connected	with	the	collapse	 of	 the	 U.S.	 subprime	 mortgage	 market.	 The	 bursting	 of	 the	 housing	bubble	started	with	the	Californian	financial	firm	Countrywide	Securities,	which	funded	 itself	 both	on	 the	ABCP	and	 the	 tri-party	 repo	market.	 In	August	2007,	Countrywide	got	into	trouble	with	its	business	model	of	originating,	securitising	and	selling	mortgages.	When	Countrywide	announced	disappointing	earnings,	a	number	of	ABCP	programmes	had	 to	extend	the	maturities	of	 their	papers	and	eventually	defaulted:		“[T]he	 turmoil	 […began]	 with	 mounting	 delinquencies	 of	 subprime	mortgages	triggering	a	decline	in	investor	confidence	in	mortgage	financial	intermediaries	and	ratings	downgrades	of	structured	mortgage	securities.	Reflecting	 these	 concerns,	 investors	 became	 reluctant	 to	 roll	 over	 ABCP,	yields	 on	 new	 issues	 of	 ABCP	 soared,	 and	 outstanding	 ABCP	 plummeted	$190	billion,	 almost	20	percent,	 in	August,	 and	 fell	 by	 an	additional	 $160	billion	by	the	end	of	the	year”	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	2).		Analytically,	from	a	shadow	money	perspective,	if	a	SPV	is	not	able	to	issue	new	ABCPs	 because	 its	 investors	 are	 not	willing	 to	 roll	 over	 any	more,	 this	 can	 be	understood	in	analogy	to	a	run	on	bank	deposits	(ibid:	13).	An	important	factor	contributing	 to	 the	 run	 on	 SPVs	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 concerning	 the	underlying	 assets	 they	 held	 (ibid:	 9-10).	 Figure	 6.15—taken	 from	 Covitz	 et	 al.	(2009:	36)—depicts	the	percentage	of	SPVs	that	were	experiencing	such	a	run	in	2007.68			
	
Figure	6.15—Run	on	ABCP	programmes	in	2007	 																																																									68		 A	run	is	defined	here	as	a	situation	in	which	the	SPV	“does	not	issue	paper	but	has	at	least	10	percent	 of	 paper	 maturing	 or	 when	 the	 program	 continues	 not	 issuing	 paper	 after	experiencing	a	run	in	the	previous	week”	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	36).	
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Primarily,	the	losses	that	SPVs	incurred	due	to	their	inability	to	roll	over	ABCPs	 had	 to	 be	 borne	 by	 the	 commercial	 banks	 that	 had	 set	 them	up	 as	 off-balance	 sheet	 vehicles.	 These	 sponsoring	 institutions	 had	 issued	 implicit	 or	explicit	guarantees.	As	they	were	also	from	other	countries	than	the	U.S.,	the	run	on	 ABCPs	 had	 an	 international	 dimension.	 The	 German	 IKB	 Deutsche	Industriebank	 and	 Sachsen	 Landesbank	 “had	 provided	 credit	 guarantees	more	than	 three	 times	 their	 equity	 capital	 in	 order	 to	 issue	 ABCP	 of	 the	 risk-free	variety”;	 as	 they	 could	 not	 meet	 their	 promises	 to	 pay,	 they	 faced	 insolvency	(Acharya	and	Schnabl	2010:	40).	Other	banks	had	incurred	substantial	losses	but	survived	 the	 run	 on	 the	 ABCP	market.	 Among	 them	were	 e.g.	 ABN	 Amro	 and	Citibank	whose	“credit	guarantees	to	outside	investors	required	them	to	pay	off	maturing	ABCP	at	par	independently	of	underlying	asset	values”	(ibid).		To	 attenuate	 the	 rising	 panic,	 the	 Fed	 clarified	 in	 August	 2007	 that	investment-quality	 ABCPs	 would	 be	 accepted	 as	 collateral	 for	 its	 discount	window	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	42-43)	and,	in	line	with	its	traditional	role	as	lender	of	 last	 resort,	 reacted	 with	 conventional	 expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 from	September	(Cecchetti	2008:	13).	In	parallel,	Treasury	Secretary	Paulson	pushed	towards	the	introduction	of	a	market-based	plan	to	cushion	the	credit	crunch	on	the	ABCP	market.	 In	October,	 three	major	U.S.	 financial	 institutions—Citigroup,	JPMorgan	Chase	and	Bank	of	America—followed	up	and	suggested	 introducing	the	 Master	 Liquidity	 Enhancement	 Conduit	 (MLEC)	 as	 a	 privately	 funded	liquidity	backstop	 (Covitz	et	al.	2009:	43).	However,	 the	 financial	 industry	was	not	 able	 to	 agree	 on	 joint	 actions	 to	 push	 through	 the	 plan	 and	 buried	 it	 in	December	2007	(Ellis	and	Rooney	2007).			 While	the	attempted	market-based	solution	turned	out	ineffective,	policy-makers	 saw	 themselves	 forced	 to	 intervene	more	 substantially,	 yet	 still	within	the	 conventional	 framework	 of	monetary	management.	 The	 Fed	 calmed	 down	the	run	on	ABCPs	by	establishing	the	Term	Auction	Facility	(TAF)	as	an	extended	discount	 window,	 which	 gave	 additional	 liquidity	 support	 to	 the	 commercial	banks	that	sponsored	the	SPVs	and	thus	had	to	bear	the	losses	from	the	run	on	ABCPs	(cf.	Armantier	et	al.	2008:	1-2).	In	this,	TAF	was	supposed	to	“remove	the	stigma	 associated	with	 discount	 borrowing,	 and	 in	 that	way	 to	 get	 reserves	 to	banks	 that	 needed	 them”	 (Cecchetti	 2008:	 14).	 Effectively,	 the	 Fed	 offered	Treasury	bills	as	substitutes	for	the	defaulting	ABCPs	that	the	market	no	longer	wanted	(Mehrling	2011:	120).	In	addition,	the	Fed	created	reciprocal	Swap	Lines	with	 the	ECB	and	 the	Swiss	National	Bank	as	an	extension	of	 the	TAF	 to	other	financial	 systems.	 The	 measure	 was	 necessary	 due	 to	 the	 international	entanglement	 of	 the	 ABCP	 market	 (cf.	 Cecchetti	 2008:	 15).	 The	 Swap	 Lines	expanded	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 Fed’s	 emergency	 liquidity	 injections	 beyond	 U.S.	borders	 and	 contributed	 to	 cushioning	 the	 effects	 that	 the	 run	 had	 on	 the	liquidity	 of	 non-U.S.-based	parent	 institutions.	 Later,	 the	 Swap	Lines	were	 also	extended	to	other	major	central	banks	(Mehrling	2015b).		In	addition	to	the	run	on	SPVs,	the	first	wave	of	the	crisis	had	contagion	effects	that	hit	the	tri-party	repo	market	(cf.	Covitz	et	al.	2009:	2).	On	15	August	2007,	 BNYM	 threatened	 to	 no	 longer	 facilitate	 Countrywide’s	 tri-party	 repo	transactions.	BNYM	did	not	want	to	grant	intra-day	credit	anymore,	as	it	feared	
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an	 immediate	 default	 of	 Countrywind	 and	 held	 it	 for	 no	 longer	 creditworthy	(Paulson	 2010).	 As	 to	 Timothy	Geithner	 (2014),	 then	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Federal	Reserve	 Bank	 of	 New	 York	 (FRBNY),	 the	 Fed	 observed	 that	 they	 were	 at	 the	brink	of	a	panic	on	the	repo	market.	In	this	situation,	BNYM	and	Countrywide		 “both	urged	the	Fed	to	intervene	to	assume	the	risk	and	protect	the	system.	[…	BNYM]	 executives	 said	 they’d	 roll	 over	 Countrywide’s	 book	 if	 the	 Fed	guaranteed	the	resulting	intraday	credit	exposure	to	the	firm,	indemnifying	them	 against	 losses	 if	 Countrywide	 failed	 while	 they	 were	 on	 the	 hook.	They	 were	 basically	 asking	 us	 to	 stand	 behind	 the	 entire	 tri-party	 repo	market,	because	if	we	backstopped	one	firm	we’d	have	to	backstop	them	all	[…].	We	 thought	 about	 it,	 conferred	with	Washington,	 and	 said	 no”	 (ibid:	125).			Ultimately,	the	Fed	facilitated	an	agreement	between	both	companies,	according	to	 which	 BNYM	 continued	 offering	 its	 services	 to	 Countrywide,	 while	Countrywide	upgraded	the	quality	of	its	collateral	(ibid:	122-126).	In	the	end,	the	Fed	managed	to	solve	the	issue	without	having	to	step	in	and	back	the	tri-party	repo	market.			In	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 the	 run	 on	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system,	 Bear	Stearns—a	 major	 securities	 dealer	 in	 the	 tri-party	 repo	 market—was	 at	 the	brink	of	collapse.	Again,	public	officials	 feared	a	run	on	repo:	As	 then	Treasury	Secretary	Paulson	(2010:	99)	argues,	the	assessment	of	the	time	was	that	if	Bear	fell,	“all	counterparties	would	be	scrambling	to	collect	their	loans	and	collaterals.	[…]	 The	 firms	 that	 had	 already	 started	 to	 pull	 their	 money	 from	 Bear	 were	simply	trying	to	get	out	first”	(Paulson	2010:	99).	Although	Bear	was	not	among	the	 largest	 U.S.	 financial	 institutions,	 it	 was	 tightly	 integrated	 in	 the	 shadow	banking	sector.	With	almost	 four	hundred	subsidiaries,	 it	had	trading	positions	with	five	thousand	counterparties	globally	and	had	borrowed	about	$80	billion	in	the	tri-party	repo	market,	representing	the	substantial	risk	of	a	run	on	MMFs,	securities	dealers	and	other	financial	institutions	(Geithner	2014:	150).			The	strategy	of	the	Fed	and	the	Treasury	was	two-fold:	On	the	one	hand,	they	 organized	 a	 take-over	 of	 Bear	 Stearns	 by	 JPMorgan	 Chase	 (JPMC),	 which	allowed	 for	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 systemically	 relevant	 functions	 of	 Bear	 as	 a	securities	dealer	under	the	umbrella	of	JPMC	(Ennis	2011:	389).	In	March	2008,	to	save	Bear	Stearns,	the	Fed	decided	to	grant	a	‘back-to-back’	loan	via	JPMC	that	it	 would	 then	 pass	 on	 to	 Bear	 (Geithner	 2014:	 151).	 This	 more	 permanent	solution—negotiated	from	16	to	24	March	and	completed	on	30	May	2008—was	a	full	takeover	of	Bear	Stearns	at	a	very	low	price	with	the	Fed	granting	special	financing	(JPMC	2008)	and	taking	over	asset	portfolios	that	JPMC	found	too	risky	to	 assume	 entirely	 on	 its	 own	 (Paulson	 2010:	 115-116).	 From	a	 private	 credit	money	perspective,	 rescuing	Bear	 implied	making	sure	 that	 the	 repos	 it	 issued	would	not	collapse	and	turning	JPMC	into	a	private	backstop	for	Bear.		 On	 the	other	hand,	 the	Fed	established	emergency	 liquidity	 facilities	 for	tri-party	 dealers:	 the	 Term	 Securities	 Lending	 Facility	 (TSLF)	 and	 the	 Primary	Dealer	 Credit	 Facility	 (PDCF).	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 prevent	 the	 repo	 market	 from	drying	up.	As	lenders	of	funds	were	worried	about	the	value	of	collateral	and	the	
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credit	 risk	 of	 securities	 dealers,	 they	 stopped	 lending	 against	 certain	 types	 of	collateral,	 in	 particular	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 (Geithner	 2014:	 146),	 and	increased	haircuts—i.e.	they	reduced	the	amount	of	deposits	they	were	willing	to	lend	against	a	given	amount	of	collateral.	For	dealers,	it	became	more	difficult	to	finance	 their	 term	 repos,	 which	 forced	 them	 to	 seek	 alternative	 sources	 of	funding	or	 liquidate	positions.	This	 turned	out	difficult.	Many	dealers	were	not	able	to	borrow	elsewhere	or	sell	their	securities	at	an	acceptable	price	(Fleming	et	al.	2009:	2-3).	The	TSLF	and	PDCF	were	introduced	to	avoid	that	the	dealers	had	to	file	for	bankruptcy	due	to	this	liquidity	impasse.		In	the	third	wave,	the	financial	crisis	reached	its	peak	when	in	September	2008,	 Lehman	 Brothers—another	major	 securities	 dealer	 in	 the	 tri-party	 repo	market—reportedly	 was	 ‘only	 days	 away’	 from	 bankruptcy	 and	 threatened	 to	put	other	financial	institutions	at	risk”	(Adrian	et	al	2009:	4).	On	10	September	2008,	Lehman	announced	a	$3.93bn	loss	for	the	third	quarter	as	it	had	to	write	down	$5.6bn	on	toxic	mortgages	(Junod	2009).	Treasury	Secretary	Paulson	tried	to	find	a	buyer	for	Lehman	Brothers	who—as	in	the	case	of	Bear	Stearns—would	take-over	the	company	and	act	as	a	private	backstop	that	guarantees	Lehman’s	liabilities.	 This	 had	 become	 necessary	 due	 to	 a	 range	 of	 fruitless	 attempts	 by	Lehman	 to	 find	 new	 investors	 on	 its	 own	 (Sorkin	 2009).	 On	 12	 September,	Barclays	 Capital—led	 by	 its	 CEO	 Bob	 Diamond—expressed	 its	 interest	 in	purchasing	Lehman.	However,	 the	 take-over	was	 turned	down	due	 to	 financial	stability	 concerns	 by	 UK	 regulators	 (Junod	 2009).	 On	 15	 September,	 Lehman	filed	for	bankruptcy	(McDonald	2015:	51).	In	consequence,	repo	markets	froze	as	repo	 counterparties	 became	 unwilling	 to	 lend	 to	 each	 other	 (Mehrling	 2011:	120-121).	Figure	6.16—taken	from	Gorton	and	Metrick	(2012:	429)—depicts	the	run	on	repo.	It	shows	the	spiking	of	the	panic	when	Lehman	collapsed	by	plotting	the	average	haircut	for	the	collateral	used	in	repo	transactions.		
	
Figure	6.16—Run	on	repo	in	terms	of	average	haircuts	demanded,	2007-2009	 	
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After	 the	 collapse	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers,	 the	 spreading	 panic	 on	 the	financial	markets	affected	also	 the	MMF	industry.	 Investors	 in	MMFs	started	to	convert	 their	 shares	 into	 bank	 deposits	 as	 higher-ranking	 money	 that	 was	covered	by	the	FDIC.	As	Bernanke	(2013:	81)	puts	it,	investors	“began	to	pull	out	their	money,	 just	 like	 a	 standard	 bank	 run”.	Most	MMFs	were	 able	 to	 keep	 up	constant	 net	 asset	 value	 because	 they	 had	 parent	 institutions	 as	 private	backstops	 that	 supported	 them	 with	 liquidity	 (Mehrling	 2011).	 However,	 the	Reserve	 Primary	 Fund	 (RPF)—one	 of	 the	 U.S.’s	 oldest	 and	 most	 traditional	ones—was	a	family	enterprise	that	did	not	have	a	parent	institution	to	go	to.	As	Geithner	(2014:	195)	points	out,	it	“had	even	added	to	its	stash	of	Lehman	paper	over	the	summer	while	everyone	else	was	unloading	it,	which	sparked	a	run	on	the	 fund	 after	 Lehman	 fell”.	 On	 16	 September,	 the	 RPF	was	 no	 longer	 able	 to	sustain	 a	 constant	 net	 asset	 value	 and,	 by	 paying	 only	 97	 cents	 on	 the	 dollar,	‘broke	the	buck’.	Thus,	par	clearance	was	broken	and	further	fueled	the	run	on	MMF	shares.		 Overall,	using	the	analytical	language	of	the	Money	View,	the	expansion	of	the	monetary	 system	as	 a	 self-referential	network	of	debt	 claims	was	 about	 to	revert	itself	during	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	and	continuously	endangered	par	clearance	 of	 the	 shadow	 money	 forms	 vis-à-vis	 deposits	 as	 higher-ranking	money.	The	financial	strains	increased	substantially	throughout	the	three	waves.	In	the	first	wave,	when	SPVs	were	struggling,	par	clearance	of	ABCPs	had	to	be	guaranteed	 by	 their	 sponsoring	 banks.	 In	 the	 second	 wave,	 the	 collapse	 of	 a	systemically	 relevant	 securities	 dealer	 could	 only	 narrowly	 be	 avoided.	 In	 the	third	wave,	with	Lehman	Brothers	collapsing	and	sending	shock	waves	through	the	 entire	 monetary	 and	 financial	 system,	 even	 the	 retail	 money	 market	 was	affected	 and	par	 clearance	of	MMF	 shares	was	broken.	 Figure	6.17	depicts	 the	upwards	contagion	within	the	hierarchy	of	money	that	materialized	in	2007	and	2008.			
	
Figure	6.17—The	2007	and	2008	runs	with	upwards	contagion	in	the	hierarchy	 	
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6.3.2	PDCF	and	Treasury	Guarantee	as	public	bailout	in	reaction	to	the	run		On	13	and	14	September,	 the	weekend	before	Lehman’s	 insolvency,	a	 series	of	crisis	 meetings	 took	 place	 at	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 U.S.	 monetary	 and	 fiscal	authorities	(cf.	 Junod	2009,	McDonald	2015:	43-52).	They	were	led	by	Timothy	Geithner,	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 New	 York,	 Ben	 Bernanke,	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	of	Governors,	and	Henry	Paulson,	Jr.,	U.S.	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	(cf.	Paulson	2010:	62).	While	the	rescuing	attempts	for	Lehman	Brothers	did	not	work	out	successfully,	the	executive	bodies	decided	for	a	 number	 of	 emergency	 interventions	 that	 amounted	 to	 a	 public	 bailout	 for	securities	dealers	and	MMFs	as	struggling	speculative	and	Ponzi	units.			 The	 foundation	 for	 the	bailout	of	 the	repo-issuing	securities	dealers	had	already	been	laid	in	the	second	wave	of	the	run	on	the	shadow	banking	system.	The	 creation	 of	 the	 emergency	 liquidity	 facilities	 PDCF	 and	 TSLF	 had	 been	 a	pivotal	 change	 in	 the	 crisis	 intervention	 strategy	 compared	 to	 the	 first	 wave.	Geithner	points	out	in	his	memoirs	that	in	2007,	hawkish	governors	of	regional	Federal	 Reserve	 banks	 had	 impeded	 him	 and	 Ben	 Bernanke	 to	 fight	 the	 crisis	more	 aggressively	 because	 they	 were	 afraid	 of	 rising	 inflation	 rate	 and	moral	hazard	 problems.	 In	 January	 2008,	 Bernanke	 told	 Geithner	 that	 “he	 no	 longer	intended	 to	 be	 so	 deferential	 to	 the	 FOMC’s	 hawks.	 If	 they	wanted	 the	 Fed	 to	stand	around	inert	as	the	crisis	intensified,	they	could	dissent.	He	wouldn’t	meet	them	 halfway	 anymore”	 (Geithner	 2014:	 143).	 To	 put	 the	 emergency	 liquidity	facilities	in	place,	the	Fed	had	to	invoke	its	emergency	powers	provided	in	Article	13(3)	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Act,	which	give	it	the	right	to	lend	to	non-banks	in	‘unusual	and	exigent	circumstances’.	On	Sunday,	9	March	2008,	Bernanke	sent	an	email	 to	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board,	 in	 which	 he	 strongly	advocated	 the	 implementation	 of	 TSLF	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Article	 13(3),	 despite	warnings	that	it	was	politically	dangerous	for	the	Fed	to	accept	collateral	that	no	one	else	wanted.	On	10	March,	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	approved	the	TSLF.			On	11	March	2008,	the	Fed	established	the	TSLF,	which	allowed	security	dealers	 to	 borrow	Treasury	 securities	 for	 a	 term	of	 28	days	by	pledging	 other	securities	 as	 collateral,	which	were	 no	 longer	 accepted	 by	 repo	 counterparties	(Fleming	 et	 al	 2009:	 3).	 The	 Treasury	 securities	 were	 allocated	 to	 dealers	 via	auctions	which	should	avoid	negative	signaling	effects	(Interview	2).	The	explicit	goal	was	“to	promote	 liquidity	 in	 the	 financing	markets	 for	Treasury	and	other	collateral	and	thus	to	foster	the	functioning	of	financial	markets	more	generally”	(Federal	 Reserve	 Board	 2008a).69	As	 to	 Geithner	 (2014:	 146-157),	 the	 TSLF	should	“provide	some	relief	where	it	would	do	the	most	good.	[…]	We	hoped	to	thaw	 the	 frozen	markets	 for	 those	 securities	 [that	 the	private	 sector	would	no	longer	finance,	S.M.],	since	they	would	now	be	exchangeable	for	Treasuries.	We	also	hoped	 to	ease	 liquidity	pressures	 throughout	 the	system,	reaching	beyond	commercial	banks	for	the	first	time	to	the	most	troubled	part	of	the	markets”.	 																																																									69		 Interestingly,	the	Fed	introduced	the	TSLF	in	close	cooperation	with	the	Bank	of	Canada,	the	Bank	of	England,	 the	European	Central	Bank	and	the	Swiss	National	Bank,	who	took	similar	actions	 in	 their	 jurisdictions	 (see	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board	 2008a).	 This	 is	 relevant	 for	understanding	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 international	 spill-over	 of	 decisions	 to	 accommodate,	which	occurred	here	simultaneously	(cf.	Chapter	7).		
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The	PDCF,	in	turn,	was	a	standing	backstop	facility	in	which	the	Fed	took	the	lending	side	in	tri-party	repo	transactions	and	bought	the	dealers’	overnight	repos	against	a	penalty	 rate	 (Ennis	2011:	392).	By	 introducing	 it	on	16	March,	“the	Fed	[…]	opened	the	discount	window	to	investment	banks	for	the	first	time	since	 the	 Great	 Depression”	 (Paulson	 2010:	 116).	 The	 PDCF	 was	 designed	 to	reduce	 the	 funding	 pressure	 on	 dealers	 in	 a	 crisis	 situation	 and	 inject	market	liquidity	in	a	distressed	environment	(Adrian	et	al.	2009:	4).	Thus,	the	PDCF	not	only	 backed	 the	 dealers	 and	 the	 liabilities	 they	 issued,	 but	 also	 took	 away	 the	counterparty	 risk	 for	 their	 clients,	 cash	 investors	 and	 the	 clearing	 banks	(Mackenzie	2008).	For	accessing	the	PDCF,	dealers	had	to	 inform	their	clearing	banks,	which	checked	 if	a	sufficient	amount	of	collateral	had	been	pledged	and	informed	the	New	York	Fed.	The	Fed,	in	turn,	would	then	transfer	a	loan	for	the	primary	dealer	to	the	clearing	bank	(Adrian	et	al.	2009:	5).		 The	introduction	of	the	TSLF	and	the	PDCF	represents	a	shift	in	the	Fed’s	crisis	 intervention	 framework—driven	 by	 functional	 demand	 originated	 in	 the	credit	money	 system—from	 simply	 providing	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 liquidity	 to	making	 markets	 in	 certain	 securities	 to	 preserve	 the	 par	 value	 of	 the	 repo	liabilities	 issued	against	 those	tradable	securities.	Table	6.2—based	on	Fleming	et	al.	(2009:	3-4)—summarizes	the	main	differences	between	TSLF	and	PDCF.			
Term	Securities	Lending	Facility	 Primary	Dealer	Credit	Facility	Exchanges	securities	against	securities	 Exchanges	securities	against	deposits	Does	not	affect	the	dealers’	holdings	of	deposits	 Does	affect	the	dealers’	holdings	of	deposits	Auction	facility	 Standing	facility	Available	when	auctions	are	conducted	 Available	on	continuous,	as-needed	basis	Borrowing	rates	are	determined	in	auctions	 Borrowing	rates	are	set	by	the	Fed	with	a	premium	Is	more	attractive	to	dealers	and	does	not	imply	a	stigma,	as	dealers	approach	the	Fed	collectively		 Is	potentially	associated	with	a	stigma,	so	dealers	will	only	reluctantly	use	it	
	
Table	6.2—Comparison	of	TSLF	and	PDCF	
	 In	the	third	wave,	with	Lehman	filing	for	bankruptcy,	it	was	necessary	to	combat	the	panic	that	spread	on	the	repo	market	as	an	indirect	consequence	of	the	 failure.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Fed	 announced	 on	 14	 September	 2008	 that	 it	would	expand	the	collateral	acceptability	for	the	PDCF	to	a	broader	set	of	assets.	Until	that	point,	the	Fed	had	only	accepted	collateral	that	was	also	eligible	for	its	open	 market	 operations	 as	 well	 as	 “investment-grade	 corporate	 securities,	municipal	 securities,	 mortgage-backed	 securities,	 and	 asset-backed	 securities.	Collateral	 that	was	not	priced	by	the	clearing	banks	was	not	eligible	 for	pledge	under	 the	PDCF”	(Adrian	et	al.	2009:	4-6).	From	then	on,	 loans	via	PDCF	could	include	 anything	 that	 was	 acceptable	 in	 the	 tri-party	 repo	 system,	 e.g.	 non-investment	grade	bonds	and	stocks	(Paulson	2010:	218).	As	a	consequence,	the	usage	of	PDCF	skyrocketed	(Ennis	2011:	392).	As	Geithner	(2014)	points	out,	the	emergency	 intervention	 likely	overstepped	 the	Fed’s	 legal	mandate:	 “We	didn’t	believe	we	had	the	legal	authority	to	guarantee	Lehman’s	trading	liabilities,	even	using	our	 ‘unusual	and	exigent’	powers	under	13(3)”	 (ibid:	186).	Nevertheless,	they	decided	to	greatly	extend	their	liquidity	programmes	in	response	to	the	run.	
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Thus,	 the	 Fed	 effectively	 bailed	 out	 securities	 dealers	 by	 fulfilling	 the	 role	 of	whatever	counterparty	was	necessary	and	granting	them	all	necessary	liquidity	to	tame	the	run	on	repo.		Following	 up	 on	 the	 bailout	 of	 securities	 dealers	 through	 the	 Fed,	 the	Treasury	implemented	a	bailout	decision	for	MMFs.	On	19	September	2008,	the	U.S.	 Department	 of	 Treasury	 “provided	 a	 temporary	 guarantee	 that	 investors	would	 get	 their	 money	 back	 if	 they	 did	 not	 pull	 it	 out	 right	 then”	 (Bernanke	2013:	82).	As	to	the	press	release	announcing	the	programme,	“the	U.S.	Treasury	will	 insure	 the	 holdings	 of	 any	 publicly	 offered	 eligible	money	market	mutual	fund—both	 retail	 and	 institutional—that	 pays	 a	 fee	 to	 participate	 in	 the	program”	(FRB	2007).	The	guarantee	program	should	be	effective	for	one	year.	The	necessary	sources,	summing	up	to	$50	billion,	should	be	mobilized	from	the	Exchange	 Stabilization	 Fund	 (‘ESF’)	 (U.S.	 Treasury	 2008)—a	 pool	 of	 reserve	assets	controlled	by	the	Treasury	that	has	been	“created	and	originally	financed	by	 the	 Gold	 Reserve	 Act	 of	 1934	 to	 contribute	 to	 exchange	 rate	 stability	 and	counter	disorderly	conditions	in	the	foreign	exchange	market”	(FRB	2007).			Figure	6.18—taken	 from	Bernanke	 (2013:	82)—depicts	 the	net	 flows	 to	prime	 Money	 Market	 Funds	 in	 the	 heyday	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 thus	visualizes	the	run	as	well	as	the	impact	of	the	bailout.	Daily	outflows	rose	sharply	after	the	Lehman	bankruptcy	and	the	Reserve	Primary	Fund	breaking	the	buck,	but	got	halted	with	the	U.S.	Treasury	announcing	the	Temporary	Guarantee.		
	
Figure	6.18—Net	flows	to	prime	MMFs,	7-24	September	2008	(in	billion	USD)		 As	 Paulson	 explains	 in	 his	 memoirs,	 the	 decision	 to	 introduce	 the	temporary	guarantee	was	made	on	Thursday	18	September	during	a	call	among	himself,	 Tim	 Geithner,	 Ben	 Bernanke	 and	 Christopher	 Cox	 as	 well	 as	 their	members	of	staff.	Afterwards,	they	met	the	president	in	the	White	House	and	told	him	 that	 they	 “were	going	 to	need	 to	 get	 special	powers	 from	Congress”	 (ibid:	255).	 President	 Bush	 hesitated	 and	wanted	 the	 Fed	 to	 do	more,	 but	 Bernanke	
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insisted	that	it	was	unavoidable.	The	day	after,	the	Treasury	announced	the	MMF	guarantee	programme,	which	had	been	mainly	developed	in	overnight	sessions	by	 David	 Nason	 and	 Steven	 Shafran,	 two	 members	 of	 staff	 at	 the	 Treasury	Department.	 After	 its	 public	 announcement,	 FDIC	 chairman	 Sheila	 Bair	complained	 about	 not	 being	 involved	 in	 the	 process	 of	 developing	 the	programme.	She	argued	that	the	guarantee	would	hurt	uninsured	bank	deposits.	As	solution,	she	suggested	the	MMF	guarantee	should	only	insure	those	customer	balances	 that	 had	 been	 in	 the	 MMFs	 before	 the	 guarantee	 was	 announced.	Paulson	 agreed	 to	 this	 proposal	 and	 amended	 the	 rules	 for	 the	 temporary	guarantee	(ibid:	262-263).		In	 parallel	 to	 the	 Treasury	 guarantee,	 the	 Fed	 introduced	 the	 Asset-backed	Commercial	Paper	Money	Market	Mutual	Fund	Liquidity	Facility	(AMLF)	on	19	September.	With	the	AMLF,	“the	Fed	created	a	backstop	liquidity	program,	under	which	it	lent	money	to	banks,	which	in	turn	used	that	money	to	buy	some	of	the	assets	of	the	money	market	funds.	That	gave	the	money	market	funds	the	liquidity	 they	needed	 to	pay	off	 their	depositors	and	helped	 to	calm	 the	panic”	(Bernanke	2013:	82).	Banks	were	allowed	to	borrow	from	the	AMLF	if	the	MMF	they	 wanted	 to	 purchase	 ABCPs	 from	 experienced	 “significant	 redemption	pressures”	and	qualified	as	an	MMF	under	the	SEC	Rule	2a-7	(FRBNY	2010).			Why	did	the	highest	political	authorities	decide	in	favour	of	the	bailout?	A	factor	 frequently	brought	 forth	to	explain	the	government	 interventions	during	the	 crisis	 is	 the	 proximity	 of	 decision-makers	 to	 the	 financial	 industry	 (cf.	 e.g.	Tsingou	2015).	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 for	Treasury	 Secretary	Henry	Paulson,	who	used	 to	work	 for	Goldman	Sachs	and	 took	some	of	his	 intimates	with	him	when	he	assumed	office	(cf.	Paulson	2010).	Although	he	repeatedly	emphasizes	in	his	memoirs	that	he	tried	to	fulfill	the	deeds	of	the	positions	he	held	and	kept	financial	stability	as	the	greater	good	in	mind,	it	can	hardly	be	neglected	that	the	Wall	Street	CEOs	were	his	peers	with	whom	he	consulted	frequently	and	directly	(cf.	 e.g.	 Paulson	 2010,	 Junod	 2009,	 Sorkin	 2009).	 In	 particular,	 this	 proximity	may	have	played	a	role	for	the	public	bail-outs	of	(e.g.	Bear	Stearns,	AIG)	and	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	 Program	 (TARP),	which	was	used	 to	 re-capitalize	 banks,	given	that	the	Treasury	plaid	the	dominant	role	in	developing	and	implementing	those	policies.			However,	with	regard	to	the	emergency	 liquidity	 facilities,	 the	argument	that	the	top-level	staff’s	close	personal	ties	to	the	financial	industry	explains	the	decision	 to	 accommodate	 repos	 is	 not	 very	 convincing.	 Neither	 Ben	 Bernanke	nor	Timothy	Geithner	had	been	working	for	the	financial	industry	in	beforehand:	Bernanke	had	made	his	career	in	academia,	Geithner	in	public	service	(Geithner	2014).	 Therefore,	 this	 study	 contends	 that	 the	 key	 rationale	 for	 the	 decisive	intervention	was	the	fear	of	a	spill-over	from	the	crisis	on	the	wholesale	to	the	retail	money	market	in	which	also	households	would	be	affected—the	doomsday	scenario	 of	 a	 systemic	 meltdown	 (Interview	 1,	 6).	 This	 is	 the	 tone	 set	 in	 the	autobiographies	 of	 the	 three	protagonists	 in	 the	bailout	 decision	 (cf.	 Bernanke	2015,	Geithner	2014,	Paulson	2010).	A	particular	role	was	played	the	historical	experience	 of	 the	 Great	 Depression,	which	 had	 incentivised	 them	 to	 intervene	decisively	early	on	in	the	crisis	(Bernanke	2013,	Geithner	2014).	 	
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6.3.3	Accommodating	repos	and	MMF	shares	as	systemic	transformation		The	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	has	not	only	received	extensive	scholarly	attention	in	IPE,	 economics	 and	 beyond	 (cf.	 Chapter	1)	 but	 also	 sparked	 intensive	 political	reprocessing,	e.g.	through	the	Financial	Crisis	Inquiry	Commission	(FCIC	2011).	The	crisis	 is	widely	regarded	as	a	watershed	moment	and	frequently	put	in	the	context	of	1929,	while	stressing	similarities	and	differences	between	the	 ‘Great	Depression’	 and	 the	 ‘Great	 Recession’	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Eichengreen	 2015).	 From	 the	perspective	 of	 this	 study,	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 literature	 that	 adopts	 a	monetary	angle	on	shadow	banking,	there	is	an	additional	key	parallel	between	the	 two	 ‘centenary	 events’:	 Both	 entailed	 an	 accommodation	 of	 systemically	relevant	private	credit	money.			 Accordingly,	the	activities	of	the	Fed	and	the	Treasury	in	2008	extended	core	 aspects	of	 the	public	 framework	 for	deposit	 creation,	which	give	deposits	the	 status	 of	private-public	money,	 and	 applied	 it	 to	 overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	shares.	 This	 framework	 had	 been	 established	 in	 1933	 with	 the	 Emergency	Banking	 Act	 and	 the	 Glass-Steagall	 Act	 (cf.	 Chapter	5).	 With	 their	 coordinated	decision	to	guarantee	MMF	shares	and	backstop	repos,	the	Fed	and	the	Treasury	assumed	full	responsibility	for	both	shadow	money	forms	to	sustain	par	and	thus	dragged	 them	 from	 the	 private	 into	 the	 public	 credit	 money	 realm.	 ABCPs,	 in	contrast,	had	been	largely	driven	out	of	the	market	already	in	the	first	wave.	As	Figure	 6.19	 highlights,	 the	 bailouts	 effectively	 accommodated	 overnight	 repos	and	MMF	 shares	 in	 the	 second	 and	 the	 third	 wave	 of	 the	 run	 on	 the	 shadow	banking	system,	while	ABCPs	were	demonetized	in	the	first	wave.		
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Figure	6.19—Shadow	money	accommodation	via	Fed	and	Treasury	interventions	 	
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This	 section	 details	 said	 findings	 about	 the	 three	 shadow	 money	 forms	 and	presents	the	argument	that	the	public	interventions	amounted	to	a	substantive,	albeit	unintentional,	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		 In	the	first	wave,	when	the	ABCP	market	was	affected,	the	crisis	was	not	yet	perceived	as	severe	as	in	2008	after	Bear	Stearns	and	Lehman	Brothers:		“The	holders	of	ABCP	were	worried	about	 the	underlying	 collateral,	 but	the	 parents	 of	 the	 shadow	 banks	 apparently	 were	 not	 (yet),	 since	 they	were	willing	to	take	it	back	onto	their	own	balance	sheets;	and	the	market	was	 not	worried	 about	 the	 parents	 (yet),	 since	 it	was	willing	 to	 lend	 to	them.	Thus,	in	the	first	stage	of	the	crisis,	the	traditional	banking	system	was	willing	and	able	to	act	as	private	lender	of	last	resort	to	the	shadow	banking	system”	(Mehrling	2011:	119).		The	dropout	of	ABCPs	could	be	compensated	with	other	source	of	funding.	SPVs	could	be	 funded	by	 their	 parent	 institutions,	 and	 investors,	 i.e.	MMFs,	 still	 had	other	options	to	invest	in,	in	particular	the	other	channel	of	the	shadow	banking	system.	Thus,	the	run	on	ABCPs	was	compensated	both	by	an	expansion	of	repo	funding	 and	 traditional	 deposit	 banking	 (Mehrling	 2011:	 119).	 Figure	 6.20	makes	evident	that	the	issuance	of	ABCP	declined	sharply	in	the	last	months	of	2007.	 As	 the	 crisis	 proceeded	 in	 2008,	 the	 ABCP	market	 had	 effectively	 been	dried	 out.	 After	 the	 collapse	 of	 Lehman,	 public	 authorities	 adopted	 a	 range	 of	measures	 to	 support	 the	 securitization	 channel	 of	 shadow	banking,	 but	ABCPs	had	 already	 lost	 their	 relevance	 at	 that	 point	 (Interview	 5,	 Mehrling	 2011).	Among	 those	measures	 were	 emergency	 liquidity	 facilities	 such	 as	 the	Money	Market	 Investor	 Funding	 Facility	 (MMIFF),	 the	 Commercial	 Paper	 Funding	Facility	(CPFF)	as	well	as	the	Term	Asset-Backed	Securities	Loan	Facility	(TALF),	see	e.g.	FOMC	(2008),	FRBNY	(2008),	FRBNY	(2009a,	2009b).		
		
Figure	6.20—ABCPs	vs	bank	liabilities,	2000-2012	(in	trillion	USD)	 	
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Figure	6.21—based	on	Covitz	et	al.	(2009:	34)—visualizes	how	the	ABCP	market	was	 hit	 by	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	which	 effect	 the	 TAF’s	 introduction	had.	 The	 run	 on	 ABCPs	 was	 offset	 by	 the	 SPVs’	 sponsors	 that	 functioned	 as	private	 backstops	 for	 the	 shadow	 money	 form.	 TAF	 was	 used	 by	 the	 Fed	 to	cushion	the	effects	on	commercial	banks.	The	TAF	contributed	to	a	liquidation	of	ABCPs:	Banks	had	to	look	for	an	alternative	source	of	funding	instead	of	ABCPs,	and	 TAF	 provided	 it	 as	 a	 ‘robustified’	 discount	 window	 (Interview	 5),	 which	helped	 drying	 out	 the	 market	 and	 allowed	 investors	 to	 shift	 to	 other	 assets.	Crucially,	 however,	 the	 Fed	 did	 not	 backstop	 ABCP-issuing	 SPVs	 directly	 and	hence	did	not	accommodate	ABCP	in	the	public	money	supply.		
		
Figure	6.21—Impact	of	the	public	intervention	on	the	ABCP	market	
	 The	case	of	overnight	repos,	however,	is	different.	Figure	6.22—based	on	Copeland	et	 al.	 (2012)—shows	 that	with	 the	 introduction	of	 the	PDCF	and	 the	TSLF	 as	 innovative	 liquidity	 facilities,	 the	 Fed	 granted	 dealers	 access	 to	 its	balance	sheet	and	stood	ready	to	guarantee	the	repos	that	dealers	had	issued	as	IOUs.	 If	necessary,	dealers	could	 first	exchange	 their	bad	collateral	at	 the	TSLF	
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against	good	one	and	then	use	the	good	one	to	borrow	deposits	from	the	PDCF.	This	 substantially	 affected	 the	 market	 structure	 of	 tri-party	 repo.	 By	 letting	dealers	 tap	 its	 balance	 sheet,	 the	 Fed	 became—in	 the	 words	 of	 Mehrling	(2011)—the	‘Dealer	of	Last	Resort’.	Hence,	the	establishment	of	PDCF	and	TSLF	accommodated	overnight	repos	 into	 the	public	credit	money	supply:	The	PDCF	effectively	 turned	 overnight	 repos	 into	 a	private-public	money	 form.	When	 the	PDCF	 was	 first	 established	 in	 March	 2008,	 it	 had	 relatively	 high	 quality	standards	for	the	collateral	it	accepted.	Arguably,	this	transformed	merely	those	overnight	 repos	 into	 private-public	 money	 that	 had	 high-quality	 collateral	 in	beforehand,	 i.e.	 those	 issued	by	Dealers’	 government	desk.	When	 the	 collateral	standards	were	lowered	in	September	2008,	also	the	overnight	repos	issued	by	Dealers’	credit	desks	became	public-private	money.		
	
	
Figure	6.22—Impact	of	the	public	intervention	on	the	tri-party	repo	market	
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accommodation	was	that	Article	13(3)	allowed	Bernanke	and	Geithner	to	act	in	a	timely	manner.	The	technocratic	nature	of	the	accommodation	was	structurally	embedded	 in	 the	 design	 of	 the	 Fed.	 In	 this,	 the	 accommodation	 of	 overnight	repos	was	not	directly	 intended.	 Instead,	 the	primary	objective	was	 saving	 the	struggling	 repo	 issuers	 as	 speculative	 and	 Ponzi	 units	 (Interview	 6).	 Yet,	 the	accommodation	occurred	because	the	apparent	threat	of	a	systemic	collapse	was	so	imminent	that	the	technocratic	actors	were	willing	and	able	to	do	whatever	it	takes	 to	 prevent	 a	 systemic	meltdown	 (Paulson	 2010;	 Geithner	 2014).	 In	 this	case,	they	created	a	discount	window	for	securities	dealers	and	made	it	possible	for	them	to	tap	the	Fed’s	balance	sheet.			 As	 concerns	 the	 accommodation	 of	 MMF	 shares,	 the	 Temporary	Guarantee	and	the	AMLF	were	announced	on	the	same	day,	both	measures	were	closely	 coordinated	 (Paulson	 2010).	 Driven	 by	 the	 Treasury,	 the	 Guarantee	Programme	 required	 the	 president’s	 consent—in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Federal	Reserve’s	 liquidity	 facilities,	 which	 did	 not	 require	 such	 approval	 given	 the	central	 bank’s	 independence.	 The	AMLF	was	 legitimized	with	Article	 13	 (3)	 of	the	Federal	Reserve	Act.	The	Temporary	Guarantee	was	a	rescue	measure	taken	at	 the	 brink	 of	 financial	 collapse	 when	 policy-makers	 did	 not	 see	 any	 other	alternative	(Paulson	2010).	The	Treasury’s	press	release	states:			 “Concerns	about	the	net	asset	value	of	money	market	funds	falling	below	$1	 have	 exacerbated	 global	 financial	market	 turmoil	 and	 caused	 severe	liquidity	strains	in	world	markets.	In	turn,	these	pressures	have	caused	a	spike	 in	 some	 short-term	 interest	 and	 funding	 rates,	 and	 significantly	heightened	 volatility	 in	 exchange	markets.	 Absent	 the	 provision	 of	 such	financing,	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 risk	 of	 further	 heightened	 global	instability.	 Maintenance	 of	 the	 standard	 $1	 net	 asset	 value	 for	 money	market	mutual	funds	is	important	to	investors.	If	the	net	asset	value	for	a	fund	 falls	 below	 $1,	 this	 undermines	 investor	 confidence.	 The	 program	provides	support	to	investors	in	funds	that	participate	in	the	program	and	those	funds	will	not	‘break	the	buck’.	This	action	should	enhance	market	confidence	and	alleviate	 investors'	 concerns	about	 the	ability	 for	money	market	mutual	funds	to	absorb	a	loss.	Investors	in	money	market	mutual	funds	 with	 a	 net	 asset	 value	 that	 falls	 below	 $1	would	 be	 notified	 that	their	fund	triggered	the	insurance	program.”	(U.S.	Treasury	2008).		As	Geithner	 (2014:	195)	points	out,	 the	option	was	on	 the	 table	 to	 introduce	a	public	liquidity	backstop	for	MMFs	by	the	Fed	but	the	proposal	was	scrapped:		 “The	Reserve	Fund	asked	the	New	York	Fed	for	help	to	avoid	breaking	the	buck,	 but	my	 team	 said	 no.	We	 didn’t	 think	we	 could	 stop	 the	 run,	 and	agreeing	 to	 their	 request	would	 have	 amounted	 to	 an	 implied	 backstop	for	the	entire	$3.5	trillion	money	market	industry.	The	Fed	didn’t	have	the	legal	 authority	 to	 guarantee	 money	 market	 funds	 and	 protect	 their	investors	from	losses”	(Geithner	2014:	195).		The	 fact	 that	 the	 intervention	 by	 Sheila	 Bair	 was	 accepted	 underlines	 the	assumption	 that	 the	 accommodation	 of	 MMF	 shares	 was	 unintended.	 The	decision-makers	did	not	take	into	account	how	their	decisions	would	affects	the	monetary	system	(Interview	5).	 	
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Figure	6.23	highlights	the	impact	of	the	Treasury’s	temporary	guarantee	and	the	AMLF	on	the	MMF	market.	The	Guarantee	Program	paralleled	the	logic	of	deposit	 insurance.	 As	 Bernanke	 (2013:	 83)	 puts	 it:	 “This	 was	 an	 absolutely	classic	bank	run	and	a	classic	response:	providing	liquidity	to	help	the	institution	being	 run	 provide	 cash	 to	 its	 investors,	 and	 providing	 guarantees.	 That	successfully	 ended	 the	 run.”	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 adequate	 to	 say	 that	 MMF	shares	were	a	form	of	public-private	money	while	the	Guarantee	Program	was	in	place.	While	Prime	money	funds	were	mainly	subject	to	the	run,	the	Temporary	Guarantee	affected	all	MMF	types.	The	AMLF,	in	contrast,	did	not	grant	MMFs	as	shadow	banks	access	to	the	Fed’s	balance	sheet.	The	funds	it	supplied	in	support	for	MMFs	were	distributed	via	banks.	Hence,	the	Fed’s	 facilities	 in	this	case	did	not	contribute	to	the	accommodation	of	MMF	shares	in	the	public	money	supply.		
		
Figure	6.23—Impact	of	the	public	intervention	on	the	MMF	Market	 	
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In	sum,	Figure	6.24	shows	how	the	interventions	by	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Treasury	brought	 in	ad	hoc	public	guarantees	that	overnight	repos	and	MMF	 shares	 sustain	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher	 ranking	 money	 forms	 and	accordingly	transformed	public-private	setup	of	the	monetary	system.			
	
Figure	6.24—Accommodation	to	guarantee	par	for	repos	and	MMF	shares	
	
	 From	the	functionalist	logic	adopted	in	this	study,	the	accommodation	of	overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	shares	 is	 the	 consequence	of	 the	 rise	of	 the	 shadow	banking	system	that	started	in	the	1970s	and	brought	along	new	forms	of	private	credit	 money,	 which	 eventually	 attained	 systemic	 relevance.	 In	 that	 sense,	following	 the	 introductory	quote	 to	 this	chapter,	 the	2007-9	was	a	crisis	of	 the	entire	market-based	credit	system—a	systemic	event	that	exceeded	the	scope	of	some	 partial	market	 segments	 such	 as	 those	 for	 subprime	mortgages	 or	 some	isolated	aspects	of	 the	 shadow	banking	 ‘daisy	chain’.	While	 individual	 financial	innovations,	 market	 events	 and	 decisions	 of	 policy-makers	 had	 their	 share	 in	actually	 bringing	 about	 the	 outcome	 of	 shadow	 money	 accommodation,	 the	underlying	 root	 cause	 for	 it	 is	 the	monetary	 system’s	 ability	 to	 create	 private	credit	money	out	of	nothing	by	swapping	IOUs	of	different	maturities.	Sooner	or	later,	this	had	to	lead	to	a	run	on	the	private	credit	money	forms	and	bring	along	the	built-in	necessity	that,	to	avoid	the	collapse	of	the	debt	house	of	cards,	public	authorities	 have	 to	 backstop	 the	 private	 credit	 money	 system.	 The	accommodation	of	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	in	2008	was	an	unintended	side-effect	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 rescue	 the	 financial	 system	 by	 bailing	 out	 major	financial	 institutions.	 The	 decision	 had	 been	 adopted	 at	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	political	 and	 administrative	 authorities.	 The	 political	 willingness	 was	 derived	from	 a	 doomsday	 scenario	 that	was	 feared	 among	 politicians	 and	 technocrats,	which	ultimately	led	them	to	exercise	the	state’s	infrastructural	power.	
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6.4	Conclusion		This	 chapter	has	 traced	 the	 rise	of	ABCPs,	overnight	 repos	and	MMF	shares	as	private	credit	money	forms	or	‘shadow	money’	with	a	focus	on	the	U.S.	from	the	1970s,	 followed	by	 the	 accommodation	 of	 overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	 shares	 in	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	via	the	Fed’s	PDCF	and	TSLF	as	well	as	the	Treasury’s	temporary	guarantee.	This	political	intervention	unintentionally	transformed	the	U.S.	 monetary	 system	 by	 shifting	 the	 delineation	 between	 public	 and	 private	credit	money	within	the	hybridity	of	the	self-referential	credit	money	system.		 The	 chapter	 has	 applied	 the	 two-phase	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	accommodation	on	the	U.S.	context	in	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	century	as	the	centre	 of	 the	 world’s	 financial	 system.	 It	 demonstrated	 how	 SPVs,	 securities	dealers	and	MMFs	as	speculative	and	Ponzi	units	or	‘shadow	banks’	rose	sharply	in	quantity	and	systemic	 relevance	with	 the	concomitant	processes	of	 financial	liberalization	 and	 globalization.	 In	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis,	 with	 the	 three-wave	 run	 on	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system,	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 credit	 money	system	reverted	itself.	In	the	first	wave,	the	preferred	market-based	intervention	was	still	sufficient	to	tame	the	run.	In	the	second	and	the	third	wave,	the	Fed	and	the	Treasury	saw	themselves	forced	to	bail	out	securities	dealers	and	MMFs,	the	still	 remaining	 shadow	 banks	 that	 faced	 an	 existential	 struggle,	 following	 the	functionalist	 logic	 embedded	 in	 the	 credit	money	 system	which	 allows	money	creation	ex	nihilo.		What	 happened	 to	 the	 accommodated	 shadow	 money	 forms	 after	 the	intervention?	Were	 the	accommodation	and	 the	concomitant	 transformation	of	the	 monetary	 system	 permanent?	 How	 did	 it	 affect	 the	 setup	 of	 the	 money	supply	as	we	know	it	today?		The	backstops	for	MMF	shares	and	repos	had	only	been	established	for	a	limited	period	of	 time	after	 the	 collapse	of	Lehman.	The	Temporary	Guarantee	Programme	was	 in	 place	 from	September	 2008	 to	 September	 2009.	 The	PDCF	and	the	TSLF,	after	several	prolongations,	were	finally	shut	down	on	1	February	2010	 (Federal	 Reserve	 2010b).	 Since	 the	 heyday	 of	 the	 crisis,	 two	 divergent	processes	have	been	 taking	place:	On	 the	one	hand,	 as	 the	 result	 of	 regulatory	reforms	between	2009	and	2014,	the	status	of	ABCPs	and	Prime	MMF	shares	as	shadow	money	has	been	abrogated.	Both	instruments	no	longer	trade	at	par	to	bank	 deposits,	 hence	 their	 function	 as	 deposits	 substitutes	 for	 institutional	investors	 is	 gone.	Overnight	 repos	 and	Government	MMF	 shares,	 in	 turn,	 have	been	consolidated	as	shadow	money	under	public	control.	Thus,	 the	process	of	extending	the	public-private	framework	for	deposit	creation	on	shadow	money,	which	 had	 been	 started	 during	 the	 crisis,	 has	 found	 continuation	 in	 the	 post-crisis	regulatory	process	between	2009	and	2014.		In	 the	 ABCP	 market,	 regulatory	 changes	 were	 introduced	 regarding	accounting	 standards	 after	 the	 crisis	 that	 led	 to	 a	 strong	 decrease	 in	 ABCP	issuance.	In	2010,	the	“favorable	risk	capital	treatment”	has	been	dropped.	With	this	decision,	regulators	reversed	the	decision	taken	in	2003,	which	had	made	it	possible	 for	 sponsoring	 banks	 to	 exclude	 ABCPs	 from	 their	 risk-weight	 asset	
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base	and	had	 thus	 facilitated	 the	 rise	of	ABCP	as	 shadow	money.	Hence,	banks	are	 not	 only	 forced	 to	 consolidate	 the	 ABCP-issuing	 SPVs	 onto	 their	 balance	sheets,	but	also	have	to	keep	risk	capital	for	the	SPVs	(Chen	2015:	8-10,	51).	The	removal	of	preferential	accounting	rules	made	ABCPs	not	only	 lose	their	status	as	shadow	money	de	facto,	but	also	by	regulation	(Interview	6).		 For	 MMF	 shares,	 the	 SEC	 introduced	 a	 substantial	 distinction	 between	Prime	 MMFs,	 which	 predominantly	 invest	 in	 private	 assets	 with	 floating	 or	variable	 rates,	 as	 well	 as	 Government	 and	 Tax-exempt	 MMFs,	 which	 invest	almost	exclusively	 in	public	debt.	The	 regulatory	 change	 for	MMFs	occurred	 in	two	main	steps:	the	Amendments	to	Rule	2a-7	of	the	1940	Investment	Company	Act	 in	 2010	 and	 2014.	 In	 2010,	 the	 SEC	 introduced	 five	 moderate	 new	 rules	aimed	 at	 limiting	 the	 risk-taking	 of	 MMFs	 (SEC	 2010:	 10060).	 After	 the	 2010	Amendment,	debates	emerged	about	whether	the	changes	were	sufficient	(Lynch	2013).	 In	 November	 2012,	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Oversight	 Council	 (FSOC)	suggested	on	 the	basis	of	 its	 authority	granted	by	 the	Dodd-Frank-Act	 that	 the	SEC	 should	 implement	 further	 reforms.	 In	 June	 2013,	 the	 SEC	 published	 two	alternative	 proposals:	 One	 suggested	 that	 all	 non-government	 MMFs	 should	introduce	 a	 floating	 net	 asset	 value	 (NAV)	 and	 thus	 abandon	 the	 guarantee	 to	trade	 their	 shares	 at	 par.	 The	other	 foresaw	 the	 introduction	of	 a	 two	percent	withdrawal	 fee	 for	 Prime	 MMFs	 if	 their	 five-day	 liquidity	 dropped	 below	 15	percent	of	its	total	assets	(SIFMA	2015).	In	2014,	the	SEC	adopted	both	options—floating	 NAV	 and	 withdrawal	 fees	 (SEC	 2014)—and	 made	 Prime	 MMF	 shares	lose	the	status	of	shadow	money.			 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 de-monetisation	 of	 ABCPs	 and	 Prime	 MMF	 shares,	Government	 MMF	 shares	 and	 overnight	 repos	 sustain	 par	 vis-à-vis	 bank	deposits.	 An	 apparent	 consequence	 of	 the	 explicit	 emergency	 backstops’	expiration	 would	 be	 to	 assume	 that	 public	 authorities	 no	 longer	 adopt	responsibility	for	par	clearance	of	Government	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos.	However,	as	indicated	in	a	number	of	interviews,	scholars,	regulators	and	market	participants	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	backstops	are	still	implicitly	in	place	and	could	 be	 re-enacted	 by	 the	 Fed	 and	 the	 Treasury	 any	 time	 if	 necessary	(Interviews	1,	4,	6	7).	While	the	Dodd-Frank-Act—the	main	political	response	to	the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis—makes	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 the	 Fed	 to	 invoke	 its	Article	13	(3)	emergency	powers,	 there	 is	still	 the	possibility	 to	do	so.	The	Fed	could	not	 implement	measures	 on	 the	basis	 of	 those	powers	 again	 as	 a	 purely	technocratic	 decision	 but	 would	 require	 political	 permission;	 still,	 everybody	expects	that	in	times	of	extreme	financial	strain,	it	will	very	quickly	receive	such	permission	 (Interview	 1).	 As	 to	 MacDonald	 (1996:	 8-11),	 implicit	 guarantee	schemes—though	 not	 legally	 equivalent—are	 comparable	 to	 explicit	 ones	 as	they	have	the	same	economic	and	functional	effects.	While	an	explicit	guarantee	scheme	would	be	established	by	a	 law	that	 lays	out	 in	detail	who	 is	entitled	 to	what	 under	 which	 circumstances,	 an	 implicit	 guarantee	 scheme	 allows	 public	authorities	 to	decide	about	protection	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	 leaves	 flexibility	and	 reduces	 administrative	 costs.	 This	 applies	 to	 the	 Treasury’s	 guarantee	 for	MMF	 shares	 as	 well	 as	 the	 PDCF	 and	 the	 TSLF.	 Therefore,	 government	 MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos	may	be	considered	as	still	implicitly	backstopped.	 	
	 209	
Moreover,	 the	 Fed’s	 Reverse	 Repo	 Facility	 (RRP)	 is	 an	 institutional	innovation	that	functions	as	an	explicit	permanent	backstop	for	overnight	repos.		The	Fed	established	the	RRP	 in	2013	as	a	novel	 tool	 to	regain	control	over	 the	federal	 funds	 rate	 at	 the	 zero	 lower	 bound.	 It	 is	 an	 overnight,	 risk-free	instrument	 to	which	not	only	banks	but	also	MMFs	and	securities	dealers	have	access.	 A	 transaction	 via	 RRP	 ‘is	 economically	 similar	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	borrowing	 from	 a	 counterparty,	 with	 the	 loan	 secured	 by	 collateral	 from	 the	Federal	 Reserve’s	 security	 portfolio	 (Frost	 et	 al.	 2015:	 6).	 Primarily,	 RRP	was	intended	to	be	a	monetary	policy	tool.	An	alternative,	albeit	contested	(Interview	1),	interpretation	is	that	the	RRP	represents	the	continuation	of	the	Fed’s	dealer	of	last	resort	function—with	the	Fed	acting	as	an	alternative	dealer	that	tri-party	repo	 counterparties	 could	 turn	 to	 (cf.	 Figure	 6.25).	 As	 to	McCulley	 and	 Pozsar	(2014),	RRP	“gives	shadow	banks	an	account	at	 the	Fed,	 similar	 to	 the	reserve	accounts	 that	 deposit-taking	 institutions	 keep	 there”	 In	 December	 2015,	 after	some	 experimenting,	 the	 Fed	 turned	 the	 RRP	 into	 a	 full-allotment	 facility	(Boesler	and	Condon	2015)	and	made	the	backstop	unlimited.			
		
Figure	6.25—Implicit	backstops	for	overnight	repos	and	RRP		 In	 post-crisis	 regulation,	 there	 were	 considerations	 to	 set	much	 tighter	standards	for	the	issuance	of	Government	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos,	but	the	 actual	 regulatory	 changes	 implemented	 remained	 rather	 marginal:	 For	overnight	repos,	on	the	one	hand,	some	new	regulations	have	been	passed,	most	importantly	the	introduction	of	the	Supplementary	Leverage	Ratio	which	forces	securities	 dealers	 to	 keep	 a	 minimum	 ratio	 of	 capital	 to	 total	 assets	 of	 five	
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percent	 (Duffie	 2016).	 Still,	 more	 far-reaching	 reforms—e.g.	 to	 reduce	 the	possibility	of	fire	sales,	to	control	the	setting	of	haircuts	or	to	manage	collateral	constraints—did	not	materialize	 although	 the	 FSB	had	made	 repo	 regulation	 a	priority	in	their	post-crisis	reform	agenda	(Gabor	2016).	For	MMFs,	on	the	other	hand,	 the	 Group	 of	 Thirty—a	 private	 body	 of	 financial	 experts—called	 for	prudential	regulation	and	supervision	next	to	explicit	government	insurance	and	access	 to	central	bank	 liquidity	 if	 they	wanted	to	 issue	shares	 trading	at	par	 to	deposits	 (Fink	 2011:	 254).	 In	 2012,	 Mary	 Schapiro—Chair	 of	 the	 SEC	 from	January	2009	 to	December	2012—proposed	 to	make	MMFs	more	bank-like	by	introducing	 capital	 buffers.	 However,	 the	 FSOC	 with	 its	 intervention	 forced	Schapiro	to	drop	the	proposal	(Lynch	2013).	As	a	consequence	of	the	SEC’s	2014	decision,	Government	MMF	shares	remain	functionally	equivalent	to	deposits	as	they	 keep	 their	 constant	 net-asset	 value,	 but	 are	 regulated	 differently.	 Finally,	Ricks	(2016)	has	brought	 forth	his	r-currency	proposal,	which	would	make	the	issuance	of	 the	 remaining	 shadow	money	 forms	dependent	on	public	 licensing	and	thus	turn	them	into	pure	public	money.	He	thus	effectively	calls	for	a	version	of	 the	 1844	 Bank	 Charter	 Act	 or	 the	 1933	 Chicago	 Plan	 applied	 on	 today’s	shadow	money	supply.		 Figure	 6.26	 demonstrates	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 post-crisis	 regulatory	reforms	had	on	the	remaining	shadow	money	forms	which	defines	the	status	quo	of	 the	 monetary	 system	 today.	 The	 decisive	 step	 towards	 this	 status	 quo	 of	today’s	empirical	setup	of	the	money	supply	were	the	emergency	interventions	of	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Treasury	that,	by	accommodating	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares,	induced	a	profound	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
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Figure	6.26—Re-regulating	the	shadow	money	supply	in	2014	
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Chapter	7	
Discussion:	Accommodation	Theory	in	the	Framework	of	IPE			 “In	a	parliamentary	debate	on	Sir	Robert	Peel’s	Bank	Act	of	 1844	 and	 1845,	 Gladstone	 remarked	 that	 not	 even	love	 has	made	 so	many	 fools	 of	men	 as	 the	 pondering	over	 the	 nature	 of	 money.	 He	 spoke	 of	 Britons	 to	Britons.	The	Dutch,	on	the	contrary,	who,	 from	times	of	yore,	have	had,	Petty’s	doubts	notwithstanding,	 ‘angelic	wits’	for	money	speculation	have	never	lost	their	wits	in	speculation	about	money”	(Marx	1859	[1904]:	73).			
7.1	Introduction	and	plan	of	the	chapter		This	 chapter	 summarizes	 and	 compares	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 theoretical	 and	empirical	parts	of	this	study,	discusses	their	role	as	a	contribution	to	the	field	of	IPE,	 elaborates	 on	 implications	 of	 the	 approach	 based	 on	 analyticism	 and	functionalism,	and	sketches	venues	for	future	research.		 The	 primary	 objective	 of	 this	 study	 has	 been	 to	 identify,	 flesh	 out	 and	empiricize	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 as	 a	 historically	 repeating	political-economic	phenomenon	that	has	an	impact	on	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	 system	 and	 can	 provide	 a	 genealogy	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	contemporary	 credit	 money	 supply	 is	 set	 up.	 As	 Chapter	1	 has	 argued,	 the	absence	 of	 both	 private	 money	 and	 credit	 money,	 conceptually	 speaking,	 is	 a	significant	gap	in	the	IPE	body	of	literature	on	money	and	the	monetary	system’s	transformation—especially	 bearing	 in	 mind	 that	 accommodation	 of	 private	credit	money	as	a	form	of	state	intervention	is	a	phenomenon	par	excellence	for	IPE	 to	study	as	 it	 represents	a	very	peculiar	overlap	of	politics	and	economics.	The	 gap	 in	 the	 IPE	 literature	 has	 pointed	 to	 the	 need	 of	 “pondering	 over	 the	nature	of	money”.	As	depicted	in	the	introductory	quote	taken	from	Karl	Marx’s	
Contribution	to	the	Critique	of	Political	Economy,	such	pondering	is	not	unknown	to	 the	British	 intellectual	 tradition,	and	 therefore	may	be	 legitimate,	or	at	 least	forgiven,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 British	 IPE.	 Chapter	2	 has	 pondered	 accordingly	 and	developed	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	expanding,	yet	 instable	debt	claims—an	assessment	that	 lies	at	the	heart	of	the	functionalist	accommodation	theory	developed	in	Chapter	3.			Following	 up	 on	 the	 previous	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 chapters	 about	private	credit	money	accommodation,	this	chapter	presents	a	discussion	as	well	as	a	critical	reflection	of	their	main	findings	and	results.	The	specific	setup	of	the	study—in	 line	 with	 the	 research	 paradigm	 of	 ‘analyticism’	 in	 the	 Weberian	tradition	 (Jackson	2011)—has	brought	along	very	specific	 ‘degrees	of	 freedom’	regarding	 some	 typical	 issues	 in	 contemporary	 social	 science	 research—e.g.	posing	relatively	broad	research	questions,	choosing	the	conceptual	 framework	of	 a	market-based	 credit	 theory	of	money,	building	an	 ideal-typical	 theory	and	conducting	the	empirical	research	by	developing	an	analytical	narrative.	This	has	
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allowed	 to	 approach	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 from	 a	 somewhat	unconventional—if	 not:	 idiosyncratic—angle	 and	 may	 have	 yielded	 some	innovative	insights	that	advance	our	understanding	of	institutional	change	in	the	monetary	 system,	 both	 in	 the	 past	 and	 today.	 They	 prepare	 the	 ground	 for	follow-up	 research,	 using	 either	 the	 theoretical	 or	 the	 conceptual	work	 of	 this	study	as	 a	 starting	point.	 Still,	within	a	 framework	of	mind-world	monism	and	essentially	qualitative,	narrative	research,	 they	are	 likely	 to	be	confronted	with	charges	 of	 being	 subjective	 and	 hardly	 generalizable.	 However,	 in	 line	 with	Jackson’s	 ideal	 for	 a	 pluralism	 of	 research	 paradigms	 (ibid:	 210),	 this	 chapter	argues	 that	 those	 issues	 may	 be	 remedied	 by	 approaching	 the	 matters	 again	from	a	different	methodological	angle.		 The	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:		Section	7.2	provides	a	comparative	summary	of	the	empirical	findings	in	the	 three	 case	 studies	 about	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 notes,	 bank	 deposits	and	 shadow	money.	 By	 discussing	 its	 similarities	 and	 differences,	 it	 highlights	empirical	variations	of	the	ideal	type	and	stresses	what	is	distinctive	about	each	instance	of	accommodation.		Section	7.3	points	out	the	contribution	the	study	makes	to	the	field	of	IPE	with	 regard	 to	 describing	 and	 explaining	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	system.	It	highlights	three	main	aspects:	presenting	a	historical	genealogy	of	the	monetary	system,	bringing	in	innovative	tools	for	the	conceptual	apparatus	and	developing	a	distinct	functionalist	explanatory	approach.			Section	7.4	discusses	a	number	of	implications	of	the	analyticist	research	paradigm	and	the	functionalist	explanatory	approach	that	affect	the	status	of	the	accommodation	 theory	 developed	 in	 this	 study.	 These	 issues	 refer	 to	 negative	case	 as	 well	 as	 a	 possible	 underappreciation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 when	 it	comes	to	establishing	new	forms	of	private	credit	money.		Section	7.5,	in	turn,	presents	venues	for	a	further	research	agenda	for	IPE.	Building	 on	 this	 study,	 the	 follow-up	 processes	 after	 the	 accommodation	 of	private	credit	money	may	be	scrutinized	more	in	detail,	especially	regarding	the	re-regulation	 of	 the	monetary	 system,	 international	 spill-overs	 as	well	 as	 new	mechanisms	for	monetary	governance.	Building	on	the	Money	View	framework,	in	 turn,	 other	 empirical	 objects	 of	 analysis	 may	 be	 addressed	 such	 as	 the	International	Monetary	System	or	the	European	Monetary	Union.		Section	7.6	concludes.	
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7.2	Comparative	summary	of	the	findings	
	As	argued	in	Chapter	3,	the	ideal-typical	response	to	the	two	research	questions	guiding	this	study	can	be	given	as	follows:	
	 RQ1:	 How	 does	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 affect	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system?	 Private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	
transforms	the	public	money	supply	by	shifting	the	delineation	between	public	and	
private	 credit	money.	 It	 is	 preceded	by	a	 long	period	of	 financial	 stability	during	
which	 private	 profit-oriented	 institutions	 conduct	 financial	 innovation.	 They	
develop	novel	 short-term	 IOUs,	which	 eventually	 become	private	 credit	money	as	
they	 establish	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 money	 forms	 and	 attain	
systemic	 relevance	 as	 they	 grow	 in	 size,	 interconnectedness,	 non-substitutability	
and	complexity.	The	private	credit	money	form	is	accommodated	at	a	very	specific	
moment	 in	 time	 that	 coincides	 with	 a	 ‘Minsky	moment’,	 i.e.	 a	 systemic	 financial	
crisis,	 when	 public	 balance	 sheets	 are	 used	 to	 create	 backstops	 against	 the	
illiquidity	 and	 insolvency	 of	 the	 defaulting	 institutions	 that	 have	 issued	 the	
systemically	relevant	credit	money	form.			RQ2:	Why	 is	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodated	 in	 the	 public	 money	supply?	Private	credit	money	accommodation	is	driven	by	the	very	own	properties	
of	 the	 monetary	 system	 itself,	 notably	 its	 ability	 to	 create	 credit	 money	 out	 of	
nothing.	 As	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	 claims,	 the	
monetary	system’s	ability	to	bring	forth	new	forms	of	private	credit	money	sooner	
or	 later	 leads	 to	 an	 imminent	 threat	 of	 implosion.	 This	 creates	 the	 necessity	 for	
political	 authorities	 to	 bail	 out	 the	 struggling	 institutions	 that	 issue	 the	
systemically	 relevant	 private	 credit	 money	 form.	 As	 private	 agency	 dominates	
during	the	rise	of	the	systemically	relevant	private	credit	money	form,	public	actors	
only	 react	 ex	 post	 to	 the	 technical	 necessities	 in	 a	 crisis	 to	 prevent	 a	 systemic	
meltdown.	 The	 accommodation—i.e.	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	
that	 induces	 a	 change	 in	 the	 public-private	 setup	 of	 the	 money	 supply	 while	
exercising	 the	 state’s	 infrastructural	 power—is	 the	 unintentional	 side-effect	 of	
those	 bail-outs,	 decided	 upon	 on	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 government	 under	 extreme	
time	pressure	and	uncertainty	while	fearing	a	doomsday	scenario	for	the	financial	
system	and	the	wider	political	economy.	
	 These	findings—as	Chapters	4-6	have	demonstrated—are	reflected	in	all	three	cases	under	scrutiny	in	this	study.	They	are	the	historical	manifestations	of	the	ideal-typical	process,	yet	with	empirical	variations.		The	 rise	 of	 bank	 notes	 as	 a	 private	 credit	 money	 form	 began	 with	 the	Bank	 of	 England’s	 foundation	 in	 1693.	 From	 the	 1750s	 onwards—during	 the	Industrial	Revolution—the	use	of	country	bank	notes	became	more	wide-spread.	They	are	thus	the	private	credit	money	form	of	the	Industrial	Revolution,	created	in	 the	 technological	 and	 political	 context	 of	 the	 17th	 and	 18th	 century.	 Bank	deposits	 had	 historically	 been	 developed	 even	 before	 bank	 notes,	 but	 were	barely	 used	 in	 transactions.	 They	 only	 gradually	 emerged	 as	 a	 private	 credit	money	 form	 in	 the	 mid-19th	 century,	 after	 the	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 notes.	Despite	the	prevalence	of	central	banks	as	private	institutions,	deposit	creation	
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was	 not	 publicly	 backstopped.	 In	 terms	 of	 their	 complexity,	 global	interconnectedness	 and	 technological	 implications,	 both	 bank	 notes	 and	 bank	deposits	are	substantially	different	than	the	shadow	money	forms	of	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	century.	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	developed	in	the	1970s	 in	 the	 context	 of	 financial	 liberalization.	 The	 issuing	 institutions	 found	advanced	ways	to	make	them	directly	compete	with	bank	deposits,	among	others	by	using	innovative	accounting	rules	to	induce	par	clearance.			All	 types	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 that	 were	 later	 accommodated—i.e.	Bank	 of	 England	 notes,	 bank	 deposits,	 overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	 shares—had	become	an	 indispensable	part	of	 the	money	supply	at	 the	point	 in	time	when	a	systemic	 crisis	 emerged	with	a	 run	on	 the	 issuing	 institutions.	They	all	 existed	next	to	other,	more	insecure	forms	of	private	credit	money,	namely	country	bank	notes,	 trust	 deposits	 and	 ABCPs.	 The	 emergence	 of	 the	 runs	 was	 typically	connected	to	those	lower-ranking	forms	of	shadow	money	and	led	to	an	upwards	contagion	within	the	hierarchy.	However,	while	bank	notes	were	accommodated	before	 the	run	 fundamentally	affected	the	Bank	of	England	as	 the	key	 issuer	of	the	 systemically	 relevant	 credit	 money	 form,	 bank	 deposits	 only	 were	accommodated	after	many	runs	had	taken	place	and	par	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	was	 broken	 over	 and	 over	 again.	 Overnight	 repos	 and	MMF	 shares,	 in	turn,	were	accommodated	at	the	very	peak	of	the	run.		The	 bank	 note	 accommodation	 occurred	 in	 February	 1797	 when	 the	convertibility	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 into	 gold	 was	 suspended.	 Instead,	 a	liquidity	 backstop	 was	 established	 via	 the	 legal	 proclamation	 that	 Bank	 of	England	notes	were	a	promise	to	pay	nothing	else	but	themselves,	and	a	solvency	backstop	 was	 created	 via	 the	 government’s	 guarantee	 to	 accept	 an	 unlimited	amount	 of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 for	 tax	 payments.	 In	 this,	 the	 ‘paper	 credit’	(Thornton	 1802)	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England—which	 at	 that	 time	 was	 a	 private	institution—was	 shifted	 from	 the	 private	 to	 the	 public	 credit	 money	 realm.	Crucially,	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	were	made	 equivalent	 to	 the	 fictional	 unit	 of	account	 and	 turned	 into	 its	 primary	 representation.	 This	 accommodation	 via	legal	proclamation	differs	from	the	accommodation	of	bank	deposits	and	shadow	money.	 In	 those	 cases,	 public	 authorities	 guaranteed	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	 forms	of	money	but	did	not	 turn	 them	 into	 the	highest-ranking	form	of	money.		Accordingly,	the	accommodation	of	bank	deposits	 in	the	U.S.	occurred	in	March	 1933,	 at	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 multi-wave	 banking	 crisis	 during	 the	 Great	Depression	when	runs	on	commercial	banks	took	place	all	over	the	country.	To	calm	 down	 that	 systemic	 crisis,	 newly	 elected	 President	 Franklin	 D.	 Roosevelt	adopted	unprecedented	measures,	declared	a	National	Banking	Holiday	and,	by	passing	the	Emergency	Banking	Act	and	holding	his	First	Fireside	Chat	in	March	1933,	 announced	 an	 implicit	 100	 percent	 government	 guarantee	 for	 bank	deposits.	 This,	 in	 effect,	 created	 a	 public	 solvency	 backstop	 for	 deposits.	 In	addition	 to	 putting	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	 under	 federal	 control	 and	massively	 extending	 its	 lender-of-last-resort	 responsibilities,	 this	 amounted	 to	an	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 deposits	 which	 guaranteed	 par	 clearance	 vis-à-vis	bank	notes.	 	
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The	accommodation	of	shadow	money	materialized	in	the	U.S.	during	the	2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis	 when	 the	 Fed	 and	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 in	 a	 coordinated	action	 established	 novel	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 backstops	 for	 those	 financial	instruments.	The	PDCF	and	 the	TSLF	 created	 a	discount	window	 for	overnight	repos	whose	 issuers—so-called	 Securities	Dealers—could	 then	directly	 tap	 the	Fed’s	 balance	 sheet.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Temporary	 Guarantee	 Program	 for	 MMF	shares	was	an	explicit	100	percent	government	guarantee	for	MMF	shares.	Those	actions	were	taken	after	failures	of	Bear	Stearns	and	Lehman	Brothers	in	March	and	 September	 2008,	which	 led	 to	 a	 system-wide	 run	 on	 the	 shadow	 banking	system,	and	established	guarantees	for	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	deposits.		The	 decisions	 that	 accommodated	 the	 respective	 credit	 money	 forms	were	all	 taken	at	 the	highest	 level	of	executive	authority,	yet	with	variations	 in	the	 respective	 historical	 contexts.	 In	 all	 three	 cases,	 they	 were	 connected	 to	enormous	 time	 pressure,	 taken	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 doomsday	 scenario	 and	materialized	as	unintended	side-effect	of	bailing	out	the	issuing	institutions.		In	line	with	this	assessment,	firstly,	the	decision	to	stop	the	convertibility	of	 Bank	 of	 England	 notes	 was	 taken	 via	 an	 Order	 of	 the	 Privy	 Council	 at	 an	improvised	 meeting	 during	 a	 nation-wide	 bank	 run	 and	 was	 implemented	overnight.	 As	 the	 Privy	 Council	 feared	 that	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 could	 face	bankruptcy	in	the	middle	of	a	war	against	the	arch-enemy	France,	it	was	willing	to	take	unprecedented	measures	to	rescue	the	domestic	monetary	and	financial	system.	Prime	Minister	Pitt	was	 in	 the	 lead	 for	deciding	to	bail	out	 the	Bank	of	England.	The	accommodation	of	the	systemically	relevant	Bank	of	England	notes	was	the	unintentional	side-effect.		The	decision	to	announce	the	deposit	guarantee	and	fundamentally	alter	the	Federal	Reserve	System	was	 taken	only	days	after	President	Roosevelt	had	taken	over	office	when	the	scale	of	banks	defaulting	had	reached	the	level	of	an	unparalleled	systemic	crisis.	The	bank	runs	of	the	Great	Depression	materialized	in	 a	 secular	 decline	 of	 confidence	 in	 deposits	 and	 continuous	 attempts	 to	permanently	convert	 them	 into	higher-ranking	money	 forms.	While	 the	 idea	of	public	 deposit	 insurance	 had	 been	 debated	 repeatedly	 in	 beforehand,	 it	 could	only	 be	 implemented	 under	 improvised	 circumstances	 and	 after	 the	 EBA	 had	granted	 President	 Roosevelt	 quasi-dictatorial	 powers.	 He	 was	 able	 to	 bypass	Congress,	which	had	a	long	history	of	objecting	to	deposit	insurance.	All	aspects	of	 the	 implicit	 deposit	 guarantee	 came	 from	 the	 administration.	 Some	 were	based	 on	 the	 formal	 powers	 the	 administration	 had	 implemented	 in	 the	 EBA,	whilst	others	were	just	due	to	the	government’s	informal	authority.		The	decision	to	establish	the	Fed’s	emergency	facilities	and	the	Treasury’s	temporal	guarantee	in	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	was	taken	during	conference	calls	among	Ben	Bernanke,	Timothy	Geithner	and	Hank	Paulson	with	only	a	few	high-level	 members	 of	 staff	 involved.	 The	 Fed	 was	 only	 able	 to	 establish	 its	innovative	facilities	by	invoking	its	emergency	powers,	which	it	had	never	used	before	 in	 its	 history.	 In	 the	 run,	 a	 complete	 systemic	meltdown	 could	 only	 be	avoided	 by	 publicly	 backing	 the	 defaulting	 institutions	 and	 in	 this,	 as	 a	 side-effect,	integrating	shadow	money	in	the	public	money	supply.	
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This	 comparative	 summary	 demonstrates	 that,	 in	 sum,	 each	 case	 of	accommodation	 has	 its	 distinctive	 properties	 with	 which	 it	 diverges	 from	 the	ideal	type	and,	despite	common	features,	is	a	unique	event	in	its	own	right.	The	function	 performed	by	 accommodation	 occurs	 in	 different	 forms	 and	 contexts:	Case	I	differs	from	the	cases	II	and	III	insofar	as	the	accommodation	materialized	at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy.	 The	 public	 guarantee	 to	maintain	 par	 clearance	 of	bank	notes	thus	refers	to	the	connection	between	the	credit	money	form	and	the	unit	of	account.	In	the	cases	of	bank	deposits	and	shadow	money,	this	guarantee	relates	 to	 the	 connection	 of	 the	 respective	 credit	 money	 form	 with	 higher-ranking	 money	 and	 thus	 take	 place	 within	 the	 existing	 hierarchy	 of	 money.	Case	II	 is	 distinctive	 because	 the	 public	 intervention	 here	 came	 very	 late	 and	only	after	years	of	erosion	 in	 the	credit	money	system.	Case	 III,	 in	 turn,	differs	from	 the	 other	 cases	 not	 only	 in	 that	 two	 rather	 different	 credit	money	 forms	have	 been	 accommodated	 and	 that	 the	 process	 of	 post-crisis	 regulation	 is	 still	ongoing.	More	importantly,	with	the	accommodation	of	repos,	public	authorities	have	 assumed	 responsibility	 for	 guaranteeing	 par	 clearance	 of	 a	 collateralized	debt	instrument.	This	brings	along	two	very	different	notions	of	how	to	interpret	its	‘accommodated’	state.	On	the	one	hand,	it	relates	to	the	aspect	that	securities	dealers	 as	 issuers	 of	 repo	 credit	 money	 receive	 a	 backstop	 for	 their	 funding	liquidity,	which	paralles	 the	other	cases	of	bank	notes,	bank	deposits	and	MMF	shares;	 this	 is	 what	 the	 case	 study	 in	 Chapter	 6	 has	 focused	 on.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 accommodation	 in	 the	 repo	 case	 can	 also	 refer	 to	 public	 authorities	assuming	 responsibility	 to	 safeguard	 the	 market	 liquidity	 of	 the	 underlying	collateral.	 This	 is	 an	 interpretation	of	 repo	 as	 shadow	money	 that	 comes	 from	the	analytical	perspective	of	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	(2016)	who	stress	 the	key	role	of	collateralized	lending	in	the	repo	case.	This	second	aspect	puts	a	nuance	to	what	 it	means	that	a	credit	money	form	has	been	accommodated,	which	has	not	been	accounted	for	in	the	ideal	typical	model	of	Chapter	3	and	points	to	the	limitations	of	this	ideal	type.			 	
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7.3	Accommodation	theory	as	contribution	to	IPE		This	study	about	the	political	economy	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	 a	 historically	 repeating	 mechanism	 that	 transforms	 the	 monetary	 system	contributes	to	the	IPE	literature	in	various	facets.	This	section	highlights	three	of	them.		 First,	 applied	 on	 bank	 notes,	 bank	 deposits	 and	 shadow	 money	 as	 the	relevant	cases,	the	accommodation	theory	provides	a	historical	genealogy	of	the	credit	 money	 system	 and	 contributes	 to	 explaining	 the	 institutional	 setup	 of	today’s	monetary	 system—a	 seemingly	 opaque	 amalgam	of	 credit	 instruments	issued	by	both	public	and	private	 financial	 institutions.	Figure	7.1—taken	from	Murau	 (2017)—depicts	 today’s	Money	Matrix	 since	 2014.	 Accordingly,	 today’s	public	 money	 supply	 is	 made	 up	 of	 central	 bank	 liabilities	 (i.e.	 currency	 and	central	bank	deposits),	 commercial	bank	 liabilities	 (i.e.	 insured	bank	deposits),	securities	 dealers’	 liabilities	 (i.e.	 repos	 of	 the	 government	 and	 the	 credit	 desk)	and	MMF	liabilities	(i.e.	Prime	Money	Market	Fund	shares).	As	can	be	argued	on	the	basis	of	this	study,	this	very	setup	of	the	contemporary	public	money	supply	is	 the	 result	 of	 past	 processes	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation.	 Bank	notes,	 bank	 deposits,	 repurchase	 agreements	 and	 Money	 Market	 Fund	 shares	first	emerged	as	forms	of	private	credit	money.	Then,	in	a	systemic	crisis,	public	authorities—by	exercising	the	state’s	infrastructural	power—shifted	them	in	the	public	credit	money	realm	by	setting	up	an	ad	hoc	public	 framework	to	sustain	their	par	clearance	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	forms.	
	
Public	Credit	Money	Forms	 Private	Credit	Money	Forms	
	
(1)	Pure	Public	Money	
	Central	Bank	liabilities	
• Currency	(Notes,	Coins)	
• Central	bank	deposits	
 
	
(3)	Public-private	Money	
	
	
	
(2)	Private-public	Money	
	Commercial	bank	liabilities	
• Insured	bank	deposits		Securities	dealers’	liabilities	
• RPs	(o/n)	of	government	desk	
• RPs	(o/n)	of	credit	desk		MMF	liabilities	
• Shares	of	Government	MMFs	
	
(4)	Pure	Private	Money	
	Commercial	bank	liabilites	
• Uninsured	bank	deposits	
	
Figure	7.1—The	contemporary	empirical	Money	Matrix	 	
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Second,	 being	 based	 on	 the	 analytical	 language	 of	 the	Money	 View,	 the	accommodation	theory	brings	in	innovations	to	the	conceptual	apparatus	of	IPE	with	regard	to	money	and	the	monetary	system.	Following	the	logic	of	a	market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	 money,	 the	 theory	 goes	 beyond	 simple	 notions	 of	 ‘fiat	money’	according	to	which	the	money	supply	is	simply	under	the	control	of	the	state	 and	 money	 is	 declared	 to	 be	 money	 due	 to	 the	 simple	 exercise	 of	 state	power.	 Instead,	 the	 study	 theorizes	 that	 today’s	 public	 money—which	 may	
appear	to	the	observer	as	 ‘fiat	money’—is	accommodated	former	private	credit	money.	Moreover,	the	approach	adopted	in	this	study	suggests	thinking	of	‘state	money’	or	 ‘public	money’	not	as	 ‘outside	money’	but	as	a	 form	of	 ‘public	 inside	money’.	The	money	issued	by	the	central	bank	is	therefore	still	credit,	but	a	debt	that	does	not	have	to	be	repaid.	Within	the	hybrid	setup	of	the	monetary	system,	‘public	 inside	money’	 co-exists	 next	 to	 ‘private	 inside	money’.	 As	 the	 empirical	chapters	have	demonstrated,	private	money	creation	is	and	has	been	an	integral	part	of	the	way	in	which	the	monetary	system	operates.	It	is	not	just	an	anomaly	at	some	historical	stages	of	the	monetary	system	but	the	very	heart	of	the	matter.	The	 money	 supply	 is	 essentially	 a	 hybrid.	 While	 political	 actors	 repeatedly	attempt	 to	constrain	or	abrogate	private	credit	money	creation,	private	 issuing	institutions	 usually	 find	 ways	 to	 create	 private	 money	 substitutes,	 either	 by	circumventing	 restrictions	 for	 existing	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 or	 by	innovating	new	private	IOUs	outside	the	regulatory	scope	which	may	eventually	become	private	credit	money	themselves.	Kindleberger	describes	this	process	as	a	perpetuum	mobile.	Within	this	framework,	we	may	think	of	central	banking	as	both	 the	 direct	 management	 of	 this	 ‘public	 inside	 money’	 and	 the	 indirect	management	of	 ‘private	inside	money’.	 In	sum,	the	study	contributes	to	the	IPE	literature	its	notion	of	the	modern	monetary	system	as	a	self-referential	network	of	expanding,	yet	instable,	debt	claims.		Finally,	 the	 study	develops	a	distinct	 functionalist	 explanatory	approach	and	feeds	it	into	IPE’s	body	of	literature	on	institutional	change	in	the	monetary	system.	The	underlying	logic	of	the	accommodation	is	derived	from	the	inherent	ability	embedded	in	the	credit	money	system	to	create	money	out	of	thin	air.	The	monetary	 system	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	instable	 debt	 claims	 that	 has	 been	 called	 into	 being	with	 the	 English	 financial	revolution	 and	 extended	 its	 scope	 ever	 since.	 Bearing	 in	mind	 that	 the	 rise	 of	the—initially	private	(!)—credit	money	system	coincided	with	the	emergence	of	capitalism	 as	 a	 socioeconomic	 formation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 England’s	 Industrial	Revolution,	its	property	of	being	both	expansionary	and	instable	may	be	framed,	in	 Marxian	 terms,	 as	 one	 of	 capitalism’s	 ‘inherent	 contradictions’.	 The	 debt	network	is	inevitably	prone	to	expand	and	to	contract.	To	avoid	its	implosion	in	a	systemic	 financial	 crisis,	 policy-makers	 are	 confronted	 with	 the	 technical	necessity	to	contribute	to	the	system’s	self-preservation	and	do	whatever	it	takes	to	 bail	 out	 the	 issuers	 of	 private	 credit	money.	 Thus,	 the	 political	 economy	 of	private	 credit	 money	 accommodation	 follows	 a	 functionalist	 logic	 that	 has	manifested	 itself	 in	 bank	 notes,	 bank	 deposits	 and	 shadow	 money.	 It	 may	 be	positioned	 as	 a	 fifth	 explanatory	 strand	 in	 the	 IPE	 discourse	 next	 to	 realism,	liberalism,	constructivism	and	structuralism	(cf.	Chapter	1).		 	
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7.4	Implications	of	analyticism	and	functionalism	
	Working	within	 the	 analyticist	 research	 paradigm	 and	 adopting	 a	 functionalist	understanding	of	the	mechanics	of	the	credit	money	system,	the	study	has	been	able	to	generate	a	range	of	theoretical	and	empirical	insights	about	the	political	economy	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation.	 Still,	 the	 use	 of	 analyticism	and	functionalism	brings	along	some	implications	and	limitations.	In	particular,	this	 refers	 to	 the	 role	 of	 negative	 cases	 and	 more	 autonomous	 state	 agency.	Taking	 the	 results	 of	 this	 study	 as	 a	 reference	 point,	 these	 aspects	 may	 be	addressed	by	conducting	complementary	research	that	uses	a	modified	research	paradigm	or	chimes	in	with	an	alternative	explanatory	approach.	
	 First,	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 case	 selection,	 the	 study	 has	 only	 taken	 into	account	 those	 instances	 in	 which	 private	 credit	 money	 has	 actually	 been	accommodated	in	the	public	money	supply.	It	leaves	out	negative	cases,	in	which	a	 run	 on	 private	 credit	money	 has	 taken	 place	 but	 an	 accommodation	 did	 not	materialize.	 This	 refers	 to	 crises	 connected	 to	 one	 of	 the	 private	 credit	money	forms	under	 scrutiny	 in	 this	 study	 (e.g.	previous	 runs	on	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits	before	1797	and	1933,	respectively)	as	well	as	to	crises	of	other	credit	instruments	that	 functioned	as	private	money	substitutes,	even	 if	 they	may	not	have	 fully	 satisfied	 the	Money	View	 criteria	 to	 count	 as	 ‘private	 credit	money’.	Kindleberger	 (1973	 [2005]:	 64-66)	 lists	 an	 extensive	 number	 of	 instances	 in	which	 private	 credit	 money	 was	 created.	 For	 example,	 he	 refers	 to	 bills	 of	exchange	 as	 substitutes	 for	 silver	 in	 the	 triangular	 trade	 between	 the	 United	States,	China,	and	the	United	Kingdom;	clearing	house	certificates	in	London	and	New	York	 in	 the	mid-19th	 century;	 the	 French	 reportage	 system	 that	 provided	credit	 through	 a	 system	 of	 delayed	 payments	 for	 stock	 exchange	 transactions;	negotiable	certificates	of	deposits,	which	developed	after	World	War	II	in	the	U.S.	and	resembled	Austrian	Cassenscheine,	an	instrument	invented	in	the	1870s.		 Omitting	 such	 negative	 cases	 from	 the	 case	 selection	 is	 due	 to	 the	analyticist	research	paradigm	that	this	study	has	adopted.	Following	a	Weberian	tradition,	it	is	tailored	towards	carving	out	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	an	ideal-typical	phenomenon.	Using	analytical	narratives	and	configurational	types	 of	 causation,	 it	 has	 sketched	 the	 path	 that	 led	 to	 a	 specific	 outcome—namely,	the	accommodation	of	bank	notes,	bank	deposits	and	shadow	money	as	historical	forms	of	private	credit	money.	This	has	been	conducive	to	generating	insights	about	private	credit	money	accommodation	as	a	repeating	phenomenon	that	 fundamentally	 transforms	 the	 setup	 of	 the	monetary	 system.	Moreover,	 it	has	 uncovered	 similar	 patterns	 in	 all	 the	 three	 cases	 studied	 that	 deliver	 an	explanation	for	why	this	happened.			From	 a	 ‘neopositivist’	 perspective	 (cf.	 Jackson	 2011),	 an	 approach	 that	ignores	 the	 use	 of	 negative	 cases	 and	 thus	 has	 no	 variation	 across	 the	 cases	entails	 a	 selection	 bias.	 Accordingly,	 the	 case	 study	 design	 does	 systematically	take	into	account	similar	cases	in	which	a	private	credit	money	form	came	into	a	crisis	and	became	subject	to	a	run,	yet	without	an	accommodation	that	followed	suit.	 This	 hampers	 the	 significance	 and	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	 explanation	that	has	been	established	 for	 the	accommodation	phenomenon.	Neo-positivists	
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may	raise	the	objection	that	the	accommodation	theory	follows	the	post	hoc	ergo	
propter	hoc	rationale	 and	 is,	 at	 its	 very	 essence,	 a	 tautological	 argument.	 Such	criticism,	however,	can	be	remedied.	A	complementary	analysis	could	seize	 the	concept	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	that	has	been	developed	in	the	analyticist	paradigm,	go	beyond	the	small	 ‘N’	case	design,	compile	a	data	set	on	crises	 of	 (systemically	 relevant)	 private	 credit	 money	 forms	 and,	 by	 isolating	possible	causal	 factors,	 study	systematically	which	 factors	may	be	 identified	as	responsible	 for	 the	 (non)accommodation.	 The	 findings	 brought	 forth	 in	 this	study	may	be	used	as	hypotheses	that	are	to	be	tested.		Second,	 an	 implication	 of	 the	 accommodation	 theory	 with	 its	 focus	 on	market	dynamics	 is	 that	 it	places	 little	emphasis	on	 the	role	of	 the	state	 in	 the	pre-accommodation	 phase.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 focus	 on	 market	 forces	 in	phase	I	 of	 the	 accommodation	 model	 is	 due	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 market-based	credit	theory	of	money	as	conceptual	lens	and	may	be	objected	from	a	Chartalist	point	 of	 view.	 As	 Chapter	2	 has	 argued,	 the	 antagonism	 between	market-	 and	state-based	monetary	theory—exemplified	by	the	opposition	of	the	Money	View	and	Modern	Monetary	Theory—permeates	the	history	of	monetary	thought	and	is	not	so	much	an	empirical	question	but	rather	a	matter	to	be	discussed	a	priori,	on	 the	 level	 of	 monetary	 theory.	 The	 functionalist	 accommodation	 theory	 has	purposefully	 adopted	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 former	 and	 relies	 axiomatically	 on	the	reader’s	acceptance	of	this	lens.		On	the	other	hand,	with	its	functionalist	explanatory	approach,	the	study	has	 not	 systematically	 investigated	 into	 other	 potential	 factors	 that	 may	contribute	to	the	rise	of	private	credit	money	such	as	economic	ideas	or	the	role	of	 lobbying	by	powerful	 financial	 interests.	 Critical	 readers	who	wish	 to	 stress	the	 ‘political’	 in	 the	 IPE	 discipline	 may	 contend	 that	 public	 actors	 have	empirically	 supported	 the	 rise	 of	 private	 credit	money	 forms	 in	 a	much	more	substantial	 fashion	than	presented	in	phase	I	of	the	accommodation	model.	For	example,	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 shadow	 money,	 regulatory	decisions	have	driven	the	expansion	of	tri-party	repo,	notably	by	the	SEC,	the	Fed	or	the	legal	system	(cf.	e.g.	Garbade	2006).	Such	decisions	certainly	have	played	a	role,	 and	 maybe	 were	 even	 critical	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 private	 credit	money	 forms	 to	materialize	 in	 the	very	specific	way	 that	we	determine	ex	post	(cf.	Chapter	6).	Further	work	will	be	needed	to	investigate	how	the	functionalist	logic	 suggested	 in	 this	 study	 interacts	 with	 other	 explanatory	 approaches.	 An	argument	that	may	be	brought	forth	to	defend	the	functionalist	reasoning	against	other	 explanatory	 approaches	 (cf.	 Chapter	1)	 is	 that	 if	 the	 actual	 regulatory	decisions	 had	 been	 made	 differently,	 private	 profit-driven	 companies	 would	nevertheless	 have	 found	 a	 way	 to	 come	 up	 with	 new	 IOUs,	 which	 eventually	adopt	 the	 role	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 and	 further	 extend	 the	 self-referential	debt	network.	Hence,	despite	public	facilitation	in	setting	up	new	private	credit	money	 forms,	 the	 underlying	 motive	 comes	 from	 private	 interests	 in	 profit-making	and	private	agency.		 	
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7.5	Venues	for	further	research	
	By	developing	the	functionalist	political	economic	theory	of	private	credit	money	accommodation,	this	study	has	laid	the	foundation	for	a	future	research	agenda	in	IPE.	Follow-up	work	on	the	political	economy	of	private	credit	money	may	use	Chapter	3,	 the	 two-phase	 accommodation	model,	 as	 a	 starting	 point	 and	 carve	out	processes	that	take	place	in	a	third	phase	(7.4.1).	Moreover,	Chapter	2	on	the	Money	 View	 as	 a	 conceptual	 lens	 for	 IPE,	 offers	 the	 potential	 for	 further	empirical	research	targeting	other	objects	of	analysis	(7.4.2).	
		
7.5.1	Studying	the	post-accommodation	phase		The	accommodation	of	a	credit	money	form	in	the	public	money	supply	is	a	crisis	phenomenon.	Once	it	has	been	completed	as	ad	hoc	backstops	against	illiquidity	and	 insolvency	have	been	established,	different	 follow-up	processes	 set	 in	 that	may	be	studied	in	more	detail,	amounting	to	a	third	phase	of	the	accommodation	model.	Such	a	third	phase	could	involve	systematizing	elements	such	as	the	re-regulation	 of	 the	 public	 money	 supply,	 the	 development	 of	 new	 tools	 for	monetary	 governance	 and	 the	 international	 spill-over	 of	 the	 accommodation	from	the	centre	to	the	periphery.		A	 first	aspect	 to	be	 studied	 is	 the	process	of	 re-regulating	 the	monetary	system	after	an	accommodation.	While	each	empirical	chapter	of	this	study	has	pointed	 out	 some	 major	 events	 in	 monetary	 history	 that	 affected	 the	accommodated	 credit	 money	 form,	 it	 was	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study	 to	systematize	 and	 model	 how	 the	 re-regulation	 process	 takes	 place	 in	 detail.	Accordingly,	 the	 regulatory	 process	 for	 bank	 notes	 in	 England	 took	 several	decades,	 centred	 around	 various	 parliamentary	 committees	 and	 debates	 on	monetary	 theories,	 and	 finally	 resulted	 in	 the	 1844	 Bank	 Charter	 Act,	 which	established	a	note	issuing	monopoly	for	the	Bank	of	England	and	banned	country	bank	 notes.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 bank	 deposits,	 the	 main	 regulatory	 decisions	 were	taken	only	months	after	 the	accommodation	by	passing	the	1933	Bank	Charter	Act,	which	established	the	Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation	and	separated	commercial	banking	 from	 investment	banking.	While	 this	 act	was	perceived	as	merely	preliminary	by	many	observers	 and	many	hoped	 that	by	 implementing	the	 Chicago	 Plan,	 a	 similar	 step	 would	 be	 taken	 for	 deposits	 as	 with	 notes	 in	1844,	 this	 never	 materialized.	 As	 concerns	 shadow	 money,	 the	 regulatory	process	may	still	be	regarded	as	ongoing	although	major	steps	have	been	made	already	by	U.S.	regulatory	agencies,	e.g.	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission.		In	terms	of	 the	Money	Matrix,	as	Figure	7.2	demonstrates,	 four	different	outcomes	can	potentially	emerge	as	the	result	of	this	regulatory	process:	1. The	credit	money	form	becomes	pure	public	money	by	putting	the	issuing	institution(s)	under	public	control.	2. The	 credit	 money	 form	 remains	 private	 public	 money	 by	 keeping	 the	liquidity	and	solvency	backstops	for	the	private	issuing	institution(s)	and	enacting	rules	for	regulation	and	supervision.	
	 222	
3. The	 credit	 money	 form	 becomes	 public-private	 money	 or	 pure	 private	
money	 again	 by	 removing	 the	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 backstops	 for	 the	issuing	 institution(s)	while	par	 is	sustained.	The	accommodation	 is	 then	reversed.	4. If	 the	 credit	 money	 forms	 breaks	 par	 vis-à-vis	 higher-ranking	 forms	 of	money,	 it	 loses	 its	 status	 as	 money	 substitute	 (i.e.	 is	 “de-monetised”),	becomes	just	as	any	other	private	IOU	and	drops	out	of	the	Money	Matrix.		
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Figure	7.2—Regulation	of	the	credit	money	form	after	the	accommodation	
	 The	 regulatory	 process	 involves	 political	 deliberations	 that	 may	 take	place	over	varying	time	horizons	and	incorporate	a	variety	of	actors	and	interest	groups	 in	 various	 political	 arenas	 (parliament,	 regulatory	 bodies,	 expert	committees,	 public	debates	 etc.).	 In	 this,	 it	 remains	 an	open	question	what	 the	decisive	 factors	 are	 that	 determine	 which	 outcome	 ultimately	 eventuates.	Follow-up	 research	 to	 this	 study	 may	 inquire	 into	 this	 mechanism	 that	 goes	beyond	 the	 functionalist	 logic	 of	 the	 immediate	 crisis	 response	 by	 the	 highest	political	authorities.	From	the	stance	of	 liberal	 IPE	theories,	 for	example,	 it	will	be	worthwhile	 inquiring	 into	 the	 interest	 groups	 involved	 that	 will	 undertake	lobbying	efforts	to	steer	the	regulatory	process	in	their	preferred	direction	and	seek	 to	 influence	 decision-makers	 in	 the	 competent	 political	 arenas	 (‘liberal	discourse’).	 Constructivists,	 in	 turn,	 may	 wish	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 role	 ideas	 and	monetary	theories	play	in	the	aftermath	of	an	accommodation.	Among	scholars,	journalists,	 business	 and	 finance	 practitioners,	 politicians	 and	 intellectuals,	 a	struggle	is	likely	to	emerge	about	the	adequate	way	of	conceptualizing	the	credit	money	form.	Those	debates	may	be	framed	as	an	‘ideational	discourse’.	 	
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A	 second	 avenue	 for	 research	 on	 post-accommodation	 processes	 is	 the	development	 of	 new	 theories	 and	 tools	 for	 monetary	 governance.	 Since	 the	accommodation	implies	that	a	formerly	private	IOU	is	dragged	under	the	control	of	 public	 authorities,	 they	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 develop	 new	 strategies	 to	exercise	power	over	 the	 issuance	of	 those	 credit	money	 forms.	 In	particular,	 it	stands	to	reason	to	ask	how	the	accommodation	affects	the	theory	and	practice	of	central	banking	and	monetary	policy.	With	regard	to	bank	notes,	it	became	the	dominant	idea	for	monetary	governance	in	the	mid-19th	century	that	they	should	only	be	issued	by	the	Bank	of	England	and	no	longer	be	a	private	debt	certificate	denominated	 in	 gold	 as	 unit	 of	 account	 but	 a	 gold	 certificate	 issued	 in	 a	 fixed	relationship	to	the	actual	amount	of	gold	held	in	the	Bank	of	England’s	vault.	In	the	case	of	bank	deposits,	the	accommodation	coincided	with	theories	about	the	‘deposit	multiplier’,	which	suggested	that	the	commercial	banks’	deposit	creation	is	a	 function	of	central	bank	behaviour.	This	became	a	guiding	idea	for	modern	monetary	 policy	 theory.	With	 regard	 to	 shadow	money,	 debates	 about	 how	 to	organize	monetary	governance	are	still	in	their	infancy	but	are	likely	to	become	topical	in	the	near	future.	In	the	repo	case,	for	example,	we	may	expect	conflicts	between	the	public	authorities’	function	to	provide	funding	liquidity	to	securities	dealers	in	a	classical	lender	of	last	resort	manner	and	to	secure	market	liquidity	for	 the	 underlying	 collateral,	 not	 the	 least	 as	 these	 interventions	 are	 likely	 to	have	pro-cyclical	effects	on	the	credit	money	system.		A	third	process	to	be	researched	is	how	the	re-design	of	the	public	money	supply	spills	over	from	the	apex	of	the	international	monetary	system,	where	the	accommodation	 took	 place,	 to	 peripheral	monetary	 jurisdictions.	 That	 such	 an	international	 spill-over	 is	 likely	 to	 take	 place	 has	 only	 been	 hinted	 at	 but	 not	fleshed	 out	 in	 this	 study.	 The	 accommodation	 of	 bank	 notes	 was	 adopted	 by	numerous	European	countries	throughout	the	19th	century,	and	the	U.S.	followed	suit	with	the	National	Banking	System,	established	during	the	Civil	War.	Publicly	backstopping	bank	deposits	with	publicly	organized	insurance	schemes	became	the	norm	throughout	the	20th	century;	most	European	countries	created	explicit	insurance	 schemes	whereas	others—most	notably	 the	United	Kingdom—relied	on	 implicit	 schemes	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 The	 accommodation	 of	 shadow	 money	spilled	over	directly	to	other	jurisdictions	due	to	the	international	entanglement	of	 the	shadow	banking	system.	 In	particular,	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	policies	had	immediate	 impact	 on	 the	 other	 key	 financial	 systems,	 not	 the	 least	 due	 to	 the	central	bank	swap	lines	called	into	being	during	the	crisis.	This	element	of	policy	diffusion	may	be	 the	 subject	 of	 further	 analysis	 from	various	perspectives,	 e.g.	the	international	financial	governance	literature.	While	this	study	has	focused	on	the	 national	 level	 in	 order	 to	 theorize	 the	 mechanism	 through	 which	accommodation	 happens,	 future	 research	 could	 explore	 how,	 when	 and	 if	 the	accommodation	travels	internationally.	In	this,	it	stands	to	reason	to	assume	that	there	 is	 no	 automatism	 involved	 for	 the	 accommodation	 to	 transgress	 through	the	 international	 financial	 system.	 However,	 since	 the	 regulations	 in	 the	 apex	have	major	 implications	 for	peripheral	 segments	of	 the	 international	payments	system,	it	seems	plausible	that	the	periphery	will	sooner	or	later	comply	with	the	institutional	 innovations.	 This	 may	 either	 occur	 due	 to	 explicit	 legislative	decisions	or	it	will	be	implemented	by	administrative	bodies.	 	
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7.5.2	Applying	the	Money	View	lens	on	other	topics	relevant	to	IPE		An	additional	starting	point	for	further	research	is	the	elaboration	of	the	Money	View	into	a	conceptual	 lens	for	IPE	brought	 forth	 in	Chapter	2.	 Its	 insights	as	a	market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	 money	 as	 well	 as	 its	 analytical	 toolkit	 may	 be	applied	on	other	objects	of	analysis.	IPE	scholarship,	as	Chapter	1	has	argued,	is	largely	subject	to	the	Essentialist	and	the	Chartalist	bias.	This	implies,	on	the	one	hand,	that	IPE	implicitly	tends	to	apply	the	logic	of	a	monetary	theory	of	credit,	which	e.g.	oversimplifies	the	relation	between	money	and	credit	and	thus	misses	elementary	 aspects	 of	 the	 ‘financial	 plumbing’	 in	 the	monetary	 system.	On	 the	other	hand,	IPE	rather	follows	a	state-based	monetary	theory,	which	often	leads	to	a	one-sided	representation	of	the	role	as	well	as	the	power	of	state	authority	in	the	monetary	system.	The	Money	View,	 in	turn,	offers	a	coherent	conceptual	framework	to	broaden	the	notions	of	money	and	finance	in	IPE	and	to	go	more	into	depth	with	regard	to	the	actual	financial	plumbing.	Two	topics	stand	out	to	be	 approached	 from	 a	 distinct	 IPE-Money	 View	 perspective:	 the	 International	Monetary	System	(IMS)	and	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU).	
	First,	 it	 is	 a	 common	 perspective	 in	 IPE	 that	 since	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Bretton	 Woods	 System,	 the	 IMS	 has	 lacked	 proper	 system-like	 qualities.	 The	typical	 rationale	 is	 that	 under	 Bretton	 Woods,	 there	 was	 a	 politically	 agreed	upon	 exchange	 rate	 arrangement	 between	 the	 participating	 states	 which	 was	enforced	by	specifically	mandated	international	organizations,	first	and	foremost	the	 IMF,	and	held	up	by	central	banks	 that	 followed	the	rules	of	 the	game.	The	US-Dollar	was	explicitly	singled	out	to	be	the	international	reserve	currency	that	was	 tied	 to	 the	 ‘real	 economy’	 due	 to	 its	 convertibility	 into	 gold	 at	 a	 pre-determined	rate.	This	system	was	in	place	for	roughly	three	decades	until	it	was	unilaterally	 suspended	by	 the	Nixon	Administration	without	being	 replaced	by	anything	remotely	similar.	Instead,	the	era	of	Generalized	Floating	set	in,	which	lacks	any	kind	of	centralized	political	monetary	planning	on	a	global	level.	Today,	in	 rather	 prototypical	 manner,	 the	 IMS	 under	 the	 conditions	 of	 Generalized	Floating	 and	 financial	 globalization	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 “non-system”	 (Mateos	 y	Lago	et	al.	2009)	or	an	“international	monetary	non-order”	(Bibow	2008).		 Against	that	notion,	a	Money	View	perspective	could	make	the	point	that	the	IMS	does	indeed	have	system-like	properties.	However,	in	order	to	see	them,	we	 have	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 Essentialist	 and	 the	 Chartalist	 biases.	 This	 means	acknowledging	 that	 today’s	 IMS	 is	a	credit	money	system	(Mehrling	2016)	and	that	international	money	creation	occurs	predominantly	by	private	institutions,	not	the	state.	In	fact,	the	contemporary	IMS	has	been	crucially	shaped	by	private	credit	 money	 creation	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 US-Dollar	 as	 the	 unit	 of	 account,	 yet	outside	the	US’s	monetary	jurisdiction	in	what	may	be	called	the	‘offshore	dollar	realm’.	Thus,	we	do	have	an	international	monetary	system	which	has	gradually	developed	 over	 the	 last	 decades	 and	 predominantly	 relies	 on	 private	 dollar-denominated	 offshore	 credit	 money	 creation.	 The	 rise	 of	 the	 offshore	 dollar	realm	began	with	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 eurodollar	market	 (Burn	 2006)	 and	 is	being	backstopped	by	what	has	become	to	be	called	the	Global	Financial	Safety	Net	(Denbee	et	al.	2016),	which	since	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	comprises	the	C6	Swap	Lines	as	a	key	element	(Broz	2015,	Mehrling	2015).	 	
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Second,	the	Money	View	could	address	topical	questions	about	the	EMU.	The	ongoing	crisis	of	the	EMU	has	been	portrayed	by	scholars,	among	others,	as	a	sovereign	debt	 crisis,	 a	 banking	 crisis	 and	 a	 current	 account	 crisis	 (cf.	 Frieden	and	Walter	 2017).	While	 the	 Eurocrisis	 has	 provoked	 notable	 reforms	 in	 EMU	governance,	the	IPE	literature	widely	acknowledges	that	the	EMU’s	institutional	design	 is	 still	 unfinished	 and	 has	 caused	 the	 economic	 divergences	 in	 the	currency	 bloc	 visible	 in	 many	 policy	 fields	 today	 (Matthijs	 and	 Blyth	 2015).	However,	IPE	scholars	have	not	systematically	addressed	one	key	intricacy	of	the	EMU’s	 governance	 architecture:	 the	 failure	 to	 harmonize	 private	 credit	money	creation	on	a	European	level	(cf.	Murau	2016).	The	inherent	hybridity	of	credit	money	systems	has	only	insufficiently	been	recognized	in	the	theory	underlying	European	monetary	integration	and	plays	a	merely	implicit	role	in	contemporary	debates.	 In	 the	 EMU,	 only	 the	 key	 public	 credit	 money	 forms—currency	 and	central	bank	deposits—have	been	fully	integrated	on	a	supranational	level	with	the	 Treaty	 of	 Maastricht.	 Privately	 created	 bank	 deposits	 and	 shadow	 money	remain	in	an	ambiguous	position	between	national	and	supranational	regulation.			On	 the	 one	 hand,	 with	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Maastricht,	 the	 public-private	partnership	for	bank	deposit	creation	remained	scattered	across	various	 layers	of	 the	 EU’s	multi-level	 governance	 system.	 The	 liquidity	 backstops	were	made	supranational	via	the	ECB’s	discount	window.	The	solvency	backstops	and	bank	supervision	 remained	 national,	 while	 regulatory	 competences	 were	 spread	across	 national,	 European	 and,	 through	 the	 Basel	 Accords,	 international	 levels	(Goldbach	2015).	In	2009,	the	Eurocrisis	revealed	the	shortcomings	of	this	setup	when	 it	 became	obvious	 that,	 in	 absence	of	 a	 supranational	 deposit	 protection	framework,	 euro-denominated	 deposits	 in	 deficit	 countries	 traded	 at	 par	 to	those	 in	 surplus	 countries	 but	 had	 a	 different	 risk	 structure.	 In	 2010,	 the	deposits	stopped	to	flow	across	the	EMU	and	concentrated	in	surplus	countries.	After	the	crisis,	the	EU	reacted	with	calls	for	completing	the	Single	Rulebook	for	bank	regulation	and	Banking	Union.	It	is	an	open	question	how	those	measures	affect	the	EMU’s	private	credit	money	system.	If	successful,	they	could	imply	an	upload	of	the	public-private	framework	for	deposit	creation	to	a	European	level.		On	 the	other	hand,	 the	EMU’s	 key	 shadow	money	 form	since	 the	EMU’s	start	had	been	repos.	Despite	ambitious	plans	to	create	a	 liquid	European	repo	market,	 repo	 issuance	 remained	 nationally	 fragmented	 in	 absence	 of	supranational	 public	 debt	 as	 homogenous	 collateral.	 As	 a	 remedy,	 the	 ECB	declared	all	sovereign	bonds	in	the	Eurozone	to	be	equal	collateral	(Gabor	2016).	When	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	spilled	over	to	Europe,	it	fragmented	the	EMU’s	repo	 market	 and	 showed	 that	 the	 ECB’s	 basket,	 in	 which	 all	 EMU	 members’	public	debt	was	equal	repo	collateral,	was	a	fair	weather	construct.	The	ECB	first	behaved	procyclically	in	the	crisis	and	failed	to	relax	the	strains	on	repo	(Gabor	and	Ban	2016).	In	this	context,	the	EU’s	post-crisis	plan	for	Capital	Market	Union	may	be	viewed	as	an	attempt	to	revamp	the	repo	market	and	compensate	for	the	EMU’s	 struggling	 deposit	 banking	 system	 (Valiante	 2016).	 In	 absence	 of	 EMU	Treasury	bonds,	the	strategy	leans	again	towards	using	securitized	private	debt	as	collateral	(Hübner	2016).	The	impact	of	those	processes	on	the	EMU’s	shadow	money	supply	and	 its	overall	governance	architecture	remains	 to	be	studied	 in	greater	depth.	 	
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7.6	Conclusion		This	 chapter	 has	 discussed	 various	 dimensions	 of	 the	way	 in	which	 this	 study	contributes	 to	 IPE.	 First	 and	 foremost,	 it	 presents	 a	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	analysis	of	how	private	credit	money	affects	the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system	 and	 thus	 remedies	 the	 gap	 elaborated	 upon	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 At	 the	 same	time,	 its	 arguments	 and	 findings	 are	 consequences	 of	 its	 analyticist	 research	paradigm	and	 the	 functionalist	 explanatory	 approach.	 They	may	be	 confirmed,	refined	 or	 contested	 by	 conducting	 complementary	 studies	 that	 adopt	 an	alternative	 research	paradigm	or	 a	 different	 explanatory	model.	Moreover,	 the	accommodation	 phenomenon	 is	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 studying	 its	 national	and	 international	 implications	 over	 a	 longer	 period	 in	 a	 third	 ‘post-accommodation’	 phase,	 whilst	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 of	 the	 Money	 View	allows	addressing	other	fields	of	empirical	enquiry.		 A	major	element	applied	in	this	study	to	come	up	with	its	contribution	to	IPE	scholarship	was	the	“pondering	about	the	nature	of	money”	which	has	led	to	choosing	the	Money	View	as	a	conceptual	framework.	Marx—following	up	on	his	reference	to	Gladstone’s	speech	in	Parliament	cited	in	the	introductory	quote—makes	 a	 remark	 that	 stresses	 the	 relevance	 of	 a	monetary	 theory	 of	 credit	 for	understanding	the	role	of	money	in	the	capitalist	political	economy:		“The	main	difficulty	 in	the	analysis	of	money	is	overcome	as	soon	as	the	evolution	 of	 money	 from	 commodity	 is	 understood.	 This	 point	 once	granted,	 it	 only	 remains	 to	 comprehend	 clearly	 the	 particular	 forms	 of	money,	 which	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 made	 difficult	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 all	bourgeois	 relations,	 being	 gilt	 or	 silver	 plated,	 have	 the	 appearance	 of	money	 relations,	 and	 money,	 therefore,	 seems	 to	 possess	 an	 endless	variety	 of	 forms,	 which	 have	 nothing	 in	 common	 with	 it“	 (Marx	 1859	[1904]:	73).		He	 argues	 further	 that	 for	 his	 analytical	 entry	 point,	 credit	 money	 is	 logically	subordinate			 “In	 the	 following	 investigation	only	 those	 forms	of	money	are	 treated	of	which	directly	grow	out	of	the	exchange	of	commodities;	the	forms	which	belong	 to	a	higher	stage	of	production,	as	e.	g.,	 credit	money	will	not	be	discussed	here.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity	gold	is	assumed	throughout	as	the	money	commodity”	(ibid:	73-74).	
 In	 this	 respect,	 this	 study	 has	 chosen	 an	 alternative	 route	 and,	 with	 the	accommodation	 theory	 based	 on	 the	Money	View	 framework,	 has	 developed	 a	contribution	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 ‘evolution’	 of	money	 in	 the	 capitalist	political	 economy	 that	 follows	 the	 credit	 theory	 of	 money	 logic.	 While	 credit	money	 is	seen	as	 the	capitalist	core	 institution,	commodity	money	rather	plays	the	role	of	a	pre-modern	relict.	It	shall	be	upon	the	reader	to	decide	whether	this	intellectual	 enterprise	 has	 yielded	 some	 valuable	 insights	 or	 if	 it	 was	 just	 as	foolish	as	pondering	over	the	true	nature	of	love.		 	
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Conclusion			 “When	I	was	young	I	 thought	 that	money	was	the	most	important	thing	in	life;	now	that	I	am	old	I	know	that	it	is”	(Oscar	Wilde).			This	study	has	set	out	to	theorize	and	empirically	analyze	the	political-economic	phenomenon	of	private	credit	money	accommodation.		 The	study	has	identified	it	as	a	gap	within	the	IPE	literature	that	it	has	not	brought	 forth	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 monetary	 system’s	 transformation	 which	 takes	both	 the	 logics	 of	 private	money	 and	of	 credit	money	 seriously	 and	 views	 this	system’s	properties	as	a	driving	force	for	institutional	change.	This	is	because	the	vast	majority	of	 IPE	studies	on	 the	 transformation	of	 the	monetary	system	has	two	 biases:	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 neglect	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 full	implications	 of	 the	 insights	 from	 the	 studies	 that	 have	 argued	 how	 capitalist	money	 is,	 and	 has	 been,	 in	 its	 essence	 debt—not	 commodities,	 a	 mere	 legal	creature,	 or	 a	 social	 construction	 as	 suggested	 by	 the	 term	 ‘fiat	 money’	(‘Essentialist	bias’).	On	the	other	hand,	they	tacitly	assume	that	money	by	default	is	a	creature	of	the	state	and	rarely	acknowledge	the	existence	and	the	systemic	relevance	of	private	money	creation	beyond	the	purview	of	the	state.	In	this,	they	underemphasize	 the	 role	 of	 private	 agency,	 notably	 within	 a	 credit	 leverage	cycle,	for	changes	in	the	monetary	system	(‘Chartalist	bias’)	(Chapter	1).		 In	 order	 to	 have	 an	 appropriate	 conceptual	 toolkit	 to	 overcome	 the	Essentialist	 and	 the	 Chartalist	 biases	 and	 to	 theorize	 the	 role	 of	 private	 credit	money	 for	 the	monetary	 system’s	 transformation,	 the	 study	 has	 developed	 an	account	of	the	current	Money	View	literature,	which	has	tailored	the	Money	View	into	 a	 conceptual	 lens	 that	 is	 applicable	 in	 the	 context	 of	 IPE.	 The	 core	characteristic	of	the	Money	View,	which	makes	it	suitable	to	study	private	credit	money	 accommodation,	 is	 that	 it	 is	 a	market-based	 credit	 theory	 of	money.	A	
priori,	this	allows	developing	an	account	of	autonomous	private	money	creation	beyond	 the	 control	 of	 the	 state	 and	 systematically	 addressing	 the	 complex	relationship	of	 the	 two	 categories	 of	 ‘money’	 and	 ‘credit’,	which	often	 involves	conceptual	confusion	when	analyzing	modern	credit	money	systems	(Chapter	2).		Based	on	the	Money	View	as	a	conceptual	lens,	the	study	has	developed	a	two-phase	 model	 of	 private	 credit	 money	 accommodation.	 It	 uses	 the	 Money	View	language,	while	bringing	in	a	Minskian	and	Kindlebergerian	understanding	of	financial	innovation	and	financial	instability.	The	model	allows	combining	the	two	dimensions	of	private	credit	money	accommodation:	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	a	moment	 of	 genuine	 political	 decision-making,	 of	 political	 primacy	 that	 can	 be	circumscribed	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 infrastructural	 power,	 in	 a	 world	 mainly	driven	 by	 market	 processes	 and	 the	 activities	 of	 profit-oriented	 financial	corporations.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 a	 process,	 given	 that	 the	 seeds	 for	 the	accommodation	decisions	have	been	planted	years	and	decades	 in	beforehand,	and	 the	 direct	 and	 indirect	 consequences	 occupy	 policy-makers,	 regulators,	
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scholars	and	the	wider	public	for	the	years	and	decades	to	come.	The	overall	root	cause	 for	 the	 monetary	 system	 to	 transform	 in	 line	 with	 the	 accommodation	theory	 is	 the	 very	 own	 properties	 of	 the	 credit	 money	 system	 itself.	 In	 the	monetary	 system	 as	 a	 self-referential	 network	 of	 expanding,	 yet	 instable	 debt	claims,	 the	 ability	 to	 create	 credit	 money	 ex	 nihilo	 sooner	 or	 later	 brings	 the	system	to	a	point	at	which	it	has	overpromised	and	requires	the	state	as	deus	ex	
machina	 to	 prevent	 its	 implosion.	 By	placing	 these	properties	 of	 the	monetary	system	 centre	 stage,	 the	 theory	 adopts	 a	 functionalist	 understanding	 on	 the	political	economy	of	private	credit	money	accommodation	(Chapter	3).		The	model	of	private	credit	accommodation	has	sought	 to	carve	out	 the	abstract	 properties	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 in	 general	 terms,	 and	 to	 deliver	 a	sufficiently	 abstract	 argument	 for	 how	 and	 why	 the	 political	 decision	 to	accommodate	 private	 credit	 money	 is	 taken.	 The	 subsequent	 Chapters	4-6,	 in	turn,	 have	 empiricized	 the	 phenomenon	 and,	 while	 they	 reflect	 the	 general	properties	of	the	accommodation	both	as	momentum	and	the	process,	they	also	provide	 insights	 into	 the	 idiosyncratic	 nature	 of	 each	 of	 the	 instances.	Not	 the	least,	 it	 is	 due	 to	 this	 idiosyncratic	 nature	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 and	 the	unpredictability	of	political	processes	that	the	two	historical	cases	of	bank	note	and	 bank	 deposit	 accommodation,	which	may	 be	 regarded	 as	 completed,	 have	yielded	different	results	regarding	the	status	 in	today’s	monetary	system:	Bank	notes	 are	 regulated	 as	 pure	public	money,	 whereas	 deposits	 remained	 private-
public	money.	 It	 remains	 to	be	seen	how	the	contemporary,	ongoing	process	of	regulating	 the	 accommodated	 shadow	 money	 forms	 and	 developing	 new	monetary	governance	tools	for	them	will	eventually	play	out.	From	the	point	of	view	adopted	 in	 this	 study,	 the	question	of	how	 to	deal	with	shadow	money	 is	one	of	 the	major	construction	sites	 for	 international	 financial	 regulation	of	our	time	(Chapter	7).		The	 fundamental	 motivation	 to	 conduct	 this	 study	 was	 to	 provide	 a	theoretically	grounded,	historically	 informed	analysis	of	 the	monetary	system’s	transformation	which	can	make	a	small	contribution	to	better	understanding	the	specific	situation	and	challenges	that	Western	political	economies	are	confronted	with	in	the	era	after	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis.	Most	notably,	the	study	sought	to	respond	to	its	problématique,	i.e.	the	lack	of	understanding	how	the	rise	and	the	 crisis	 of	 shadow	 money	 can	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 IPE	 literature	 on	 the	transformation	of	the	monetary	system.		
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